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Abstract
The constitution of the British-leased territory of Weihaiwei (1898-1930) introduced a 
legal system which turned out to be too elaborate for the territory’s needs; there was 
never a resident judge or barrister and most cases were heard and investigated by non­
specialist government administrators. With the exception of civil disputes between 
Chinese, the courts were to apply English law and procedure. Most accused and 
litigants, however, had their cases heard in accordance with laws and procedures which 
were quite different from those used in England. Defendants in criminal cases were 
tried by lay magistrates without a lawyer; rights in civil cases were determined by 
Chinese law; and headmen supplemented the police in maintaining order in the 
villages. When it was discovered that the appeals system had not been used, a simpler 
procedure was introduced.
On the whole, the authorities prioritised the hearing of civil disputes, the 
involvement of headmen in law reform, mediation and law enforcement. In contrast, 
they were indifferent towards jury trials and lawyers, and reluctant to pursue reforms 
ahead of social change. Indeed, success in providing access to the courts for civil 
disputes inadvertently undermined traditional mediation. When it came to a social 
problem such as suicide, the authorities, though remarkably well informed about 
suicide amongst the Chinese, tackled only its aftermath.
Although new, the legal system which affected the territory’s Chinese 
inhabitants was not entirely unfamiliar: by their position and functions, the magistrates 
resembled the Chinese district magistrate; Chinese law was often applied; some civil 
and criminal cases were tried by headmen; and village regulations were recognised. It 
was a legal system shaped not only by the conservatism of individual officials but also 
by factors such as Weihaiwei’s unpromising start, its subsequent decline in strategic 
importance, demography, shortage of officials, and lack of socio-economic 
development.
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INTRODUCTION
Once dubbed the ‘Cinderella of Empire’,1 the British-leased territory of Weihaiwei 
has attracted more than its share of scholarly attention. Its people and their culture, 
customs, beliefs and everyday life, as well as an overview of British rule of the 
territory, were the focus of Reginald F. Johnston’s monograph published in 1910. The 
Lion and Dragon in Northern China,2 written from the vantage point of the author’s 
service in the territory’s administration as district officer and magistrate, remains a 
source of primary data. Biographical interest in Johnston and his superior, James 
Stewart Lockhart, has also given rise to a number of works which have added 
considerable direct and background information to the stock of knowledge on the 
leased territory.3 The most substantial general historical work on Weihaiwei is Pamela 
Atwell’s research monograph4 which covers the period from the commencement of 
the lease until the period after rendition. In this work, Atwell argued that Weihaiwei 
was run by ‘British mandarins’ - officials whose outlook led them to govern as though 
they were conservative Chinese officials steeped in Confucian tradition - who left 
reform to be pursued belatedly by the Chinese after the British had relinquished 
jurisdiction over the territory. Although Johnston’s Lion devotes an entire chapter to 
civil litigation as an aspect of British rule, the subject of law and the administration of 
justice in the territory has, however, received scant attention.
1 'A Cinderella o f  Empire', NCH, vol. LXXXV, no. 2106, 20 Dec 1907, p. 701.
2 R.F. Johnston, Lion and Dragon in Northern China (London: John Murray, 1910),
3 The main biographical works are Shiona Airlie, Thistle and Bamboo (Hong Kong: Oxford University 
Press, 1989); Shiona Airlie, Reginald Johnston (Edinburgh: NMS, 2001); Raymond Lamont-Brown, 
Tutor to the Dragon Emperor (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Sutton, 1999); Henry J. Lethbridge, ‘Sir James 
Haldane Stewart Lockhart’, Journal o f  the Hong Kong Branch o f  the Royal A siatic Society, 1972, vol. 
12, 55-88; R. Bickers, ‘ “Coolie Work” \  Journal o f  the Royal Asiatic Society, 1995, series 111, vol. 5, 
385-401; See also R. Soarne Jenyns, ‘Johnston, Sir Reginald Fleming 1874-1938’, D ictionaiy o f  
National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); R. Bickers, ‘Johnston, Sir Reginald 
Fleming (1874-1938)’, Oxford D ictionary o f  National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2004), [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/34212, accessed 5 Dec 2005]; and S. Airlie, ‘Lockhart, 
Sir James Haldane Stewart (1858-1937)’, Oxford D ictionaiy o f  National Biography (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2004) [http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/63594, accessed 5 Dec 2005], See 
also S.M. Airlie, An Ardent Collector (Edinburgh, Merchant Company Education Board, 1982).
4 Pamela Atwell, British Mandarins and Chinese Reformers (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 
1985).
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Sources of data
The inattention to the subject of law and the absence of work by legal scholars is 
partly attributable to the absence of information from the courts of Weihaiwei in the 
primary records of the territory. The magistrates in Weihaiwei certainly heard many 
civil and criminal cases but court files, along with most of the Chinese archives of the 
government, were, in keeping with the practice of the Colonial Office, left in the 
territory upon rendition and appear not to have survived. The law reports of the North 
China. Herald and Supreme Court and. Consular Gazette (‘the Herald'’ or ‘the North 
China Herald”) included a small number of cases from Weihaiwei’s courts. In 
addition, a few cases are referred to in various minutes and despatches. The 
implications for legal research on Weihaiwei of this gap in sources are addressed 
later. The main sources used in the present study are as follows:
1. Despatches of the Colonial Office and other departments
The largest collection of relevant data is to be found in the records of the Colonial 
Office. Within these, despatches between the Commissioner of Weihaiwei and the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies5 provide much information, particularly on issues 
such as law-making in the territory, the policy of funding counsel for the defence and 
on the introduction of the jury. Records of the Foreign Office throw light on the 
question of how the status of Weihaiwei was determined, whilst War Office records, 
although not cited in this work, are useful for the military perspective on the value of 
Weihaiwei.
2. Records of the Weihaiwei Government
The Colonial Office records include a series of files from the office of the 
Commissioner of Weihaiwei.6 These contain local records of draft annual reports and 
files on perennial and particular subjects that were discussed amongst officials in 
Weihaiwei. This series is incomplete and contains only those files that were specially
n
selected for removal to London upon rendition. It is fortunate that they were
5 These are in the series CO 521, Weihaiwei Original Correspondence.
6 These are in the series CO 873, Commissioner’s Files for Weihaiwei.
7 Many o f  the government files were left behind in Weihaiwei. Proposals for the disposal o f  files were 
made by the Commissioner in 1923. Amongst the categories o f  files to be transferred to the Chinese
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removed, since the rest of the government’s local files have not, thus far, been found.
The Commissioner’s files thus form the most important of the sources of data on
Weihaiwei and are used extensively in this work. As earlier mentioned and
* * 8unfortunately for the legal scholar, court files, magistrates’ ‘Action Books’, 
precedent books9 kept by individual magistrates or judges,10 and the files of district 
officers were not amongst the records brought back to London and have not, thus far, 
been traced. Article 48 of the Wei-hai-Wei Order in Council (‘Wei-hai-Wei Order’, 
‘Order in Council’, or ‘Order’) required an annual report of the work of the courts to 
be submitted to the Secretary of State. It might have been hoped that these annual 
reports would contain detailed information. However, the annual reports submitted to 
the Secretary of State, though they often contained statistical summaries of the work 
of the courts, contained few particulars of the cases which passed through the courts.
3. The North China Herald
A small number of the cases heard in the courts of Weihaiwei were reported in the 
North China Herald. Most of these cases appear within the ‘Law Reports’ section of 
the weekly newspaper. Others are reported in the sections on Weihaiwei in the 
‘Outports’ columns. These columns, from time to time, carried news from Weihaiwei. 
In all, thirty-two cases from the courts of Weihaiwei are reported. Fourteen of these 
were criminal cases heard in the territory’s High Court. It might be thought that High 
Court cases would be more frequently reported. However, other sources indicate that 
not all such cases were reported. For instance, whilst all criminal cases involving a 
European defendant were reported, a fact no doubt connected with the readership of 
the newspaper, not all murder cases were. Reporting across the years was also uneven. 
In some years, more than a handful of cases was reported, whilst, in the years 1918- 
1923, not one case was reported. Aside from these unexplained irregularities, the 
quality of reporting also varied. Some reports were very cursory; others were more 
detailed. Despite these empirical deficiencies and in the absence of more complete
Government were records o f  all civil and criminal cases. See Blunt to SSC, 20 Apr 1923, CO 521/25 
and the Secretary o f  State's approval.
8 WOIC, art. 52.
9 Walter, one o f  the magistrates, mentions that he kept such a book: Minute, 22 Jan 1910, CO 873/287.
10 Bourne, the Judge o f the High Court, kept a ‘Criminal Trials Note Book No. 1 ’ which he mentioned 
in Report to H.H. Commissioner under Article 32 o f  the Order-In-Council 1901, 7 Sept 1912, CO 
521/15.
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sources, this collection of cases provides much important information which is not 
otherwise available.
4, Private papers
The private papers of James Lockhart, Commissioner of Weihaiwei from 1902 until 
his retirement in 1921, form an important source of data on legal policy and particular 
issues. The letters from Johnston to Lockhart are especially revealing. A number refer 
to questions of law and the work of his court - the Magistrates’ Court of the South 
Division. It is from one such letter that we learn of the feelings harboured by both 
Lockhart and Johnston at the impending execution of a woman convicted of murder.11 
From another, we gain insight into the difficulties caused by land disputes. The 
Lockhart papers also reveal something of the conditions under which the Weihaiwei 
government carried out its many tasks. Had the private papers of Johnston also 
survived, we would have a further rich seam of data on Weihaiwei. Unfortunately,
19these papers were destroyed after Johnston* s death.
Principal aims, themes and structure of this work
The absence of a fuller collection of court judgments lessens considerably the 
feasibility of conducting an enquiry into issues which have been addressed in 
comparable contexts. It is, for instance, impossible to probe fully one of the questions 
asked in relation to the Straits Settlements, that of how far Chinese law and custom 
was modified, intentionally or inadvertently, by the common law courts.13 Similarly, 
it is not possible to examine the extent to which English law, prima facie applicable, 
was rejected by the courts on the basis that the local circumstances did not permit its 
application. Unlike other territories, we are unable to study in detail the reception of 
English law.
Yet, a study of the system of law in Weihaiwei is possible, albeit one different 
in emphasis to that which might have been earned out if all of the records of the 
territory were available. In particular, the available sources permit a reconstruction of 
law-making, the work of the magistrates, court procedure, and the relationship
11 The trial o f this woman and her co-defendant is discussed in ch. 5.
12 The destruction o f  his private papers is told in Airlie (2001), 100.
13 See for instance Leong Wai Kum, ‘Common Law and Chinese Marriage Customs in Singapore’ in 
A.J. Harding, The Common Law in Singapore and M alaysia  (Singapore: Butterworths, 1985), 175-194.
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between the government and the governed through the territory’s legal institutions 
and its law enforcement agencies. What emerges is a broader enquiry based on a 
range of primary sources in which more attention is paid to the context of the law - 
the administration and its resources, conditions in the territory and the territory’s 
inhabitants - and the functioning of the law in practice. Such a reconstruction is the 
principal aim of this study.
The chapters that follow comprise three which discuss the foundational 
aspects of the territory’s legal system, including the context for the lease of the 
territory and its circumstances during the lease, followed by four on particular aspects 
of the law, its administration or enforcement in the territory. Chapter 1 provides an 
overview of how the territory of Weihaiwei came to be leased by Great Britain and 
the way in which control over the territory was only gradually assumed. It also 
surveys the geo-political, demographic, social, administrative and economic contexts 
in which the territory’s legal system and laws were inaugurated and, subsequently, put 
into practice. These contextual elements had an important influence upon the 
territory’s legal system. Chapter 2 contains an exploration of the territory’s 
constitutional instrument - the Wei-hai-Wei Order in Council, 1901. This Order 
provided the legal framework for the exercise of executive, legislative and 
administrative powers in the territory and contained many laws and provisions 
relevant to the local administration of justice. In considering the Order, chapter 2 
attends to two concerns which received much attention during drafting, namely, the 
status of Weihaiwei, and the importance of local circumstances in finalising the 
arrangements for the territory. British foreign policy rather than legal argument 
determined that Weihaiwei was treated as Chinese territory over which the British 
exercised jurisdiction. The rest of the Order in Council provided the territory with 
laws and a hierarchy of courts for the administration of justice. The courts and the 
sources of law in Weihaiwei are examined further in chapter 3. The Order in Council 
provided a structure of courts which, even in the last decade of British administration, 
remained in advance of the needs of the territory. The combination of the absence of 
commercial development, the almost negligible number of European residents, and 
the power to delegate cases to the Magistrates’ Courts meant that the High Court of 
Weihaiwei heard few cases and that the magistrates alone, in the minds of most of the 
inhabitants of the territory, represented the system of civil and criminal justice. One 
source of law in the territory was ‘Chinese law and custom’. Such law was often 
applied by the magistrates, particularly in civil disputes. Although the Order provided
16
that the courts were to follow the procedure of their English counterparts, the 
procedure of the courts of Weihaiwei was, in fact, modified in accordance with the 
circumstances attending trials in the territory. Chapter 4 addresses the question of how 
law and order was maintained in the territory through an examination of the police 
force and the use of village headmen. Although the police force, very small during the 
first few years, was gradually expanded, the general shortage of government staff and 
the consequent heterogeneity of the duties of the police inspectors meant that the 
presence of the police was never overwhelming. In place of police, the government 
continued to rely 011 village and district headmen. Not only was this system of co­
opting village authority inexpensive, it had the added appeal of being, or at least the 
government perceived it to be, an indigenous institution. This chapter is followed by 
one which explores the mechanisms and institutions used to try and punish offenders. 
Most trials were before a magistrate whose role was, by necessity, more that of an 
investigating magistrate. Unsurprisingly, the authorities in the territory were 
indifferent to the question of jury trials and legal counsel. The jury was introduced to 
the territory, in 1905 at the instigation of the Crown Advocate, but its use appears to 
have been rare. A fund to cover the costs of defence counsel for those charged with 
capital offences emerged after the territory’s legal system had received adverse 
publicity following the trial of a Chinese man and woman for murder in 1912. 
Chapter 6 looks at the experience of dealing with civil disputes. Despite stretched 
resources, much attention was given to the resolution of disputes. The civil litigation 
processes were such that many ordinary inhabitants of the territory took their cases to 
court. The authorities in Weihaiwei, whilst encouraging the use of mediation, 
nonetheless placed importance on access to the magistrate for the purposes of civil 
litigation. The commitment to civil litigation appears to be linked with the use of 
Chinese law and custom and the interest of individual magistrates in such law. 
Hearing civil disputes was also a way of ensuring that the territory remained peaceful 
and enabled the government to keep in touch with the villages. The final chapter 
comprises a study of the law and policy responses of the authorities to the perceived 
social problem of suicide. The administration lamented the waste of life, particularly 
that of young women. Local officials displayed a depth of knowledge and 
understanding of suicide in the Chinese context but, paradoxically, the government’s 
response to the problem was conservative.
This reconstruction of the legal system of Weihaiwei reveals the priorities of 
the government and its magistrates. The civil disputes between the Chinese
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inhabitants of the territory, many of them petty, were one, as were the use of local 
headmen, minimal interference in the daily life of the village and allowing customs to 
evolve rather than effecting change through law reform. The territory’s police force 
underwent gradual expansion but its strength was never used intrusively or 
oppressively. The near absence of a European community meant that the government 
could and did concentrate its efforts on the Chinese community without having to 
heed other conflicting demands. In law-making and enforcement, the authorities 
concentrated on dealing with the Chinese in ways they thought most suited to the 
local circumstances. It is also clear that the introduction to the territory of trial by 
jury, the presence of counsel, and adversarial procedure - regarded by some to be the 
cornerstones of ‘British’ justice - were not priorities.
What is also observable from looking at law and the administration of justice 
in Weihaiwei is that the legal system experienced by the Chinese in the territory was 
not the one a perusal of the Order in Council would suggest. In some ways, it was not 
too dissimilar from aspects of the legal processes they would have experienced under 
the Chinese authorities. Yet, the Order in Council contained 110 formal intention of 
continuing the pre-existing legal system nor, as would have been more likely, any 
acceptable part of it. It allowed for the application of Chinese law and custom in civil 
disputes but, in other disputes and in court procedure, English laws and procedures 
were introduced without particular allowance for the fact that the law was to be 
applied to Chinese nationals in a territory which remained a part of China.
In thinking of the contrasts between that which was introduced and that which 
was experienced, the schema used by Robert Seidman in studying the reception of 
English law in colonial Africa provides a helpful analytical structure.14 It is one which 
compares a legal system’s ‘outputs’ with its ‘inputs’. Between the two is a 
‘conversion process’. This structure was used by Seidman to assess the extent to 
which it was accurate to say, as others had done, that the law received in colonial 
Africa was ‘basically’ English.15 He concluded that the English law received in Africa 
was limited and narrow in form. Although a similar enquiry into the reception of 
English law in Weihaiwei is constrained by the limited legal records, Seidman’s
14 Robert B. Seidman, ‘The Reception o f  English Law in Colonial Africa Revisited’, Eastern Africa 
Law Review, 1969, vol. 2 ,47-85 .
15 Seidman was referring to remarks made in H.F, Morris and James S. Read, Uganda: The 
Developm ent o f  its Laws and Constitution (London; Stevens, 1966), 237; and Anthony Allott, Essays in 
African Law  (London: Butterworth, 1960), 7.
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triptych is nevertheless of some use. It encourages the viewing of the system of law in 
Weihaiwei as a product of a process which converted a legal system that was a break 
from the pre-existing system to one which was less unfamiliar' to the people of 
Weihaiwei. It sharpens our observation of the transformation undergone by the law. 
To what extent was the legal system of Weihaiwei, as experienced by the territory’s 
inhabitants (the ‘outputs’), a product of the Order (the ‘inputs’) as it was transformed 
by the Colonial Office, the local authorities in Weihaiwei, and other possible 
pressures and influences (the ‘conversion process’)? What general or particular, 
external or internal, global or local, factors may have been responsible for the 
contours of the system of law in Weihaiwei? Was there a single overriding factor to 
account for its conversion? Such questions, important as they are, underlie but do not 
occupy the centre of this work. In discussing the general administration of the 
territory, Pamela Atwell found the lack of funds and the admiration for the old China 
of two of the territory’s longest serving officials - Lockhart and Johnston - difficult to 
ignore.16 So too were these important in shaping the law and the administration of 
justice in Weihaiwei. There were other factors: the geo-political considerations of the 
day which accounted for the decision of the British Government to treat Weihaiwei as 
Chinese territory and which discouraged expenditure on it; the uncertainty over the 
duration of the lease; the administration’s close proximity to the people of the 
territory; and the pragmatic approach in which measures were taken with local 
conditions kept firmly in view. These several factors and influences are explored in 
the next chapter.
16 This is a theme o f  her monograph on Weihaiwei: see Atwell (1985).
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CHAPTER 1
WEIHAIWEI: FROM RELUCTANT ACQUISITION 
TO LONG TWILIGHT
The leasing of the territory
A Foreign Office memorandum summarising the key events in the history of 
Weihaiwei described how, in 1898 and in circumstances not of its choosing, Great 
Britain had, ‘somewhat reluctantly’,1 acquired the lease of the territory. During the 
19th century, Britain’s interests in China lay in the extension of her trade there. When 
she had attained a position of dominance among other foreign powers in her 
commercial relations with China, the maintenance of this position and China’s 
political integrity became her two main aims. The latter aim was vitally important if 
Britain was to enjoy the treaty rights it had earlier wrested from China, By the end of 
the 19th century, the situation had altered to such an extent as to require a change in 
attitude towards these aims and the way in which they were to be achieved. Japan had 
occupied Weihaiwei in 1895 after its victory in the Sino-Japanese War. By 1898, 
China had almost repaid its large war debt to Japan and Japanese forces were 
preparing to leave Weihaiwei. The repayment of the debt had been financed by loans 
from Germany, Russia and France in the so-called ‘Triple Intervention’. In return for 
the loans, Russia acquired rights in the Liaotung peninsula,3 whilst France obtained 
rights in Kwangchouwan. Germany, the third of the powers, had long harboured an 
ambition to find a foothold in China. By the end of the 19th century, Germany’s 
commercial presence in China exceeded that of France and Russia, and its nationals 
there made up the second largest group of Europeans. By the time a suitable port for 
Germany had been identified, too much time had elapsed since the Triple Intervention 
for its use as a ground for the demand of the port. However, the murder of two 
German missionaries on 1 November 1897, provided the excuse to seize Tsingtao.
1 1929, Memorandum on the Rendition o f Weihaiwei [undated and closed until 1980], FO 676/311.
2 For a cogent discussion o f the pressures which shaped British policy in China towards the end o f  the 
19th century see L.K. Young, British Policy in China, 1895-1902 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 2- 
15.
3 Russia was granted Port Arthur, Talien and the surrounding territory in the peninsula.
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This seizure culminated in the lease of Kiaochou by China to Germany in March 
1898.4 Perhaps conscious that neither France nor Russia had asked for outright 
cessions of territory as compensation for their part in the Triple Intervention, the 
German government pressed the Chinese instead for a 99-year lease of Kiaochou.
As this scramble for leases and other concessions unfolded, concern grew over 
the threat to Great Britain’s pole trading position in China.5 The need to assert British 
interests more positively was perceived. However, although Great Britain was 
interested in securing a naval base or, at the very least, the right to occupy territory in 
the north of China, it did not desire actual territory and its accompanying 
administrative burdens. The British Government had sought to persuade Russia not to 
lease Port Arthur which, they argued, had no commercial use. In return, Great Britain 
would not seek a port in the area. Concerned with the threat posed by Russia, the 
Chinese Government itself had, at first, offered Weihaiwei to Britain. The British 
Prime Minister, The Marquess of Salisbury, and Sir Claude MacDonald, the British 
Minister at Peking,6 responded by seeking an undertaking from China not to alienate 
Weihaiwei upon the departure of the Japanese. Aside from this possibility, there was 
also the possibility that Germany, already in possession of Shantung as a sphere of 
influence, would occupy Weihaiwei. Great Britain also hoped Russia would not 
fortify Port Arthur and that this port and Talien would be kept open to foreign trade. 
By March 1898, it appeared almost certain that Port Arthur would be fortified and 
closed. Negotiations with China over Weihaiwei ensued but, by this time, China was 
unwilling to lease its last remaining naval port. It offered instead to make Weihaiwei a 
treaty port with special facilities for British ships.7 The British, by now fearing the 
partition of China, replied that they needed a naval base to offset the presence of 
Russia in Port Arthur.8 In the event, pressure had to be brought to bear on China
4 The treaty for the lease o f  Kiaochou was signed on 6 March 1898.
5 For a discussion o f  how the growing competition faced by British interests led to the search for a 
‘positive policy’, the matters taken into account when considering the lease o f  Weihaiwei and Cabinet 
discussions see Young, 65-76.
6 The full title o f  the post was Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to the Emperor o f  
China and also to the King o f Corea.
7 No. 5, MacDonald to Marquess o f Salisbury, 16 Apr 1898, Extract, p. 2, Eastern No. 72, CO 882/6/4.
8 According to I.H. Nish, the Royal Navy played an insignificant role in the decision to lease 
Weihaiwei. See I.H. Nish, ‘The Royal Navy and the Taking o f Weihaiwei, 1898-1905’, The M ariner’s 
Mirror, 1968, vol. 54, 39-54. This article endorses the view apparent from the primary records that the 
decision to lease the territory was a political decision.
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before an agreement was reached in early April.9 The formal convention leasing 
Weihaiwei - ‘The Convention between Great Britain and China Respecting Wei-hai 
Wei5 (‘the Peking Convention5) - was signed on 1 July 1898 and came into force on 
that date.10
Like Germany before it, Britain deliberately chose to lease the territory rather 
than seek more permanent tenure. By merely leasing Weihaiwei, the Foreign Office 
intended to show that Britain was not exceeding Germany or Russia in its demands on 
China, since both Germany and Russia held leaseholds. The leasing of the territory for 
‘so long as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia5 was also deliberate. 
Although Russia's lease of Port Arthur was for 25 years, the Foreign Office was 
concerned that Russia might try to convert it into a longer arrangement. In such an 
event, having to renegotiate the lease of Weihaiwei would be inconvenient.
Later, similar geo-political considerations persisted in spite of shifts in the 
regional balance of power. When Russian authorities departed from Port Arthur in 
1905, Germany’s continuing occupation of Kiaochou was the excuse given for the 
continuation of the Weihaiwei lease. In 1916, Germany having withdrawn from 
Kiaochou, Japan’s presence there was invoked to justify retaining Weihaiwei.
The leased territory and its inhabitants
The leased territory, measuring 288 square miles, comprised the island of Liukung 
and the adjacent mainland area. Liukung was small - 7/8th of a mile at its widest, 2lA 
miles long and with 5XA miles of coastline. The mainland portion of the territory 
consisted of a coastal strip measuring 10 miles wide and 30 miles long, starting north 
of the island and curving out to its south and southeast. Beyond this lay a neutral zone 
within which Chinese administration was not to be interfered with but which the 
British could use for defensive purposes.
Weihaiwei was not a pre-existing administrative unit. It comprised territory 
belonging to two adjacent counties or xian. The eastern third had been a part of Jung-
9 For further details see Pamela Atwell, British Mandarins and Chinese Reformers (Hong Kong:
Oxford University Press, 1985), 10, and the source she cites. See also 8-10 for her discussion o f  
China’s attitude towards the lease and for her assessment o f the conclusions drawn in E-tu Zen Sun, 
‘The Lease o f  Wei-hai W ei’, Pacific Historical Review, 1950, vol. 19, 277-283.
10 Parliamentary Paper, Treaty Series, no. 14 (1898). Signed also in Chinese. Ratifications were 
exchanged in London on 5 October 1898. Although the treaty required ratification, it also provided 
expressly that the convention would come into force upon signature. The text o f  the Peking Convention 
is reproduced in the appendix to this work.
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ch’eng xian, whilst the remaining two thirds had been a part of Wen-teng xicm. These 
two comities were among ten counties belonging to the prefecture of Tengchou, 
which had a capital city bearing the same name. Tengchou was one of 107 prefectures 
in Shantung province, which had its provincial capital in Tsinan. The walled city of 
Weihai, which lay within Wen-teng xian and in which there was a Sub-Magistrate’s 
office, was the subject of a special clause in the lease convention. Under this clause, it 
was agreed that ‘Chinese officials shall continue to exercise jurisdiction except so far 
as may be inconsistent with naval and military requirements for the defence of the 
territory leased.’ Between 1398 and 1735, the walled city of Weihai had formed the 
headquarters of a military district known as Weihaiwei but this district was later 
absorbed by the civil administration of Wen-teng xian.
Males Females Total
Chinese 77,656 69,184 146,840
Europeans 160 55 215
Indians 3 Nil 3
Koreans 16 12 28
Japanese 25 22 47
Total 77,860 69,273 147,133
Figure 1. Population figures from the 1911 census11
Males Females Totals
Chinese 80,953 73,463 154,416
Europeans 124 53 177
Indians 59 Nil 59
Koreans 5 Nil 5
Japanese 5 1 6
Total 81,146 73,517 154,663
Figure 2. Population figures from the 1921 census12
No population figures for the territory at the inception of the lease were 
known. One rough estimate put the population at 100,000.13 In 1901, registers were 
distributed to 50 villages. Based on the returns, the population of the whole territory
11 Lockhart to SSC, 15 Aug 1911, Report o f Census o f Weihaiwei 1911, CO 521/12.
12 These figures are taken from the draft Census Report o f  1921, C 0873/649.
13 See for instance, Memorandum on Wei-hai Wei, by Colonel J.F. Lewis, 9 March 1900, enc. in No. 
18, Eastern No. 72, CO 882/6/4 which also said that some had estimated the population to be as high as 
300,000.
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was estimated at 127,966.14 Statistics recorded by census in 1911 and 192115 are 
shown in the tables above.
The territory had over 300, mostly single-surname, villages.16 Each had 
influential senior members and a headman. Village houses were built of adobe brick, 
enclosing a floor of beaten earth and containing a room with a hang}1 Most of the 
villages were dirty and laid out haphazardly but many of them possessed a temple, a 
village school and a permanent theatre stage. Villages were also over-crowded, a
* ISfeature likely to have been conditioned by the topography of the leased area. A 
mountainous interior and a sandy coastline squeezed the inhabitants into the 
remaining 40% of land suitable for fanning.
Aside from the small community of fishermen in the port of Mat’ou, most 
villagers were engaged in the fanning of small plots of land. As the territory’s soil 
was not the most fertile, cultivable land was made to produce as much as it could. 
Crops such as wheat, barley, peanuts, sweet potatoes, maize and beans were grown 
intensively in a system of multiple cropping on the same piece of land.19 Even 
hillsides were cultivated with scrub oak to feed worms used in the silk industry.
As can be seen from Figure 1, Figure 2 and Figure 3, the number of non- 
Chinese living in the territory accounted for a very small percentage of the population 
- less than 0.2% in 1911 and 1921. The Europeans amongst the non-Chinese 
population accounted for approximately 0.11% in 1921; 44 of the 177 were either 
schoolboys or infants. Also important when examining the administration of the 
territory is the fact that the majority of the Europeans - 103 of the 177 - lived on the
14 Dorward to SSC, 1 Apr 1901, C0521/2: The figure excludes military and naval personnel in the 
territory on the census date.
15 A draft o f the 1921 Census Report may be found in CO 873/649.
16 According to one author, there were 330 villages: C.E, Bruce-Mitford, The Territory o f  Wei-hai-Wei 
(Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1902). In the 1912 census, 218 surnames were recorded, with 17 
surnames representing 75% o f the population: see CO 521/12.
17 This is a cement structure which served as a bed and stove.
18 As the 1921 census report expressed it:
‘A  family o f  12 persons, with a ploughing team o f a cow and a small donkey and a couple o f pigs can 
subsist on a farm o f 15 mou, or 2.5 acres. This is the equivalent o f a population density o f 3072 
persons, 256 donkeys and 512 pigs per square mile o f  cultivated land, or to put the illustration in a form
more easily understood, a 40 acre farm would support 192 persons, 16 cows, 16 donkeys, and 32 pigs’:
Report o f Census o f W ei Hai W ei 1921, CO 873/649.
19 The multiple cropping was described thus: ‘Wheat, ready for the sickle, beans, three parts grown, and 
cotton just planted. Or, wheat and sorghum, with beans sprouting’: Report o f  Census o f Wei Hai Wei 
1921, CO 873/649.
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island of Liukung. Most of the Europeans were connected with the government, the 
church or the various uniformed forces. Those connected with the church 
outnumbered merchants - there were two clergymen, nine nuns and six lay 
missionaries to the three merchants - who might otherwise have been an influential 
lobby.20
Male Female Total
British 44 28 72
German 2 2 4
French 1 1 2
Italian 1 3 4
Canadian 1 - 1
Belgian 1 2 3
Spanish - 1 1
Hungarian - 1 1
Korean 5 8 13
Total 55 46 101
Figure 3. Figures for the non-Chinese population at the end o f  192721 
Assumption of control
On 24 May 1898, after the lease of the territory had been agreed but before the 
signing of the Peking Convention, a ceremony took place on an island west of 
Liukung island to mark the impending lease. Present at the ceremony were British 
naval officers and men as well as Chinese sailors and other officials. From that time 
until further arrangements were made, the interim authority over the area to be leased 
appears to have consisted of the two newly appointed British Commissioners - 
Captain King-Hall of HMS Narcissus and L.C. Hopkins, British Consul at Chefoo - 
and two Chinese Commissioners. In the following month, some 800 armed sailors, 
including a brass band, landed on the mainland at Mat’ou and marched through 
several of the villages within easy reach. The signing of the Peking Convention a few 
weeks later on 1 July, appears not to have been marked in the territory until 16 July.
20 All o f  the population shown in Figure 3 with the exception o f  the British and the Germans, were in 
Weihaiwei in connection with the Roman Catholic Mission and Convent: Annual Report for 1927, CO 
521/41.
21 Annual Report for 1927, CO 521/41.
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On this day, there was a ceremony on the mainland during which the Chinese flag, 
lowered the day before, was replaced by the Union Jack.22 It is not clear why the 
Chinese flag remained until then; Pamela Atwell suggests that it was attributable to 
the policy of British officials to assume control of the territory gradually.23
The authorities were certainly slow in bringing the lease to the attention of the 
local people. Neither the Chinese nor the British issued any proclamation informing 
the people of the change in authority or in the laws applicable in the leasehold.24 A 
proclamation made by the Governor of Shantung in late July or early August 1898 
stated that the territory had been leased for the mutual advantage of England and 
China. However, according to a newspaper report, the proclamation included a 
statement that the government of the people continued to be in the hands of ‘the usual
ry JT
authorities.’ To the relief of the British side, this proclamation was not widely 
circulated.
One reason for the delay in taking over control of the territory was the 
agreement that, until the boundary of the leased territory had been marked, British 
authority should be exercised only on the island of Liukung. Marking out the 
boundary was of significance given the most general terms - ‘a belt of land 10 English 
miles wide along the entire coast-line of the Bay of Wei-hai-wei’ - in which the 
mainland part of the territory leased was defined in the Peking Convention.26 
Boundary demarcation was to produce a difficult episode in the lease of Weihaiwei. 
Three Boundary Commissioners had been appointed by the Tsung-Li Yamen, the 
Chinese office of foreign affairs, to cany out the work on behalf of the Chinese
9 7 ♦Government. On their arrival in the territory, the Chinese Boundary Commissioners 
had met with village headmen without the permission of Colonel Dorward, the then 
Commissioner of Weihaiwei. Dorward’s insistence on being included in any
22 The Illustrated London News, 16 July 1898, p. 96.
23 Atwell, 17. She gives no support for this statement and none has been found in the records.
2<l NCH, vol. LXI, no. 1613, 4 July 1898, p. 17. The report in The Illustrated London News, 16 July 
1898, p. 96 mentions that a ‘proclamation o f  occupation’ was read out by Captain King-Hall but no 
details were reported. See also Miscellaneous Records, enc. no. 2 in China Letter No. 230, King-Hall 
and Hopkins to Seymour, ‘Proceedings o f  British Commissioners for taking over W ei-hai-wei’, 2 June 
1898, p. 7, Miscellaneous Records, Cabinet Papers 1/2/410.
25 NCH , vol. LXI, no. 1619, 15 Aug 1898, p. 293.
26 For the text o f the Peking Convention see appendix to this work.
27 Tsung-Li Yamen to MacDonald, 9 Feb 1900, enc. to No. 30, McDonald to Marquess o f  Salisbury, 11 
Feb 1900, Eastern No. 72, CO 882/6/4.
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discussions was ignored and secret meetings were held in which the headmen were 
told that the British intended to collect taxes in an area over which they had no 
jurisdiction. Dorward also reported that the Chinese Boundary Commissioners gave 
excuses for wishing to delay the demarcation of the boundary. Work did, in fact, 
begin on the appointed day but, a few days later, the villagers involved in the secret 
meetings made a show of strength and, for fear of trouble, the Chinese 
Commissioners recommended that the work be stopped. Dorward’s offer of British 
protection was declined and the Governor of Shantung telegraphed him to insist that 
the demarcation work be stopped. Dorward replied that he would inspect the situation 
but refused to halt the work, partly due to his strong suspicion that the Chinese 
Boundary Commissioners had stirred up the trouble. Shortly afterwards and 
continuing on the following day, villagers attacked the British Boundary
Q
Commissioners. Men of the 1st Chinese Regiment, who were nearby at the time, 
were sent to respond to the attackers. In the skirmishes, thirty Chinese were killed,
9 0  * * •whilst five men on the British side were injured. After this incident, the Chinese 
Commissioners refused to continue their work and left the territory escorted by 
Chinese troops. Dorward then instructed the British Boundary Commissioners to go 
ahead with the work30 and, by May 1900, boundary stones, 37 in all, bearing the 
words ‘leased territory* had been put in place. By the end of that month, the Governor 
of Shantung had written to the Commissioner of Weihaiwei agreeing to the 
demarcation.31 Adjustments, where the boundary cut through three villages, were later 
sought by the British from the Chinese Government but not obtained.
As a result of the delay in determining the boundary, government by the 
British was, for some time, little felt in the larger part of the area leased. On Liukung, 
a British naval officer had set up a police force almost from the start of the lease. By 
the autumn of 1900, at the latest, a European police inspector, one Chinese sergeant
28 The Regiment’s proper title was the Chinese Regiment o f Infantry, but it was also known as the Wei 
Hai Wei Regiment or the 1st Chinese Regiment. It never had battalions other than its first. For further 
information on the 1st Chinese Regiment, see Alan Harfield, The British and Indian Armies on the 
China Coast 1785-1985 (Farnham: A. and J. Partnership, 1990).
29 No. 36, MacDonald to Marquess o f  Salisbury, Telegram, 9 May 1900, referring to a telegram from 
Dorward: Eastern No. 72, CO 882/6/4. Other facts from another telegram from Dorward are referred to 
in No. 39, MacDonald to Marquess o f Salisbury, 10 May 1900, Eastern No. 72, CO 882/6/4.
30 His instructions were later approved by the War Office: Secretary o f  State for War to Dorward, 
telegram, 10 May 1900, No. 41, Eastern No. 72, CO 882/6/4.
jl Governor Yuan to Commissioner, 31 May, Shantung, 1900, Enc. C in Swettenham Report, 
Swettenham to SSC, 26 July 1900, CO 521/1, p. 717.
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and eleven Chinese constables policed the island. Buildings belonging to the 
Chinese Government were requisitioned and put to various uses. In the previous year, 
the War Office and Admiralty had purchased all privately owned land and dwellings, 
but allowed the previous owners to continue living on the island as tenants of the 
government.33 In early 1900, the Admiralty appointed Commander Gaunt, Royal 
Navy, as Cantonment Magistrate for the island to, inter alia, supervise the police 
force, deal with breaches of regulations, collect boat licence fees and other dues, and 
keep the island clean, improve the streets and so on.
On the mainland, in contrast, the town centre of Mat'ou, in which there were 
some small Chinese businesses, lagged behind in being policed and administered by 
the British. Troops of the 1st Chinese Regiment, quartered at Mat'ou since the 
regiment was raised in early 1899,34 marched through the streets almost daily and 
assisted in keeping order. In mid-1899, a municipal council was established to bring 
sanitary improvements to the town. Hawkers and stall keepers were restricted to 
particular areas, an unsanitary slaughterhouse was closed down and the town’s streets 
were cleared of some of the houses, widened and paved. Such was the progress that, 
by the autumn of 1899, a visitor could remark with some pride at the ‘signs of the 
speedy coming of that order and smart appearance that mark out the British 
possessions all the way East.’36 This was in considerable contrast to what was 
observed by a missionary eight months earlier:
M a-t’ou is not a p leasing v illage. Its situation is pleasant, but it is dirty,
sm elly , and disreputable. It has on ly  one long, straggling street, w ithout
interest or beauty o f  any kind, inhabited m ainly by sam pan m en .37
Even so, in comparison with the urgency with which the Germans had established 
themselves in Kiaochou, Captain Wingate of the 1 st Chinese Regiment, after visiting
32 No. 73, War Office to Treasury, 28 N ov 1900, enclosing Acting Military Commissioner 
(Prendergast, Colonel) to War Office, 20 Sep 1900, CO 882/6/4.
33 The Peking Convention allowed the British authorities to purchase ‘at a fair price’ land for 
‘fortifications, public offices, or any official or public purposes’.
34 Memorandum o f  Col. J.F. Lewis, dated 9 March 1900, written at the request o f  the Colonial Office, 
CO 521/1, p. 342.
35 NCH, vol. LX11I, no. 1671, 14 Aug 1899, p. 326.
36 . y 5, ‘A Visit to W eihaiwei’, NCH, vol. LX1U, no. 1675, 1 1 Sept 1899, p. 531.
’7 This quotation is taken from Atwell, 20, where the following source is cited: Reverend Roland Allen, 
‘W eihaiwei’, North China and Shantung Mission Quarterly Paper: Land ofSinim , vol. 6, no. 4, Jan 
1899, p. 66.
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4that place, said that ‘Weihaiwei cuts but a sorry figure beside Kiaochow.’ In a letter 
written in January 1900, he reported that the Germans had begun constructing a 
drainage system, built numerous roads, laid the foundations for an extensive rail 
network, cleared away a Chinese village and re-housed its occupants in a model 
village elsewhere, and constructed a number of ‘beautifully built villas’, ‘German 
looking Chateaux’ and an imposing hotel to rival any in Shanghai. In Weihaiwei, 
aside from some road improvements on Liukung and the construction of two forts, 
nothing much had been done. Moreover, ‘Everything is being done very much on the 
cheap’, he observed.39 By the time a report on the civil administration for the period 
1899 to 1901 was written by the then Acting Commissioner of the territory, there was 
only slightly more to report - eighteen miles of road had been built, three miles of 
mule tracks had been improved and five miles of road into the interior were under 
construction.40
Given the slow progress in establishing British rule, it is not surprising that 
Chinese officials continued to demand the payment of taxes from the people of the 
territory.41 As late as March 1900, Colonel J.F. Lewis, in a memorandum written at 
the request of the Colonial Office, reported that the Chinese authorities were
AO‘probably still collecting taxes’. In December of that year, the British authorities 
collected the land tax for the first time. In preparation for this, regulations, drafted in 
consultation with the magistrates of Wen-teng and Jung-ch’eng and with officials 
appointed by the Governor of Shantung, were drawn up which allowed for the 
collection of tax in accordance with the tax-payer’s place of residence, rather than 
where his land was situated. The tax on land outside the lease thus collected by the 
British authorities was then transferred to the Chinese authorities and vice versa as 
was also provided by the regulations.43 These regulations were designed in large part 
to keep Chinese tax collectors out of the leased area.
38 Extracts from a private letter from Captain A.W.S. Wingate, 1st Chinese Regiment to Captain 
E.W.M. Norrie, Wei-hai-wei, January 1900’, CO 521/1.
39 Ibid.
40 A General Report on the Civil Administration o f the Territory o f  W ei-hai-wei, 1899-1901, 31 March 
1902, enc. to No. 96, G.T. Hare to Acting Commissioner Cowan, 15 Apr 1902, Eastern No. 75, CO 
882/6/7.
41 See Dorward to MacDonald, 23 May 1900 and Barton to MacDonald, 18 March 1900, CO 873/4.
42 Memorandum o f Weihaiwei, 9 March 1900, Colonel J.F. Lewis to Colonial Office, CO 521/1.
43 No. 28, Commissioner Dorward to Chamberlain, 1 June 1901, Enc. 1, Eastern No. 75, Confidential 
Print, FO 882/6/7.
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Law, order and the administration of justice prior to the Wei-hai-Wei Order in 
Council
The delay in taking control of the territory was accompanied by confusion over 
questions of jurisdiction and applicable law. At least two questions were not 
considered fully in the period between the signing of the Peking Convention and the 
drafting of the Wei-hai-Wei Order in Council: which court or courts had jurisdiction 
over criminal and civil cases and what law was to be applied in the cases over which 
jurisdiction was claimed by a British court or tribunal. It was only later that the 
fundamental question of whether the Chinese of the territory continued to be subject 
to the Chinese authorities was addressed. In practice, the cantonment magistrate dealt 
with crimes committed on the island; those suspected of crimes on the mainland part 
of the leased territory were turned over to the Chinese authorities after being arrested 
by the British authorities. The British authorities at first encouraged village headmen 
to deal with civil disputes as they had done, it was assumed, prior to the lease. Later, 
when the district officer heard civil disputes, he did so applying Chinese law and
44custom.
Had there been any discussion of the applicable law, no clear answer would 
have been found. There were settled principles on the extent to which indigenous laws 
and English law were applicable in a colony.45 In these principles, the mode by which 
the territory was acquired, whether there were already laws in existence in the 
territory at the time of acquisition, and whether such laws - indigenous laws - were 
contrary to the laws of Christian countries were all determinative factors. The primary 
distinction was between ceded and conquered territories and colonies acquired 
through settlement. In ceded and conquered territories which already had their own 
laws, those laws, subject to some qualifications, remained in force until altered by the 
Crown. The main qualification to the continuation of indigenous laws was the 
abrogation ipso facto of laws which were ‘based on religious or ethical principles 
inconsistent with European civilisation’ - sometimes referred to as ‘barbarous laws’ 46
44 A  General Report on the Civil Administration o f  the Territory o f  W ei-hai-wei, 1899-1901, 31 March 
1902, enc. to No. 96, G.T. Hare to Acting Commissioner Cowan, 15 Apr 1902, Eastern No. 75, CO 
882/6/7.
45 For relevant authorities see Earl o f  Halsbury, Laws o f  England, vol. XXV (London: Butterworth, 
1913), 565-573, relied on here for a summary o f  the main principles, together with Kenneth Roberts- 
Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law  (London: Stevens, 1966), 533 and 540-542.
46 The abrogation ipso fac to  was subject to any agreement by the Crown to allow such laws to continue.
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Until the enactment of other laws, the gap left by such abrogation was to be filled 
with ‘natural equity5.47 In the case of settled colonies, the settlers took with them so 
much of English law as was applicable to their situation and the circumstances of the 
infant colony. These laws governed until such time as the Crown exercised its 
prerogative powers to give to the settled colony a legislature 48 These common law 
rules relating to colonies did not refer to protectorates or protected states, nor to leases 
akin to the Weihaiwei lease, the last category being unknown when the principles 
were stated. In the opinion of Roberts-Wray, the position in protectorates and other 
types of territories should be little different from that in territories acquired by cession 
or conquest49 It is certainly arguable that the principles developed for colonies, 
although usually articulated with reference to the modes by which a colony is 
acquired, give at least equal weight to the presence or absence of civilised laws under 
some form of organised government This view of the principles would make the rules 
relating to colonies applicable to territories such as Weihaiwei. Being a territory in 
which there was a system of laws, those laws would, subject to the abrogation of 
unacceptable laws ipso facto, remain in force till abrogated. No act of abrogation 
appears to have been made prior to the passing of the Wei-hai-Wei Order in Council 
in 1901. However, some Chinese law and custom may have been replaced by 
magisterial orders or other ad hoc measures discussed below. The Foreign Jurisdiction 
Act, 1890,50 confirmed the Crown's powers, having obtained jurisdiction in foreign 
territory by the means of treaty, capitulation, grant, usage, sufferance and other lawful 
means, to ‘hold, exercise, and enjoy5 jurisdiction ‘in the same and as ample a manner 
as if Her Majesty had acquired that jurisdiction by the cession or conquest of 
territory.’ However, this would not have been of assistance whilst the question of 
whether Weihaiwei was, as a matter of municipal law, merely Chinese territory over 
which jurisdiction was to be exercised had yet to be addressed. As we shall see, this 
question was answered only during the later drafting stages of the Wei-hai-Wei Order 
in Council.51
47 Calvin's Case (1608) 7 Co. Rep. la.
48 The Crown’s powers extend to the creation o f a constitution for the settled colony but not to the 
making o f ordinary laws for it; see discussion o f  this point in Roberts-Wray, 151.
49 Roberts-Wray, 543.
50 53 & 54 Viet. c. 37.
51 This is discussed in ch. 2.
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Without an Order in Council and without clear principle to follow, officers 
adopted measures as they saw fit. In the autumn of 1898, Vice-Admiral Seymour 
reported that, soon after taking possession of the territory and ‘having received no 
instructions for [his] guidance in the matter’, he placed Liukung under ‘Naval (or 
Martial) Law’. Commander Gaunt, who, in February 1900, was appointed 
Cantonment Magistrate and who, later, became the Commissioner for the whole 
territory, dealt summarily with all offences against law and order. Seymour observed 
with relief that, given the makeshift nature of the arrangements in place, ‘fortunately’ 
no serious crimes had been committed.52 In respect of the mainland, the Vice-Admiral 
reported that the villagers there continued to be subject to the authority of their 
respective village headmen and that no changes in this regard were proposed. One 
reason for writing to the Secretary to the Admiralty was for advice as to what action 
to take in the case of offences committed by those who were neither British nor 
Chinese subjects, offences committed by British subjects and serious offences such as 
murder committed by the Chinese. The Law Officers advised that, unless a judge was 
appointed, the Officer in Command should administer and enforce the law. He should 
deal with all crimes committed by British subjects and subjects of countries other than 
China in accordance with naval law.53 Such offenders should not be sent to the British 
or other Consuls in Chefoo. Further, the Officer Commanding should deal with crimes 
committed by the Chinese, ‘having regard to their usages; but probably in most cases 
the headmen of the villages will be able to deal with Chinese crime’. Naval and 
military personnel in Weihaiwei should, however, remain subject to naval and 
military law.54
This advice was given in the context of the administration of the island. On the 
mainland, two examples from the spring of 1899 indicate that the British authorities, 
probably because of the agreement to limit the exercise of their authority to Liukung 
until the territory’s boundary had been marked, were still referring cases to the 
Chinese authorities. The first was an incident in which a number of deaths from
59 Seymour to Secretary o f the Admiralty, ‘Alacrity’, 12 Dec 1898, FO 17/1664.
53 The main sources o f  such law were the penal code found in the Naval Discipline Act (29 and 30 
Viet. c. 109), as amended by the Naval Discipline Act, 1884 (47 and 48 Viet. c. 39) and the civil code 
o f  the navy contained in the relevant regulations and instructions established by Order in Council. The 
naval penal code not only covered breaches o f naval discipline and duty specified in the Naval 
Discipline Act but also included offences against ordinary criminal law. That naval law did not, by and 
large, apply to civilians was only identified as a problem later. See the beginning o f  ch. 2.
54 Report o f  the Law Officers (Richard Webster and Robert Finlay), 22 Feb 1899, FO 17/1664.
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falling debris occurred when villagers looted a partially demolished building. British 
officials took action only through the Chinese officials in Weihai City. There, a 
Chinese Sub-Magistrate remained in office under the clause in the Peking Convention 
which provided that ‘within the walled city of We-hai-wei, Chinese officials shall 
continue to exercise jurisdiction, except so far as may be inconsistent with naval and 
military requirements for the defence of the territory leased.’ The headmen of the 
relevant villages were made to sign declarations against any repetition of such 
behaviour.55 In the second example, brothels and opium dens had reopened for 
business despite an order to the contrary given by the Magistrate, Colonel Bower. 
After some inaction, the men of the 1st Chinese Regiment raided the premises but 
turned the shop owners over to the Sub-Magistrate of Weihai City. Such action did 
not escape remark in the North China Herald, whose correspondent was critical of the 
British authorities: ‘Having broken British law they should surely be dealt with by the 
British executive. For since they have not broken Chinese law, how is a Chinese 
official to punish them?’ There was also the question of ‘squeeze’. ‘Need H.B.M.’s 
Commissioner help Mr Wang [the Chinese magistrate] to make hay?’,56 he continued.
At the end of May 1899, Commander Gaunt wrote to Vice-Admiral E.H. 
Hopkins saying that it was ‘imperative that further steps should be taken for the 
proper governing and maintenance of law and order upon the mainland of the leased 
territory.’57 It appears, from this same communication, that Gaunt, as magistrate, 
himself found unsatisfactory the arrangement whereby criminal cases involving the 
Chinese were put in the hands of the Chinese Sub-Magistrate of Weihai City. The 
possibility of appointing Chinese to be magistrates answerable to the Commissioner 
was raised, as was the need for European mounted troops and a European resident 
magistrate on the mainland, should the territory attract European residents, as was 
then still expected. On 14 December 1899, the first District Officer and Magistrate for
* c t>the entire mainland area of the territory - Sidney Barton - arrived in Weihaiwei. 
Barton, a Consular Service official in China, toured the villages in his jurisdiction 
soon after taking up his post.59 It was not until 1 April 1901, however, that a second
55 NCH, vol. LXI, no. 1613, 4 July 1898, p. 17.
56 NCH, vol. LX1I, no. 1660, 29 May 1898, p. 962, at p. 964.
57 Gaunt to Vice-Admiral E.H. Hopkins, 30 May 1899, FO 17/1664.
58 Enc. to No. 20, Dorward’s proposals for the Civil Administration o f  the Leased Territory, 7 Jan 
1900, Eastern No. 72, CO 882/6/4.
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official, an Assistant Commissioner, was appointed by the then Commissioner, 
Colonel Dorward.
Although some progress had been achieved in the administration of justice by 
the division of the mainland area into two magistracies - one under the Civil 
Magistrate, Sidney Barton, and the other under Colonel Bower,60 no proclamation 
informing the people of how crimes were defined or what acts were punishable by the 
new authorities had been made. In such a situation, in the autumn of 1900, some 
villagers, rather than reporting the crimes to the British authorities, reported to the 
Magistrate of Wen-teng two deaths resulting from a scuffle occurring in the leased 
territory. The suspects were eventually turned over to the British by one of the 
province’s three daotai (circuit heads) whose headquarters was in Chefoo. The 
villagers reportedly gave the leniency of British punishments as the reason for their 
actions. Three men were sentenced to death for their responsibility in the deaths and 
executed by firing squad. To send a message that the British were in control, a fine 
was imposed on the entire village.61
By 1901, the Assistant Commissioner, resident at Mat’ou, was regularly 
hearing both civil and criminal cases involving the Chinese, whilst the Commissioner 
dealt with cases on the island and any appeals fi*om the decisions of the magistrates. 
During that same year, five new provisions concerning jurisdiction over criminal and 
civil cases were added to the regulations concerning the collection of tax mentioned 
earlier.62 These regulations provided for British and Chinese officials jointly to try 
serious crimes in which persons resident within or without the territory were
* * 63concerned. Punishment was to be ‘according to the law of [the convicts’] district’. 
The new regulations included rules for the handing over of offenders from Weihaiwei 
who took refuge outside the territory and vice versa. Neither authority was to send 
runners across the border to make arrests. If Chinese officials arrested residents of the 
leased territory, British officials were to be notified immediately.64 In civil disputes,
59 ‘The Situation at W eihaiwei’, NCH, vol. LXIV, no. 1705, 11 Apr 1900, p. 649, at p. 650.
60 NCH , vol. LXIV, no. 1697, 14 Feb 1900, p. 263. Colonel Bower's division had thirteen o f the 
principal villages, whilst Barton's contained the rest o f  the villages.
61 NCH, vol. LXV, no. 1731, 10 Oct 1900, p. 763.
62 The whole set o f  regulations including the five new provisions are to be found in Dorward to SSC, 1 
June 1901, CO 521/2.
63 Regulation IX, Dorward to SSC, 1 June 1901, CO 521/2.
64 Regulation X, Dorward to SSC, 1 June 1901, CO 521/2.
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jurisdiction followed the ‘defendant’s district’, an official from the plaintiffs place of 
residence being allowed to attend the proceedings. If such a cross-border case was 
appealed, it could be retried by both Chinese and British officials, though in
65accordance with the law of the ‘defendant’s district’.
As mentioned earlier, prior to these regulations, civil disputes were, at first, 
left in the hands of the village headmen and, later, heard by the magistrate. Many 
villagers appreciated the accessibility of the magistrate; they could seek his help 
directly and they were not charged any fees. Most of the cases brought were to do 
with land and houses, family inheritance, adoption, division of property and other 
Chinese customs and usages. For these, it was ‘best to follow Chinese customs and 
usages as far as is reasonable and just - without paying too much attention to 
procedure and rules of evidence, with which the Chinese are unacquainted.’66 Despite 
a large rise in the number of cases heard by the magistrate in 1901, no changes were 
suggested. It was said that court fees should not be charged ‘as this would be sure to 
lead to irregularities, and the Chinese would dislike coming to Court, for fear of being 
squeezed.’67
By the middle of 1901, some 50 Magisterial Orders had been made. These 
were mostly in connection with the house tax, licences for hotels and boarding 
houses, and monopolies for the selling of Chinese spirits, opium and other narcotics. 
The earliest such orders were made for the purpose of bringing order to the island of 
Liukung. One rule prohibited the sale of alcohol on the island except in the naval 
canteen.68 Breaches were to be met with fines, though it would seem that this was not 
adhered to. In one reported instance, a Chinese man who had been expelled from the 
island for selling ‘vile native spirits, with its usual accompaniments’ was, later, 
expelled a second time. This time, ‘the unhappy wretch left the island minus his pig­
tail.’69
65 Regulation VIII, Dorward to SSC, 1 June 1901, CO 521/2. This aspect o f  these regulations appears 
to have ceased to be effective at least by the time the territory was transferred to the responsibility o f  
the Colonial Office.
06 A General Report on the Civil Administration o f the Territory o f W ei-hai-wei, 1899-1901, 31 March 
1902, enc. to No. 96, G. T. Hare to Acting Commissioner Cowan, 15 Apr 1902, Eastern No. 75, CO 
882/6/7.
671bid.
68 NCH, vol. LX, no. 1609, 6 June 1898, p. 978.
69 Ibid., where there is, in addition, a contrasting report o f  the treatment o f  two non-British Europeans 
who established ‘The Victoria Hotel’ for similar purpose in rented premises on the island. These two 
were reported as having been told to leave the island. They repeated their attempts on the mainland and
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A  lease o f  uncertain duration
The lease of Weihaiwei was greeted with some excitement amongst the British 
trading community in China. There were some who saw in Weihaiwei an opportunity 
to develop a commercial port to rival those nearby. However, the territory’s prospects 
for development were affected by two early decisions. First, the British Government 
assured Germany that neither the British Government nor its nationals would build a 
railway connecting Weihaiwei with the interior of the province. A formal declaration 
to this effect was offered and then amended in accordance with a suggestion made by 
the German government.70 The lack of railway communications was thought by many 
to be a limitation on the territory’s potential as a port for the shipment and landing of 
goods.
The second was the early abandonment of plans to fortify the harbour. 
Although Weihaiwei had been used by the Chinese as their second most important 
naval harbour, fortifying the port would have required expenditure of funds the Royal 
Navy could ill-afford so soon after the Boer war. The Navy decided, in February 
1902, that Weihaiwei should, for its own purposes, be no more than a 'flying naval 
base'. For the duration of the lease, Royal Navy vessels used Weihaiwei mostly as a 
sanatorium.
Soon after this decision had been reached, the Colonial Office considered a 
proposal, put forward by G.T. Hare, to return to China all territory, save for Liukung 
and a small strip of land around Mat'ou.71 Flare had been Secretary for Chinese 
Affairs in the Federated Malay States since 1897 but, in 1901-1902, he served in 
Weihaiwei on special service and was, for a time, Acting British Commissioner of 
Weihaiwei. Behind his proposal lay the idea that only such territory as was necessary 
for the protection of British and other European interests should be retained. The 
proposed reduction in territory and jurisdiction would have left Weihaiwei akin to a 
treaty port in which the British would exercise extra-territorial jurisdiction over their
were then told to leave the territory. Even if emphasis is discounted from this report, it is very likely 
that the Europeans would not have been treated in a way calculated to either humiliate them or to deter 
others, since, in the case o f  the latter, there were probably few Europeans on the island with similar 
intentions at the time.
70 No. 1, Balfour to Sir F. Lascelles (Ambassador at Berlin), Telegram, 2 Apr 1898; No. 2, Sir F. 
Lascelles to Marquess o f Salisbury, Telegram, 4 Apr 1898, No. 4, Lascelles to Herr von Billow, 10 Apr 
1898, all in Eastern No. 72, CO 882/6/4.
71 Confidential Portions o f  a Report on the Civil Administration o f Wei-hai-Wei by Mr G.T. Hare, 31 
March 1902, Eastern No. 80, Confidential, CO 882/6/12, p. 388.
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own nationals and have control over how the town was run. The Commissioner’s role 
would be reduced to more or less that of a British Consul at a treaty port. Although 
jurisdiction over all nationalities on Liukung would be retained, the Chinese on the 
mainland would come under Chinese jurisdiction and, in the small strip of the 
mainland measuring three square miles retained by the British, the Commissioner 
would exercise municipal authority in conjunction with a Chinese magistrate. The 
Chinese magistrate would hear mixed cases in the presence of the Commissioner in 
the role of assessor. These suggestions were not adopted.
By 1904, the Colonial Office was considering yet another memorandum
rjry
weighing the pros and cons of retaining Weihaiwei. The disadvantages included
limited opportunities for trade and revenue, the lack of a clear commitment from the
naval authorities to make Weihaiwei a significant base, the vulnerability of the
territory if left unfortified, the lack of a rich hinterland to exploit even if a railway
were built, and uncertainty over how long Weihaiwei would be administered by the
British. The advantages were unconvincing. By this time, the grant-in-aid received
from the Imperial Exchequer was relatively low. It was argued that, if this cost was
still a concern, Weihaiwei could be administered by the government of Hong Kong,
although it had earlier been thought that Weihaiwei was simply too far from Hong
Kong for its administration to be a part of the Hong Kong administration. A second
advantage was the quality of the harbour, said to be the best in North China but, in
fact, insufficiently deep. There was also the use of the territory by the 1st Chinese
Regiment and the fact that all land on the island of Liukung now belonged to the
government of Weihaiwei. The advantage to the 1st Chinese Regiment was to
disappear with the decision to disband the regiment. Stronger reasons for retaining the
territory were the negative impact on British prestige of going back on the lease, the
consequence of leaving Germany in sole possession of the whole of Shantung
province, and Weihaiwei’s value as a sanatorium. Charles P. Lucas, the author of this
memorandum and, by this time, Assistant Under-Secretary of State with responsibility
for the Eastern Colonies, appeared to stress this last advantage to the point of
conceding its other so-called advantages:
T he p lace has been ridiculed as a second  or third rate w atering-place.
Suppose it w as no more! Sup pose it had no good harbour! E ven then, from  its 
con sp icu ou s healthiness, its good  sanitation and its sulphur springs, it w ould  
be worth keep ing as a sanatorium  for the m any E nglishm en  in the Far East,
72 Confidential Memorandum, C.P. Lucas, 7 June 1904, Eastern No. 86, Weihaiwei, CO 882/6/17.
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naval, m ilitary, c iv ilian s, m erchants, m issionaries. I f  w e  are go in g  to m ake as 
m uch o f  our Em pire as heretofore, w h y  should it be a subject for ridicule that 
in the Far East w e  have a p lace w hich  is thoroughly healthy for Englishm en?
He concluded that Weihaiwei should be retained and, if possible, a statement made to
that effect.73
Before the end of that year, the Foreign Office was in receipt of a report 
commissioned by Sir Ernest Satow, the British Minister at Peking, 011 the commercial 
prospects of the territory, were the lease to be revised to provide a duration of a 
definite term of years. J.W. Jamieson, then Commercial Attache at Shanghai, painted 
a rather bleak picture of Weihaiwei’s prospects. Assuming that the question of tenure 
could be resolved satisfactorily, he found that it would be difficult to divert to 
Weihaiwei the trade and industries which the nearby established ports had attracted to 
themselves. Competition between these ports had shown that the limited trade had 
done little more than increase the prosperity of Tsingtao at the expense of Chefoo. He 
asked,
W ill the paling o f  one star add lustre to that o f  a n ew  arrival, fa intly  striving  
to m ake itse lf  v isib le?  It is to be feared not, u nless W ei-hai W ei can cover its 
hill s lop es w ith  mulberry trees, attract to  itse lf  the beans o f  M anchuria, or 
co n v in ce  m erchants in China that it w ould  serve adm irably as a duty-free  
god ow n .74
The term of the lease itself, dependent as it was on Russia remaining in Port 
Arthur, also cast a pall of uncertainty and made it hard for the territory to attract 
investment. When Port Arthur had fallen to the Japanese, the China Association, a 
body representing British commercial interests in China, petitioned the Commissioner 
and Satow, urging the British Government to seek renewal of the lease of
• * t  T CWeihaiwei. Herbert Beer, headmaster of the Weihaiwei School, a boarding school 
for European boys established in 1903, also wrote to the Commissioner and to Satow, 
expressing similar concern.76 In reply, they were told that rumours of the return of 
Weihaiwei to China should be ‘entirely disregarded’77 and that the ousting of the
73 Ibid.
74 Memorandum regarding the Future Prospects o f  the Leased Territory o f  Wei-hai Wei as a 
Commercial Centre, in relation to the German Dependency o f Kiao-chau and the Province o f  Shantung 
in general, 9 Sept 1904, enc. to No. 1, Jamieson to Lansdowne, Secretary o f  State for Foreign Affairs, 
Confidential Print, FO 881/8284.
75 China Association, 2 Jan 1905, referred to in Foreign Office to China Association, 11 Jan 1905, FO 
228/2621.
76 Beer to Lockhart, 4 March 1905; and Beer to Satow, 21 June 1905, FO 228/2621.
77 Satow to Beer, 3 July 1905, FO 228/2621.
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Russians from Port Arthur by the Japanese would neither affect the lease nor require
78its renewal.
In fact, there was far less certainty than these replies conveyed. Whilst it was 
convenient, during the war between Japan and Russia and with its outcome still 
unknown, to say that the lease of Weihaiwei was unaffected, other questions were 
anticipated. The Colonial Office suggested that a lease be sought either for so long as 
Germany held Kiaochou or for 99 years from the date of the original lease. The later 
alternative would match the 99-year leases of Kiaochou and the New Territories and
79would be sufficiently long to attract investment to the territory. The Foreign Office 
put this suggestion to Satow80 who replied pointing out that, since it was the 
dependence on the duration of Russia’s stay in Port Arthur which had given rise to the 
current uncertainty, it was inadvisable to seek an amendment which would make the 
lease of Weihaiwei dependent on Germany’s presence in Kiaochou. On the other 
hand, a lease to last 25 years from 1898 so as to fit in with the German lease would 
make it too obvious that Britain was seeking a counterpoise to Germany’s presence in 
North China. Satow also advised delaying any overtures to the Chinese Government
o i
until the terms of the transfer to Japan of the Liaotung peninsula were known. 
Despite more rumours of retrocession circulating in both the European and Chinese 
presses in the middle of the following year,82 the British Government did nothing until 
October 1906 when the Chinese Minister in London asked Britain to return 
Weihaiwei to China, as China was anxious to develop its navy.83 Sir Edward Grey, 
the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, replied that Britain had obligations to Japan 
which it had to honour. Besides, conditions in China were not ‘normal’, for Japan and
78 Foreign Office to China Association, 11 Jan 1905, FO 228/2621. The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-5 
formally ended with the signing o f the Treaty o f Portsmouth on 5 Sept 1905, under article 5 o f  which 
Russia transferred the lease o f  Port Arthur and Talienwan to Japan. China agreed to this transfer in the 
Sino-Japanese Treaty signed in Peking on 22 Dec 1905. In 1915, the lease was extended from its 
original 25-year term to a term o f 99 years.
79 Ommaney (Colonial Office), to the Under-Secretary o f State, Foreign Office, 27 June 1905, FO 
228/2621.
80 Lansdowne to Satow, 13 July 1905. See also Campbell to Colonial Office, 2 June 1905; and 
Memorandum transmitting advice received from Satow to the Colonial Office, Affairs o f China, 
Confidential, 2 June 1905, all in FO 228/2621.
81 Satow to Lansdowne, 5 Oct 1905, FO 228/2621.
82 See Commissioner Lockhart to Elgin (Principal SSC), 2 June 1906, FO 228/2621.
83 This request is referred to in Grey to John Jordan, 6 Oct 1906, Telegram, FO 228/2621.
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Germany remained and Britain’s withdrawal from Weihaiwei was ‘inconvenient’.84 
The issue of Britain’s withdrawal was temporarily resolved by an understanding that 
the question should be postponed until China was in possession of a ‘fair naval 
strength’.85
The uncertainty over the length of stay of the British administration of 
Weihaiwei continued to be felt in the territory. Even in mid-1907, the proprietors of 
Lavers and Clark, one of the first to invest in the territory, were writing to Sir John 
Jordan, then the British Minister at Peking, asking if China would compensate them 
for their investment after retrocession, given that they had been informed that the 
British Government would not.
When Germany withdrew from Kiaochou in 1915, the Foreign Office again 
sought the views of other Whitehall departments on the value of Weihaiwei. The War 
Office replied, emphasising the fact that this was the only British possession in the 
region and returning it would diminish British prestige. The Colonial Office thought it 
a question of foreign policy, since, from its point of view, there were no strong 
arguments for or against retention. In 1918, with the Peace Conference of the 
following year in sight, departmental views were again solicited. Johnston, the then 
Commissioner of Weihaiwei, suggested that the mainland portion of the territory 
should be returned. British prestige had not been advanced by the occupation of 
Weihaiwei, as it compared unfavourably with the progress made by the Germans in
* 0 7Kiaochou and the Japanese in Dairen. Jordan took the view that Weihaiwei should 
be returned but only as part of a broader movement by all powers to give up their 
rights and concessions in China. He is quoted as saying that the leased territories were 
‘a legacy of imperialistic ambitions of Russia and Germany in the Far East and [the] 
proximate cause of the Boxer outbreak of 1900.’88 The Admiralty informed the
84 Grey (Foreign Office) to Sir John Jordan (Peking), Telegram, 23 N ov 1906; and Grey to Jordan, 21 
N ov 1906, FO 228/2621.
85 Chinese Legation (Wang Tahsieh) to Grey, 20 Dec 1906; Grey to Jordan, 3 Dec 1906; and Foreign 
Office to Wang Tahsieh, 4 Jan 1907; all in FO 228/2621.
86 Lavers and Clark to Jordan, 5 July 1907, FO 228/2621.
87 This is referred to in FO 371/6669, 3 March 1921, Memorandum on Wei-hai Wei by C.W. Campbell, 
app. IV to Confidential Memorandum, Foreign ‘Leased Territories’ and ‘Spheres o f  Influence’ in 
China, 10 Oct 1921. Under Japanese administration, the area formerly called Talien (in Russian,
Dalny) was known as Dairen.
88 Memorandum on Wei-hai Wei, by C.W. Campbell, 3 March 1921, app. IV to Confidential 
Memorandum, Foreign ‘Leased Territories’ and ‘Spheres o f Influence’ in China, 10 Oct 1921, FO 
371/6669.
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Colonial Office that Weihaiwei was still useful from a naval point of view. One 
consideration taken into account was the precarious status of the New Territories of 
Hong Kong, the tenure of which also rested on a lease. It was felt that the government 
had to tread carefully so as not to jeopardise its position there. At the close of this 
round of internal discussion, the British Government was opposed to the question of 
the leased territories being raised and, as a consequence, the question of Weihaiwei 
was not raised at the Peace Conference.
Three years later, in anticipation of the Conference on Limitation of 
Armament (the ‘Washington Conference’)89 and with Japan still in Shantung 
province, the British Government remained reluctant to give up Weihaiwei. Prior to 
the conference, the Colonial Office asked Sir Reginald Stubbs, the Governor of Hong 
Kong, to visit Weihaiwei and report on the territory. Stubbs, whose report kept the 
cost of the territory firmly in view, offered three alternatives: relinquish the mainland; 
give up the larger part of the mainland and retain only a strip of the mainland and 
Liukung island; or retain the entire area of the leased territory under a renegotiated 
fixed-term lease. Stubbs warned of the dangers to British prestige of allowing the 
administration of the territory ‘to be left to drag on in a poverty-stricken and hand-to- 
mouth existence’ but also warned that prospects for the further development of local 
industries were not great.90 The overall view of the British Government, 011 the eve of 
the conference, was that Weihaiwei should be retained for so long as Japan remained 
at Tsingtao. However, after the start of the conference, Arthur Balfour, the head of the 
British delegation, sent telegrams to the Foreign Office urging that the rendition of 
Weihaiwei should be considered, particularly if France and Japan were to agree to 
relinquish their territories in China. By the end of January 1922, the British 
government was prepared to surrender Weihaiwei provided certain conditions were 
fulfilled. On 1 February, Balfour announced the rendition of the territory at the 
conference.91 Negotiations over rendition were lengthy but an agreement was ready
89 Conference proceedings were published as Proceedings o f  Conference on Limitation o f  Armament 
held at Washington, 12th Nov, 1921 - 6th Feb, 1922, (Eng. and Fr.) and there is also a shorter account 
o f the proceedings in Westel W. Willoughby, China at the Conference (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 1922). See also the same author’s Foreign Rights and Interests in China, rev. and enlarged edn, 
2 vols (Taipei: Ch5 eng-wen, 1966).
90 Memorandum by Stubbs, enc. to No. 1, Grindle to Foreign Office, 21 N ov 1921, FO 371/6645.
91 For more information on the communications between Balfour and the Foreign Office during the 
period o f  the Washington Conference see Memorandum on the Rendition o f  Weihaiwei, FO 676/311. 
Although by late January 1922, Balfour had persuaded the British Government that Weihaiwei should 
be surrendered if  France and Japan also agreed to surrender their rights, he had, in fact, acted beyond
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for signature in October 1924. Signature of the agreement, however, was delayed until 
18 April 1930 by the political situation in China, with rendition taking effect on 30 
October that same year.
Without more ambitious naval plans or commercial investment, it is not 
surprising that the territory experienced only modest economic and social 
development. Between lease and rendition, the number of market towns in the 
territory grew from four92 to nine93 and, as more Chinese became involved in small 
businesses, the urban population increased. A network of roads was built, first for 
wheelbarrow and cart traffic, and then, eventually, for motorised vehicles during the 
last three years prior to rendition in 1930.94 Telephone lines comiected the island and 
Port Edward - the new name given to Mat’ou in 1902 - not long after the lease began 
but, even in the second decade of the lease, there was no telephone line connecting 
Port Edward with the interior of the territory. Small industries were later developed in 
which inhabitants were employed making lace, hairnets and silk. A company 
prospected for gold but the mine was unsuccessful and shut down in 1907. Likewise, 
plans to introduce tobacco as a crop did not materialise. Weihaiwei’s low tax yields 
allowed the territory to be self-financing only during the last decade of the leasehold. 
A surplus was built up during the last six years of British administration but this was 
due largely to the continued parsimony of the administration.95
The British administration was to interfere little with day-to-day life in the 
Chinese villages. As we shall see, education received inadequate public investment 
and the government was loath to stop customs such as foot-binding.96 As the years 
went by, the growing police force no doubt made its presence felt in the villages. 
Even then, Weihaiwei had not developed economically and socially to the extent that 
it stood out as a fine example of what could be achieved by a British administration.
his instructions when he announced the rendition o f  Weihaiwei without securing a detailed agreement 
with China on the continued use o f  Liukung and the harbour by the Royal Navy.
92 The four markets were at Feng-lin, Ch’iao -f ou, T s’ao-miao-tzu and Yang-t’ing.
93 The five added markets were at Ku-shan-hou, T ’un-Hou-chia, P’o Yii-chia, Pei-chiang-hsi and Hsiao 
Y en -f an; some o f  these were markets relocated from outside the boundary o f  Weihaiwei: Annual 
Report for 1928, Colonial Reports - Annual, no. 1446, FO 371/13899.
94 Annual Report for 1928, Colonial Reports - Annual, no 1446, FO 371/13899.
95 The territory's yearly revenue did not exceed $105,934 (all sums given in Mexican dollars) during 
the ten years from 1901-1911, was $176,450 in 1919-20 and peaked at $433,774 in 1929-30. For 
revenue and expenditure tables for 1901 to 1930 see Atwell, 57, 103 and 167.
96 Both o f  these are discussed briefly in ch. 7.
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The opposite was true. When rendition was very definitely within sight, the parlous 
state of the territory’s hospitals, roads and other infrastructure, resulting from years of
Q 7cost cutting, was a source of embarrassment to some.
The territory’s failure to attract European residents was a consequence of the
uncertainty over the duration of the lease and other factors. However, although few
Europeans made Weihaiwei their home in China, many visited the territory each
summer. With its lesser humidity when compared to other places in China, Weihaiwei
earned itself a reputation as a pleasing summer retreat.98 Indeed, the press had spotted
the potential of the territory as a tourist destination within a year of the lease:
w hatever the ultim ate prospects m ay be o f  the latest British acquisition  
becom in g  an im portant centre o f  trade, it is certain that at no distant period it 
is destined  to b ecom e a popular sanatorium  and sum m er health resort.
B lessed  w ith  a delightfu l clim ate, lo v e ly  scenery and perfect sea  bathing, it is 
bound to supplant C hefoo , w here the c lo se  proxim ity o f  a fou l C hinese city  
g o es far to destroy its attractions for foreign visitors. In addition, there are 
good  roads all about the settlem ent, and one fairly good  road tow ards C hefoo, 
w here for fu lly  ten m iles b icyc lin g  can be satisfactorily  indulged  in. Then  
there are exce llen t opportunities for p laying polo, cricket, and lawn tennis, 
w h ile  W eihaiw ei can boast a g o lf  links that w ould  d eligh t the hearts o f  
d evotees o f  that attractive gam e."
Later issues of the newspaper suggested that Weihaiwei could be called ‘Land of
Everlasting Sim’, owing to its good climate and should soon be a ‘Brighton or perhaps
an Oriental Naples’,100 it was a place which bid ‘fair to become the Ostend and
Biarritz of China.’101 Herbert Beer, later to be the proprietor and headmaster of
Weihaiwei School, thought Port Edward and its bund resembled Llandudno more than
any other British resort abroad. By 1902, the town was graced by a town hall, an
hotel, a church, and a jetty. To some it was, at best, a ‘Margate of the East.’ The
presence of the British fleet in the summer months undoubtedly enlivened the place.
Visitors stayed in hotels on the island or the mainland or in bungalows in Narcissus or
Half Moon bays, entertained to picnics by the Commissioner. Japanese sulphur
97 See Atwell, 167, where she mentions Johnston’s unease. She cites Johnston to Lampson, 15 N ov  
1929, CO 521/56.
98 For the advantages and disadvantages o f Weihaiwei as a resort see Frances Wood, No Dogs and Not 
Many Chinese (London: John Murray, 1998), 109-110, citing Arnold Wright and H.A. Cartwright 
(eds), Twentieth-century Impressions o f  Hong Kong, Shanghai and Other Treaty Ports o f  China 
(London, Lloyd's Greater Britain Publishing Company, 1908), 773-774.
99 ‘The Future o f W eihaiwei’, NCH, vol. LXII, no. 1661, 5 June 1899, p. 1007.
100 ‘Weihaiwei and its Wants’, NCH, vol. LXV, no. 1729, 26 Sept 1900, p. 677.
101 NCH, vol. LXV1II, no. 1799, 29 Jan 1902, p. 174.
102 Bruce-Mitford, 2 Iff.
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bathhouses, constructed in 1903 and 1904 to the east of Weihai City to replace 
temporary structures built during the Japanese occupation, were an added 
attraction.103 These continued in business for a number of years and, in 1933, were 
mentioned as one of the eight best features of Weihaiwei.104 The territory, in fact, 
possessed another place - Wen-ch’tian-t’ang - in which there was a natural hot spring 
but similar facilities were not developed there. The economic importance to the 
territory of its summer visitors was so great that, when, in 1908, there were rumours 
of an outbreak of chicken pox in the territory, an anonymous correspondent wrote to 
the Herald immediately to counter the rumours in order to prevent any damage to the
* I OSimage of the territory.
British administration
Despite initial suggestions, based on similar experience in India, that separate 
administration of Liukung as a cantonment should be continued, both island and 
mainland came under the authority of the Commissioner of Weihaiwei whose office 
and residence were located in Port Edward. The Commissioner, given executive, 
legislative and judicial powers by the Wei-hai-Wei Order in Council in 1901, was first 
assisted by an Assistant Commissioner, then by a Secretary to the Government 
(‘Government Secretary’). In 1906, a District Officer was added and, in 1916, the 
posts were reorganised to provide for a Senior and a Junior District Officer. 
Government in Weihaiwei was maintained at a small scale throughout the lease. A 
post such as that of District Officer had to be traded against the appointment of more 
police. For a short period of time, the territory had the services of a cadet, that is, one 
of an elite group of administrative grade civil servants of far eastern colonies or 
dependencies who spent the first three years of their appointment learning Chinese, 
but the Colonial Office withdrew the post on the grounds that the territory did not
l0j There were four classes o f  baths ranging from 1st class, single occupancy baths with hot water 
pumped in and out for each bather, to the native-only 4th class bath house which was built on the 
springs itself. The facilities included two other rooms and two sitting rooms for tea and relaxation: The 
Hot Springs, Weihaiwei ([n.p.]: [n.p.], c.1904).
104 Guide to Wei-hai-wei ([n.p.]: Office o f  the Weihaiwei Commissioner, 1933). This was a tourist 
brochure probably published by the post-rendition authorities o f Weihaiwei.
105 ‘The Health o f  W eihaiwei’, letter from ‘Your Weihaiwei Correspondent’, 20 June, NCH, vol. 
LXXXVI1, no. 2133, 27 June 1908, p. 815.
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provide any prospects of promotion.106 Arguments that the ‘passed cadet’ - one who 
had passed the language and other examinations - could continue his career in Hong 
Kong or elsewhere were ignored. Other officers of the Weihaiwei government 
resident in the territory included one or two Medical Officers and a Financial 
Assistant. For most of the period of the lease, there were between two and four 
European Police Inspectors. Non-resident officials included the Crown Advocate, 
who was the legal adviser to the government, and the High Court Judge, both 
ordinarily resident in Shanghai.
As in British administrations elsewhere, the consequence of a small 
establishment was that the duties of each post were more heterogeneous than might 
otherwise have been the case. For instance, the first Government Secretary was also 
appointed Magistrate and, as such, had, until a second magistrate was appointed, to 
try nearly all criminal and civil cases on both the mainland and the island. Aside from 
assisting the Commissioner in the preparation of draft legislation, the Government 
Secretary’s time was very much taken up with the collection of revenue, particularly 
that from shipping and trade passing through the harbour. The Police Inspectors also 
had a number of duties. Alongside their law enforcement and prison duties, they were 
also responsible for the collection of rents from buildings owned by the government, 
sanitation and street lighting. When the District Officer was appointed in 1906, he 
was simultaneously appointed Magistrate for the South Division of the territory, 
newly divided into two administrative divisions - North and South. As District 
Officer-cum-Magistrate, the holder of the post supervised the police force and often 
took an active part in the investigation of crimes.
Of the two districts, the South Division was both larger and more rural than 
the North Division and contained 17 of the 26 districts of the territory. In 1910 or 
thereabouts, there were 231 villages in the former and only 84 in the latter.107 The 
population of the South Division was estimated to be about two thirds of the total 
population of the territory. The District Officer, who lived and worked at Wen- 
ch’tian-f ang, a distance of 13 miles from Port Edward, was the person to whom many 
ordinary villagers took their petitions, trivial and serious, and it is clear that the office
106 For an article discussing the origins and impact o f the Hong Kong cadet system see H.J. Lethbridge, 
‘Hong Kong Cadets, 1862-1941 Journal o f  the Hong Kong Branch o f  the Royal Asiatic Society, 1970, 
vol. 10, 36-56. Both Lockhart and Johnston had started out in the Hong Kong Government as cadet 
officers.
107 LDNC, 129.
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of the District Officer and Magistrate was significant in the relations between 
government and the governed. The contact between the magistrate and the people was 
all the more significant when it is considered that the High Court Judge did not reside 
in the territory. He visited it no more than once or twice a year and only for the 
purposes of hearing the most serious of cases. It was not thought necessary to have a 
resident judge108 and, indeed, the Commissioner was empowered to sit as a judge.109 
Thus, the district officers and Commissioner combined their administrative tasks with 
their respective judicial roles.
The District Officer also supervised the village and district headmen. The 
British authorities relied on headmen from the inception of British control over the 
territory. More systematic use of headmen was probably begim in 1900, after the 
arrival of Barton and after he had compiled a register of villages in the territory. The 
names of village headmen, chosen by the villagers, were registered, as were ‘the 
number of families, the sexes, the acreage of land cultivated, and the occupations of 
the villagers.’110 Once the registration process was complete, the authorities found it 
much easier to administer the territory and Hare, then Acting Commissioner, reported 
that there had been few difficulties in dealing with Chinese villagers; ‘the headmen 
understand now that they must obey a summons from the District Magistrate, and 
produce any person living in the village they are responsible for.’111 Tribunals of 
village elders were also mentioned as being a part of the village system and Hare’s 
report implied that these tribunals dealt with petty crimes within the village.
In 1902, shortly after the arrival of the territory’s first civilian Commissioner, 
the headman system was put on an official footing. The government gave headmen 
commissions of office and placed upon them the responsibility of reporting crimes 
and settling petty civil disputes. It was later reported that to qualify for the position of 
headman, the person had to own at least 10 mu (equivalent to 1.6 acres) of land and 
that the government preferred headmen were who literate over those who were not.112 
Headmen were also expected to be a link between the government and the villager
108 The decision regarding the need to appoint a High Court Judge is discussed in ch. 3.
109 WOIC, art. 12.
110 A General Report on the Civil Administration o f  the Territory o f  W ei-hai-wei, 1899-1901,31  
March 1902, enc. to No. 96, G.T. Hare to Acting Commissioner Cowan, 15 Apr 1902, Eastern No. 75, 
CO 882/6/7.
m Ibid.
112 Report compiled by Moss, Jan 1915, CO 873/438.
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and the government often used them as a sounding board for its plans, particularly 
when it came to the introduction of laws. An upper tier of local authority was added in 
1905 when twenty-six District Headmen were appointed. Each district headman was 
responsible for between nine and fifteen villages. Their duties included supervising 
the collection of the land-tax; distributing government notices and proclamations to 
village headmen; distributing deed-fonns to purchasers and vendors of property; 
keeping litigation in check; and keeping order in their districts.113 The government 
paid each district headman a small salary of five Mexican dollars114 per month which 
they were allowed to augment from a commission on the sale of deed-forms and 
through the receipt of gifts and invitations to feasts.115 A few times a year, the 
Commissioner assembled the district headmen for a meeting during which matters 
such as the introduction of new laws or other reforms would be informally discussed. 
In 1920, the government decided that the Commissioner would meet all district 
headmen at Port Edward twice a year. From the following year (1921) onwards, after 
the autumn meeting of district headmen, which coincided with H.M. the King’s 
birthday, the Commissioner entertained them at a feast and theatre performance. The 
Colonial Office was informed that this was done so as to enhance British prestige, 
‘give face’ to the district headmen and to ‘popularise a somewhat thankless post.’116 
Formal assemblies of village headmen were much rarer after the institution of district 
headmen. One such gathering of village headmen had previously occurred during 
Coronation Day celebrations in 1904. The gathered headmen were invited onboard a
i | n
Royal Navy vessel anchored in the harbour.
James Haldane Stewart Lockhart and Reginald Fleming Johnston
The size of the administration meant that individuals serving in the Weihaiwei 
government could, and did, influence the tenor of the administration to a greater 
degree than their counterparts in a larger administration. In this regard, two names
1,3 LDNC, 95.
114 The Mexican silver dollar, because o f its high silver content, was a currency widely used on the 
China coast in the 19th and early 20th centuries. The rate o f pay was the same in 1923: Blunt to SSC, 2 
N ov 1923, CO 521/27.
115 LDNC, 95.
116 Blunt to SSC, 2 N ov 1923, CO 521/25.
!17 Annual Report for 1904, CO 873/163.
47
stand out; James Haldane Stewart Lockhart and Reginald F. Johnston,118 two 
Scotsmen and friends, left their mark on the territory more palpably than any other 
Weihaiwei government officer.
Lockhart, who was some twenty years older than Johnston, had served in the 
Hong Kong Government between November 1879, when he was appointed a cadet, 
and his appointment to Weihaiwei in the spring of 1902. The appointment to the 
government of Weihaiwei was a post he wanted, having told the Colonial Office, in 
the August of the previous year, that he wished to be posted to a place outside Hong 
Kong but still within China. Since much of what had been achieved by his military 
and naval predecessors were ad hoc measures, Lockhart had much to do when he 
arrived in the territory. He had the territory’s administration to establish, the question 
of policing to address, laws to draft, and village headmen to recognise formally. 
Lockhart was Weihaiwei5s longest serving official, relinquishing his post only upon 
his retirement in 1921. For most of the years between 1904 and 1916, Lockhart had, 
in the territory’s administration, the company of a kindred spirit in Reginald Johnston. 
Johnston was, for a short time, Government Secretary at the government offices in 
Port Edward before being appointed District Officer and Magistrate of the South 
Division in 1906, a position he held until 1916. Later still, he was Senior District 
Officer before becoming Commissioner of Weihaiwei in the three years prior to 
rendition. Lockhart and Johnston had known each other since the beginning of 
Johnston’s cadetship in Hong Kong. They had both served in the New Territories 
administration not long after the lease of the area. They shared an admiration for 
Chinese civilisation and regretted the demise of the China of old. Both were fluent, 
first in Cantonese, then Mandarin. Their knowledge of the Chinese language and 
China earned them the respect of their peers and of sinologists. Both were to consider 
academic positions although only Johnston went on to become a Professor of Chinese, 
a post he held at what was then the School of Oriental Studies in London for six years 
after the rendition of Weihaiwei.119
Both Lockhart and Johnston had much to do with law and the administration 
of justice in the territory. As Commissioner, Lockhart had legislative powers and, 
from time to time, sat as High Court Judge. Johnston heard and investigated civil and
118 For biographical works on both men see Introduction, n. 3. The former’s surname is ‘Stewart 
Lockhart’, but for convenience, only ‘Lockhart’ is used in this work.
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criminal cases in his capacity as Magistrate and District Officer or Senior District 
Officer. In their approach to law and order, a lack of legal training and a close 
proximity to the day-to-day incidents of life in the territory combined to give both 
men a tendency towards pragmatism rather than legal principle. Lockhart’s drafting 
deficiencies, which ranged from minor errors of form to substantive mistakes, were 
often criticised in the Colonial Office.120 Both men shared a general predisposition 
towards seeing, in the circumstances of the territory, more reasons to depart from 
English law than others might have. This was, no doubt, enhanced by their genuine 
interest in Chinese culture and their preference for the past over the contemporary. 
They sought to uphold traditional social structures, effecting repairs where decay was 
evident and reinforcing tradition through official encouragement. An example of this 
was the headman system which both Lockhart and Johnston were keen to revitalise. 
Lockhart’s enthusiasm for the system led him to award medals to headmen who had 
performed their duties most meritoriously, an action which, he was told by the
Colonial Office, infringed the rule that all decorations should emanate from the
1 0 1 • sovereign. Another example of the government encouraging traditional practices
was the official congratulations sent to women to honour them for their chaste
widowhood.122 Neither Johnston nor Lockhart was sufficiently opposed to the practice
of foot-binding to support wholeheartedly the territory’s Anti-Foot-Binding Society.
The government’s approach to education, the progress of women and suicide provide
123yet more examples of tradition favoured over change.
In dealing with the territory’s inhabitants, both men were sympathetic towards 
the Chinese. Although both Lockhart and Johnston saw that corruption and bribery 
were always a possibility, both were quick to defend the Chinese inhabitants of the 
territory and express faith in them. Johnston, in particular, was usually ready to 
defend them against complaints from the small number of European residents. 
Complaints made about the behaviour of the Chinese were treated with something
119 Johnston’s career as an academic is explored in R. Bickers, ‘ “Coolie Work” Journal o f  the Royal 
Asiatic Society, 1995, series III, vol. 5, 385-401.
120 These are discussed in ch. 3.
12 ’ Having made Lockhart aware o f the possible infringement, the Colonial Office probably turned a 
blind eye to his continued practice o f awarding such medals: Commissioner to Earl Elgin, 11 Dec 1906 
and Draft Despatch to Commissioner, 18 Feb 1907, CO 521/9; Comm to Lord Elgin, 9 Apr 1907 and 
Lucas to Hopwood, 15 May 1907, CO 521/10.
122 An example o f  this is given in ch. 7, ‘Attempts at understanding suicide in China’.
123 See ch. 7.
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approaching contempt, particularly if the complainants were missionaries.124 He was 
not sympathetic to their cause, and, in 1911, using the pen name of Lin Shao-Yang, he 
published a book he referred to as ‘The Blast’, in which he criticised missionaries and 
their methods.125 In later life, some called him a Buddhist crank;126 his religious 
inclinations lay far from Christianity.
Despite each, from time to time, feeling overlooked for promotion, both men 
governed with enthusiasm and a keen interest in Weihaiwei. Johnston’s book on the 
territory - Lion and Dragon in Northern China121 - is a testament to his interest and 
knowledge of the area, its people and their ways. Lockhart encouraged Johnston to 
write this book, assuring him of a supply of information based 011 his own knowledge 
and experience of the territory.128 Lion thus reflects the interest of both men. This 
interest in Chinese law and custom, and in the settlement of petty quarrels seen in 
chapter 6, was particularly clear in the case of Johnston but, judging from the 
frequency with which he wrote to Lockhart about the disputes he was dealing with, 
this interest was probably also shared by Lockhart.
Johnston was not alone in his scholarly leanings. Lockhart took 011 a number
of writing projects and published a number of books and articles in his lifetime on a
variety of subjects.129 Mutual discussion of their respective writing projects alleviated
the duller months of the year when Lockhart’s wife was in England. For instance, they
1 ^0wrote to each other for information on local folklore, and the arrival of a collection 
of books purchased by Johnston was mentioned in letters, Johnston urging Lockhart
1 0 1
to pay him and his books a visit.
124 Johnston’s contempt for missionaries did not prevent him from accepting their hospitality when 
travelling. He once wrote to Lockhart saying that he was a guest o f  missionaries for the night, adding ‘I 
have not told them I am a Buddhist’ - Johnston to Lockhart, 12 Feb 1906, Wanhsien, SLPNLS, vol. 
9(a).
125 Lin Shao-Yang, A Chinese Appeal to Christendom Concerning Christian Missions (London: Watts, 
1911).
126 See Shiona Airlie, Reginald Johnston (Edinburgh: NMS, 2001), 7.
127 R.F. Johnston, Lion and Dragon in Northern China (London: John Murray, 1910).
128 Airlie (2001), 43.
129 See Lethbridge (1972). A noteworthy published work o f Lockhart’s is J.H. Stewart Lockhart, ‘The 
Marriage Ceremonies o f  the Manchus’, Folk Law, 1980, vol. 1, pt 4, 480-492.
130 Johnston to Lockhart, 8 Sept 1915, SLPNLS, vol. 10. 
ljl Johnston to Lockhart, Friday, 1910, SLPNLS, vol. 9.
50
In this chapter, we have seen how the leasing of Weihaiwei was motivated by 
contemporary regional geo-politics. Weihaiwei was a reluctant acquisition made not 
for a positive purpose but to counterbalance the influence of Russia and Germany in 
the north of China. The territory’s lack of importance ensured that control over it was 
assumed without urgency, an Order in Council for the territory being passed only in 
1901. The interim period was characterised by some confusion over jurisdiction and 
the applicable law under ad hoc measures for dealing with offenders and civil 
disputes. The Wei-hai-Wei Order in Council was to clarify much but its introduction 
was delayed until responsibility for the territory had passed, first, from the Admiralty 
to the War Office and then, finally, to the Colonial Office on 1 January 1901. The 
territory was also dogged by uncertainty as to how long British administration would 
continue. This situation persisted for some two decades until the announcement in 
1922 that the territory would be returned to Chinese jurisdiction ushered in a 
prolonged twilight of British administration. Against this backdrop, there was little 
public or private investment in the territory. With that deficiency came the failure to 
attract a sizeable European population and the lack of any significant social or 
economic transformation of the territory. A consequence of the absence of more 
Europeans or other foreign communities in the territory was that the government 
directed its policy on law and order towards the indigenous Chinese without the need 
to balance this against the conflicting needs of others.
By coincidence and circumstance, some characteristics of those early months 
remained true for much of the period of the lease. The reluctance to increase 
expenditure in the territory meant that the administration remained small. This had 
several important consequences for the arrangements for law and the administration 
of justice. With few officers, the government had to co-opt local structures of 
authority whilst maintaining close ties with the villages making up the territory, 
particular in the farther-flung areas. Village headmen became the conduits between 
villager and government and an important element of the government’s policies for 
the maintenance of order. The parsimony also limited the number of police in the 
territory’s police force and, with few police, the government erred on the side of 
conservatism when it came to law reform. Changes to the law were usually made only 
after full consultation with headmen. Reforms that would antagonise the Chinese 
inhabitants of the territory were avoided. In general, it was consent which 
characterised the exercise of authority through the law.
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The small number of officials serving in Weihaiwei also made it possible for 
individuals, particularly if they served in the territory for any length of time, to 
influence the territory’s laws and procedures and determine the tenor of British rule in 
general and law enforcement in particular. Lockhart and Johnston were together 
responsible for most of the policies and practices in law which impinged on the lives 
of the inhabitants of Weihaiwei. The traditionalist tendencies of both men with regard 
to China reinforced the conservatism counselled by the need to govern by consent.
It would seem that the context in which Weihaiwei was leased, the lack of 
ambition for the territory, the parsimony with which it was administered, the 
pragmatism induced by the limited number of officers of government, magistrates and 
police, as well as the conservatism of individual scholar-administrators, all played a 
role in shaping the contours of the legal system of Weihaiwei. As we shall see, geo­
politics and a desire to administer the territory inexpensively were two significant 
considerations during the drafting of the territory’s constitutional instrument.
52
1. G overnm ent H ouse, Port Edward, c. 1902.
2. G overnm ent O ffices, Port Edward.
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3. Quarters o f  the Secretary to the G overnm ent, c. 1902.
m r f fr r r r r r r f
4. D istrict O ffice  and M agistrates’ Court, W en -ch ’uan-t’ang.
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5. O ffice  o f  the District O fficer.
6. R eginald  Johnston ‘tenting it’, as he often did for the purposes o f  investigating disputes.
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7. Jam es Stewart Lockhart w ith District H eadm en (front row ).
8. O fficia l gathering o f  V illage H eadm en.
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CHAPTER 2 
TOWARDS AN ORDER IN COUNCIL FOR WEIHAIWEI
In early 1899, the Government considered the use of naval law, administered by naval 
courts-martial, as a system of law for Weihaiwei.1 The main sources of such law were 
the penal code found in the Naval Discipline Act and the civil code of the navy 
contained in the relevant regulations and instructions established by Order in Council. 
The naval penal code covered not only breaches of naval discipline and duty specified 
in the Naval Discipline Act but also offences against ordinary criminal law. However, 
naval law was not, by and large, applicable to civilians and this idea was soon 
abandoned.3 It then became clear that Weihaiwei would need to be governed under an 
Order in Council. Two concerns were prominent during the process of drafting the 
order. One was the specific question of whether the Order should be passed pursuant 
to the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 18904 (‘FJA’). As we shall see, this question, which 
was one of law, was side-stepped as a result of contemporary Foreign Office policy. 
The other concern was the arrangements for the administration of Weihaiwei. What 
arrangements would best suit the conditions of the territory? With this question in 
mind, the Colonial Office commissioned a report on the territory, the 
recommendations of which enabled it to finalise the provisions of the Wei-hai-Wei 
Order in Council and to make a number of decisions on various aspects of the 
territory’s administration. This chapter begins with a survey of this report and its 
recommendations before turning to the question of jurisdiction in Weihaiwei.
1 See W.E.D., Foreign Office, 11 March 1899, Jurisdiction at Wei-hai Wei, Confidential Print, Printed 
for the use o f the Foreign Office, 20 May 1899, FO 881/7149.
2 29 and 30 Viet. c. 109, as amended by the Naval Discipline Act, 1884 (47 and 48 Viet. c. 39).
3 The idea o f  naval law had been inspired by the example o f  Ascension Island, a place in which there 
were reportedly no civilians. For a list o f  persons subject to naval law see Earl o f  Halsbury, The Laws 
o f  England, vol. XXV (London: Butterworth, 1913), 9ff. Although civilian passengers on board Her 
Majesty’s ships were subject to naval law it is clear from this list that naval law would not have been 
suitable for a civilian population.
4 53 & 54 Viet. c. 37.
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T he Sw ettenham  R eport3
The Colonial Office asked Sir Frank Swettenham, then Resident General of the 
Federated Malay States, to visit the territory. With the question of jurisdiction 
receiving attention separately, Swettenham was asked to make wide-ranging 
recommendations for the governance of the territory. He was asked, inter alia, to 
consider how far the existing machinery of Chinese local government, village 
organisation and headmen could be used and what means there were for the creation 
of a police force.6 Sir Frank arrived in Weihaiwei on 17 June 1900 and was joined by 
G.T. Hare, also of the Straits Settlements and later Acting Assistant Commissioner of 
Weihaiwei, Soon after reaching Weihaiwei, however, Swettenham contracted malaria 
and had to be confined to a ship in the harbour. It was Hare, an officer regarded as 
possessing ‘excellent knowledge of Chinese dialects’ who visited the enclave to make 
enquiries.7 Swettenham left Weihaiwei for Tientsin 011 2 June, passing through the 
territory briefly on 9 June because the Boxer rebellion had necessitated a change in 
his itinerary. After his mission he travelled across America by rail before sailing to
o
England, compiling his report on the way. Of his many recommendations, a number 
that were relevant to law and the administration of justice are examined in this 
chapter. We turn first to the recommendation on the use of existing Chinese local 
government, village organisation and headmen.
5 Report on Weihaiwei and its Future Administration, Swettenham to Colonial Office, 26 July 1900, 
CO 521/1.
6 Chamberlain to Straits Settlements, 16 March 1900, CO 521/1, p. 350. He was also asked specifically 
to recommend the possible sources o f revenue in the territory and the best method o f formally taking 
over administration so as to minimise friction with the Chinese authorities and to avoid the resistance 
o f the inhabitants o f  the territory.
7 Hare had held various positions in the Straits Settlements and at the time o f  his visit to the territory to 
assist Swettenham, he was Secretary o f  Chinese Affairs in the Federated Malay States. He had begun 
his colonial service career as a cadet in 1884 and passed his cadetship in Chinese in 1888. In so far as 
most o f  his experience was in Penang, he would probably have been more familiar with the Fujian and 
Cantonese dialects than with Mandarin. His published works, for which see the bibliography at the end 
o f this work, further suggest that his knowledge o f  the Chinese language and Chinese people was 
superior to that o f  Swettenham, who, aside from his interests evidenced from his published work, had 
passed the final examinations in Malay, See n. 12 for a biography o f  Swettenham. It was Hare, it may 
be remembered, who later proposed the scaling back o f British involvement in the territory, including 
relinquishing territory and exercising rights akin to those exercised in a treaty poit. See ch. 3.
8 Swettenham’s itinerary and his report on the future administration o f Weihaiwei is reported in 
Swettenham to SSC, 26 July 1900, CO 521/1, p. 641 and printed copy at p. 717.
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1. V illage organisation
Swettenham thought that the existing village organisation should, to a large extent, be 
maintained. Where, previously, village headmen had been answerable to the Chinese 
magistrate they should now be made accountable to a British magistrate. Headmen - 
or ‘elders’ as Swettenham also called them - should be given a written letter of 
authority, stating briefly the duties and powers of the holder, chopped with the 
Commissioner’s seal and signature. These elders were also to be given the task of 
collecting taxes. Swettenham’s recommendations are more easily understood after an 
excursus into the nature of Chinese local government and village organisation.
Administrative structure and legal process during the late Qing
Although we do not know much about the extent to which formal imperial authority 
in the late Qing was felt in the villages which became a part of Weihaiwei, we can be 
informed by studies of late Qing administrative institutions and arrangements for rural 
control. It should be noted from the outset that punishment and justice in China was 
not the work of a separate hierarchy of specialised tribunals in which specialist legal 
personnel were employed. Although there was some specialisation, this was to be 
found within the hierarchy of the Qing bureaucracy. This bureaucracy had the 
Emperor at its apex below which, in the capital, was a grand secretariat, a grand 
council and six boards. Alongside the six boards were another three boards or offices. 
Beneath these central bodies, and with some variation, the structure was as follows. 
China was divided into eighteen provinces. Provinces were, for some purposes, a 
collection of circuits (dcio). Each province had a number of prefectures (fu), and 
prefectures were made up of several districts or counties (xian). Government was 
represented by the provincial, circuit, prefectural and county governments, headed 
respectively, by a governor-general or governor, prefect and magistrate. At the 
provincial level, the administration also had a provincial treasurer and a provincial 
judge. In the case of Weihaiwei, the eastern third of the territory lay in Jung-ch’eng 
district whilst the western two thirds lay in Wen-teng district. Both districts belonged 
to Tengchou prefecture, in Shantung province. The records show that, during the lease 
and particularly in its early years, the Commissioner of Weihaiwei communicated 
with the Governor of Shantung province. Little is recorded of any communications 
with the head of Tengchou prefecture but British officials had fairly regular contact 
with the magistrates of Jung-ch’eng and Wen-teng, sometimes consulting them on 
questions of Chinese law.
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Situated at the district or county level, magistrates, usually referred to as the 
xian magistrate, were the Chinese officials at the basic level and who were popularly 
called ‘local officials’ (difangguan) or the jumuguan i.e. the father and mother 
official. Each magistrate would have had an office of subordinate officials and a staff 
of clerks, runners and so on with which the overburdened magistrate was expected to 
carry out his multifarious tasks. Approximate figures for 1819 show that the average 
population of a county was 250,000. District magistrates would probably have had 
deputies or sub-magistrates to cany out their orders in some of the larger towns in the 
country. The Chinese official who was stationed in Weihai City, the walled city which 
remained under Chinese jurisdiction throughout the period of the lease, was a sub­
magistrate.
As already mentioned, the institutions of the Qing which dealt with criminal 
and civil cases were part and parcel of its administrative system. The District 
Magistrate was also the official with responsibility for law and order. Apart from 
petty crimes and minor civil disputes, all cases began at the district magistracy. From 
there, cases moved up and often also down along a well-defined route in the 
administrative hierarchy, described above, of county-prefecture-province-capital. A 
system of ‘obligatory review’, dependent upon the hierarchy of punishments and the 
administrative hierarchy, existed for criminal cases. All but the most trivial cases 
progressed in this way. The more severe the punishment imposed, the further along 
the route the case would go. All capital cases were eventually heard by the officials 
from the Board of Punishments, Censorate and the Court of Revision. Some cases 
reached the Emperor. Another feature of the system was that the highest level reached 
by a case was not necessarily the level at which the case was concluded. Cases were 
frequently remitted downwards for further review or for the punishment to be carried 
out where the case originated. Aside from the system of obligatory review, there was 
also a system of appeals which culminated with a petition to the Emperor himself. 
That the system of obligatory review emphasised good administration rather than the 
rights of the individual should be noted but this is not to say that the Qing state was 
uninterested in injustice and oppression suffered by the individual. Indeed, in the 
political theory of the time, cosmic harmony was affected by bad or wrong 
applications of the law as well as injustice and oppression to the individual. Either 
could lead to the downfall of a dynasty. It is therefore not surprising that the Qing 
legal process had a system of reviewing decisions taken by officials and a system for 
appealing against injustice.
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Rural control
Below the district magistrate and sub-magistrates, the structures of authority are less 
easily traced. It would appear that separate systems of rural control and revenue 
collection existed, with agents appointed by the magistrate within a lower or sub- 
administrative division of rural China. The structure for policing adopted by the Qing 
at the inception of the dynasty was built upon the system introduced in the Ming. It 
had as its smallest unit the household (hit), ten of which made a pai, ten pai forming a 
jia  and every ten jia  constituting a bao. This was the baojia system. Each unit in this 
structure had a head. Thus there were pai, jia  and bao heads. If not chosen by the 
magistrate but selected by the units they were to head, they would at least have been 
confirmed by the magistrate. In theory, at least, these divisions were superimposed 
upon the natural divisions in the countryside which had been shaped by geographic 
and economic factors. In practice, however, the baojia divisions were difficult to 
implement and, in many cases, deviated from the decimal pattern to coincide more 
with the natural divisions of village, rural markets and towns. This occurred despite 
the fact that the system had been designed with a deliberate disregard of the natural 
divisions in order to check any growth of rural power.9
The baojia system was meant to work through the registration of households. 
Each household was given a placard on which the names of the adult males and other 
persons belonging to it were to be recorded. Comings and goings from the household 
were likewise to be recorded. Although there were thus aspects of registration and 
census in the system, in fact its primary aspect was rural surveillance. Upon every 
person lay the responsibility to report to his baojia head the presence of criminals and 
offences coming to his attention. The baojia head was then responsible for reporting 
the matter to his superior, the district magistrate. By the middle of the 18th century, 
the similar parallel revenue system (lijia) had collapsed, leaving the baojia system to 
shoulder the additional responsibilities for collecting revenue. To remedy this 
situation, difang (or dibao), whose duty it was to arrest criminals, appeared as yet 
another agent of the government.
Later, when the baojia system declined, the difang or dibao became more and 
more synonymous with policing and tax collecting and, in some places, became the 
only heads of the baojia system. Chinese officials mentioned difang as being heads of
9 Hsiao Kung-chuan, Rural China (Seattle: University o f  Washington Press, 1960) makes this argument 
in a number o f  places e.g. at 29.
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baojia. The following, cited by Hsiao Kung-chuan from an official source, shows how 
the duties of the difang had become so comprehensive as to suggest the eclipsing of 
other agents:
T h e serv ice  perform ed b y  the ti-fan g  is m ost important. E ach o f  the chou or 
h sien  is d ivided  into a num ber o f  ti-fan g [wards] and each  ti-fan g  [agent] is in  
charge o f  a num ber o f  v illages. H e shares the resp onsib ility  for tax paym ents, 
disputes over land and hom esteads, cases o f  litigation, occurrences o f  robbery  
and theft, and in vestigation  o f  murder cases. W herever there is any  
[governm ent] serv ice  or undertaking, h e is resp onsib le for prom pting the 
supply o f  the necessary  im plem ents and m aterials, and for supervising the 
drafted corvee laborers.
It is thus not surprising that Sybille Van der Sprenkel, echoing earlier Western 
observers, put the dibao at the top of a pyramid consisting of none other than the 
decimal baojia system.10 By the second half of the 19th century, the system had all 
but gone. Its nomenclature, however, remained, making it difficult to ascertain, from 
the use of the terms dibao and difang, the precise position of the post holders.
The geographic focus of this work is of course the 300 or so square miles in 
Jung-ch’eng and Wen-teng districts which became a part of the leased territory. On 
the eve of the lease of Weihaiwei how much remained of the baojia structure and the 
difang or dibao? Swettenham, in his report explained how ten ‘families’ formed one 
jia  and ten such jia  formed one bao. Li and bao appear to have been alternative terms 
for the same thing.11 Three separate authorities were mentioned. There were dibao or 
difang appointed by the magistrate for each village or group of villages, village 
headmen and village elders. According to Swettenham, this last group sometimes 
constituted a ‘council of elders’. The first group i.e. dibao or difang were referred to 
by Swettenham as ‘watchmen’ or ‘village constables’. Their duties included 
informing village elders of the district magistrate’s instructions and collecting taxes. 
Swettenham’s report also suggests that dibao or difang were reliant on village elders 
for success in their tasks. Village headmen had numerous duties including assisting 
the dibao or difang with the collection of taxes and other tasks, supervising village 
fairs, maintaining and repairing temples, being responsible for wells, organising crop 
watching and the theatre performances which were very popular in the territory. 
Village headmen also mediated disputes and may have dealt with crimes considered
10 Sybille Van der Sprenkel, Legal Institutions in Manchu China (London: Athlone Press, 1962), 47.
11 See Enc. G, Report on W eihaiwei and its Future Administration, Swettenham to SSC, 26 July 1900, 
CO 521/1.
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too petty to report to the magistrate. The magistrate could also demand their co­
operation if village resources were needed for official purposes.
It is not entirely clear from Swettenham’s account that village headmen and 
village elders were distinct. For the most part, village elders, who could be dismissed 
by the magistrate, are described separately from village headmen, who had certain 
responsibilities towards the magistrate. However, in making his recommendation that 
existing arrangements be allowed to continue, only the dibao!difang and village elders 
are mentioned. Annual government reports from 1902 onwards offer little help in 
clarifying the situation. These only mention headmen rather than elders but this can be 
explained by the fact that, by this time, the government had co-opted village headmen 
as their agents. The earliest report on the administration of the territory, compiled by 
G.T. Hare, implies that headmen and village elders were one and the same, though 
there must have been influential and respected older individuals in the villages who 
were nonetheless not headmen. He states simply that *[i]n none of the villages within 
the Wei-hai-wei area are there any official representatives, or ti pao, of the local 
Chinese Magistrates.’ Of course, he may have been referring to the situation under 
British rule; it would have been odd if difang answerable to the Chinese magistrates 
had been allowed to continue their duties in the territory. However, the report goes on 
to explain that ‘[i]n this part of Shantung the tribunals of village elders have 
practically no connecting link with the district authorities and are entirely self­
governed.’ This suggests that Hare was making a broader point about the autonomy of 
the villages in Weihaiwei. Johnston’s account in Lion, published eight years later also 
makes no historical reference to the presence of dibao or difang. The reliability of the 
Swettenham report is in any case open to question given the briefness of the visit, 
Swettenham’s confinement to his bed and his lack of relevant experience with similar 
communities. Swettenham was picked for the task because of his supposed 
‘familiarity with the general system of Colonial administration’ and ‘his experience in 
dealing with the Chinese’, the latter gained as a result of his appointments in the 
Straits Settlements and in the Malay states. Although he was no doubt familiar with 
the ‘general system of Colonial administration’, it is less clear that he had much 
experience in dealing with the Chinese. At the time of his visit to Weihaiwei, his main 
experience of the Chinese came from the time he spent in Larut, a tin mining town in 
the Malay state of Perak. There, he had worked to appease the demands of Chinese
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miners, after which he remained for a month to ensure that the peace between factions 
of miners was kept.12 His experience of negotiating with the Malays was greater and 
indeed his published works attest to a primary interest in Malay language and 
culture.13
It would appear that, contrary to Swettenham5 s report, dibao or difang were 
not known in Weihaiwei. Villages possessed headmen and village elders, who 
between them carried out a variety of tasks and though not officially agents of the 
Chinese district magistrate, would have been the persons from whom the Chinese 
magistrate expected co-operation.
The rest of Swettenham5s recommendations relevant to this study can be 
stated briefly.
2. Modifications to The China and Japan Order in Council, 1865
The most fundamental recommendation, from the point of view of the constitutional 
arrangements for the governance of Weihaiwei, was Swettenham’s proposal that, with 
some modifications, the China and Japan Order in Council, 1865 (The China Order5), 
should be extended to the territory.14 First passed in 1865, it had been subject to 
correction, amendment and partial repeal at least five times by the time Swettenham 
wrote his report.15 The China Order was an elaborate instrument, almost as elaborate 
as the Ottoman Dominions Order in Council, 1875, which was considered to contain 
‘a complete law5 for the exercise of jurisdiction under the FJA, supplying as it did, a 
comprehensive system of civil and criminal jurisdiction in more than 300 articles. The 
China and Ottoman Orders were two of about a dozen orders in council, mostly 
shorter in length and more restrictive in substance, issued pursuant to the FJA.16 Like 
the Ottoman Dominions Order, the China Order dealt thoroughly with the court
12 For more on Sir Frank Swettenham see the biography by H.S. Barlow, Swettenham  (Kuala Lumpur: 
Southdene, 1995).
13 Works authored by Swettenham are listed in the bibliography at the end o f  this work.
14 Report on Weihaiwei and its Future Administration, Swettenham to SSC, 26 July 1900, CO 521/1.
15 The China and Corea Order in Council, 1904, repealed the 1865 Order and nine other China Orders 
in Council.
16 These were the Orders for Siam; Morocco; Muscat; Madagascar; China, Japan and Corea (first 
passed in 1865 as the China and Japan Order in Council); Ottoman Dominions (including Tripoli and 
Egypt); Zanzibar, The Western Pacific, West Africa; South Africa; and Cyprus. The degree o f variation 
between orders in council was a function o f  the flexibility o f the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, which, 
although passed mainly with the protection o f  British subjects abroad in mind, could and was used for 
far wider exercise o f  nearly all government functions in a foreign territory.
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system, jurisdiction of the courts, and criminal and civil procedure, including, inter 
alia, the special procedures for bankruptcy, admiralty, matrimonial, probate and 
administration and other causes. In appended schedules, both orders had detailed rules 
of court, court fees and a large number of court forms. The hierarchy of courts 
prescribed by the China Order consisted of H.B.M.’s Supreme Court of China, which 
ordinarily sat in Shanghai, at its apex. Below this court lay the Provincial Court for 
each consular district, presided over by the Consul-General, Consuls or Vice-Consuls. 
Appeals from any Provincial Court lay to the Supreme Court in Shanghai and from 
there to the Privy Council. As to the applicable law, with some exceptions, English
17law prevailed.
3. A Supreme Court of Weihaiwei
Swettenham recommended that Weihaiwei should have a Supreme Court. In the light 
of his proposal to extend to Weihaiwei the China Order, this court was to be treated 
on a footing similar to that of a provincial consular court, reporting to H.B.M’s 
Supreme Court in Shanghai.18 To avoid too many cases being sent to Shanghai, 
Swettenham proposed enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Weihaiwei Supreme 
Court to $2000 in mixed civil cases and $1500 in cases between Europeans. Criminal 
jurisdiction extended to sentences of imprisonment of up to 24 months and fines not 
exceeding $4000, in the case of the Chinese, and imprisonment of up to 12 months 
and fines not exceeding $1000, in the case of Europeans. As a provincial court, the 
Weihaiwei Supreme Court would have to report all civil and criminal cases to the 
Supreme Court in Shanghai at regular intervals. On the personnel of the court, 
Swettenham’s report contemplated the appointment of non-Europeans as magistrates, 
observing that it would be impossible, at least for some time, to appoint sufficient 
numbers of European magistrates.
4. Trial procedure
In Chinese-only cases, Swettenham suggested a ban on counsel for at least the first 
five or ten years of the administration. The courts could be assisted by assessors or a
17 WOIC, art. 19.
18 Enc. D, Required Modifications o f  Order in Council for the Government o f Her Majesty's subjects in 
China, 1865, Report on Weihaiwei and its Future Administration, Swettenham to SSC, 26 July 1900, 
CO 521/1. In this enclosure, Swettenham refers also to the 1881 and 1887 China Orders in Council.
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jury but these matters should, it was suggested, be left to the discretion of the 
Commissioner.
5. Chinese village courts
Although jurisdiction lay in the Supreme Court, Swettenham suggested that the 
executive of the territory - the Commissioner - should be empowered to delegate to 
other officers jurisdiction in all cases where only ‘persons of Chinese birth’ were 
concerned. In this regard, Swettenham also suggested that the Commissioner should 
be empowered to constitute ‘Chinese village Courts’ to deal with petty debts and 
trivial offences. These tribunals, assumed to have existed at the time of Swettenham’s 
report, would continue to hear civil cases as they had previously done.
6. Indian or Straits Settlements Penal Codes and local customary law
In a departure from the China Order, Swettenham suggested that the Indian or Straits 
Settlements Penal Code be adopted for the Chinese population, whilst crimes 
committed by Europeans and civil disputes involving a non-Chinese should, as in the 
China Order, be determined in accordance with English law. Local customary law 
should be applied in all civil and criminal cases involving only Chinese persons. In 
criminal cases, this would mean the ousting of the aforementioned penal codes but 
Swettenham appears to have overlooked this possible inconsistency.
7. Policing
On policing, Swettenham proposed that some 200 men of the 1st Chinese Regiment 
be detailed to undertake a policing role, under a Superintendent of Police. As we saw 
in chapter 1, the 1st Chinese Regiment, which had been raised in the territory in 1899, 
was already headquartered in Mat’ou and had been useful in quelling the trouble 
which had arisen during the demarcation of the boundary of Weihaiwei. This 
regiment had received praise for its service in Tientsin during the Boxer rebellion.
8. Separate administration of Liukung
Citing the difficulties of communication between the island and the mainland,
Swettenham echoed the views of others that Liukung should be administered 
separately under a cantonment magistrate responsible for the entire administration of 
the island.
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9. A  C om m issioner for W eihaiw ei
Swettenham proposed that Weihaiwei should have a Commissioner and in his view,
the territory’s needs were best met by
an exp erienced  c iv il o fficer  w ho understands the C hinese language and 
p eop le . . .  T h e C om m issioner, i f  a m ilitary officer, w ill k now  noth ing o f  
C hinese, and probably very little o f  adm inistration. . ..  W hat is really wanted  
is an able, experienced  civ ilian , w ho understands the C hinese p eop le and 
language, w h o  know s h is w ork thoroughly, and can put the adm inistration o f  
the territory on a sound footin g , so that his su ccessors w ill not be 
em barrassed by his m istak es.19
10. The walled city of Weihai
Within the leased territory of Weihaiwei lay the walled city of Weihai. It was an area
covering about a square mile in which there was a sub-magistrate’s yamen (the
headquarters of the official, usually housing his office and residence), a temple, some
private dwellings, a few streets and a population of over a thousand Chinese.20 The
Peking Convention contained the following clause:
It is a lso  agreed that w ithin  the W alled C ity o f  W ei-h a i-w ei C hinese o ffic ia ls  
shall continue to exerc ise jurisd iction  excep t so  far as m ay be inconsistent 
w ith  naval and m ilitary requirem ents for the d efen ce o f  the territory leased.
Swettenham recommended that the walled city, like the territory surrounding it,
should be brought under British jurisdiction. He referred to it as a ‘squalid Chinese
town, the refuge of bad characters’ and ‘the centre of sedition.’ Its brothels and other
entertainment had already seduced some men of the Chinese Regiment,
The walled city clause in the Peking Convention was similar to the clause with
respect to the Kowloon walled city contained in the convention for the lease of the
New Territories, except that, in the latter, it was ‘the Chinese officials now stationed
there’ who were referred to.21 It was the phrase ‘now stationed there’ which provided
the grounds, in the face of an uprising against the British in the newly leased area, for
expelling the Chinese officials, troops and Chinese residents from Kowloon City in
1899. Kowloon City was then declared in the New Territories Order in Council of
December 1899 to be ‘part and parcel of Her Majesty’s Colony of Hong Kong, in like
19 Report on Weihaiwei and its Future Administration, para 26, Swettenham to SSC, 26 July 1900, CO 
521/1.
20 See population figure o f  3500 and notes on differing estimates discussed in Atwell, British 
Mandarins and Chinese Reformers (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1985), 20.
21 John V.A. MacMurray (ed.), Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China, 1894—1919, Vol 
1: Mancha P eriod (1894-1911) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921), 130-131.
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manner and for all intents and purposes as if it had originally formed pail of the said 
Colony.’22 Norman Miners, in his comparative study of the two walled cities, has 
shown how the Chinese language version of both conventions referred to the ‘Chinese 
officials now stationed there’ and further, that neither convention stated which version 
- the Chinese or the English - was to prevail.23 There was thus a similar ground on 
which to bring to an end Chinese jurisdiction in Weihai City when a change in the 
Chinese officials stationed there occurred. Furthermore, in the case of the Kowloon 
City clause, the exception of inconsistency with the ‘military requirements for the 
defence of Hong Kong’ had been interpreted very broadly by the British.24 In 
Weihaiwei, the complaints by the military officers of the deleterious effect of the 
walled city on their men could well have been the basis for the argument that the 
‘defence’ exception was fulfilled and that Chinese jurisdiction should be ended. 
Dorward’s report that the boundary disturbances had been organised from the walled 
city could similarly have been used to eject the Chinese officials.
Despite Swettenham’s recommendation and the support of others, Chinese 
officials continued to exercise jurisdiction within the walled city of Weihai until 
rendition. The Colonial Office urged the Foreign Office to take steps to bring Chinese 
jurisdiction to an end but the Foreign Office made it clear that they were not prepared 
to act without the agreement of the Chinese Government.25 The British Minister in 
Peking was instructed to raise the question when the time was ripe.26
In the meantime, the practice of the British authorities contributing an
additional salary to the sub-magistrate of the Walled City was instituted, a practice
01  * • which gave them a measure of control over the area. The question of Chinese
22 In Re Wong Hon [1959] HKLR 601, the Full Court o f the Supreme Court o f  Hong Kong declared 
this Order in Council to be an ‘act o f state’, with the consequence that the courts could not question the 
order’s validity.
23 N.J. Miners, ‘A Tale o f  Two Walled Cities: Kowloon and W eihaiwei’, Hong Kong Law Journal, 
1982, 179-202.
24 See Miners’ comment that the British authorities took the clause to include ‘practically anything that 
might be considered inconvenient by the military authorities’, Miners (1982), 183.
23 No. 61, Colonial Office (Lucas) to Foreign Office, 9 Oct 1900; No. 65, Foreign Office to Colonial 
Office, 22 Oct 1900; and No. 71, Foreign Office (Bertie) to CO, 21 N ov 1900; all in Eastern No. 72,
CO 882/6/4.
26 No. 42, Foreign Office (Villiers) to Colonial Office, 17 Aug 1901, Eastern No. 75, Confidential, CO 
882/6/7.
27 This practice is reported to have begun when Lockhart arrived to take up his post as Commissioner 
o f  the territory, see Commissioner to Chamberlain, 1 Sept 1902, Eastern No. 75, CO 882/6/7. The 
practice had in fact begun in 1899 under Lockhart’s predecessor, Colonel Dorward: No. 40, 
Commissioner Sir A.F. Dorward to Mr. Chamberlain, 16 July 1901, CO 882/6.
68
jurisdiction in Weihai City appears to have been forgotten after Lockhart, reporting as 
Commissioner in 1902, advised that no change to the existing arrangements was 
necessary.28 The years which followed saw co-operation between the Weihai City 
sub-magistrate and the district officers of Weihaiwei between whom there was an 
agreement that Chinese officials traversing the British leased areas had to report to the 
British authorities.
A number of the other recommendations made by Swettenham were also 
rejected. Liukung island was not administered separately and the China Order in 
Council was not extended to Weihaiwei. Weihaiwei was instead given its own Order 
in Council. The territory was also given its own High Court, independent of the court 
structure under the China Order. Neither the Indian Penal Code nor the Straits 
Settlements Penal Code was adopted, though Chinese law and custom became one of 
the sources of law in the territory. On the rights of audience of counsel, there was no 
prohibition of counsel and a few defendants were represented in court. We have 
already seen that Weihai City continued to be under Chinese jurisdiction; the Wei-hai- 
Wei Order in Council incorporated, with some variation, the walled city clause in the 
Peking Convention. The question of the deployment of men from the 1st Chinese 
Regiment to carry out policing duties was hotly opposed by some but men discharged
OQas the regiment was disbanded were employed to enlarge the police force. 
Swettenham’s strong preference for a civilian to be appointed as Commissioner was 
shared by the Colonial Office and made real with the appointment of Lockhart in 
1902. The recommendations of Swettenham which were incorporated into the Wei- 
hai-Wei Order in Council are discussed in more detail below.
The question of jurisdiction
At the same time as instructing Swettenham to concentrate, in his report, on questions 
of administration, the Colonial Office alluded to the prevailing view of the 
government 011 the status of the territory and its inhabitants. Swettenham was told that 
Weihaiwei was considered analogous to Cyprus, territory outside H.M.’s dominions 
in which jurisdiction was exercised under the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890. The 
drafter of the Order in Council, Albert Gray, had by then begun drafting the
28 Commissioner to Chamberlain, 1 Sept 1902, Eastern N o 75, CO 882/6/7.
29 See ch. 4.
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Weihaiwei Order using the Cyprus Order in Council, 1878 (‘the Cyprus Order’), as a 
template. The prior question of whether the FJA should be invoked drew a divided 
response amongst the government departments involved. The FJA would not have 
been relevant if Weihaiwei was pail of H.M.’s dominions but, if it were to remain 
Chinese territory, it was the practice to pass a constitutional instrument, in this case an 
Order in Council, pursuant to the FJA.
United Kingdom constitutional law recognised the Crown’s prerogative to 
acquire dominion or title over territory through the modes of settlement, cession, 
conquest and annexation or a combination of any two of these. Territory thus acquired 
became a part of H.M.’s dominions.30 The Crown could exercise jurisdiction over 
such territory without reference to any Act of Parliament. The Law Officers and the 
Colonial Office took the view that Weihaiwei was a part of H.M.’s dominions by 
virtue of cession achieved through the Peking Convention. This conclusion was based 
partly on the clauses in the convention which gave Great Britain ‘sole jurisdiction’ 
over the territory. The benchmark set in the case of the New Territories, which was 
the subject of a 99-year lease convention in which the words ‘sole jurisdiction’
31similarly appeared, had the appearance of a more cogent reason. In the Colonial
Office, Lucas, the Under-Secretary of State, wrote that a lease contingent upon the
occupation of Port Arthur by the Russians was at least as good as a lease for 99 years:
W e have the great advantage o f  gu idance from this latter case. A s  it w as there 
ruled that the leased territory could  be treated as an en largem ent o f  Her 
M ajesty ’s D om in ion s and that the leased soil becam e British so il, so  w e can 
n ow  treat W eih aiw ei as in all respects a British co lon y , for I take it that 
law yers w ill not fee l bound to treat a lease “for so long . . . ” as less effective  
than a lease for 99  years.32
The Colonial Office thus pushed for the treatment of Weihaiwei as a colony.
Aside from recognising the Crown’s prerogative to add territory to H.M.’s
dominions, United Kingdom municipal law also recognised the Crown’s prerogative
to acquire jurisdiction in relation to a territory without obtaining title to that territory.
30 Throughout this work, I have used the definition o f  H.M.’s dominions used in Kenneth Roberts- 
Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law  (London: Stevens, 1966), 23. We need not concern ourselves 
with the peripheries o f  this term which may be problematic. It is used here in the sense which excludes 
places in which the Crown possesses only jurisdiction. The use o f  this term by the government 
departments and the Law Officers in the discussions regarding the status o f  Weihaiwei certainly 
apprehended this aspect o f  it.
31 Leased under the Convention for the Extension o f the Hongkong Territory, 1898, signed in Beijing 
on 9 June 1898, just weeks before the convention leasing Weihaiwei was signed on 1 July 1898. At the 
time, the N ew  Territories was also referred to as ‘the Kowloon extension’.
32 Lucas, Minute, 12 March 1900, CO 521/1.
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The preamble to the FJA recognised the long established methods through which the
Crown could acquire jurisdiction, namely, ‘treaty, capitulation, grant, usage,
sufferance and other lawful means.’ As a matter of practice established by the time of
the lease of Weihaiwei, such jurisdiction was usually exercised under the FJA.
Thus, if the view of the Colonial Office was accepted, it would have been
inappropriate for the Order in Council to refer to the FJA, This view, shared by the
Law Officers, did not prevail. The Foreign Office insisted that Weihaiwei should
remain Chinese territory. It later explained why:
W eih aiw ei is held  by Great Britain on the sam e terms as Port Arthur is held  
by R ussia , on the understanding that it w ill be handed back to China i f  and 
w hen  R ussia  g iv es  up Port Arthur. In these circum stances the incorporation  
o f  the territory o f  W eihaiw ei in the British D om in ion s w ould  create a 
precedent w hich  w ould  probably be fo llow ed  by other Persons w ho have  
leased  territory from  C hina.33
As mentioned in chapter 1, the choice of a lease of Weihaiwei, rather than a 
cession, was deliberate and based on geo-political reasons. Treating Weihaiwei as 
Chinese territory had at least the merit of consistency with those reasons. Before 
looking at any light which might have been thrown by municipal and international 
law on whether the leased territory of Weihaiwei was capable of being British 
territory rather than Chinese territory, we should note that the question we have been 
examining would, as a matter of municipal law, only have been of significance in the 
period before the Wei-hai-Wei Order in Council had been passed. Once it had been 
passed, had jurisdiction been asserted on the basis that Weihaiwei was incorporated 
into H.M.’s dominions, this jurisdiction would not, as a matter of municipal law, have 
been justiciable on the basis of the doctrine of act of state.34 In the period when the 
status of Weihaiwei in municipal law was still being decided, the terms of the Peking 
Convention and the principles of international law would have been relevant, though 
as we have seen, it was possible to side-step the legal question entirely.
Municipal law perspectives
In municipal law, the question of the extent of the powers acquired by the Crown is 
usually answered by looking at the treaty or agreement in question, in this case the 
terms of the Peking Convention. In the case of Weihaiwei, municipal law would have
33 Colonial Office to Law Officers, 5 Jan 1900, CO 521/2.
34 Japanese Imperial Government v. P . & O. Co [1895] A.C. 644, at 658; R. v. Crewe, ex parte  
Sekgome [1910] 2 K. B. 576, at 607 and 626 and Sobhrna II v. M iller [1926] A.C. 518.
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recognised that jurisdiction in Weihaiwei did not extend beyond the area leased under 
the convention. However, once jurisdiction is asserted by the Crown in the exercise of 
its prerogative powers, the validity of such jurisdiction is usually treated by the courts 
as a non-justiciable matter.
Furthermore, there were no general constraints on the extent to which the 
Crown could exercise jurisdiction in foreign territory. It had originally been thought 
that the Crown’s powers of jurisdiction in foreign territory were limited to British 
subjects and to the nationals of a foreign state which had consented to a submission of 
its nationals to British jurisdiction. Gradually, the law adopted the attitude of German 
and French law and, certainly by the time of the lease of Weihaiwei, allowed more 
extensive jurisdiction to be claimed, including jurisdiction over persons of any 
nationality, in accordance with the need for effective control or administration of a
35protectorate.
International law perspectives
In determining whether the British Government could properly have treated 
Weihaiwei as British territory, the Colonial Office and the Law Officers would not 
have had the assistance of a definite answer from the principles of international law. 
The international lease was not an established concept at the time and the terms of the 
Peking Convention did not provide clear guidance.
Leases as a novel category
International law recognised ways in which a state could acquire territory. It had long 
recognised the acquisition of territory by a state through gift, prescription, accretion or 
cession. The lease, however, was little known. The main difficulty lay in the dearth of 
principles on the concept of the lease. At the end of the 19th century, international law 
had had little experience of leases of territory resembling the Weihaiwei lease. There 
had been leases, but these, although international, were not ‘political’36 and were 
more in the nature of private leases, albeit between two states rather than private
35 Roberts-Wray, 114. An alternative ground for the claim o f jurisdiction over Chinese nationals might 
have been the submission o f China o f  its nationals resorting to Weihaiwei, a submission which could 
have been made through the lease convention. Likewise jurisdiction over other foreign nationals 
claimed would also have had to rest on submission by the powers to whom these foreign nationals 
belonged.
36 This label was later used by Lauterpacht: See H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources and Analogies o f
International Lcnv (London: Longmans, 1927). Others have used the label ‘public’ to indicate the same.
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17  *individuals or corporations. By comparison, cession of territory was well 
established. This concept dominated attempts to understand the rights between states 
when territory had been the subject of ‘sale’ or ‘pledge’ agreements, so much so that 
it was usually assumed that these arrangements resulted in a cession of territory. Pre- 
20th century treatises were thus, not surprisingly, silent on leased territories.38
Early 20th century texts such as Oppenheim’s treatise, published in 1905, 
mentioned the leases of Chinese territory - the German lease of Kiaochou, the British 
leases of Weihaiwei and the New Territories, and the lease of Port Arthur to Russia - 
in the context of a discussion of whether more than one State may exercise 
sovereignty over a territory. Weihaiwei was cited as an example of an apparent, but 
not real, exercise of sovereignty by two states. The leases of Chinese territory and the 
administration of Cyprus between 1878-1914 were thus considered by Oppenheim to 
be ‘practically, although not theoretically, cessions of pieces of territory.’39 Most 
commentators, likewise, adopted the theory of the ‘disguised cession’.40 This was 
partly a result of a theory of sovereignty in which sovereignty was thought to be, by 
definition, absolute. Though a state could part with territory and its sovereignty over 
it, sovereignty over a territory was assumed to be neither reducible nor divisible.41 To
J? Possible 19th century exceptions were the leases o f strips o f land on the mainland o f Africa by the 
Sultan o f  Zanzibar to the British East Africa Company (in 1887, 1888 and 1890), to Italy (1892) and to 
the German East Africa Company (1888). See M.F. Lindley, The Acquisition and Government o f  
Backward Territory in International Law  (New York: Longmans, Green, 1926), 237-239, at which 
these leases are considered to have conveyed the ‘internal’ sovereignty o f  the territory to the lessee 
state, the lessor state retaining ‘external’ sovereignty.
jS William Edward Hall, A Treatise on International Law , 3rd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890) is 
an example.
39 L. Oppenheim, International Law  (London: Longmans, 1905), vol. 1, 220-221.
40 Writing after all Chinese leases, barring the N ew  Territories, had been restored to China, Brierly 
remarked that excepting the Chinese ones, leases were ‘no more than a diplomatic device for rendering 
a permanent loss o f  territory more palatable to the dispossessed state by avoiding any mention o f  
annexation and holding out the hope o f eventual recovery.’ - J.L. Brierly, The Law o f  the Nations, 6th 
edn, Sir Humphrey Waldock (ed.), (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963), 189.
41 The concept o f  sovereignty has o f course undergone much change. Although it was once understood 
as the untrammelled authority o f  a state, independent from other states, today it is defined by some in 
purely residual terms. Take for instance, the definition o f  sovereignty as ‘a collective or umbrella term, 
denoting the rights which, at a given time, a state is accorded by international law, and the duties 
imposed upon it by that same law. These specific ... rights and duties constitute “sovereignty”; they do 
not “flow from” it.’ Bardo Fassbender, ‘Sovereignty and Constitutionalism in International Law’ in 
Neil Walker (ed.), Sovereignty> in Transition (Oxford: Hart, 2003), 115-143, at 129. This is an 
elaboration o fK elsen ’s view in H. Kelsen, ‘The Principle o f Sovereign Equality o f  States as a Basis for 
International Organization’, 53 Yale Law Journal, 1944, vol. 53, 207-440, at 208, quoted by 
Fassbender, at 129. Sovereignty in law or legal sovereignty is distinguishable from sovereignty as a 
political ideal. For a helpful elucidation o f  the two concepts and the contrasting approaches o f  China 
and Britain to the concept o f sovereignty in the context o f  the legal status o f  Hong Kong see Anthony
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divide sovereignty between two states was to diminish the sovereignty of each so that 
it made no sense to regard either as sovereign. This is why Oppenheim was at pains to 
point out that all four so-called instances of divided sovereignty were not real 
examples.
At the end of the 1920s, with events by then showing that the leases of
Chinese territory had not been treated as the lessee states’ to dispose of freely,
Lauterpacht dismissed the ‘disguised cession’ theory. China, he argued, in leasing
territory, retained sovereignty but parted ‘with the exercise of her sovereign rights for
a limited number of years.’42 Other authors also acknowledged that these leases could
not be treated as ‘equivalent to cession’ even if the ‘internal sovereignty’ passed
under the lease 43 Treatises written a few decades later, came to regard sovereignty
over territory as, exceptionally, divisible. This division was described in terms of a
split between the plenary powers of a state (‘effective’ sovereignty) and rights of
sovereignty in reversion (‘titular’ or ‘residual’ sovereignty),44 between de jure and de
facto sovereignty, or between external and internal sovereignty. Thus the sovereignty
which remained with the lessor state was not necessarily confined to its rights in
reversion.45 In the case of Cyprus between 1878 and 1914, it was said that the
sovereignty which remained with Turkey, although nominal, was ‘not necessarily
devoid of practical consequences.’46 In the case of the Chinese leases, China was
considered to have retained ‘residual sovereignty’, a point underscored by, but not
confined to, the grantor state’s reversionary rights.47
Despite the acceptance of the divisibility of sovereignty, the international lease
still lacked conceptual content. As Brownlie observed in 1966,
the heading, it m ust b e em phasised , is m ore a co n cessio n  to u sage than the  
product o f  lega l analysis. T he use o f  the term is excusab le , but it cannot be  
regarded as m ore than a superficial gu ide as to the nature o f  the interest
Dicks, ‘Treaty, Grant, Usage or Sufferance? Some Legal Aspects o f  the Status o f  Hong Kong’, The 
China Quarterly, 1983, vol. 95, 427-455, at 429-434.
42 Lauterpacht, 185. This is particularly apt a description o f  the lease o f  Kiaochou. See discussion in 
text below.
43 Lindley, 243.
44 See D.P. O’Connell, International Law, 2nd edn, (London: Stevens, 1970), v o l.l, ch. 10 for an 
exceptionally full discussion o f divided sovereignty.
45 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds.), Oppenheim's International Law, 9th edn, vol. I (London: 
Longman, 1992), 565ff.
46Ibid., 567.
47 Ibid., 567-9. See also the similar conclusion in Dicks, 448.
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concerned: each case depends on its particular facts and especially on the
precise terms of the grant.48
As mentioned above, the Law Officers5 opinion that Weihaiwei was a cession 
for a term of years was based on the analogy of the New Territories. As we have seen, 
the open-ended nature of the Weihaiwei lease was spuriously considered by some in 
the Colonial Office to make Weihaiwei a stronger case for cession than the New 
Territories. The obvious countervailing argument is that an open-ended term provides 
less certainty than a definite number of years. It is also arguable that the Weihaiwei 
lease is not accurately characterised as being ‘open-ended.5 It was a lease which 
would expire on the fulfilment of an identifiable condition. These and other 
arguments were absent from the discussions. However, this emphasis on the duration 
of the lease is a distraction from the main uncertainty in the Peking Convention -  that 
of the rights transferred to the lessee state. In comparing the Weihaiwei lease with that 
of the New Territories, key differences between the two conventions were also 
ignored. The New Territories was leased to provide for the ‘extension5 of territory 
over which Great Britain was sovereign: Weihaiwei, in contrast, was not an 
enlargement of a previously ceded area. Whilst the New Territories was leased ‘for 
the proper defence and protection of the Colony5, Weihaiwei was leased ‘to provide 
Great Britain with a suitable naval harbour in North China and for the better 
protection of British commerce in the neighbouring seas.5 It would have been possible 
to argue that cession, in the case of the New Territories, rested 011 particular 
circumstances which were absent in the case of Weihaiwei. Nonetheless, Roberts- 
Wray, whilst acknowledging the extra strengths in the case of the New Territories, 
was of the view that ‘if the existence of a lease is the essential ground for regarding 
Hong Kong as part of Her Majesty's dominions5 then Weihaiwei should have the 
same status.49 As we have seen, since the lease was bereft of content at international 
law, this conclusion goes too far. Such a conclusion, however, would not have been 
unreasonable had it been made at the time the status of Weihaiwei was being 
determined by the British Government. To sum up the discussion thus far, although 
the argument based on the analogy of the New Territories lease contained 
weaknesses, the position advocated by the Law Officers and the Colonial Office of 
cession for a term of years, was not wholly unsupportable at international law.
48 lan Brownlie, Principles o f  Public International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), at 104. The 
same view is expressed in the 6th edn, 110-11.
49 Roberts-Wray, 27.
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The terms of the Peking Convention
If the concept of a lease did not import a particular set of obligations, its terms could 
determine the question of whether Weihaiwei was ceded. The subject of treaty 
interpretation is, of course, a large one and the intention here is no more than to look 
at some obvious questions.
By the end of the 19th century, there was a body of rules, mostly common 
sense principles traceable to Roman law, on the interpretation of treaties.50 The 
present law is contained in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which, to 
the extent that it codifies previous law, is relevant to treaties concluded before its 
coming into force.51 As with the customary law it codified, the provisions of the 
Vienna Convention are residual, in that they will apply in the absence of a treaty's 
own provisions, parties' agreement and a different intention otherwise established. 
Where the parties disagree, the applicable principles were as follows: reasonable 
interpretation should be preferred over literal interpretation; words must be given their 
usual everyday meaning unless expressly used in a technical or other sense; 
stipulations should be interpreted assuming that the parties intended something 
reasonable and adequate for the purpose of the treaty and not inconsistent with 
generally recognised principles of International Law and with treaty obligations owed 
to third states.52 Very clear words are required for an act as significant as the transfer 
of sovereignty. Previous treaties between the same parties and those between one of 
the parties and a third party may be used to reduce ambiguities. The real intentions of 
the parties disclosed prior to signing the treaty may also, in certain circumstances, be 
looked at, as may, if relevant, the subsequent practice of the parties with regard to the 
treaty.
Had the British Government put forward the view that the Peking Convention 
ceded Weihaiwei to the British Crown, albeit contingent upon the presence of Russia 
in Port Arthur, it is doubtful that China would have shared this interpretation. Given 
China’s reluctance to lease Weihaiwei, it would be difficult to establish that, when the 
lease was signed, China intended a cession of territory, even if only temporarily. It 
should also be remembered that, in asserting the idea of a ‘cession for a term of 
years’, the Law Officers and the Colonial Office were stretching the law beyond its
50 For a summary o f  principles see Hall (1890), 334-342 or Oppenheim (1905), 559ff.
51 Vienna Convention on the Law o f  Treaties, art. 4.
52 Oppenheim (1905), 560-561.
76
known boundaries. That the Law Officers considered the New Territories to be a 
cession for a term of years was an attempt to hide a political choice of absorbing it 
into the colony of Hong Kong behind a partially recognisable concept of international 
law. In extending this assertion to Weihaiwei, they appear not to have taken into 
consideration the fact that ‘cession for a term of years’ had been unilaterally created 
for the New Territories rather than founded on a principle of international law.
Another impediment to the ‘cession’ argument lay in the words of the 
convention, in particular, the phrase ‘sole jurisdiction’. Although ‘sole’ implies the 
exclusion of the jurisdiction of others, including, quite possibly, the jurisdiction of the 
grantor, the word ‘jurisdiction’ has never meant the same thing as alienating the 
territory over which that jurisdiction is granted. Extra-territorial jurisdiction is of 
course an excellent example of the exercise of jurisdiction by one state over the 
territory of another. It is very doubtful that any argument that Weihaiwei had been 
ceded for a term of years could be based on the words used in the convention. 
Although ‘sole’ implies exclusivity, nothing in the phrase itself suggests a transfer of 
all rights subject only to the duration of the lease. The overarching rule of in dubio 
mitins would require very clear words for such a transfer.
A number of wider factors lent no further assistance to the ‘cession’ argument. 
Great Britain’s general policy of maintaining China’s territorial integrity and China’s 
policy towards western powers both supported a narrower, not wider, interpretation of 
the convention. The former would have been known to the Chinese Government, 
though China might have observed that Britain was, by the time of the Peking 
Convention, less committed to that policy.
Other leases to which at least one of the states was a party should be looked at. 
The New Territories lease has already been discussed. The circumstances under which 
Germany came to lease Kiaochou in 1898 are mentioned in chapter 1. Both sides of 
the bay were described in the lease convention as being ‘ceded to Germany 011 lease, 
provisionally for ninety-nine years’. However, there was also an express statement 
that China ‘will abstain from exercising rights of sovereignty in the ceded territory 
during the term of the lease.’ These statements provide reasonable grounds for the 
analysis made by Lauterpacht that this lease involved a transfer of territory for the 
duration of the lease, during which time Chinese sovereignty was suspended in favour
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of German sovereignty over the territory.53 As we saw above, international law came 
to accept that, exceptionally, sovereignty over a territory could be divided. Under 
German municipal law, the territory was treated as German territory, albeit in the 
class of territories to which the German constitution did not apply. Apart from 
indicating that there were others who were prepared to accept the novel category of 
cession for a term of years, it is doubtful if any support could be drawn from the lease 
of Kiaochou for the ‘cession’ argument in relation to Weihaiwei since the wording of 
the two conventions is so different.
Other conventions and agreements are similarly couched in such different 
terms that it is difficult to extrapolate arguments for or against the transfer of 
sovereignty in the case of the Peking Convention. In June 1878, a convention was 
signed to ‘assign’ the island of Cyprus ‘to be occupied and administered by England.’ 
An article added later ‘vested in Her Majesty the Queen ... full powers for making 
laws and Conventions for the government of the island in Her Majesty’s name ... and 
for the regulation of its commercial and Consular relations and affairs free from the 
Porte’s control.’ The land on the mainland of Africa leased by the Sultan of Zanzibar 
to the British East Africa Company and its precursor, the British East African 
Association, in 1887-1890, transferred to the lessor full powers of administration 
which were to be exercised in the Sultan’s name and under his flag.54
It may be suggested that the particular clauses and expressions used in these 
treaties are not material and that, taken together, they form a recognisable pattern or 
system of treaties. The background to the acquisition of leases, as opposed to outright 
cessions of territory, by Russia, France, Germany and Great Britain, in the period 
after the Sino-Japanese War, provide reason for treating these leases as a system of 
treaties.55 However, the basic premise behind the use of the lease was to allow China 
to save face and, after the first of the treaties, to ensure that each acquisition did not 
appear to be more extensive than the first. It should be remembered that the ‘disguised 
cession’ view of the lease remained strong for some time after these leases were
53 See text at n. 42.
54 For a full comparison o f  similar agreements reference ought also to be made to the other leases o f  
Chinese territory mentioned in ch. 1 (Port Arthur and Kiangchouwan); the leases o f  territory by the 
Sultan o f  Zanzibar to the German East Africa Company and to Italy, discussed in Lindley, see n. 37 
above; and the agreement for the perpetual lease o f  a tract o f land south o f  the Namwan river referred 
to in Dicks, at 448, n. 80.
55 The Wimbledon, P.C.I.J., Ser. A, no. 1, 30 (1923); Rights ofU . S. Nationals in M orocco , l.C J. Rep. 
1952, 189.
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entered into and gave way to a different view only with the development in 
understanding over the divisibility of sovereignty and the actual events which had 
occurred, not least the agreements reached at the Washington Conference.
In summary, the Foreign Office stance on Weihaiwei, although not based on 
legal considerations, better reflected the status of the territory in international law. 
Although the position taken by the Law Officers and the Colonial Office, on the basis 
of international law and the opinions of treatise writers, was defensible, none of the 
terms of the Peking Convention provided support for it.
For the sake of completeness, there remain three questions to touch on briefly. 
None of these questions is relevant to the issue of jurisdiction as faced at the time the 
Order in Council was drafted. First, there is the question of the validity of the Peking 
Convention. The leases of Chinese territory, along with the treaties which gave states 
extra-territorial jurisdiction in China, are still generally referred to as the product of 
the 19th century ‘unequal, treaties associated with a weakened Qing dynasty. 
Successive Chinese governments since those treaties were concluded have not taken a 
uniform approach. The nationalist government of China considered the treaties to be 
valid. Later, the Chinese communist government repeatedly denied the validity of the 
New Territories lease, by then the only remaining lease, on the basis of the alleged 
doctrine of unequal treaty.36 The Qing view of these treaties has not been the subject 
of thorough investigation but, given its very different approach to international law 
and its unique understanding of China's relations with foreign states,37 the Peking 
Convention would probably have been considered valid but only to the extent that it 
did not amount to an outright cession of the territory.
During the 20th century, states such as Russia and China argued that such 
treaties were either null, subject to annulment or, at the very least, open to revision 
under an alleged doctrine of unequal treaty at international law. There was some
58disagreement as to whether the doctrine was a substantive or a procedural doctrine.
56 Hungdah Chiu, ‘Comparison o f the Nationalist and Communist Chinese Views o f  Unequal Treaties’ 
in Jerome Alan Cohen (ed,), China’s Practice o f  International Law (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1972) and Wesley-Smith (1998), 299-301.
57 See Luke T. Lee, China and International Agreements (Leiden: Rule o f Law Press, 1969), ch. 3 
( ‘Concept o f  Treaties in Traditional China’). The classic work on China’s attitude towards other states 
is John King Fairbank (ed.), The Chinese World Order (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1968).
58 See Werner Morvay, ‘Unequal Treaties’ in Encyclopedia o f  Public International Law , published 
under the auspices o f  the Max Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law 
under the direction o f  Rudolf Bernhardt, vol. 7 (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1984), 514-517.
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The alleged doctrine was not accepted in international law at the time of the Peking 
Convention nor decades later when the international law of treaties was codified in 
1969 through the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.59 In international law, 
the validity of a treaty is conditional upon the mutual consent of the parties. Atwell’s 
account of the negotiations between Britain and China over Weihaiwei suggests that 
the former put pressure on the latter to sign the lease by threatening military action.60 
Pressure, force and intimidation, however, earned little weight in international law 
because the lack of consent as a vitiating factor was (and remains) a narrow doctrine, 
narrower even than its counterpart in private law. For one, the lack of consent applied 
only to the representative of the contracting states.61 If the doctrine were wider, few 
treaties would have been valid, given that many treaties were concluded between 
victor and defeated states after a war. Such was clearly not the law.62 An imbalance in 
the obligations of the two states under the treaty rather than in the relative bargaining 
strengths of the states was likewise ignored by international law. The law was 
prepared to intervene only exceptionally, such as when the treaty imposed immoral 
obligations.63 In short, there was no room, in the principles of international law at the 
time, for the concept of the unequal treaty.64
Second, there is the question of the status of Weihaiwei after Russia withdrew 
from Port Arthur. The Weihaiwei lease was never formally varied. However, it may 
be considered to have been varied by the exchanges between China and Britain when 
the issue was raised in 1905 and 1906. The terms of this variation were that the lease 
of Weihaiwei would continue until such time as China was in possession of ‘fair naval 
strength’. This new condition took the place of Russia’s withdrawal. Under United 
Kingdom constitutional law, however, the withdrawal of Russia would have made no 
appreciable difference. The Crown’s continued exercise of jurisdiction would still
59 In the 16th and 17th centuries inequality was acknowledged by the law, but did not cause a treaty to 
be void or invalid. For an overview o f the development o f  the doctrine o f unequal treaty, see Chiu, 239- 
242.
60 Atwell, 10.
61 See Oppenheim, 525.
62 See Hall (1890), 326 where he concludes that ‘the doctrine is one which gives a legal sanction to an 
infinite number o f  agreements one o f the parties to each o f  which has no real freedom o f  w ill.’
63 See Oppenheim, 527.
64 See Lucius Caflish, ‘Unequal Treaties’, German Yearbook o f  International Law, vol. 35 (Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot, 1992), 52-80 where in review and analysis o f  the alleged doctrine during the 20th 
century concluded that at best, the ‘unequal’ treaty is a ‘political weapon to obtain abrogation or review 
o f  conventional instruments’.
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have rested on one of the means recognised in the preamble to the FJA;65 the Wei-hai- 
Wei Order in Council, passed in 1901, would thus have remained valid.
Finally, had we been looking at the question of the status of Weihaiwei some 
time after the lease had begun, Britain and China’s policy and practice relating to it
f \ f \would be relevant as evidence of their respective attitudes towards the question. For 
instance, it might be relevant to note that, unlike the policy in the New Territories, 
some long leases of land were granted by the government of Weihaiwei without any 
reference to the contingent terms of British tenure as stated in the lease convention. In 
the New Territories, although Crown leases for land therein were issued in 
contravention of the non-expropriation clause in the convention, such leases were to 
expire, with the lease of the New Territories itself, at midnight 30 June 1997. The 
issue of leases of land extending beyond the term of the lease of Weihaiwei seems 
never to have been questioned during most of the lease. It was only when rendition 
looked certain and European landowners asked for compensation that the Foreign 
Office enquired into the matter.67
The Wei-hai-Wei Order in Council
The British Government, having resolved to treat Weihaiwei as foreign territory and 
having received Swettenham’s report, passed the Wei-hai-Wei Order in Council on 24 
July 1901.68 It incorporated some of Swettenham’s recommendations and was passed 
pursuant to the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890. As we saw above, the Order was 
initially drafted using the text of the Cyprus Order. This Order provided the Island of 
Cyprus with a High Commissioner, an Executive Council and a Legislative Council. 
Emergencies excepted, it gave the high commissioner the power to make law on the 
advice of the legislative council. Only three articles dealt with the administration of 
justice, and these did so tangentially. Article 21 empowered the high commissioner to 
‘constitute and appoint all judges, justices of the peace, and other necessary officers.’
65 See below.
65 This would include the extent to which the British government assumed mining or cabotage rights.
67 Memorandum on the Rendition o f Weihaiwei, Closed until 1980, FO 676/311.
68 Laid before Parliament on 4 Aug 1901 as required under s. 11 o f the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890. 
The many months between the leasing o f  Weihaiwei and the passing o f  the Order is to be contrasted 
with the speed with which the N ew  Territories was provided with an Order in Council. This Order in 
Council was dated 20 Oct 1898, the lease o f the N ew  Territories having become effective on 1 July that 
same year.
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The next two articles addressed the high commissioner’s powers to pardon convicts, 
either conditionally or unconditionally, and to remit or suspend the payment of fines, 
etc. The Cyprus Order made no mention of courts, the sources of law or the procedure 
to be used in court. It was a relatively short instrument of twenty eight articles, nearly 
half of which related to the legislative council, its powers, membership, quorum and 
other related matters.
Major departures from the Cyprus Order were made to arrive at the much 
longer Wei-hai-Wei Order with the result that the latter bore little resemblance to the 
former. Albeit Gray, the draftsman, explained, ‘It is obvious that the constitution 
given to Cyprus by the Order in Council ... is framed on a scale exceeding the present 
needs of Wei-hai Wei.’ One significant difference was the lack of a legislature or 
executive council in Weihaiwei. There being no legislative council, the provisions in 
the Cyprus Order 011 the membership and powers of the legislative council were 
redundant and thus omitted. Instead, the Commissioner of Weihaiwei was given 
legislative and executive powers. The executive powers of the Commissioner 
included powers to make grants and dispositions of land in H.M.’s name and the 
power to pardon or commute the sentences of offenders and remit fines.69 Unlike the 
Cyprus Order, the Wei-hai-Wei Order contained detailed provisions on the courts and 
court procedure. These were inserted by the drafter with the specific goal of providing
70the courts of the territory with ‘a procedure to work upon from the first.’
Swettenham’s proposal for a provincial court in Weihaiwei was not adopted. 
Weihaiwei was given a court system independent of H.B.M.’s Supreme Court in 
China. It was to have a High Court from which appeals lay to the Supreme Court in 
Hong Kong, final appeals lying to the Privy Council. Below the High Court, the 
Commissioner was given powers to appoint magistrates.71 Whether village courts 
over which village elders presided were continued or established as suggested by 
Swettenham is discussed in the next chapter. Swettenham’s advice on prohibiting 
counsel from appearing in the courts of the territory was not adopted nor was his 
suggestion on the incorporation of the Indian or Straits Settlements Penal Code into
69 WOIC, arts. 6 and 7.
70 Gray to Foreign Office, Confidential Print, Affairs on China, received 19 Sept 1899, FO 17/1664, pp. 
103-104.
71 The power to appoint magistrates was originally given to the SSC under art. 14(1). This was amended 
by the Wei-Hai-Wei Order in Council, 1903, which introduced a new paragraph to art. 14 allowing the 
Commissioner to appoint magistrates provisionally.
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the laws of Weihaiwei. The Order provided for the continuing reception of English
criminal and civil laws and, to a lesser extent, Chinese law and custom. As we saw
above, Swettenham’s suggestion that jurisdiction should be exercised within the
walled city was not adopted. Article 11 of the Order provided that
A nything  in th is Order to the contrary notw ithstanding, all n atives resident 
w ithin  the w alled  city  o f  W ei-h ai-W ei shall continue to be under the 
jurisd iction  o f  C hinese o ffic ia ls  excep t so  far as such jurisd iction  m ay be 
in con sisten t w ith  the naval and m ilitary requirem ents o f  H is M ajesty, or w ith  
the p eace, order, and good  governm ent o f  the said territories.
This clause was an enlargement of the walled city clause in the lease convention. That
clause provided for the continuation of the exercise of jurisdiction by Chinese
officials, ‘except so far as may be inconsistent with naval and military requirements
for the defence of the territory leased.’ The enlargement of jurisdiction was threefold.
First, the defence limitation in the convention was omitted in the Order; second, the
words ‘the peace, order, and good government’, absent in the convention, extended
the justification for intervention beyond the ‘naval and military requirements’
mentioned therein. Third, article 11 refers to the jurisdiction of the Chinese officials
over ‘natives resident within the walled city’, a restriction which does not appear in
72 • •the Peking Convention. This enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Crown beyond 
the terms of the Peking Convention would probably have been protected from 
challenge in a court by the act of state doctrine.
In drafting the Wei-hai-Wei Order in Council, there were two main concerns. First, 
there was the concern to make the Order reflect the geo-political situation which had 
motivated the British to lease the territory. Second, there was the need to ensure that 
the provisions of the Order were suitable for the conditions of the territory at the time, 
yet sufficiently flexible to cope with possible development of the territory. The former 
was achieved through the treatment of Weihaiwei as Chinese territory over which the 
Crown exercised jurisdiction. Of the latter, the modest needs of the territory were 
emphasised. It was hoped that the legal system introduced by the Order would work 
and that the administration of the territory would not be costly. In the next chapter the
72 This last extension would have justified the two instances o f  British interference in the walled city. 
These are discussed in Miners (1982), 192ff.
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system of courts and laws of the territory under the Order and in practice are looked at 
in more detail.
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CHAPTER 3
COURTS AND LAWS
The Wei-hai-Wei Order in Council was drafted at a time when the needs of the 
territory were modest and the territory’s future development uncertain. An instrument 
had to be drafted which was sufficiently flexible to accommodate both the immediate 
needs of the territory and its prospects in the longer term. Thus the drafter of the 
Order deliberately included sufficient procedural rules with which the courts could 
begin their work and a structure of courts which would endure. In many respects, the 
Order provided a system of courts and laws which proved too elaborate for the 
territory. Few cases proceeded beyond the lowest rung in the hierarchy of courts. Few 
cases were begun in the High Court and few decisions, if any, were appealed. The 
territory never had a resident High Court Judge, nor did any barristers establish 
themselves in the territory. When it came to sources of law, Lockhart, at least, was of 
the view that simple executive orders would suffice.
Rules of court and a comparatively small number of ordinances were passed to 
supplement the Order’s provisions but the Order’s provisions for the courts and laws 
of the territory did, in fact, survive with only some changes being introduced by 
ordinance. That the Order required few changes and the introduction of a relatively 
small number of ordinances is attributable not only to its inherent flexibility and to its 
rules of procedure but also to two other factors. One was the lack of commercial 
development in the territory and the consequent failure to attract a sizeable European 
population. The other were the deviations from the Order carried out in practice. Not 
all of these were strictly speaking deviations, as some were adaptations to meet the 
needs of the territory as permitted under article 19. We turn first to the courts, before 
looking at the various sources of law.
Courts of law in Weihaiwei
The hierarchy of courts established by the Order comprised a High Court and 
Magistrates’ Courts.1 Both had original jurisdiction but only the former had appellate
1 W01C, arts 12 and 14. It may be remembered that Swettenham had suggested that Weihaiwei should 
have a Supreme Court. The probable explanation for the fact that Weihaiwei was given a High Court is 
the habit, though there was no necessity for it in law, o f reserving the term Supreme Court for the court 
established in a colony, leaving protectorates and mandated or trust territories to have High Courts.
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jurisdiction.2 Some decisions of the High Court could be appealed to the Supreme 
Court of Hong Kong and from there to the Privy Council. The inhabitants of the 
territory, though they may not have had a full understanding of the powers and 
jurisdiction of these courts, were not ignorant of the powers of the Commissioner or 
the High Court Judge, particularly when they felt dissatisfied with the decision of a 
magistrate.3 Nonetheless, for the vast majority of those coming into contact with the 
court system of the territory, the Magistrates’ Court was the only court in this 
hierarchy which they encountered. This is reflected in the greater attention paid to the 
work of the magistrates below.
The High Court
The Wei-hai-Wei Order in Council provided for the establishment of a High Court of 
Weihaiwei4 in which ‘all jurisdiction, criminal and civil, over all persons and in all 
cases respectively being and arising within the territories’ was vested.5 All persons 
included the Chinese nationals of the territory, except for ‘all natives’ - defined in the 
Order as non-British subjects of ‘Chinese birth or parentage’6 resident within the 
walled city of Wei-hai-wei’ who continued to be under the jurisdiction of Chinese 
officials.7
The Order allowed for the appointment of a Judge of the High Court, but also 
allowed the Commissioner to sit as High Court Judge, both before such appointment 
had been made as well as afterwards. The clause allowing the Commissioner to sit as 
High Court Judge was included when the Colonial Office made it clear, during the 
drafting of the Order, that they did not see fit to provide the territory with a judge, at
2 WOIC, art. 14.
3 See the successive petitions made by some disappointed litigants discussed in ch. 6 .
4 WOIC, art. 12.
5 WOIC, art. 16. The exercise o f  jurisdiction over all persons, British and non-British subjects is 
consistent with the FJA, s. 1. This section explains the prerogative which enables Her Majesty to ‘hold, 
exercise, and enjoy’ jurisdiction within a foreign country to the same extent as if  that jurisdiction had 
been obtained by cession or conquest o f  territory. Jurisdiction in territory acquired by these means 
included jurisdiction over British and non-British subjects. Arguments to the contrary were put to rest 
in R. v. Crewe, ex parte Sekgome [1910] 2 K. B. 576.
6 WOIC, art. 2.
7 WOIC, art. 11. For a discussion o f  the differences between this article and the walled city clause in 
the Peking Convention, see ch. 2.
8 WOIC, arts 12 and 13. To cover for the judge’s illness or absence h orn the territory, the 
Commissioner was also empowered to temporarily appoint, in such circumstances, an acting judge; art. 
13.
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least not immediately.9 Article 13 of the Order provided that the person appointed 
High Court Judge had to be a member of the Bar of England, Scotland 01* Ireland. No 
such qualification was required of the Commissioner sitting as judge or of the 
magistrates who dealt with almost all criminal and civil cases reaching the courts of 
the territory.
Early in 1903, Lockhart had written to the Colonial Office suggesting that it 
was necessary to appoint a judge.10 He had for some time been uneasy about the 
conflicting roles of judge and commissioner, especially in view of the commissioner’s 
power to grant pardons in capital cases.11 He also expressed anxiety that a case of 
some technical difficulty might arise which required legal expertise. In a reply from 
the Colonial Office, Alexander Fiddian, assistant private secretary to the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, brushed aside the suggestion that the arrangements should be 
altered; the coincidence of ‘Judge and Fount of Mercy’ in the Commissioner was not 
unique to Weihaiwei. An arrangement whereby the Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court in Shanghai would visit Weihaiwei to hear cases was also dismissed as 
impracticable. A11 earlier suggestion had been to appoint a judge from Hong Kong but
this had been abandoned 011 the grounds of expense. On difficult points of law,
* » 10Fiddian reminded Lockhart that, under the Order, he had the power to reserve for the
Supreme Court of Hong Kong any question of law arising from a criminal trial.13 
Fiddian was later to express the view that ‘Weihaiwei cannot afford the luxury of a 
legal establishment of its own.’14 At the same time, he acknowledged that it ‘would be 
awkward if the Commissioner went wrong (as he seems likely to do) over an 
“international” case.’15 After some delay caused by the issue of finance, a judge was 
finally appointed in 1904. F.S.A. Bourne, whose principal appointment was as 
Assistant Judge of the Supreme Court for China and Corea, was appointed Judge of 
the High Court of Weihaiwei. Through discussions with H.S. Wilkinson, the Chief
9 See Albert Gray (drafter) to the Under-Secretary o f State, Colonial Office, received on 26 Dec 1900 
and related correspondence, CO 521/1.
10 Lockhart to SSC, 22 Jan 1903, CO 521/4.
!l Lockhart had earlier expressed his views in a private letter: Lockhart to Lucas, 6  Nov 1902 (private), 
CO 521/4. For the Commissioner’s powers see WOIC, arts 6 and 23.
12 WOIC, art. 35.
13 Fiddian to Lockhart (private), 19 Dec 1902, C 0521/4.
14 Fiddian to Risley and Johnson, Minute, 10 March 1903, CO 521/4.
15 / bid.
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Justice of the same court in Shanghai, it was agreed that Weihaiwei would be treated, 
for practical purposes, as if it were a province on the judge’s circuit of consular courts 
in North China. In line with the practice of judges going on circuit from that court, it 
was also suggested that no specific dates be set down for the visits to Weihaiwei - the 
judge making trips only when necessary.16 Trips to the leased territory, as it turned 
out, were usually necessary only once or twice a year. In total, the High Court of 
Weihaiwei had three judges. Soon after Bourne’s retirement in 1916, H.P. Wilkinson,
i n
formerly the Crown Advocate for Weihaiwei, was appointed as Judge. He was in 
turn succeeded in 1925 by Peter Grain, at the time Assistant Judge of the Supreme 
Court of China, who served on the Weihaiwei bench until rendition of the territory.
Owing to the small number of Europeans,18 whose cases would probably have 
been heard in the High Court, and to the infrequency of serious crimes in the territory, 
the High Court saw only a small number of cases in its nearly thirty years, some of 
which were heard by the Commissioner.19 The single most important factor 
accounting for the small number of cases heard in the High Court was the use of 
article 18 of the Order.
Magistrates’ Courts
Article 18 of the Order allowed the jurisdiction of the High Court, in respect of a
« * • * 9 0particular district, to be exercised by a magistrate appointed for that district, the 
High Court retaining concurrent jurisdiction in every such district. Apart from the 
period between 1906 and 1916 when the territory was divided into two administrative 
and magisterial districts, the whole of the territory formed a single district. It was 
article 18 which, combined with the high volume of minor civil disputes, caused the 
magistrates of Weihaiwei to be overworked. Although the Order empowered the High
16 Colonial Office to Lockhart, 19 Feb 1904, CO 521/7.
17 See Hiram Parkes Wilkinson, The Family in Classical China (Shanghai: Kelly & Walsh, 1926), 
authored by this judge.
18 See Figures 1-3 in ch. 1.
19 Incomplete statistics indicate that from 1906 to 1926, the High Court heard 28 original cases. It is 
only from about 1925 that the High Court saw more cases, some o f these being cases from the 
Magistrates under applications under the Rehearings Ordinance, 1913.
20 The Order was amended in 1903 to add three new sub-articles to art. 14. These new sub-articles 
allowed the Commissioner to appoint Magistrates provisionally, subject to the Secretary o f State’s 
confirmation or disallowance. Pending confirmation or disallowance the appointed magistrate could 
take office: WOIC, 1901, Amendment Order, 1903, Godfrey E.P. Hertslet and Edward Parker, 
H ertslet's China Treaties, 3rd edn (London: HMSO, 1908), vol. II.
Court to order any case pending before a magistrate to be removed to the High 
Court,21 this power was rarely, if ever, exercised. In practice, the High Court did not 
have routine oversight of cases so that it might order a case to be removed to itself. 
This, together with the fact of few appeals, allowed the magistrates considerable 
autonomy in their day-to-day work.
Magistrates’ powers were of course subject to restrictions. They could not try 
cases of treason, murder, rape, forgery or perjury, while other serious offences
punishable with penal servitude for seven years and upwards could only be tried by a
22magistrate at the direction, in writing, of the High Court. The High Court could so 
direct if it was of the opinion that the sentencing powers of the magistrate would be 
adequate for the particular case. The practice in Weihaiwei allowed the magistrate to 
hold preliminary hearings into cases that were beyond his jurisdiction before the case 
was tried in the High Court. An example of this is a prosecution for attempted murder 
tried in the High Court in 1927 which took place after an earlier ‘preliminary trial’ 
before the magistrate.23
The sentencing powers of magistrates were limited to imprisonment with or 
without hard labour not exceeding twelve months and fines not greater than $400 24 
These limits applied even when the magistrate was exercising the jurisdiction of the 
High Court delegated to it under article 18. This was the subject of correspondence 
with the Crown Advocate in Shanghai after one of the magistrates tried, convicted and 
sentenced a defendant to 18 months imprisonment for an assault under the Offences 
Against the Person Ordinance.25 The Crown Advocate was asked if the magistrate’s 
actions were in accordance with the Order. The view pressed upon him was that, since 
magistrates in Weihaiwei exercise the delegated jurisdiction of the High Court, 
magistrates should be entitled to pass any length of sentence, subject to the maximum 
for the offence, in this case two years imprisonment. From the information in the 
minutes, it would seem that, if not for the urgency involved in this case, the magistrate 
would have adjourned the proceedings for the case to be dealt with by the High Court.
21 WOIC, art. 18(1). See also s. 2 o f the Rehearings Ordinance, 1913, by which a Magistrate was to 
report to the Commissioner or Judge any civil case pending which appeared to him to be one which 
should be tried by the Commissioner or Judge: CO 841/1.
22 WOIC, art. 21(3).
2‘’ Annual Report for 1926, CO 521/37.
2,1 WOIC, art. 21(2).
25 Ord. 8 o f  1905, CO 841/1.
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H.P. Wilkinson, the then Crown Advocate, replied with the suggestion that the 
prisoner should be released for good behaviour after serving the first 12 months of his 
sentence. In his view, article 21(2) limited the length of imprisonment which could be
• * 9 ftimposed by the sentencing magistrate.
Magistrates and their work
At any one time dining the period of the lease, there were, at most, two magistrates
serving concurrently. There was, at first, one magistrate whose work was restricted to
the island and the area around Port Edward. A second magistracy was opened in the
interior in 1906. Although it was initially thought that Chinese naval men who had
been trained by the British could be appointed to as many as six magistracies,27 this
proposal was never taken seriously and nothing in the Order addressed it directly.
Nonetheless, the Order reserved the possibility of appointing non-European British
subjects as magistrates for the hearing of cases in which both parties were natives.
* 28Non-native cases had to be tried by a European British subject. In fact, no non- 
Europeans were ever appointed as magistrate.
By 1902, the office of what was then the territory’s sole magistrate had a staff 
of a chief clerk and interpreter, two Chinese writers, three runners and four 
detectives.29 This was a small establishment given the magistrate’s numerous duties. 
These included those of superintendent of the police, collector of revenue and 
registrar, as well as other miscellaneous tasks.30 This broad range of duties offers an 
appreciation of the place of judicial activities within the office of the Magistrate.
The collection of revenue was generally done, at least until the subdivision of 
the territory into two administrative and judicial divisions, at Port Edward. Six main 
types of revenue were collected: - Chinese land tax; taxes on monopolies in the sale of 
native wine and opium and the government abattoir; junk dues; fines of court; rents 
from land and houses on both mainland and island; various licences; and a house tax. 
One of the magistrates was also the registrar of births, deaths and marriages.
26 H.P. Wilkinson, 29 June 1915, CO 873/445.
27 Commissioner Gaunt to Vice-Admiral E.H. Hopkins, 30 May 1899, FO 17/1664.
28 WOIC, art. 18(2).
29 Report o f the SG, Annual Reports for 1902, CO 873/97.
30 Ibid.
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However, as registration was never extended to the native population,31 this function 
will not have consumed much of his time. The magistrates supervised the system of 
registration of land transfers between natives but registration was not, in general,
*39popular. In any case, village and district headmen assisted the magistrates in this
33task. One of the magistrates would also have had to carry out the functions of a 
coroner, a position which may have been burdensome owing to the many incidents of 
suicide.34
Other tasks of the magistrates included the legislative - assisting the 
Commissioner in the drafting of ordinances and also overseeing the posting up of 
notices, proclamations etc. Shortly after the arrival of Lockhart as the territory’s first 
civilian Commissioner, government notice boards for the posting of proclamations,
* * *3 Snotices, etc. were erected in all villages. While they were novel, at least, the notice 
boards appeared to have been effective in transmitting information to the villagers.36
In criminal cases, the magistrates, with the help of the police inspectors, 
investigated crimes and raided opium dens and other places of ill repute.37 As late as 
1916, Johnston led a raid of premises suspected of being used by ‘professional’ 
gamblers. Forty-one gamblers from the territory and adjacent areas as well as places 
as far away as Chefoo were arrested.
In 1906, the additional post of District Officer and Magistrate resident in the 
interior of the territory was introduced to Weihaiwei, Johnston becoming the first
31 Very few marriages were registered in Weihaiwei; the first registrations occurred in 1904: Report o f  
the SG for 1904 - app. to the Annual Report sent to the Colonial Office, CO 873/163.
’2 See further discussion o f  land registration in ch. 6 .
33 Report o f  the SG for the year 1903, app. I to Annual Report for 1903, Lockhart to SSC, 18 Apr 1904, 
CO 521/6.
34 See ch. 7.
35 Prior to that, only the larger villages had been supplied with notice boards. There was no Chinese 
press in Weihaiwei until the introduction o f the Weihai Wu Bao in 1927. See Johnston to Lockhart, 18 
Dec 1927, Weihaiwei, SLPNLS, vol. 10A, (b).
35 In his Annual Report for 1902, Walter, the Government Secretary, reported an amusing anecdote 
from a performance by a Chinese conjuror at the Magistrate’s house a few days after a notice 
prohibiting the use o f creaking wheelbarrows had been posted in the territory: ‘During the course o f  his 
seance, the wizard gave some very lifelike imitations o f  various phenomena in daily life including the 
sound made by the Chinese wheelbarrow. Before giving this imitation the man o f  legerdemain put on a 
face that baffles description and solemnly announced in Chinese “Fine o f  one dollar”. The roar o f  
laughter which greeted this announcement from the crowd that were flattening their noses at the 
Magisterial windows showed how thoroughly the people enjoyed the apt illusion’: Annual Reports for 
1902, Report o f the SG, CO 873/97.
37 See ch. 4.
38 Johnston to Lockhart, 13 Apr 1916, SLPNLS, vol. 10.
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holder of the post. The district officer’s headquarters and residence were for a short 
time located in the village of Fan-chia-pu before being relocated to the village of 
Wen-ch’iian-t’ang, about 11 miles from Port Edward. The territory was soon divided 
into two administrative divisions and all villages were grouped into one of 26 
districts. Of these, 17 to the south became Johnston’s responsibility. The remaining 
nine, which included the island of Liukung, came under Robert Walter who was, at 
the time, Government Secretary. The division in which Johnston served as Magistrate 
was the more populous,39 and its magisterial workload was always heavier than the 
other division’s. At the end of May 1912, to correct the imbalance, three districts of 
the South magistracy, which included some thirty villages and the important and 
litigious market town of Yang-t’ing, were transferred to the other magistracy.
In 1916, the arrangements were again altered to change the titles of the 
administrative posts held concurrently by the two magistrates. Thereafter the 
Magistrate of the South Division, now the Senior District Officer, heard all civil cases 
whilst the other magistrate, now the Junior District Officer, heard all criminal cases. 
This change appears to have been a direct result of tension between the two 
magistrates at the time and an imbalance in the number of cases heard in the two 
courts.40 Letters written by Johnston to Lockhart during this period emphasised his 
own heavy caseload, particularly of civil disputes. Public holidays were likely to be 
ignored in his court and each working day was long, with only a short break for lunch. 
At the end of March 1916, Johnston wrote that in the first quarter of that year he had 
already heard 141 cases and that petition fees for March alone were almost $200,41 a 
figure he confirmed at $234 on 1 April.42 In both these letters, he compared this figure 
with the substantially smaller amounts of petition fees collected during his absences 
from the territory.43
Another change in 1916, was the closure, for reasons of economy, of the 
magistrates’ court at Wen-ch’iian-t’ang, removing the Senior District Officer and his
39 See ch. 1.
40 Johnston to Lockhart, 27 and 29 March 1916, SLPNLS, vol. 10.
41 Johnston to Lockhart, 29 March 1916, SLPNLS, vol. 10.
42 Johnston to Lockhart, 1 Apr 1916, SLPNLS, vol. 10.
43 Fees for a recent three month period o f  leave were $39: Johnston to Lockhart, 29 March 1916 and 1 
Apr \9 \6 ,  SLPNLS, vol. 10.
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court to Port Edward. This court was reopened in 1923 for a couple of months.44 It is 
unclear if  the court was ever reopened more permanently.
Village tribunals
Tribunals other than those mentioned in the Order and other means by which petty 
criminal cases and civil disputes may have been disposed of should also be 
considered. Before the Order in Council was passed, Swettenham had recommended 
that ‘village tribunals’ should continue to hear nearly all cases, civil and criminal, 
involving the Chinese.45 He explained that these tribunals, constituted by the village 
‘Council of Elders’, would be necessary since it would be impossible to provide 
sufficient European magistrates to deal with all cases. A European district magistrate 
would then oversee the village tribunals and act as the appeal court for cases decided 
there. Swettenham had reported that each village had a ‘Council of Elders’ which, he 
recommended, should be maintained - the government should select or affirm one 
elder for each village and grant him written authority, signed and sealed by the 
Commissioner. This recommendation found no expression in the Order. Aside from 
the High Court and the Magistrates’ Courts, no other tribunals were mentioned. 
Although the proviso to article 19 allowed Chinese law and custom to be applied, the 
Order neither established native or customary courts nor preserved indigenous or pre­
existing tribunals for the hearing of cases to which Chinese law and custom applied.
Nevertheless, in practice, Swettenham’s suggestion appears to have been 
heeded, at least in part. Both minor civil disputes and petty criminal offences were 
dealt with within the village. As we saw earlier, the government adopted 
Swettenham’s recommendation that village headmen should be recognised formally. 
It confirmed a headman for each village and later introduced a higher tier of district 
headman 46 On headmen was placed the oft-mentioned responsibility for settling petty 
civil cases between villagers. How successful headmen were in their role as mediators 
of civil disputes is discussed in chapter 6 47 For petty offences, village processes were 
never so clearly and officially acknowledged by the government although it knew of 
the existence of village regulations and the fines to be exacted for breaches thereof.
44 Annual General Report for 1923, Russell Brown to SSC, 14 March 1924, CO 521/26.
45 See ch. 2 for an outline o f  the main proposals made by Sir Frank Swettenham.
46 See ch. 1.
47 See also the more general discussion on the effectiveness o f headmen in ch. 4.
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Headmen sometimes voluntarily sought the government’s seal of approval on village 
regulations which had been drafted within the village.48 Headmen also occasionally 
applied to the government for permission to deal with specific offences such as 
gambling.49 Thus, village enforcement existed with the tacit, if not express, agreement 
of the government.50 Questions such as the jurisdictional line between the village 
headman’s authority and the magistrates’ authority were never properly confronted, at 
least not in any record which has survived.
What is sufficiently clear is that it would be inaccurate to describe headmen or 
elders as a first rung tribunal or a court of first instance for an identifiable list of 
crimes or civil disputes. Many litigants appreciated and exploited the direct access to 
the magistrate and were not precluded from approaching him without having first 
taken the matter to the relevant headman. It would also be inaccurate to describe the 
Magistrates’ Court as a court of appeal for cases already tried in the village. The 
magistrate, on occasion, suggested mediation under the auspices of the village 
headman and sent the parties back to the village. The dividing jurisdictional line 
between the two tribunals was thus informal and fluid.
Procedure
Fairly detailed provisions regarding the conduct of cases, both civil and criminal, 
were included in the Wei-hai-Wei Order.51 These provisions were more detailed than 
in other Orders in Council. The drafter explained that this was to enable the territory’s 
courts to begin work without the need, in the short term at least, for supplementary 
rules of court to be passed.32 Rules of court were later made, mainly to introduce 
petition fees and then, to increase them.53 The procedures in the Order were to be 
supplemented by the procedure and practice of the courts of justice and justices of the
48 LDNC, 161.
49 This is referred to in Moss to Commissioner, 27 Sept 1913, CO 873/376.
50 No ordinance was passed to establish or recognise the jurisdiction o f village tribunals in Weihaiwei.
It may be questioned whether the Commissioner would have had the power to pass such an ordinance.
In the absence o f case law suggesting otherwise and express authority in the Order, once an Order 
establishes a court structure, it is doubtful if further courts can be established by ordinance. The 
Crown’s prerogative to set up courts having been exercised through the Order, any powers the 
Commissioner may have had to set up a court may have been impliedly excluded. See Kenneth 
Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth ancl Colonial Law (London: Stevens, 1966), 464.
51 WOIC, art. 19.
52 See ch. 1.
53 See ch. 6 .
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peace in England.54 It will be seen in later chapters that English laws of procedure, 
particularly rules of evidence, were often ignored.55 Magistrates were more like the 
investigating magistrates of civil jurisdictions than those in an adversarial system. In 
court, in the absence of lawyers, magistrates also assisted defendants and parties in 
putting their cases forward. The territory never attracted a Bar and the few counsel 
who appeared in its courts came from Shanghai.56 Jury trials were introduced through 
the Jury Ordinance, 190557 but only a tiny proportion of cases were tried with a jury.
Where the punishment imposed was a fine of $100 or greater or a term of 
imprisonment of at least three months, the decision of the magistrate could be
rO
appealed to the High Court. Appeals from decisions of the High Court lay to the 
Supreme Court of Hong Kong.59 There was also an ultimate right of appeal, subject to 
leave, to the Privy Council.60 Since many of the convictions in the Magistrates’ 
Courts were for petty offences, few convictions qualified for appeal. Indeed no 
appeals to the Supreme Court of Hong Kong or Privy Council were recorded in the 
history of the territory. For civil cases, the Rehearings Ordinance, 191361 was passed 
to allow the High Court to rehear civil cases from the Magistrates’ Courts. This law 
was passed because it was realised that the appeals process was a dead letter; few 
litigants were aware of the possibility of an appeal and few could have afforded one. 
To the chagrin of the magistrates, litigants often tried to get their cases reheard, 
sometimes by disguising their petitions to look like fresh disputes. No similar law was 
passed to provide for the rehearing of criminal cases.
Chinese assessors
The Order permitted the use of assessors - persons with knowledge of local customary 
law - in cases involving natives.62 Assessors did not take part in the decision of the
34 WOIC, art. 19.
55 See ch. 6 .
56 This was certainly the case with the hamsters who defended in the criminal cases discussed in ch. 5.
57 The controversy surrounding the introduction o f this ordinance and the furore over the lack o f  a jury 
in two murder trials in 1912 are discussed in ch. 5.
58 WOIC, art. 34.
59 WOIC, art. 35.
60 WOIC, arts 37 and 80.
61 Ord. 3 o f 1913, CO 841/1. This ordinance is discussed further in ch. 6 .
62 WOIC, art. 20.
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court but their opinions were recorded. This would have assisted the court in 
determining the extent to which modifications and alterations to English law were 
necessary. However, assessors appear to have been used only exceptionally. Walter, 
one of the magistrates, observed that it was difficult finding assessors since few 
people were able to state authoritatively the relevant principles of Chinese law or 
custom.63 In two of the four cases reported in the Herald in which Chinese assessors 
sat, both murder cases tried in 1912, the two assessors were both at one time district 
headmen.64 In 1906, a Chinese assessor assisted the Magistrate in a case in which the 
defendant was convicted of assault after being charged with manslaughter65 and, in 
1925, H.P Wilkinson, Judge of the High Court was assisted by an assessor in a case in 
which the defendant was charged with aggravated burglary,66 The records contain few 
clues as to when it was considered that assessors should be used. The cases in which 
assessors were used indicate that, in practice, Chinese assessors sat when there were 
questions over which local sensibilities needed to be taken into account, as when the 
facts of a case indicated the possibility of a suicide.67
Sources of Law
The sources of law by which the courts of Weihaiwei were to exercise their 
jurisdiction were provided in article 19 of the order. Before looking at article 19, a 
few minor matters should be mentioned here as a matter of convenience. First, the 
Order itself contained a number of substantive laws. Thus, article 44 made it an 
offence publicly to insult etc. any religion established or observed in Weihaiwei or to 
bring any religion into public ridicule. The section also protected places of worship,
63 Report o f  Walter, SG, Annual Reports for 1908, CO 873/280.
64 Rex v. Wang Lieu-Hsi [sic] and Hsieh Lin-Shih, 2 Sept 1912; and case o f  Rex v. Li Sing-wu, 5 Sept 
1912; both H.M. High Court at Weihaiwei, Bourne J., Messrs Sun Fa-shan and Miao Tso-Pin, 
Assessors, NCH, vol. CIV, no. 2353, 14 Sept 1912, p. 784 and 785 respectively. It is elsewhere 
recorded that Sun Fa-Shan (Sim Fashcm) was District Headman for the Port Edward area in 19 16 and 
Miao Tso-pin (Miao Znobiri) was District Headman o f Changtzu in 1910. See the discussion o f  these 
cases in ch. 5. The two other cases are Rex v. Chang Chit, Chiang Chang-shih, Chang Miao-shih, 
Chang Ching-shih, H.M. High Court at Weihaiwei, Aug 26, Bourne J., and Sun Fa-shan and Ku Fang- 
ting, Chinese Assessors, NCH, CV1I1, no. 2405, 13 Sept 1913, p. 839; Rex v. Choit Pen-shou, Chou 
Ching, Chou Teng and Chou Hsing, H.M. High Court At Weihaiwei Before P. Grant Jones, Acting 
Judge sitting with Assessors [no names given], 12 and 13 Dec, NCH, vol. CXXV, no. 2629, 29 Dec 
1917, p 792.
65 Annual Report for 1906, CO 873/239.
66 Annual Report for 1925, Russell Brown to SSC, 17 March 1926, CO 521/28.
67 For further discussion o f  the use o f Chinese assessors see ch. 5.
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tombs and religious ceremonies from public insult.68 Article 45 made it an offence to
do an act ‘calculated to excite tumult or disorder, or to excite enmity between British
subjects, Chinese subjects, and foreign subjects, or any of them, or to excite
opposition to the lawful authority of His Majesty within the territory.5
Second, the Order, in article 40, also extended to Weihaiwei, with some
express modifications, a number of Acts of Parliament such as the Fugitive Offenders
Act, 188169 and the Colonial Prisoners Removal Act, 1884.70
The sources of law for the territory mentioned in the Order are English law,
local ordinances, and Chinese law and custom. Article 19 is reproduced here in full:
Subject to the other provisions o f  this Order the criminal and civil jurisdiction 
o f the Court shall, as far as circumstances admit, be exercised on the 
principles o f and in conformity with the Statute Law and other law for the 
time being in force in England, and with the procedure and practice o f Courts 
o f Justice and Justices o f the Peace in England, according to their respective 
jurisdiction and authority.
For the purposes o f facilitating the application o f such Statute Law, 
the Court may construe any enactment with such alterations and 
modifications not affecting the substance as may be necessary to meet the 
circumstances o f the said territories.
Except as regard acts which are or may be made offences by this or 
any other Order in Council applying to the said territories, or by any laws or 
regulations made thereunder, such acts only as would be offences if  
committed in England shall be deemed to be offences rendering the person 
committing the same liable to punishment.
Provided that in civil cases between natives the Court shall be guided 
by Chinese or other native law and custom, so far as any such law or custom 
is not repugnant to justice and morality.
Subject to the provisions o f this Order and o f  any Ordinance made 
under this Order, the High Court may make rules o f Court with respect to 
procedure in all criminal and civil matters in the High Court and in the 
Magistrates’ Courts.
English law
A number of observations can be made of article 19. First, by no means uncommon, 
the Order provided for the reception of English law in the territory in an ambulatory, 
rather than direct, way. It did this by referring to the court’s exercise of jurisdiction in 
accordance with English law. Second, the reception of English law was continuous,
68 Johnston wrote o f  his plans to prosecute a ‘revolutionary gent’ who had smashed village shrines: 
Johnston to Lockhart, 1 Feb 1912, SLPNLS, vol. 9.
69 4 4  & 45 Viet. c. 69.
70 47 & 48 Viet. c. 31.
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not subject to a cut-off reception date. Amongst reception instruments for colonies, 
this is unusual but the Wei-hai-Wei Order’s formula is, in this respect, identical to the 
relevant clause in a number of Orders in Council passed for the exercise of 
jurisdiction in foreign territories.71 Third, this reception encompassed both substantive 
and procedural laws and, in contrast with some reception statutes, article 19 was wide
* * * 77enough to include statute law, common law and principles of equity. In the case of 
statute law, this is implied by the second paragraph of article 19. Fourth, in relation to 
statute law, article 19 did not limit the applicable statutes to ‘statutes of general 
application’ as was common in other reception instruments. The absence of this 
qualification probably made no difference because of the qualification referring to 
‘circumstances’ in article 19 discussed below. The application of statutes passed after 
the date of the Order is likely to have been subject to the principle that only statutes 
which were expressly, or by necessary intendment, extended to Weihaiwei, were 
applicable.
Fifth, the reception of English law was subject to other provisions of the Order 
and to the limits mentioned in article 19 itself.73 The former included ordinances 
passed by the Commissioner under article 9 of the Order. The reception of English 
law was subject to such local laws. Article 19 provided that English law was to be 
applied only ‘as far as circumstances admit’ and that English statute law was to be 
construed with ‘such alterations and modifications’ to meet the circumstances of 
Weihaiwei. A court in Weihaiwei could therefore reject an English law or apply it 
with some modifications. Unlike many other provisions for the reception of English 
law and unlike the paragraph in article 19, which dealt with the construction of 
English statutes, only ‘circumstances’ are mentioned in relation to the rejection of an 
English law. ‘Circumstances’ would almost certainly include local circumstances and
71 Two examples are the Ottoman Order in Council, 1873, art. 6 and the China and Japan Order in 
Council, 1865, art. 5. See also the China and Corea Order in Council, 1904 arts 35(2) and 89.
72 The question o f  whether ecclesiastical law would have been included in a general reception o f  
English law is a vexed one. In Weihaiwei, as the Order in Council gave the High Court only civil and 
criminal jurisdiction, it is arguable that in 1901, ‘civil law’ could not have included the entire body o f  
ecclesiastical law. In settled colonies, the law which settlers carried with them to the new colony did 
not include ecclesiastical law. Though there may have been earlier cases, the authority usually cited is 
Re The Lord Bishop o f  N atal (1884) 3 Moo. P. C. (N. S.) 115. Ecclesiastical law would probably have 
been excluded to the same extent in conquered and ceded colonies by the operation o f  a general 
principle limiting the extent o f  English law applicable to such colonies: see Attorney General v. 
Stewart (1817) 2 Mer. 143. The practice in individual colonies is unlikely to have been sufficiently 
uniform to yield a definite rule.
73 WOIC, art. 19.
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also the circumstances which gave rise to the particular law.74 The court could also 
take account of Chinese law and custom or other indigenous law as ‘circumstances’ 
affecting the application of English law.75 Note also that, although the article only 
mentions that statute law is to be construed with alterations or modifications, the rule 
would, in effect, have been applicable to principles derived from the common law.
Sixth, in respect of criminal laws, the reception of English law was 
underscored by the third paragraph of article 19 that only ‘such acts as would be 
offences if committed in England’ and other acts deemed to be offences by local 
legislation or an Order in Council applying to the territory could be offences in 
Weihaiwei. Local legislation on crime is discussed below. We know that works on
7 f iEnglish law such as the 10th edition of Harris’s Principles o f  Criminal Law and
77  *Russell on Crimes were referred to in the territory, the latter having been referred to
* • 7 0in the High Court m the case of Rex v Ku Chun-ko (1917), a case in which the court 
also examined several English authorities on forgery and deceit.79
Seventh, in applying article 19, if English law recognised the lex situs as being 
the applicable law, this principle would have to be applied in Weihaiwei as part of 
English law. In a dispute over the ownership of some land consisting of sea beach and
* RHriverbed, the issue of applicable law was addressed. Bourne J., the first Judge of the
High Court of Weihaiwei, explained that the law of England, applicable to Weihaiwei
through article 19, was that
land and its incidents are subject to the lex situs; if the framers o f the Order in 
Council had intended to vary this rule a well-known canon o f construction 
requires that such an intention being to alter the common law, should be 
explicitly stated; but there is no hint o f such an intention. It was suggested on 
behalf o f  the Crown that English law in regard to land situated in England
74 See Roberts-Wray, 549.
75 I b id , 556.
76 Seymour Frederick Harris, Principles o f  the Criminal Law, 10th edn, by Charles L. Attenborough 
(London: Stevens & Haynes, 1904).
77 William Oldnall Russell, A Treatise on Crimes and M isdemeanors, 7th edn, by William Feilden 
Craies and Leonard William Kershaw, 3 vols. (London: Stevens, 1909).
78 H.M. High Court at Weihaiwei, 13, 14 and 15 Dec, NCH, vol. CXXV, no. 2629, 29 Dec 1917, p. 
793.
79 The authorities cited by the Crown Advocate in representing the Crown were R. v. Marsh, R. v. 
Ward, R. v. Toshack and R. v. Harris. No citations were given but these cases could possibly be R. v. 
Marsh (1685) 3 Mod. Rep .66  or R. v. Marsh (1703) 3 Salk 172; R. v. Ward (1727) (2 Stra.747); R. v. 
Toshack (1849) 1 Den. 492; and R. v. Harris (1836) (7 C. & P. 429) or R. v. Harris (1842) (1 Car. & 
Kir. 179).
80 R v. Chi Hsing-nan and others, NCH , vol. LXX1X, no. 2917, 6 Apr 1906, p. 39.
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ought to be applied, but in the absence o f  any such explicit provision this 
seems to me to be an impossible interpretation o f the Order, unless indeed 
China is to be classed among uninhabited and barbarous countries. ... She is 
certainly not uninhabited; nor, from a legal point o f  view, as it seems to me, 
barbarous; she has had for many centuries a system o f land tenure and title 
and customary law.81
Consequently, he held that the lex situs, namely Chinese law, ought to be applied. 
Recognising the lex situs in this way had the advantage of avoiding inconsistency in
09
matters pertaining to land. Had English substantive law been applied in this case, in 
other disputes over land, another court might have applied Chinese law where the 
parties were both of Chinese origin, as allowed by the proviso to article 19 and as 
discussed further below.
Finally, where the procedure and practice of the courts is concerned, the first 
and last paragraphs of article 19 were subject to the Commissioner’s power to make 
rules of court under article 83.
Weihaiwei Ordinances
The Order in Council empowered the Commissioner to make laws for the territory. 
No legislative council was to be, nor was ever, established and the Commissioner was
83not obliged to consult an advisory body. In practice, however, the Commissioner 
received advice from the Crown Advocate in Shanghai who had been formally 
appointed to advise the government of Weihaiwei. Some laws, such as the Jury 
Ordinance, 1905,84 were introduced as a result of such advice,85 The Commissioner 
also had the benefit of an Advisory Council consisting of prominent European 
merchants. This council and the district headmen were usually consulted before new 
laws were introduced.86 Under article 9(3) of the Order, the sanction of the Colonial 
Office was, by implication, required for ordinances passed by the Commissioner.
81 NCH, vol. LXX1X, no. 2917, 6 Apr 1906, p. 39.
82 This decision is consistent with Bourne J.’s earlier judgment whilst sitting in the Supreme Court for 
China in the case o f M acdonald  v. Anderson (1904), a relevant excerpt from which appears in G.W. 
Keeton, The Development o f  Extraterritoriality in China (London: Longmans, 1928), vol. II, 295-297. 
In both cases, Bourne was applying the principle expounded by Lord Hobhouse in the decision o f  the 
Privy Council in Secretaiy o f  State fo r  Foreign Affairs v. Charlesworth, Pilling and Co (1901) AC 373. 
See Keeton’s discussion o f this aspect o f this case at 102.
83 W01C, art. 9.
84 Old. 2 o f 1905, CO 841/1.
85 See discussion o f  the jury in ch. 5.
86 An example o f  this can be seen in ch. 7, in relation to a proposal to introduce a law prohibiting foot- 
binding.
100
Such laws were also subject to FI.M.’s power of disallowance.87 Ordinances made and 
proclaimed by the Commissioner came into force either immediately upon 
proclamation or on the date fixed by the Ordinance but were subject to H.M.’s 
disallowance, exercisable within a year of the ordinance being proclaimed. A 
disallowed Ordinance would have ceased to have force on the disallowance being 
published by the Commissioner. The records do not indicate that any Ordinances were 
disallowed though many ordinances deemed to be deficient in some respect were 
rectified through the passing of amendment ordinances.
Between 1903 and 1930, 114 ordinances were passed. Although a number of 
ordinances touched on crime and law and order, few ordinances brought significant 
change to the principles of English criminal law. Perhaps the perception of the 
administration that the people of the territory were fundamentally law-abiding meant 
that there was no obvious or pressing need for the introduction of more ordinances. 
For the few instances of serious crime, English law would suffice. Amongst the few 
ordinances of significance to criminal law were the Offences Against the Person 
Ordinance, 1905; the Protection of Women and Girls Ordinance, 1905; and the
n  Q
Chinese Marriage Preservation Ordinance, 1913. Ordinances similar to the first of 
these three were commonly enacted elsewhere. The other two were adapted from 
Hong Kong legislation. The copying of Hong Kong legislation, with adaptations to 
suit local conditions, was expressly permitted by article 9(2) of the Order. Despite 
Lockhart’s specific protests in 1902, discussed below, that they were not suitable, 
article 9(2) of the Order was often used to introduce, with necessary adaptations, 
Hong Kong ordinances. Although the wording of the article may have allowed it, 
Hong Kong ordinances were not applied directly but copied into Weihaiwei 
ordinances which were then passed in accordance with the procedures set out in 
article 9.
Other ordinances, such as the Police Force Ordinance, 1903, and the Oral 
Examination of Prisoners Ordinance, 1905,89 were introduced to deal with either the 
policing of Weihaiwei or the punishment of offenders. Of the remaining, a number
S7 WOIC, arts 9(4) and 9(5).
88 Ords 8 o f  1905, 5 o f 1905 and 1 o f 1913 respectively, CO 841/1.
89 Ords 5 o f  1903 and 7 o f  1905 respectively, CO 841/1.
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were passed with public health in mind.90 Yet other laws required licences of one kind 
or another or imposed obligations to pay various dues.91
A total of 114 Ordinances in nearly three decades is, by any standards, a small 
number of laws. This is all the more so if we discount the ordinances passed to amend 
earlier ordinances.
Limits to the legislative competence of the Commissioner
The Commissioner’s authority to legislate was subject to some limits. Most of these 
limits proved purely theoretical, in that they were never the subject of litigation or 
discussion during the period of the lease. Indeed there was no reported litigation 
which challenged the legality of laws passed by the Commissioner. A theoretical 
survey of the general constraints 011 the law-making powers of Weihaiwei5 s 
legislature is better left to another occasion.92 The constraints contained in the Order 
in Council itself, however, are deserving of some attention. The procedural constraints 
of Colonial Office sanction and H.M.’s disallowance have already been mentioned. 
These constraints were attached to the power conferred on the Commissioner to pass 
ordinances for the ‘peace, order and good governance’ of the territory. No other type 
of law was mentioned in the Order. In an early row with the Colonial Office, Lockhart 
argued that he should be allowed to pass an umbrella ordinance to authorise him to 
pass regulations for the governance of the territory. This row is discussed below, 
along with brief treatments of the possible constraints in the phrase ‘peace, order and 
good governance’ and the terms of the Peking Convention,
1. Legislating through ordinances alone
Under article 9 of the Order, the legislative competence of the Commissioner 
extended only to ordinances passed in accordance with the procedures provided 
therein. In 1902, not long after Lockhart had arrived in Weihaiwei, he forwarded to 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies a draft of what was to have been the Peace and
90 These include the Quarantine Ordinance, 1903, the Public Health and Buildings Ordinance, 1903; the 
Dogs Ordinance, 1904; the Infected Milk Ordinance, 1906; the Hawkers Ordinance, 1916; and the 
Medical Registration Ordinance, 1923.
91 Amongst these were the Licensing o f  Pawn Brokers Ordinance, 1904; the Land and Road Tax 
Ordinance, 1904; the Shipping Dues Ordinance, 1905; the Lands and Buildings Taxes Ordinance,
1906; the Anchorage and Junk Boat Ordinance, 1907; and the Harbour Regulations, Ordinance 1907.
92 The general principles are discussed in Roberts-Wray, 21 Off.
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Good Order Ordinance, 1902.93 The Colonial Office objected to the following 
sections which were intended to allow the Commissioner to bypass the usual 
procedures for the enactment of ordinances:94
3. It shall be lawful for the Commissioner from and after the date o f the 
proclaiming o f this Ordinance to make such regulations as he may deem 
necessary for regulating the peace, order, public health, revenue, buildings, 
and good government o f  the Territories.
4. All regulations made by the Commissioner under this Ordinance shall be 
published in such manner as the Commissioner may direct, and shall 
thereupon become as valid and binding as i f  inserted in this Ordinance.
5. Any person committing a breach o f  any regulation under this Ordinance 
shall be liable for any such breach, upon summary conviction, to the payment 
o f a fine not exceeding one hundred dollars, or to imprisonment for a period 
not exceeding six months with or without hard labour.
Prior to the assumption by the Colonial Office of responsibility for the 
territory, no ordinances were passed. Instead, magisterial orders ‘which were carried 
out as if they had the force of law5 were used. Lockhart wrote about the simplicity of 
such orders which he thought suitable for the Chinese and which he wished to 
continue.95
Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, replied pointing 
out that the Commissioner had failed to appreciate the far-reaching consequences of 
the proposed ordinance.96 The objects of the last three subsections of article 9 - 
dealing with the sanction of the Secretary of State and H.M.’s disallowance - would 
be defeated and it would probably never be necessary to pass an ordinance under
93 No. 98, Lockhart to Chamberlain, 13 May 1902, Eastern No. 75, CO 882/6/7. The text o f  the draft 
ordinance (to have been Ordinance 1 o f  1902) appears as an enclosure in this despatch.
94 A further objective o f  the ordinance was the retrospective placing, on a proper footing, o f  orders or 
regulations made by the authorities prior to Lockhart’s arrival.
95 No. 128, Lockhart to Chamberlain, 11 Sept 1902, Eastern No. 75, CO 662/6/7. G.T. Hare, an early 
assistant commissioner, reporting only a few weeks before Lockhart sent the draft ordinance to the 
Colonial Office, shared this view. He wrote that Tt is not advisable that the Commissioner should make 
and proclaim any Ordinances except such as may be found absolutely necessary ... [Tjhe Magisterial 
Orders made prior to the operation o f  the Order in Council fulfil all practical purposes at present, and 
should answer for a long time to come. Legislation is not required for the Chinese at all. Proclamations 
and instructions couched in Chinese terms and published in accordance with Chinese customs are all 
that is necessary for explaining the wishes o f the Government.’: A General Report on the Civil 
Administration o f  the Territory o f  Wei-hai-wei, 1899-1901, 31 March 1902, enc. to No. 96, G.T. Hare 
to Acting Commissioner Cowan, 15 Apr 1902, Eastern No. 75, CO 882/6/7.
96 No. 109, Chamberlain to Lockhart, 31 July 1902, Eastern No. 75, CO 882/6/7. The Secretary o f  
State’s views reflected minutes written by Colonial Office clerks pointing out the unacceptable 
freedom to make law which s. 3 would bestow on the Commissioner, the complications which would 
arise from calling some laws ordinances and others regulations and refuting any relative ease which the 
making o f  regulations would entail when compared with ordinances: see Minutes in Commissioner to 
SSC, 13 May 1902, CO 521/3.
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article 9 once the proposed ordinance had been passed. Chamberlain thought passing
an ordinance should cause no inconvenience since the Commissioner was subject only
07to the control of the Secretary of State and H.M.’s power of disallowance.
Lockhart persisted in his efforts with his proposed ordinance by setting out, at
some length, the arguments for using regulations as a means of legislating for the
territory. His several comments were based on two grounds. The first was that ‘simple
regulations’ and not ‘elaborate legislation’ was what was demanded by the
circumstances of the territory. He was aware that the Order allowed for copycat
legislation from Hong Kong but saw that colony’s legislation as being far in advance
of the needs of Weihaiwei. He seemed to be under the erroneous impression that the
substance of Hong Kong legislation would have to be copied, including any
regulatory provisions.98 Parts of his despatch are worth reproducing:
the Chinese inhabitants o f  this dependency are uneducated rustics, entirely 
ignorant o f  Western methods o f  Government and quite unacquainted with the 
principles underlying British law. This mental condition o f the native renders 
it imperative that all legal enactments should be made as simple as possible, 
and adapted, so far as this can be done, without departing from the principles 
o f British jurisprudence, to the understanding o f those who will be affected 
by their provisions.
6. Speaking from a long experience o f the Chinese, 1 am convinced that, in 
the present state o f this dependency and so long as its population remains as it 
now is, its legal requirements will be much more easily and effectively met 
by framing clear and simple regulations than by enacting Ordinances which 
must necessarily be more intricate and elaborate.
... if  Ordinances are introduced such as exist in Hong Kong, it is certain they 
will not work so well, for they will be in advance o f the mental capacity o f  
the Chinese inhabitants and o f the requirements o f this dependency, whilst 
they are certain to lead to an increase in expenditure on account o f  the staff 
which will be requisite to carry out effectively their provisions.
... The drafting o f a variety o f Ordinances, even if it were only necessary in 
many cases to adopt them from the Statute Book o f Hong Kong, would be a 
work o f considerable labour and trouble, as the circumstances o f  this place at 
present differ so widely from those o f  Hong Kong, and would require skill in 
the drafting o f Ordinances. As you are aware, there is no officer here skilled 
in such work who could devote to it the requisite amount o f time and 
attention, the existing small staff o f this dependency being fully occupied 
with carrying on the general work o f administration."
Chamberlain made short shrift of these arguments, telling Lockhart that 
Ordinances passed under the Order were not necessarily more intricate or elaborate
97 No. 109, Chamberlain to Lockhart, 31 July 1902, Eastern No. 75, CO 882/6/7. As for the problem o f  
previous magisterial orders and regulations, Lockhart was told to pass a single validating Ordinance.
98 Lockhart referred to Hong Kong ordinances dealing with health and buildings.
99 No. 128, Lockhart to Chamberlain, 11 Sept 1902, Eastern No. 75, CO 882/6/7.
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than Regulations nor more expensive, slow or inconvenient to put in place. He 
thought no delays ought to be caused by the submission of an ordinance for sanction. 
Lockhart was told that ‘there is no reason why the Ordinance should not be drafted in 
terms as simple and as free from legal technicalities as you please’ and that there was 
no need to apply any of the ordinances of Hong Kong if Lockhart did not think it 
desirable.100 Lockhart’s suggestion for a trial period for legislating by regulations was 
not approved.
Of Lockhart’s arguments two observations should be made: the Chinese 
population, according to him, needed simpler laws than would be the case once the 
substance of a regulation was embodied in an ordinance. Further, Lockhart did not 
welcome the work of drafting ordinances and the trouble and labour such an activity 
would entail. Lie is very likely to have been aware of his own lack of experience when 
he told the Colonial Office that there was no officer with the requisite skills. Lockhart 
was later to provide ample evidence of this through his own drafting imperfections. 
Meanwhile, this dispute caused soreness on both sides. The draft annual report on the 
territory submitted for that year mentioned that Lockhart’s suggestion for legislating 
by regulation had been rejected because it was ‘not the British method’,101 a remark 
expunged from the final draft of the report after Fiddian in the Colonial Office 
commented that ‘Mr Lockhart oughtn’t to take the public into his confidences as 
regards a “domestic” dispute.’102
Thus it was that Lockhart settled down to the task of drafting ordinances. Later 
in 1902, he despatched a few draft laws to the Colonial Office. Although the 
Commissioner drafted laws with the assistance of the Magistrate or Government 
Secretary, and later, that of the High Court Judge, it was Lockhart who continued to 
be the target of criticism in the Colonial Office. They criticised his lapses in 
procedure. He should not have sent ordinances in batches; he should have despatched
100 No. 131, Chamberlain to Lockhart, 29 Oct 1902, Eastern No. 75, CO 882/6/7. The views expressed 
in the Secretary o f  State’s reply echoed the views o f  J.R. Risley, Legal Assistant in the Colonial Office, 
who wrote in a minute, 'What’s in a name? Because a rule is found in an ordinance it need not 
necessarily be made elaborate or complex, or be couched in over-technical language. As regards other 
objections, 1 cannot see why a few clear and simple rules when constituting an ordinance should be 
harder to draft more expensive to print or more terrifying to the Chinese than they would be if they 
took the form o f a Regulation! I should tell Mr. Lockhart to make his rules as simple as ever he pleases 
and as free from legal technicalities as possible, but to enact them in the form o f ordinances subject to 
H.M. disallowance, and not o f regulations.’: Risley, 24 Oct 1902, CO 521/3.
101 Draft Annual Report for 1902 submitted by the Commissioner to the Colonial Office, C 0521/4.
102 Minute, 9 June 1903, CO 521/4.
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each one separately together with a report of the proposed law, stating, inter alia, the 
source of the draft ordinance.103 He was later criticised for lapses in form: ‘To redress 
the balance caused by his putting two enacting clauses in the Pension Ordinance, Mr 
Lockhart now produces an Ordinance without any enacting clause at all.’104 The 
substance of his laws was also criticised, as when an ordinance provided penalties 
exceeding the limits stated in the Order.105
These errors were to prove a small advantage to Lockhart. When he suggested 
that he should have the assistance in legal matters of the Crown Advocate in 
Shanghai,106 the Colonial Office agreed. Thenceforth, most, though not all, draft 
ordinances and other legal questions were referred to Shanghai. Lockhart sometimes 
refused to seek the Crown Advocate’s help, e.g. when he was drafting the Opium 
Ordinance,107 a subject about which he felt he had sufficient experience from his 
previous appointment in the New Territories. With regard to law-making, Lockhart 
never properly mastered everything required of him and, in 1905 and 1906, his 
drafting was still attracting criticism in the Colonial Office.
2. ‘Peace, order and good governance’
The Commissioner could make and proclaim ordinances for the ‘peace, order and 
good governance of the territory and all persons within the same.’ This phrase does 
not appear to have added any constraints to the Commissioner’s legislative 
competence over and above those that were applicable under general principles. A 
number of cases before the lease of Weihaiwei had established that a subordinate 
legislature was intended to have the ‘plenary powers of legislation, as large, and of the 
same nature, as those of Parliament itself, subject only to the question of the ambit of 
the legislative powers which had been conferred.108 A court had also refused to 
analyse the component parts of a similar phrase in the constitutional instrument of 
another territory.109
103 Risley, Minute, 12 March 1903, CO 521/4.
104 Harding, Minute, 10 Feb 1905, CO 521/7.
105 Fiddian to Risley and Collins, Minute, 26 Feb 1903, CO 521/4, in which Lockhart was accused o f  
‘personal government with a vengeance.’
106 Lockhart to SSC, 22 Jan 1903, CO 521/4.
107 Lockhart to SSC, 2 May 1905, CO 521/8.
!0S Phillips v. Eyre (1870) LR 6  QB 1; R. v. Bur ah (1878) 3 App. Cas. 889 and Hodge v. R. (1883) 9 
App. Cas. 117.
,09 Riel v. R. (1885) 10 App. Cas. 675, at 678.
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3. The lease convention and other constraints on law-making
We have already observed the discrepancy between the terms of the Peking 
Convention and the Order in Council.110 Could the Commissioner have passed an 
ordinance within the legislative competence allowed by the Order but beyond the 
terms of the Peking Convention? Article 11, which deals with jurisdiction in the 
walled city, claimed greater jurisdiction than was allowed by the Peking 
Convention.111 The walled city clause in the Peking Convention provided for the 
continuation of the exercise of jurisdiction by Chinese officials ‘except so far as may 
be inconsistent with naval and military requirements for the defence of the territory 
leased.’ In the Order, the defence limitation is supplemented by the additional reason 
of ‘the peace, order and good government’, which, as we have just seen, is of the 
widest import. Had the Commissioner enacted law which contravened the terms of the 
Peking Convention, such law would not have been ultra vires because it was not 
beyond the Commissioner’s legislative competence as defined by the Order in 
Council and the courts would have been most reluctant to consider as justiciable any
• 1 1 9challenge based on contravention of the terms of the Peking Convention.
One final constraint on the legislative powers under the Order ought to be
mentioned in passing. Only laws passed by the Commissioner which were not
repugnant to an Act of Parliament which extended to Weihaiwei were valid. This is
because, although the Colonial Laws Validity Act did not directly apply to Weihaiwei
as a territory over which the Crown only possessed jurisdiction, the principles of this
Act nonetheless applied. Section 12(1) of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, 1890,
1 1 ^reproduced the principle found in section 2 of the Colonial Laws Validity Act. As 
with most of the constraints, there does not appear to have been any discussion as to 
the validity of any of the ordinances passed by the Commissioner based on 
repugnance to an Act.
110 See ch. 2, ‘The Weihaiwei Order in Council’.
H1 See the discussion o f  this article in ch. 2.
112 See Roberts-Wray, 375.
113 In the absence o f  s. 12(1), this principle would nonetheless have applied as part o f  the common law 
received into Weihaiwei by virtue o f  article 19 o f  the Order.
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Chinese law and custom
As we saw above, Chinese law and custom, as the lex situs, was recognised and 
applied in matters pertaining to land through the application of English law under 
article 19. The main provision in the Order regarding Chinese law and custom was the 
proviso to article 19.114 Under this proviso, in ‘civil disputes between natives’, the 
courts of Weihaiwei were to be ‘guided by Chinese or other native law and custom, so 
far as such law or custom [was] not repugnant to justice and morality.’ Since most 
civil disputes were between Chinese litigants and since the Commissioner passed few 
local ordinances relevant to civil disputes, Chinese law and custom was often used. 
The extent to which the application of such law was avoided on the grounds of 
repugnance to justice or morality is not known.
Weihaiwei’s magistrates and judges had an increasing body of works on 
Chinese law published in English, aside from works in Chinese, which they could 
consult. The records do not reveal the extent to which these works were used. 
There is one reference to Sir George Staunton’s work on the Da Qing La Li116 by
117Bourne J. in R. v Chi Hsing-nan and others (1906). In the same case, Bourne J. also 
mentioned a decision of a magistrate in Huchou reported in the North China Herald. 
There is also the suggestion in a Commissioner’s file that law which had been passed
lu See also arts 66(2) and 67(3) which deals with High Court jurisdiction in relation to native 
marriages and to cases o f  probate and administration. In both, jurisdiction was to be exercised in 
accordance with Chinese law and custom, subject to consistency with ‘justice and morality’ in the case 
o f marriage and ‘justice’ alone in the case o f  probate and administration. These provisions do not 
appear to have been resorted to by the courts o f Weihaiwei and are not explored in this work.
115 Among the works on law which were published before the rendition o f  Weihaiwei are Staunton, see 
n. 116; Ernest Alabaster, Notes and Commentaries on Chinese Criminal Law and Cognate Topics 
(London: Luzac, 1899); Byron Brenan, ‘The Office o f District Magistrate in China’, Journal o f  the 
North China Branch o f  the Royal Asiatic Society, 1897-8, vol. XXX11, 36-65; T.R. Jernigan, China in 
Law and Commerce ("New York: Macmillan, 1905); R.T. Bryan, An Outline o f  Chinese Civil Law 
(Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1925); G. Jamieson, Chinese Family and Commercial Law  (Shanghai: 
Kelly and Walsh, 1921); Edward Harper Parker, Comparative Chinese Family Law  (Hong Kong: China 
Review, 1879) and Pierre Hoang, ‘Notions Techniques sur la Propriete en Chine’ (condensed version
in English published in two parts), China Law Review , 1922-24, vol. 1, 90-96 and 232-244.
There were also the following general works on China which contained information on Chinese law 
and custom: - J. Doolittle, Social Life o f  the Chinese (New York: Harper, 1865); John Henry Gray, 
China: a h istoiy o f  the laws, manners and customs o f  the people , 2 vols (London: Macmillan, 1878); 
Arthur H. Smith, Village Life in China (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1899); Arthur Henderson 
Smith, Chinese Characteristics (New York: Fleming H. Revell, 1894; 5th edn rev. Edinburgh: Oliphant 
Anderson & Ferrier, 1900); A.M. Fielde, Pagoda Shadows, 5th edn (Boston: Corthell, 1884); Adele 
Fielde, A Corner o f  Cathay (New York: Macmillan, 1894).
116 Sir George Thomas Staunton, Ta Tsing Leu Lee (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1810).
117 NCH, vol. LXXIX, no. 2917, 6 Apr 1906, p. 39.
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• 1 f Rby the Chinese Republican Government may have been taken into account. Use of 
such law would have been valid under the Order as there was no cut-off date for the 
reception of Chinese law and custom.
Chinese law and custom was also incorporated into the laws of the territory 
through some ordinances. For example, the Chinese Marriage Preservation Ordinance, 
1913119 was passed to protect marriages contracted in accordance with ‘the laws and 
customs of China’.120 Similarly, the Government Waste Lands Ordinance, 1919121 
defined government waste land as ‘all unoccupied land, whether originally waste or 
formerly cultivated but abandoned through famine, civil war or otherwise, which by 
Chinese law or custom is deemed to be public property and to vest in the State’. Other
i n 'n
ordinances such as the Marriage Ordinance, 1903 (as amended by the Marriage 
(Amendment Ordinance), 1921), excluded from its licence, registration and other 
mandatory provisions marriages between Chinese persons regardless of their religion, 
and marriages between non-Chinese persons neither of whom professed the Christian 
religion.124 In these marriages, the ‘personal law and religion’ of the parties - which 
for the vast majority of the inhabitants of Weihaiwei was Chinese law and custom - 
was applicable. Personal law refers to the law applicable to certain individuals in 
particular matters, usually, though not always, confined to family matters such as 
marriage, adoption and inheritance.125 The courts of Weihaiwei certainly attempted to
118 See H.P. Wilkinson, 23 March 1916, CO 873/434 where the Crown Advocate advised the 
government o f  Weihaiwei o f  the existence o f  s. 18 o f the Chinese ‘Government Property Regulations’ 
promulgated on the 31 st July 1914 (3rd year o f the Republic) which provided that arrears o f  rent could 
be collected by the government on waste land which had been previously cultivated without its 
authority. In fact, the Weihaiwei government decided against the collection o f  arrears.
1,9 Ord. 1 o f  1913, CO 841/1.
120 Sections 3 and 4 o f  the Chinese Marriage Preservation Ordinance, 1913, CO 841/1.
121 Ord. 6 o f  1919, CO 841/1.
122 Ord. 9 o f 1903, CO 841/1.
123 Ord. 1 o f  1921, CO 841/1.
124 Section 40(a) o f  Ord. 9 o f 1903, as amended by s. 2 o f  Ord. 1 o f 1921. The original s. 40 had 
included marriages where one or both o f  the parties were Christians and in this regard did not 
discriminate between Chinese and non-Chinese. The amendment resulted from the views o f a priest in 
Weihaiwei who reported that it would be even more difficult persuading Chinese Christians to marry in 
church if  they were required to comply with the notice and registration requirements o f  the ordinance. 
See minutes in CO 873/610.
125 The recognition o f  personal law was part o f an established pattern in other jurisdictions to which 
English law had been introduced. This recognition was achieved by analogy with what might be 
contrasted as the ‘traditional’ area o f private international law where two sets o f  municipal law clashed. 
The main differences were first, that it was the personal law o f  the individual that was in conflict with 
the law which but for the recognition o f  the personal law, would have been applicable, and second, that 
the individual was not claiming a foreign domicile. See M.B. Hooker, ‘Private International Law and
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apply Chinese law and custom to questions concerning adoption and inheritance, 
especially in civil disputes, in compliance with the proviso to article 19.
A few of the disputes over land offer a glimpse of the legal issues which arose. 
These are discussed in chapter 6. By and large, detailed information on the issues of 
difficulty encountered by magistrates when applying Chinese law and custom is not 
available. One of the magistrates complained in general terms of civil disputes being 
complex ‘partly because of the difficulty of reconciling Chinese law with local 
custom.’126 As we saw above in the context of finding persons qualified to be Chinese 
assessors, persons who could provide reliable information on Chinese law and custom 
were few; local headmen were often unable to be of assistance.127 Other problems 
included legal rights which had not been asserted for a long time and long-standing 
practices which had been earned out without the objection of others.
Village Regulations
In looking at the sources of law in the territory, the existence of unofficial sources of 
law such as village regulations merits consideration. Village regulations, comprising 
lists of offences and penalties, are likely to have contributed significantly to the 
maintenance of law and order in the territory. Such regulations, probably made by 
village elders,128 were to be found in nearly all villages in the leased territory. Though 
not a requirement imposed by the government, headmen did sometimes bring village 
regulations to the British Magistrate for his approval and to be stamped with the 
government’s official seal. A copy of these regulations was usually kept in the clan 
ancestral temple or in the house of the headman. Acts prohibited by village 
regulations appear to have varied little from one village to the next, common offences 
being theft of crops, desecration of graves, grazing animals or cutting trees without 
permission. Village regulations against gambling were later said to be increasingly 
common, a development which was influenced by the government’s campaign to
Personal Laws: a note on the Malaysian experience’, Malaya Law Review, 1968, vol. 10, 55-67. See 
also the same author’s longer work on the co-existence o f  personal laws and other laws within plural 
legal systems: M.B. Hooker, Legal Pluralism  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975).
126 Report o f  the SG (Walter), Departmental Reports for the year 1908, CO 873/280. See also the 
discussion relating to the remarriage o f  widows in ch. 7 where some o f the possible difficulties are 
mentioned.
127 Report o f  the SG (Walter), Departmental Reports for the year 1908, CO 873/280. For examples o f  
cases where the headmen were consulted on questions o f customary rights see ch. 6.
128 LDNC, 160.
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divert people from the activity. Penalties, more than the offences, varied in severity 
from village to village but usually consisted of fines and, in the case of very serious 
village offences, expulsion from the village. Contempt of these penalties was usually 
dealt with by turning the case over to the Magistrate.
Aside from being a source of norms within the village, it would appear that the 
courts of Weihaiwei also tried defendants for breaches of village regulations. The 
annual reports suggest that such prosecutions were not exceptional.129 Whether they 
could be justified under either English criminal law or local legislation is doubtful.
Of the various theoretical questions discussed above, few were of any practical 
significance in the territory. Of all the courts and procedures established by the Wei- 
hai-Wei Order in Council, only the lowest rung of the hierarchy of courts - the 
Magistrates’ Courts - saw many cases. The redundant appeals procedure was later 
supplemented by an ordinance which allowed for cases to be reheard. It is also clear 
that civil disputes and petty crimes were handled by village and district headmen with 
the encouragement, at least in the case of civil disputes, of the government. Where 
sources of law were concerned, although not mentioned as a source of law in the 
Order, village regulations were recognised in the courts.
The overwhelming concentration of cases in the Magistrates’ Courts calls for 
brief comment. From the perspective of the vast majority of villagers in Weihaiwei 
who had any experience of the courts during the lease period, the Magistrate was 
probably all that they knew of the judicial system. Indeed, due to their policing and 
investigative work and the magistrates’ administrative functions, the magistrates are 
likely to have been viewed not only as the arms of the law but also as ‘the 
government’. Their combination of judicial and administrative roles gave them a close 
resemblance to the Chinese district magistrate. This resemblance is further discussed 
in some of the chapters below. It should be noted, however, that the Order was not 
drafted with any intention of continuing, subject only to the substitution of a British 
official for the Chinese district magistrate, any Chinese court which existed prior to 
the lease. The combination of judicial and administrative functions owed more to the
129 For example, there were 9 cases resulting in 8 convictions in 1910; 2 cases resulting in one 
conviction in the South Division in 1914; 3 cases resulting in two convictions and one custodial 
sentence in 1915; and 2 cases without any convictions in 1916.
Ill
practice elsewhere in British colonies and other territories in which jurisdiction was 
exercised; the British district officer with judicial powers was not novel. In 
Weihaiwei, however, the lack of resources was a factor in keeping the judicial and 
administrative roles combined even though the magistrates themselves preferred a 
separation of magistrate and administrator. In the next chapter, we discuss the effect 
of similar resource constraints on the policing of the territory.
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CHAPTER 4 
POLICING THE TERRITORY
[I]t is deem ed advisable to u tilise  for p o lice  purposes the v illa g e  organisation  
at present in ex isten ce  throughout the territory instead o f  introducing a 
system  o f  P o lice  based on W estern m ethods w hich , w h ile  b ein g  m uch m ore 
costly , w ou ld  not lik ely  be proved so  effective . T he p eop le  as a w h o le  are 
ignorant o f  such m ethods and it is alm ost certain that they  w ill be m uch m ore 
easily  p oliced  through their ow n  H eadm en than through Interpreters o f  
P o lice , liv in g  in P o lice  Stations scattered throughout the territory, w h o  w ould  
be unable to  com m unicate w ith  the peop le excep t through interpreters, - a 
system  w h ich  a lm ost invariably results in abuses and m alpractices . 1
Weihaiwei’s British administrators commonly observed that the territory was 
peaceful: it was relatively free of crime and its people were law-abiding, a situation 
the government attributed in part to its own policies of ‘the maintenance of the 
headmen system and abstention from unnecessary interference in the affairs of the
0 ■ * Tpeople5. After the boundary disturbances at the inception of the lease, there were
few threats to law and order. In comparison with the civil caseload of the courts, the
number of criminal cases was small. The vast majority of prosecutions were for
gambling, minor infringements of public health regulations or failure to pay licence
and other fees. Reported instances of robbery, theft, assault, rape and homicide were
few. The number of crimes coming to the notice of the authorities would undoubtedly
have been affected by under-reporting and limited policing.4 Although villagers were
eager enough to bring their petty civil disputes to the magistrate,5 the authorities had,
from the earliest months of the lease, experienced difficulties in gathering evidence of
crimes and in persuading witnesses to provide testimony - something they put down
to the ‘native dread of revenge’.6 Similar difficulties continued to be observed later,
• • * 1even after more than a decade of British administration. This dread of revenge may 
have left many crimes unreported. Also unreported was the petty criminal activity that
1 Lockhart to SSC, 5 June 1902, CO 521/3.
2 Annual Report for 1904, CO 873/163.
3 See ch. 1 above.
4 Although suicide is better treated stii generis, see the discussion o f  under-reporting and the impact o f  
policing on suicide statistics in ch. 7.
5 See ch. 6 .
6 Report o f  the SG, Annual Reports for 1902, CO 873/97.
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was dealt with within the villages. The evidence for this is considered both in this 
chapter and in the next. For present purposes it suffices to say that, although the 
territory experienced a few robberies, the inhabitants of the territory were never so 
insecure and at risk of crime as to have petitioned the government to do more in 
response. There were two exceptions to this. In 1903, some villagers petitioned the
* * Rgovernment for permission to keep arms with which to deal with robbers and, in 
1905, the Chinese merchants of the town petitioned the government to increase 
policing of the Port Edward area.9
In this chapter, the extent to which the government sought to establish its 
control and authority in the territory through the police and the extent to which it 
relied upon indigenous forms of control are explored. It looks first at the police force 
before considering the part played by village and district headmen.
Establishing a Police Force
A small civil police force in Weihaiwei was created soon after the territory was 
leased. By September 1900, the police force had a European inspector, a Chinese 
sergeant and 11 Chinese police constables.10 Policing was confined to Liukung and 
the M af ou area. In 1901, when the disbandment of the 1st Chinese Regiment (The 
Regiment’) was under consideration, the government proposed the establishment of a 
police force for the mainland. Colonel Dorward, then Commissioner, feared that a rise 
in crime would follow disbandment and advocated the establishment of a civil police 
force.11 He recommended a force of 47 men, including one superintendent; 29 men 
would carry out their duties in M af ou and the four market towns of the territory, 12 
men would be divided between two police stations along the frontier of the territory 
and five detectives would police the entire mainland area. Dorward recommended 
recruiting former members of the Regiment to the force. These plans were not
7 Commissioner to SSC, 20 March 1913, CO 521/14.
8 Annual Report for 1903, Lockhart to SSC, 18 Apr 1904, CO 521/6. In 1911, the government more 
actively encouraged villages to organise the defence o f  their own villages, hoping that this would lead 
to a voluntary force which could be called upon to assist the police: 13 Jan 1912, Commissioner to 
SSC, CO 521/13.
9 Commissioner to SSC, 10 Sept 1905, CO 521/8. See further discussion below.
10 Colonel Prendergast, Acting Commissioner to War Office, 20 Sept 1900, CO 521/1, p, 520.
11 Dorward to SSC, 12 Oct 1901, CO 521/2.
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approved; Dorward was instead offered the ad hoc assistance of the soldiers of the 
Regiment.
When Lockhart took over as Commissioner in May 1902, he continued the 
discussions about the policing needs of the territory.12 His views, a portion of which 
appears in the passage quoted at the start of this chapter, were in marked contrast to 
those of his predecessor. Realising that it would he too costly to police the territory in 
the same manner as the New Territories of Hong Kong and that it would be ‘worse 
than useless’ to carry it out on the scale put forward by Dorward, he advised that a 
different system he adopted for Weihaiwei. Rather than introduce more police, he 
believed that village headmen - already appointed by the Commissioner - should be
13used to police all areas outside of Mat’ou. Headmen would assist in arresting 
suspects and, for larger and more serious incidents, the Magistrate and troops were on 
hand to provide them with support. These proposals rested 011 the presence, at any 
given time, of a garrison of two or three companies in the territory able to deal with 
emergencies. Given that most of the territory was to be without police, Lockhart 
suggested the appointment of an intelligence officer to supervise the headmen. He 
was against the appointment to the police of Europeans who could not speak Chinese 
as the use of interpreters, he thought, was likely to lead to abuses. The Colonial 
Office, seeing the cost savings made possible by Lockhart’s proposal, approved his 
suggestions.
By mid-1903, however, Lockhart was asking for more police to augment the 
force of three European inspectors, seven Chinese constables and six detectives.14 Of 
these, only one inspector and five detectives policed the territory beyond Port 
Edward.15 This time, a comparison with the New Territories was made to highlight 
the deficiencies in Weihaiwei: the Colonial Office was reminded that Hong Kong’s 
annual cost of policing a population of 100,000 was £10,000 whilst Weihaiwei had 
received less than a tenth of that sum - £950 - for its larger population of around 
150,000. In Kiaochou, the German authorities had a force of about 50 Europeans and
12 Lockhart to SSC, 5 June 1902, CO 521/3.
13 Ibid.
14 Lockhart to SSC, 5 Aug 1903, CO 521/4.
15 See Annual Report for 1903, Lockhart to Secretary o f State, 18 Apr 1904, CO 521/6. In 1902, there 
was one Inspector (Inspector Whittaker), three constables in uniform and three plain-clothes detectives 
on the island. The police also looked after security in the wharves and piers and collected rents from 
houses leased to the Chinese and Europeans as well as licence fees etc. - Annual Reports for 1902, 
Report o f  the SG, CO 873/97.
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100 Chinese men.16 In reply to the Colonial Office view that the territory had the 
assistance of the Regiment, the Commissioner argued that their duties could not 
involve ordinary policing, nor were they suited to the task. However, information for 
a period of several years shows that the Regiment and other troops and marines in the 
territory were useful in particular instances of unrest and probably also in deterring 
unrest.17 Farewell speeches made by the Commissioner to detachments of the Prince 
Albert’s (Somerset Light Infantry)18 and the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers19 refer, 
somewhat apologetically, to their involvement in policing in the territory, in contrast 
with military action which he assumed they would have preferred. During 1912, there 
were troops in three places in the territory - Port Edward, Wen-ch’uan-f ang and Lu- 
tao-kou - from whence they assisted in the capture of a band of robbers who had 
committed their crime outside the territory but who had entered the territory to divide 
the loot.20 In the case of the Somerset regiment, for instance, they had mounted a 
guard outside Government House.21
The suitability of men of the Regiment for recruitment into a civil Police 
Force was a question that divided opinion. Swettenham’s recommendation, made
before the decision to disband the Regiment, was that 200 of its men should be
* * • * 22detailed to undertake policing duties, under a Superintendent of Police. Some,
16 Lockhart to SSC, 5 Aug 1903, CO 521/4.
17 Aside from the Somerset and Inniskilling regiments, detachments o f the East Yorkshire Regiment, 
Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire), the Middlesex Regiment (Duke o f Cambridge’s Own), 
Bedfordshire and Hertfordshire Regiment and the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders (Princess 
Louise’s) (91st and 93rd) served in the territory: See Johnston to Lockhart, 3 Apr, 12 May and 22 July 
1927, and 2 Feb 1930, SLPNLS, vol. 10A. The last o f these regiments, present in the territory in the 
early part o f  1930, remained there till the formal rendition ceremonies.
18 'The Somersets at Weihaiwei', NCH, vol. CVII, no. 2383, 12 Apr 1913, p. 103. This report included 
excerpts from the farewell speech o f the Commissioner on the departure o f men o f  Prince Albert’s 
(Somerset Light Infantry) to their headquarters in Tientsin. He mentioned inter alia that as fighting men 
the soldiers could not have found their duties in Weihaiwei ‘very exciting or deeply interesting as they 
have been more in the nature o f police than military duties’.
19 'The Inniskillings in Weihaiwei', NCH, vol. CIV, no. 2352, 7 Sept 1912, p. 701, from 'A 
Correspondent’, Weihaiwei, 2 Sept in which Lockhart's speech on the occasion o f  the departure from 
Weihaiwei to Tientsin o f men from the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, was reported. Lockhart mentioned 
the gratitude o f  the Chinese o f  the Territory for the ‘kindly protection’ provided by the Regiment. He 
added that though their recreations had been ‘few ’, and their ‘temptations ... many’, they showed 
‘unruffled cheerfulness under all circumstances and conditions’ revealing grit by ‘refusing to indulge in 
excessive quenching o f  thirsts even when the thermometer was high and the throat very dry’.
20 Johnston to Commissioner, 27 Oct 1912, enc. to Commissioner to SSC, 13 Dec 1912, CO 521/13.
21 'The Somersets at Weihaiwei', NCH, vol. CVII, no. 2383, 12 Apr 1913, p. 103.
22 For details o f  this report see ch. 2.
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however, thought that the Chinese would not trust the men of the Regiment.
Commander Gaunt of HMS Landrail informed the Colonial Office that:
T he C hinese, law  abiding as they are, are in tensely m istrustful o f  the m ilitary, 
and cannot be induced to lay grievances before the o fficer  com m and in g the 
regim ent; w h o , to  them , is sim ply the head o f  an organised m o b .23
Others feared that the former soldiers would themselves commit crimes. Johnston, for
instance, later remarked that a military training appeared to produce in some men
an apparent d im inution o f  their native respect for c iv il authority; and ex ­
so ld iers w h o  continue to  reside w ithin  British territory are apt to be less  
respectful in their dem eanour and less obedient to  c iv il law  than their rustic 
neighbours w h o  have never donned a British so ld ier’s uniform  24
With similar' fears in mind, the government required disbanded soldiers
remaining in the territory to register their names, occupation and place of residence
with the magistrate. When the Regiment was drastically reduced from 1200 to 500
“J ^men in 1902, about 100 returned to their homes within the territory whilst the rest 
went to other parts of China,26 Of those who remained in the territory, about 80 
registered their particulars with the magistrate. There was indeed an increase in crime, 
with ex-soldiers accounting for 100 of the 270 prisoners passing through the prisons 
in that year. Forty of these were imprisoned for purely military offences, the rest for 
crimes such as assault, extortion, gambling, robbery, and living in Weihaiwei without 
permission 27
The authorities generally downplayed the crime attributable to the ex-soldiers. 
The then Government Secretary, Walter, counselled that ‘it is only natural that when a 
man is suddenly turned loose after having a regular pay and regular duties to do he 
may drift into evil courses.’ In the early part of 1906, several robberies occurred 
which were thought to be attributable to a small gang of former soldiers. When the 
Regiment was finally disbanded later that year, no increase in crime was in fact 
observed. The earlier concerns about the wisdom of recruiting former soldiers did not 
resurface and the police force for the mainland area (also referred to as the ‘Territory 
Police’) was fully constituted in September 1906 from members of the disbanded
23 ‘Notes on W ei-Hai-W ei’, Gaunt, Commander R. N., HMS Landrail\ 19 July 1901, CO 521/2.
24 Annual Report o f the SG (Johnston), app. I to Annual Report for 1904, CO 874/163.
25 Report o f  the SG, Annual Reports for 1902, CO 873/97.
26 Tientsin is mentioned as a place from which many o f  the soldiers came, Ibid.
27 Report o f  the SG, Annual Reports for 1902, CO 873/97.
28 Ibid .
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Regiment.29 Nearly all of the inspectors in the early years of the Force were from the 
Regiment.30 This was true of Inspectors Purdon, Whittaker and Young, three of the 
earliest to be appointed to the force, and of Crudge and Forcey who joined at the end 
of 1905.31
Dealing with complaints from the European community
Within the territory, the government faced some criticism of its police force from the
small number of European residents. As early as 1902, the Government had adopted a
defensive posture. Thefts were blamed on the ‘consummate carelessness of Europeans
who placed implicit confidence in their Chinese servants’ to the extent of asking
coolies to carry cash for them from the Island to the mainland. The Annual Report
for 1903 contained a thinly veiled riposte:
T his territory has b een  so accustom ed to im m unity from  serious crim e that 
w hen  cases do unfortunately occur, there are arm -chair critics w ho declaim  
against the absen ce o f  a large p o lice  force, w hich  they, h aving  a strong b e lie f  
in num bers, and no experience o f  the adm inistration o f  the C hinese, seem  to 
think w ould  put an end to all crim e. T h ese critics appear to forget that w here 
there are large p o lice  forces crim e still continues, and, so  long as human  
nature rem ains as it is, it seem s utopian to hope that crim e can in any p lace be 
entirely prevented. In the present circum stances o f  this dependency, where 
crim e is com paratively  rare, the im position o f  a heavy tax  in order to raise 
funds to defray the cost o f  a large p o lice force does not seem  to be justifiab le.
But should  crim e increase and such a tax becom e n ecessary, it is gratifying to 
k now  that the critics o f  the present arrangement, to ju d g e  from  their 
criticism s, w ill be w illin g  to g iv e  their support to such  a ta x .33
In March of the following year, the Heralds Weihaiwei correspondent made
similar complaints in a report on a serious robbery of an opium shop in Port Edward.34
Weihaiwei had ‘no police force worthy of the name’, thanks to Colonial Office policy
and the territory’s ‘penny-wise, pound foolish’ policy of running the territory ‘on the
cheap.’ The Government’s response to the complaints from its European residents,
most of whom lived 011 the island, was to consult its Advisory Council. This Council,
29 Report by Inspector Crudge, Annual Report for 1906, CO 873/239.
30 The police also took over some o f the equipment, barracks and other premises o f  the Chinese 
Regiment.
31 Report o f  the SG, Annual Report for 1906, CO 873/239.
32 Report o f  the SG, Annual Reports for 1902, CO 873/97.
33 Annual Report for 1903, Lockhart to SSC, 18 Apr 1904, CO 521/6. See also Minute, 5 Feb 1903, CO 
873/47.
34 ‘Robbery with violence’, 15 March, NCH, vol. LXXII, no. 1911, 25 March 1904, p. 601. Twelve 
armed robbers entered an opium shop in Port Edward and made away with $1800.
Council, made up of prominent European merchants, was asked if a detective system 
should replace a beat system of policing and whether all Chinese residents of the 
island should be required to register with the police. The Advisory Council rejected 
the beat system but recommended that the police concentrate more on serious crime. 
It was recommended that three policemen, whose pay should be ‘entirely dependent 
on the practical results of their work5, should be employed for detective work alone. 
The Council believed that the overall number of police on the island was sufficient. 
On the matter of the registration of Chinese residents, they approved of a form of free 
registration by the police, with visitors arriving by sea reporting to the police on duty 
at the wharves and all hotels keeping a record of guests which could be inspected by 
the police.35 A report to the Commissioner by Inspector Whittaker, submitted a few 
days later, showed that there were already three policemen whose work consisted only 
of being plainclothes detectives, and who received daily reports of persons staying for 
the night from the Chinese hotels.36 A requirement that all Chinese present on the 
island should register with the police was introduced later in 1904.
Having made efforts to reassure Europeans who lived on the island of the 
adequacy of policing in 1903, Johnston (then the Acting Government Secretary) 
bristled with irritation when, in 1905, Mr Clark, the owner of one of the larger 
businesses on the island, complained of the prevalence of robberies. Johnston 
immediately instructed one of the police inspectors to produce a list of all reported 
crimes on the island, which he used to defend the police in lengthy minutes to the 
Commissioner, highlighting the high conviction rate of cases prosecuted. These 
minutes were then read out at a meeting of the Advisory Council. Johnston was 
satisfied that the Government had managed to convince the islanders that crime was 
not rampant, and that the police were not wholly inefficient. The Europeans living on
T7the island were told, yet again, that most crimes were due to their own carelessness. 
Despite this meeting with the Advisory Council, one island dweller, Commander 
Yorke, continued to complain to Johnston of the frequency of thefts on the island. 
When Johnston replied that the reports of theft were very few in number, the 
Commander offered the view that no reports were made because it was known that the 
police were ineffectual. For reasons that are not clear, Johnston took particular
35 Advisory Council, 6  Feb 1903, CO 873/47.
36 Inspector Whittaker, 11 Feb 1903, CO 873/47.
37 Johnston to Commissioner, 19 March 1905, CO 873/178.
119
exception to the Commander’s complaints. He suggested to the Commissioner that his 
previous minutes on the subject of theft be sent to the Commander and, further, that 
the Commander should be ‘requested to assist the government in its efforts to 
suppress crime by furnishing a list of all unreported cases of theft on the island since 
the beginning of [that] year.’38 Commander Yorke expressed his regret that Johnston 
should have turned a private conversation into an official matter. He went on to say 
that his views on the inefficiency of the police should be confined to the native police, 
giving five examples he had encountered. Yorke touched a raw nerve in Johnston 
when he concluded that it was ‘inherent in the Chinese character that he camiot make 
an efficient policeman.’ Johnston commented that this opinion was at odds with the 
experience in Hong Kong and in Singapore. Yorke noted that Sikhs and other 
foreigners were used as policemen in Hong Kong and Shanghai and that, in any case, 
his comments were to be confined to the natives of Weihaiwei. After more had passed 
between the two men, the Commissioner advised that the argument should be laid to 
rest.39 As the handling of these complaints shows, within the territory, the government 
defended the police and the level of policing but, vis-a-vis the Colonial Office, they 
emphasised the inadequacy of resources.
The police were not unproblematic. Breaches of police regulations were 
common and often resulted in members of the force being tried by the Magistrate and 
dismissed from service. Under the Police Force Ordinance, 1903, which was based on 
a similar Hong Kong ordinance, the Commissioner was expressly empowered to make 
rules and regulations for the general governance and discipline of members of the 
police force.40 Such rules were later made, then printed in booklet form from at least 
1909, though translated into Chinese only in 1915.41 These rules applied to inspectors 
and constables, the rules for the latter having been prepared by Inspector Crudge, 
again borrowing from Flong Kong Police rules.42 Section 11 of the Police Force 
Ordinance empowered the Commissioner or any authorised officer to punish breaches 
of duty with fines of up to $25 or imprisonment for up to 7 days, alongside an order 
for forfeiture of the offender’s pay. Additionally, section 12 gave the Commissioner
38 Minute, Johnston, 7 Sept 1905, CO 873/198.
39 Minute, Lockhart, 19 Sept 1905, CO 873/198.
40 Police Force Ordinance, 1903, s. 9, CO 841/1.
4! See Whittaker, 13 July 1915, and Sly to Commissioner, 14 July 1915, CO 973/432.
42 CO 873/277.
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the power to dismiss or demote any inspector, sergeant or constable for misconduct or 
neglect of duty. These rules were enforced. In 1908, for instance, two policemen were 
dismissed for involvement in gambling and for pawning government property.43 
Extortion by the police and other forms of corruption were also a concern. In 1907, 
some of the police in charge of collecting shipping dues had routinely levied a small 
extra charge for their own profit. To discourage corruption, constables, detectives and 
others in the police were required to provide security for good behaviour 44 Concerns 
over extortion were so strongly felt that the two posts vacated by the dismissals in 
1908 were left unfilled.45 In the following year, eight members of the police - 
amounting to 15% of the force - were dismissed for receiving bribes, acquiescing in 
gambling, and other less serious charges.46 Another measure taken to reduce 
opportunities for bribery and corruption was the regular rotation of men to prevent 
them from becoming too familiar with the people. In 1911, for instance, in two 
separate tranches, the men normally stationed at Port Edward replaced the whole of 
the Island Police 47 The effectiveness of monetary inducements was later turned to 
good effect by offering rewards for the clearing up of some crimes.48
On the whole, the government did not lose faith in the Chinese as policemen. 
Annual Reports alternated between praise for the police and regret at the number of 
dismissals and cases of neglect of duty. The government were aware that corruption 
was always a possibility but thought that victims of corrupt practices would report the 
police to the magistrate.49 Police breaches of discipline were blamed on the lack of 
training and supervision, as well as, in later years, the failure to increase wages in line
43 Report o f the SG, Departmental Reports for the year 1908, CO 873/280.
44 Report o f the SG, Departmental Reports for the Year 1907, CO 873/265. This was an extension o f  
the same requirement imposed on the more senior Chinese clerks in government employment.
45 Report on the Police and Gaol o f Liu Kung Tao for 1908 by Inspector Whittaker, Departmental 
Reports for the year 1908, CO 873/280.
46 Report o f  the SG, Departmental Reports for 1909, CO 873/292.
47 Report o f  Inspector Whittaker on the Police o f Liu Kung Tao, Departmental Reports for the Year 
1911, CO 873/335. Also, Police at posts changed every now and again, Report o f  Inspector Crawley, 
Annual Reports for 1914, CO 873/435.
48 See records on this matter in CO 873/652 which indicate that there had already been a system of  
rewards for opium and gambling cases but towards the end o f 1921, Inspector Whittaker suggested that 
rewards for good work in all crimes should be instituted so as to increase the motivation o f  the force.
49 Commissioner to Lord Elgin, 23 Aug 1906, CO 521/9.
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with inflation, a fact acknowledged but not addressed by the Government.50 In 1910 
and 1926 policemen petitioned the government for salary increases.51
The wider duties of the police
The strength of the police force should not be discussed without taking into account 
the other demands on police resources, many of which were beyond the strict confines 
of crime and policing. Inspectors assisted the magistrate in civil disputes,52 helped 
with administrative tasks, and were responsible for specific matters such as street 
lighting. In 1904, the Port Edward Inspector was also the Sanitary Inspector, 
answerable to the territory’s Medical Officer. At various times, the Island Inspector 
was the chief revenue collector, collecting sampan, wharfage, dog and other licence 
fees; rents from Government properties; and court fines. The Island Inspector was 
also in charge of the prison and acted as Registrar of births and deaths. Inspector 
Crawley, alongside his responsibilities as Inspector for Port Edward, supervised 
public works, particularly the time-consuming task of overseeing road works, and 
carried out the functions of Financial Assistant.54 Some policemen were also deployed 
as water police for the inspection of ships docking in the harbour.55
Gradual expansion of the Police Force
Despite the grudging attitude of the United Kingdom Treasury, the territory saw a 
gradual expansion of its police force during the early years of the lease. In 1904, a 
year in which six cases of robbery with violence were reported,56 a native sergeant 
and a constable were added to the force of three inspectors.57 A fourth inspector was 
appointed in 1906. From 1905 onwards, an increased number of policemen patrolled
50 Annual Report for 1927, CO 521/41,
51 Lockhart to Earl o f  Crewe, 4 Nov 1910, CO 521/11 and Annual General Report for 1926, CO 
521/37.
52 Inspector Jennings visited a village, on behalf o f  the Senior District Officer, to collect evidence o f  a 
dispute between two women: Jennings to Senior District Officer, 19 Sept 1920: CO 873/590.
53 Report o f  the Senior District Officer, Annual Reports for 1916, CO 873/493.
54 Report o f  Inspector Crawley, Annual Reports for 1914, CO 873/435.
55 Draft Annual Report, 1914 and District Officer’s Report for 1914, CO 873/440.
56 Annual Report for 1904, CO 873/163.
57 One o f these, Inspector Purdon, was said by Johnston to have an exceptional knowledge o f  both 
written and spoken Chinese: Annual Report o f  the SG, app. to Annual Report for 1904, CO 874/163.
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the streets of Port Edward, made possible by the voluntary subscriptions of Chinese 
merchants under a scheme they had initiated after petitioning the government for an 
increase in police.58 These voluntary payments continued to be made till 1918, at 
least. That year, Johnston, as Officer Administering the Government, expressed his 
wish to abolish the scheme and to replace it with public funding raised through 
increased taxation.59
Figures from 1907 show that the force for the mainland area of the leased 
territory had two sergeants and 34 constables, large enough for a small section to form 
a mounted squad under the supervision of an inspector. The mounted squad formed 
two patrols of three men each to visit a network of routes covering some twenty-five 
miles every day. The inspector visited the villages and police posts in the interior 
twice a month. A second detachment of nine men formed three patrols and left Port 
Edward nightly for villages lying within six miles of Port Edward. A third portion of 
the police force numbering eight men was stationed with the district officer in the 
interior. The remainder of the force was stationed at Port Edward with duties relating 
to the offices, armouries, magazine and other property belonging to the government.60
By 1911, the Weihaiwei Police Force consisted of three European inspectors, 
three Chinese sergeants and 52 constables. The demise of the Qing dynasty and the 
unsettled state of the surrounding areas made the territory vulnerable and this brought 
about a marked change in the official line on policing. Until that time, the government 
had been in favour of keeping the police force small. It was also clear that the 
government could not always rely on the co-operation of the War Office for the 
provision of troops for quasi-policing duties, for some in the War Office were not 
prepared to continue, as they saw it, subsidising the Colonial Office. Several times in 
the early 1910s, the government asked for further expenditure on the police force and 
requested that the withdrawal of troops be delayed. The government also encouraged 
villagers to provide for the defence of their own villages, permitting them to keep 
arms and providing some with instruction on the proper use of those arms. By such 
means, the government hoped that those authorised to carry arms would gradually 
organise themselves into a voluntary force. Unfortunately, it was reported that the
58 Commissioner to SSC, 10 Sept 1905, CO 521/8. As a result o f this scheme 12 more policemen were 
recruited, bringing the total up to 21 men.
59 Officer Administering the Government (Johnston) to SSC, 11 March 1918, CO 521/19.
60 Report by Inspector Crudge, Annual Report for 1906, CO 873/239.
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villagers were frequently outclassed by the robbers, many of whom had better
weapons.61 Meanwhile, the Colonial Office was enquiring of the Commissioner if the
size of the police force could be reduced; the Commissioner made it clear that no
reduction could be made.62
In 1912, the year the Somerset Light Infantry was withdrawn from the area, 40
constables were added to the force, enabling the stationing of policemen at six police
posts in the territory.63 To economise, the men were issued with only a badge, not
uniforms.64 Later that year, after members of a band of robbers had been captured,
Johnston wrote to the Commissioner advocating an enlargement of the police force to
about one hundred men. The leased territory he said, had evidently become ‘an
Alsatia for the murderers and armed robbers of the neighbouring Chinese districts’65
who relied on the fact that the Chinese authorities were not allowed to enter
Weihaiwei and that surveillance of outsiders entering the territory was negligible
given the territory’s small police force. The captured robbers had used the territory as
their base for committing robberies across the border. Johnston described the shortage
of staff. For his district which covered about 200 square miles and in which there
were about 100,000 inhabitants and all of the territory’s land frontier, there was only
himself and eight Chinese constables and one Chinese detective. He went on to say,
M y dim inutive force o f  nine p o lice has to carry out ail the duties o f  gaol-  
warders, court-m essengers (to carry sum m onses etc to w itn esses  and others in 
c iv il and crim inal cases) and ordinary police. T he country is m ountainous, 
roads are bad, and there are no telephones or other m eans o f  rapid 
com m unication . There are occasion s on w hich I have been so  hard pressed  
for m en that m y ow n d om estic servants have had to perform the duties o f  
policem en: and there have been num erous occasion s on w hich  I have had to  
postpone enquiries into crim inal outrages for sheer lack o f  availab le m en. For 
urgent tem porary purposes a few  extra police can be obtained from Port 
Edward, but even  this cannot be done w ithout serious in con ven ien ce, for the 
force o f  p o lice  stationed at Port Edward and on the Island is on ly  ju st large 
enough for the requirem ents o f  those important centres .66
In January 1913, Lockhart conveyed the change in policy to the Colonial 
Office. He wrote that it was neither prudent nor safe ‘to continue to rely on the very
61 See Annual Report for 1903, Lockhart to SSC, 18 Apr 1904, CO 521/6 and Lockhart to SSC, 13 Jan 
1912, C 0521/13.
62 Commissioner to SSC, 11 Apr 1911, CO 521/12.
63 Report o f  the SG, Annual Departmental Reports for the Year 1913, CO 873/378.
64 Commissioner to SSC, 13 Jan 1912, CO 521/13.
65 Johnston to Commissioner, 27 Oct 1912, enc. to Commissioner to SSC, 13 Dec 1912, CO 521/13.
66 Ibid.
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small and inexpensive Police Force which for many years was fortunately found to be
• ■ 67sufficient for the maintenance of peace and good order in the leased Territory.’ He 
asked for an extra European inspector, six Chinese sergeants and 36 constables.68 
Statistics compiled for 1916 showed a police force numbering 95,69 part of the force 
being stationed at six police posts in the territory.70 Three posts were added in 1920.71
At the beginning of the 1920s, a decade during which the territory was 
threatened with unrest on its boundaries, the territory had nine police posts in the 
territory throughout which 49 constables were distributed.72 Preventing bandit 
incursion at the fringes of the territory was a great concern and British troops from 
various infantry regiments did much to help the police patrol the borders and to
7Treassure the population. In 1921, the Peace Preservation Ordinance granted the 
Commissioner powers to appoint special constables, with powers akin to those of 
ordinary police, for the suppression of actual or apprehended disorder. These powers 
were probably not used.
In 1925, with the population of Port Edward growing steadily74 and unrest 
increasing outside the territory, the government applied to the Treasury for funds to 
enlarge the police force by one corporal and 23 constables as a matter of urgency.75 
The extra men were hired in April that year, bringing the total size of the police to 
148.76 For the first time in the history of the Weihaiwei Police, new recruits 
underwent six weeks of training before being placed on duty.77 Training had 
previously been done on the job; men had been recruited
straight from  the streets, g iven  uniform , a rifle, rudimentary instruction in 
drill and duty and despatched forthwith to isolated stations a lon g  the frontier,
67 Commissioner to SSC, 14 Jan 1913, CO 521/14.
68 Ibid,
69 Annual Reports for 1916, Lockhart to SSC, 15 May 1917, CO 521/18.
70 Annual Report for 1917, Officer Administering the Government to SSC, 21 May 1918, CO 521/19.
71 Report by Inspector Jennings, Annual Reports 1920, CO 873/627.
72 Ibid.
73 Ord, 2 o f 1921, CO 841/1. Special constables had the full powers o f  the ordinary police but not their 
entitlement to pay and other reward.
74 In 1927 it was estimated that the population o f the territory had swollen to 175,000, partly due to 
merchants arriving to settle in the suburbs around Port Edward. Port Edward’s population was thought 
to have been close to 20,000: Annual Report for 1927, CO 521/41.
75 Commissioner to SSC, 13 March 1913, CO 521/27.
76 Figures for 1925 include 16 prison warders.
77 Annual Report for 1925, Russell Brown to SSC, 17 March 1926, CO 521/28.
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there to guard against the inroads o f  robber and pirate and the com m ission  by  
their friends and neighbours o f  every class o f  crim e from  murder to 
adultery .78
From the mid-1920s till the end of British rule, the Weihaiwei Police Force 
continued to grow. Figures from 1927 show a force of three European inspectors, 19
7 0Chinese non-commissioned officers, and 142 other men making a total of 164 men. 
They were distributed as follows: one inspector and 17 men on the island, one 
inspector and 56 men at Port Edward, and the remainder on duty at the police posts - 
by this time 13 in total.80 This was a period in which border patrol had become 
absolutely necessary and it was felt that a fourth inspector was needed. With one 
inspector on duty on the island and one in Port Edward, the remaining inspector had a 
large force to supervise. This need was felt all the more as a shortage of staff in 
government pending rendition meant that the police had to carry out even more 
administrative tasks. The introduction of a lorry and motor cycles to the force a year 
later no doubt made it easier for the same number of police, using the network of 
roads criss-crossing the territory by that time, to cover more of the territory.81
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Figure 4. Strength o f  Police Force 
Looking back at the history of the Weihaiwei Police Force, it is remarkable 
that, while a force of 47 men had been suggested sometime before Lockhart took over 
as the territory’s Commissioner, this number of police was only reached during the
78 Annual General Report for 1924, Russell Brown to SSC, 10 March 1925, CO 521/27.
79 The police force after rendition was larger. In 1933, there were 205 policemen, 20 constables and 6 
patrol officers, reinforced by 50 policemen from Peking. See Guide to Wei-hcii-wei ([n. p.]: Office o f  
the Weihaiwei Commissioner, 1933).
80 Annual Report for 1927, CO 521/41.
81 Johnston to Lockhart, 2 Jan 1928, SLPNLS, vol. 10A.
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years 1908-1910. This was partly to do with Lockhart’s own proposal in 1902 in 
which he rejected Dorward’s proposals and argued that a uniformed force, especially 
if made up of men who could not understand the local dialect, was unsuited to the 
territory. However, his alternative proposal of relying 011 headmen was quickly 
forgotten and, in subsequent years, applications were regularly made to increase the 
police force. The effectiveness or otherwise of the headmen was never once 
mentioned in these applications, the previous policy never being acknowledged, or for 
that matter, questioned, by the Colonial Office. The role of headmen and their 
effectiveness in carrying out the policing and other miscellaneous tasks expected of 
them is looked at below, after an examination of the role of the Magistrates in the 
maintenance of law and order.
The Magistrates
In discussing policing in the territory, mention should be made of the territory’s 
magistrates. Part of the work of the magistrates was to investigate crimes, carry out 
raids and make arrests. They regularly led raids on gambling dens and brothels. One 
of the most exciting chases led by Johnston occurred in December 1911 when six 
armed pirates stormed a junk in Weihaiwei’s waters close to Port Edward and 
demanded a ransom. Johnston, together with armed police, took charge of a Japanese- 
owned launch and pursued the pirates into Chinese waters where they caught three of
* * 83them, the remaining three drowning in an attempt to swim ashore.
Crimes were often reported to the magistrate without a full investigation 
having taken place and it would then be up to the magistrate to apply his investigative 
skills. He would, if necessary, absent himself from his court for several days to visit 
the scene of the crime and interview possible witnesses. For a period, the magistrate 
in the interior was probably required to perform these extra responsibilities due to the 
absence of a police inspector at his headquarters in Wen-ch’uan-t’ang. In 1914, 
Johnston complained to the Commissioner regarding this state of affairs: he was 
overworked and concerned about the conflict of interest inherent in his multifaceted 
position. I11 the changes which were instituted, Johnston instructed the police that they 
should henceforth report cases to him only after a proper initial investigation. Three of
82 Report o f  the SG, Departmental Reports for the year 1907, CO 873/265.
83 Lockhart to SSC, 13 Jan 1912, C 0521/13.
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the foui' inspectors would henceforth receive all reports relating to crime, lawlessness, 
breaches of police or other regulations, make all necessary investigations, prepare 
cases for prosecution and appear- in court to conduct the case for the prosecution. 
Minor cases could be delegated to a Chinese sergeant or constable.
Even when the police inspectors conducted investigations without recourse to 
the magistrate, the magistrate was still responsible for the supervision and deployment 
of the police in the territory. In their administrative capacities both magistrates also 
supervised the district and village headmen. This last supervisory function had been 
the main justification used by the Commissioner in applying to the Colonial Office in 
1906 for the appointment of a district officer who would reside in the interior.85 As he 
later argued, the appointment of the officer was not so much to augment the 
administrative staff of the government as to ‘provide for an efficient police.'86
Village and district headmen
As alluded to above, Lockhart fully supported Swettenham’s proposal that traditional 
village organisation should be maintained. Traditional forms of social control were 
incorporated into early policies on law and order, in part because the alternatives 
would have been costly and in part because the government believed that they should 
interfere as little as possible with village life. Village order was thus made the 
responsibility of village headmen who were issued with certificates of appointment. 
Headmen were told that they were the ‘eyes and ears’ of the government, and should 
report to the government any untoward occurrences (including serious crimes and the 
presence of undesirables) in their villages.
A certain amount of self-policing was assumed and expected to take place in 
the village. In Johnston’s Lion, the villages were described as being ‘somewhat like so 
many little self-contained republics.’87 The government assumed that each village was 
made up of blood relatives and had a socio-political hierarchy, with the most 
respected elders at the top. Since the headman was chosen from amongst the elders, 
he was in a natural position to prevent trouble and to keep an eye on individuals
84 CO 873/432.
85 Commissioner to Lord Elgin, 13 Feb 1906, CO 521/9.
86 Commissioner to Lord Elgin, 7 Apr 1906, CO 521/9.
87 LDNC, 155.
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within the village. The government counted on the fact that villagers would instantly 
spot outsiders and potential troublemakers. The self-policing processes occurring 
within the village in relation to petty crime were not reported in any detail by the
government. However, Swettenham’s report described the way in which villagers co-
88operated in watching over their fields, in schemes organised by a village elder. In a 
farming area, most thefts would have been of crops or farming tools. Since it was 
often the case that a family’s fields were not contiguous, it was impossible to watch 
over all of them simultaneously. A few villagers were therefore paid by the village to 
guard over fields. Suspicious characters would be arrested by the crop watchers and 
taken to the village elders. Crop watching is not often mentioned in the records but it 
would appear that the practice continued well into the third decade of British rule; in
OQ
1925 a crop watcher was reportedly murdered while on duty late at night. The 
existence of village regulations, discussed above in chapter 3, many of which were 
intended to protect crops and fields, also suggests that villages took action against 
those who desecrated graves or engaged in gambling.
The government expected that headmen would, as part of their general 
responsibility to maintain order in their respective villages, resolve petty disputes and 
prevent them from erupting into disorder or from reaching the magistrate. The 
mediation of petty disputes was mentioned in the headman’s letter of appointment but 
no division of jurisdiction was formalised by means of court rules. The magistrates, as 
we shall see, sometimes thought that many of the cases reaching them could easily 
have been dealt with by the headmen.
The salaried district headmen introduced in 190 5 90 were, amongst their other 
duties, expected to ensure the success of newly introduced laws such as the Opium 
Ordinance, which was introduced in 1909 to eradicate the smoking of opium except 
by licensed users. At a regular meeting of district headmen with the Commissioner, 
the former were reminded of sayings on the authority of the law from the Sacred 
Edict and other sources such as ‘Explain the law in order to warn the ignorant and the
88 Report on Weihaiwei and its Future Administration, 23 June 1900, enc. to Swettenham to SSC, 26 
July 1900, CO 521/1, p. 642.
89 Annual General Report for 1926, CO 521/37.
90 See ch. 1.
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obstinate’, ‘Instruct the youth in order to prevent them from doing evil’, and ‘Do not 
that which is a transgression of the law.’91
Effectiveness of the headmen
It is not easy to determine how effective the headmen were in keeping order in the 
villages and reporting crimes. The opinions of government officials on this subject 
varied. Walter, the Government Secretary, thought headmen to be without influence 
and incapable. He complained about their inability to mediate civil disputes
» 09effectively and their failure to report gambling and other offences. By 1908, through 
resignation and or dismissal, the total number of district headmen had been reduced to 
nineteen from twenty-six.93 So pessimistic was Walter by this time that he thought it 
was probable that the system of district headmen would ‘gradually die a natural 
death’.94 This prediction turned out to be incorrect, but doubts over the effectiveness 
of headmen lingered.
Like the police, headmen were occasionally summoned to appear before a 
magistrate on charges of neglect of duty or other offences. In 1916, a district headman 
was convicted of manslaughter and fined for neglecting to report a fatal revenge 
attack carried out by the relatives of a village headman who had been killed in the 
course of a robbery.95 Some years earlier, a headman - Kuo Lien-ytieh of the village 
of Sung-ling-kuo-chia - was dismissed for making false statements in a petition to the 
government and falsely putting the names of district headmen and two village 
headmen on the petition. Kuo was found guilty and removed from office. He had been 
under surveillance by the police for suspected involvement in gambling transactions 
and in the suicide of a gambling debtor. The evidence was insufficient to support a 
conviction but Johnston ordered that a bond be posted to secure his future good 
behaviour. Johnston explained to the Commissioner that the headman’s false petition 
to the government was probably rooted in his annoyance at being under suspicion. 
However, Johnston’s remark that ‘he has no excuse for his conduct except that he is
91 Text o f Commissioner’s address to District Headmen, prepared for a meeting on 8 Apr 1910, CO 
873/299.
92 Report o f the SG, Annual Reports for 1902, CO 873/97.
93 Departmental Reports for 1907, CO 873/265. See also further discussion below.
94 Departmental Reports for 1907, CO 873/265.
95 Departmental Report o f the Junior District Officer for 1916, Annual Reports 1916, CO 873/493.
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old and foolish’ and the views of other district and village headmen resulted in a 
lesser penalty than the Commissioner might otherwise have imposed. The headman 
was fined $50 and removed from his office.96 The authorities lost no time making the 
details of the case known through a proclamation warning Kuo and others that similar 
conduct in the future would not be treated with leniency.97 On another occasion, the 
headman of the village of Meng-chia-chuang, who had earlier been sacked from
QO
office, was stripped of a previously awarded good service medal.
Several times during the term of the lease, village headmen were held 
responsible for not preventing their villagers from fighting with people from a 
neighbouring village. In one case, a headman whose villagers had been involved in 
riotous behaviour was imprisoned after he had refused to find security against 
repetition.99 Such riots usually had their root cause in disputes over land. It is quite 
probable that village headmen were better at maintaining order within their respective 
villages than when their village was in dispute with another. In such instances, the 
involvement of the Magistrate and the police was almost inevitable and the stationing 
of extra police to keep the peace was sometimes necessary. In 1913, three policemen 
were stationed in two villages which had been quarrelling over rights to land. The cost 
of the extra policing was imposed on the two villages.100 Where order within the 
village was concerned, it is likely that headmen were effective in reporting serious 
crimes to the government (if somewhat selectively) and in dealing with most of the 
petty crimes themselves. In view of the government’s general policy of non­
interference in village life, this was acceptable, so long as village matters were not 
allowed to fester and grow into disputes of a magnitude no government could ignore.
In general, however, Johnston and Lockhart defended the headman system. It 
was Lockhart who had officially co-opted the headmen and awarded medals to those 
who had served the government well. In addition to these medals, the government was 
quick to present honorific tablets to headmen for their exemplary conduct. In 1905, as 
a result of a petition from a man who had been saved by the headman of the village of 
Hai-hsi-f ou when the steamer he was on was shipwrecked, Lockhart had a tablet
96 CO 873/238.
97 See draft proclamation, CO 873/238.
98 Lockhart, 7 Oct 1907, CO 873/256.
99 Johnston to Lockhart, 9 May 1913, SLPNLS vol. 9(h); the underlying dispute was one involving 
rights over grazing lands.
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made up in Hong Kong through the trading firm of Butterfield and Swire.101 When it 
arrived in the territory, the headman was presented with it at the district officer’s 
yamen and arrangements were made to have the tablet sent to Hai-hsi-fou by 
sampan.102 In 1910, a district headman, Miao Tso-pin (Micto Znobin), was similarly 
presented with a tablet for his good work in rescuing the crew of a wrecked Japanese
103steamer.
In his farewell speech to the local community in September 1930, Johnston, 
who had suggested the introduction of a higher level of headman, praised district 
headmen104 for their work in developing a public spirit in Weihaiwei. He said that, as 
a result, roads had been built not only thanks to the villagers’ free labour but also 
through their provision of land without compensation where roads encroached upon 
their property.105 However, Johnston had realised that the headman’s position was 
‘not altogether enviable’, noting that when a vacancy arose there were often few 
applicants for the position.106 Indeed, some villages had to be persuaded to produce a
1 07candidate for headship by the threat of a fine. There is evidence that district 
headmen felt that their influence might be insufficient without the express backing of 
the government. On one occasion, when headmen were asked to establish village 
guards, they asked the government to buttress their authority through the issue of a 
proclamation announcing that district headmen would be carrying out the orders of 
the government.108
The uncertain status of headmen within the village will have contributed to 
their lack of influence. Martin Yang’s account of village life in Taitou, within the
100 Johnston to Lockhart, 8 May 1913, SLPNLS, vol. 9(h).
101 This was a matter in which the Commissioner took much personal interest, to the extent o f  
providing specific instructions on the design o f the tablet. On Johnston’s suggestion, the tablet was 
presented by him self as District Officer after advising the Commissioner against too much ceremony 
because the headman ‘may get inflated ideas about his own value and importance’: Johnston to 
Lockhart, 28 July 1905, CO 873/184.
102 See Johnston, 10 Aug 1905 and other minutes and correspondence in CO 873/184.
103 See CO 873/299. This District Headman was an assessor in the murder trial o f  R. v. Wang and Liu 
discussed in ch. 5.
104 Commissioner’s speech at the Government Offices, Weihaiwei, 29 Sept 1930: SLPNLS, vol. 64.
105 Address to District Headmen and Headmen by Commissioner, 18 Apr 1914, Government House, 
which alludes to this, Commissioner to SSC, 29 Apr 1914, CO 521/15.
106 LDNC, 156.
m  Ibid., 156.
108 CO 873/770.
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same province as Weihaiwei, confirms the ambiguous standing of headmen who were 
agents of the government Yang carefully distinguished official from lay leaders. Lay 
leaders included the elders of the village and others such as the local schoolteacher. It 
was these lay leaders, not the official leaders, who were the most influential and 
respected in the village. The official leaders were, like their Weihaiwei counterparts, 
elected by the villagers before being appointed by the local county government. These 
leaders formed a hierarchy of rural district head, village head, tax collector and *ti- 
fa n g \ or village policeman. Officially elected posts were, according to Yang, 
unpopular because ‘those in office acted as government representatives and 
consequently were somewhat disassociated from the village and generally disliked by 
the other villagers’.109 Those who sought the position of village head were persons 
who ‘did not care overmuch for reputation or social status’, being more interested in 
the profits to be made.110 The person who typically become a village head might be a 
person such as one P’an Chi, a man considered by villagers to be a successful village 
headman. Like all village heads Yang could remember, P’an Chi came from an 
unimportant family in the village. He was, nevertheless, a man of leisure whose sons 
worked the family’s market garden. He was articulate, persuasive and good at making 
speeches. These characteristics enabled him to convince villagers of the benefits of 
government proposals and to be an effective mediator in village disputes. A 
pragmatist, P’an Chi was cunning in his dealings with villagers and was not above 
acts of petty deception. Pan Ch’i acknowledged his subordinate position vis-a-vis the 
lay leaders of the village - elders and others such as the school teacher, whose support 
was vital, if he were to carry out his tasks at all. Government orders had first to be 
discussed with the village elders before implementation. Besides, it was the lay 
leaders who had the power to dismiss the official leaders. Yang reported that, since 
most villagers knew that the lay leaders could dismiss the headman, they did not 
attribute to him a great deal of importance. In mediation, lay leaders had the tendency 
to be more successful than village heads because of the greater respect accorded to the 
lay leaders. This lower status was also apparent in the way in which the Chinese
109 Martin Yang, A Chinese Village (Columbia University Press, 1945), 174.
1,0 Ibicl, 186.
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magistrates traditionally paid respect to the village gentry, teachers and heads of large 
clans b u t4assume[d] an air of superiority toward the official leaders.5111
Village hierarchy in Weihaiwei was less stratified than in Taitou and, as
discussed in chapter 2, prior to British rule there appear to have been no dipao or
difang and indeed no agent of the government There were, instead, village headmen
and village elders who were independent of the government. The experience of Taitou
alerts us to the likelihood that the headmen accountable to the British government
were not necessarily the most influential persons in the village. If this were the case, it
would go a long way towards explaining the ineffectiveness complained of in an early 
112annual report. Not much appeal's in the official records to shed light on the esteem 
in which the headmen in Weihaiwei might have been held or on their backgrounds. 
We know that very few of them, at least in the earliest years and quite possibly even 
in the later years of British rule, were literate but this is not surprising since few of the 
territory’s Chinese were literate. Headmen were usually heads of families or clans, 
chosen by the people, either informally or by some system of election, and confirmed
1 1 "3by the government. In 1908, when the villagers of Yu-chia-chuang reported 
dissatisfaction with their headmen to the Commissioner, they were asked to name a 
new headman.114 Officially, the power to dismiss a headman lay with the district 
officer but villagers had a large say in the matter. This is demonstrated by the case of 
Yii I-tung (Yu Yidong), the headman of the village of Shuang-ssu-k’uang. His fellow 
villagers complained to Johnston that Yll had ignored their requests to produce the 
village accounts. Johnston ordered Yii to produce the accounts and later dismissed 
him for improper manipulation of public funds and his refusal to produce the 
accounts. He was found to have engaged in extortion and to have tyrannised several 
families in the village.115 The fact that villagers could remove a headman and the 
nexus of headmen to the government may have distanced them from other villagers. 
These isolated cases suggest that Johnston's account, in which the headman was The
1,1 Ib id , 186.
112 See discussion in ch. 6 , ‘Mediation’.
1n LDNC , 156.
1 !4 CO 873/270.
115 Johnston to Lockhart, 15 Sept 1910, CO 873/309. Yii had also come to the attention o f  the 
government when he evicted cattle grazers from land which he had recently purchased. This dispute is 
discussed in ch. 6 .
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senior representative of the senior branch of the family5 and therefore higher in status 
that the village gentry, was naive.116 The comment mentioned above - that the 
position was ‘not entirely enviable5 - is probably more accurate.
There is also the headmen's association with the government to take into 
account. To the extent that headmen were accountable to the British authorities, they 
were in fact acting as government agents. This created the risk that, by co-opting 
village elders or village headmen and making them the lowest rung of the British 
administration, the government in effect compromised whatever standing and 
influence the headmen may have previously had in their own communities. The 
position of headman probably brought some personal advantage to the individuals 
involved, but it also attracted the suspicion of fellow villagers and brought other 
personal risks, such as the humiliation of being prosecuted for neglect of duty. Not 
surprisingly, it was not always easy to fill vacancies and it may be that, instead of 
attracting those held in the highest esteem in the village, persons with characteristics 
similar to Taitou5 s Pan Ch5i were drawn to the posts. The British authorities in 
Weihaiwei were no doubt genuine in their efforts to preserve and use the village 
organisation which had existed prior to the lease. In general, the government saw 
itself as not merely maintaining previous social organisation but also, where 
necessary, repairing it. In the process, however, unintended changes were almost 
certainly effected. Despite these considerations, the relationship between the 
government and the villages was not problematic; sufficient order was maintained in 
the territory for the system of headmen never to have been in danger of collapse or in 
need of fundamental reform. Although over time the number of district headmen 
diminished and some of them had to be removed from their positions, the majority 
carried out their tasks to varying degrees of government satisfaction.
The foregoing discussion shows how, given relatively peaceful conditions in the 
territory and some assistance from troops of various regiments in the territory, it was 
possible for the authorities in Weihaiwei to maintain order through a combination of a 
small police force and local headmen, supervised by inspectors and magistrates, at 
least some of whom had a very good command of the local language. The
116 LDNC, 156.
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government’s initial position was to deny the need for police, preferring instead to use 
local headmen supervised by a district officer but, in subsequent years, the police 
force underwent slow but steady growth without the headman system being 
abandoned. Even with the growth in the size of the police force and the establishment 
of posts in the hinterland, the police probably continued to have a relatively limited 
presence in the villages of Weihaiwei. Police resources for law enforcement work 
were in practice diminished by the administrative tasks for which the police were also 
responsible. This is one reason why headmen continued to be useful in maintaining 
order within the village and in other ways, particularly in being a conduit between the 
authorities and the villagers of Weihaiwei. Police resources in the territory were 
always over-extended, as evidenced by the fact that the magistrate continued to 
investigate crimes, make arrests and lead the police in raids. Moreover, the police 
were not used in the application of oppressive policies against the territory’s 
inhabitants. Incidents of police high-handedness and corruption were punished, 
whenever they came to light. This was in keeping with the government’s policy of 
maintaining good relations with the Chinese, which required the deliberate avoidance 
of any unnecessary intrusion into village life.
It has frequently been argued that policing in places occupied or colonised by 
the British in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was modelled on the 
example of the Royal Irish Constabulary (the RIC).117 The model of the RIC meant, in 
essence, that policing was seen as an extension of the executive branch of government 
rather than being founded on the community’s consent.118 Other salient features 
drawn from the RIC included a uniformed, military style of policing in which the 
police, recruited from other places, were armed, lived in barracks and, like troops, 
drilled and trained to move quickly en masse to react to disturbances. It is unclear to 
what extent the Weihaiwei Police had these qualities. It was the case that the 
European police inspectors and a high proportion of the Chinese rank and file had
117 Comparison o f  policing in Weihaiwei may be thought inappropriate since Weihaiwei was, in theory, 
neither a colony nor occupied territory. The view taken here is that this would be too technical an 
approach, one which is not likely to have been intended by those who have examined British methods 
o f  policing overseas nor consistent with the attitude on the ground in Weihaiwei. The fact that 
Weihaiwei was not a colony may well explain why the territory was not more lavishly funded. When it 
came to discussion o f the policing needs o f  the territory, however, the fact that the territory was merely 
a leased territory and not a colony was never once raised. Note that the view that the RIC was the 
model for policing overseas has been criticised as being inaccurate.
118 David M. Anderson and D. Killingray (eds), Policing the Empire (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1991), particularly the editors’ overview in ch. 1.
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been in the 1st Chinese Regiment and thus had received some military training. On 
the other hand, when resources did not allow it, police uniforms were dispensed with 
and training of the men, whether in drill or otherwise, was minimal. So far as can be 
ascertained from the records, the men were not housed in barracks. The police were 
armed but it is doubtful that they were trained to be a defensive force. The presence, 
in the territory, of detachments of troops belonging to various British regiments, 
probably made it unnecessary to train the Weihaiwei police to be a semi-military 
force. As we saw, troops were used to deal with particular large-scale disturbances. 
Furthermore, the government did not, in recruiting men, adopt a policy of selecting 
men from outside China or from other parts of China. The fact that the police were 
required to perform administrative tasks was something the Weihaiwei Police Force 
shared with some colonial police forces. On balance, however, the police in 
Weihaiwei exhibited few of the features associated with the Irish police.
Despite the weaknesses of the headmen system and police indiscipline and 
cases of corruption, the government never lost faith in either. As an indigenous 
institution, the headmen system appealed to the traditionalist preference of officials 
such as Lockhart and Johnston and on the whole, the policing of the territory was 
sufficient to prevent serious problems from arising. There was an absence of strife and 
the vast majority of the territory’s inhabitants saw no grounds for complaint. In 
devising their policy and practice with regard to the policing of the territory, the task 
of the government of Weihaiwei was simplified by the fact that there were few 
Europeans resident in the territory. Without a European lobby, it could concentrate its 
efforts on ensuring that there were adequate and acceptable forms of policing from the 
point of view of the Chinese inhabitants of the territory. The occasional outburst of 
criticism from Europeans about the inadequacy of policing could be largely ignored. 
And, due to the small number of Europeans present, there was an absence of the kind 
of social friction between the two communities, so that the day-to day routines of the 
Chinese could become a nuisance to the European inhabitants, necessitating more 
intrusive policing. It is also relevant to note that the territory did not, at any stage, 
experience a worrying influx of bad characters, apart from during limited periods of 
upheaval in the province when troops were on hand to patrol the territory’s 
boundaries.
The attention to the needs of the territory’s Chinese inhabitants is similarly to 
be observed with regard to the trial and punishment of offenders. The next chapter
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shows how the government of the territory was indifferent to the question of the 
introduction of the jury and that of legal representation for defendants.
9. James Stewart Lockhart with soldiers from the 1st Chinese Regiment and pupils o f  the Government Free
School.
10. Ch’e Shuo-hsiie, District Headman, with the tablet he received from the government in recognition o f his
efforts to rescue a wreck, August 1905.
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11. District Headman o f  Feng Ling.
12. Police Inspectors Whittaker, Crudge and Forcey.
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13. Headman o f Hai-hsi-t’ou village and his family, 23 April 1905.
14. James Stewart Lockhart and Luo Chong-ming, 
Magistrate o f Jung-ch’eng, 1905.
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CHAPTER 5
TRYING AND PUNISHING OFFENDERS
It seems to be the fact - to my mind ail amazing fact - that by this Order in 
Council, it is possible for a man to be condemned to death in a British court 
without trial by jury and without legal defence. ... I am in a position to state 
that two foreigners have within the past ten years been tried in H.M. High 
Court, Weihaiwei, and in each case there was the usual and regular 
procedure. Weihaiwei has been a British possession for fourteen years, and it 
is time the native population were accustomed to British methods and British 
procedure in criminal trials.1
As we saw in the previous chapter, Weihaiwei was considered to be a 
relatively peaceful place, almost free of serious crime. Compared with civil litigation, 
the trial and punishment of offenders appears to have been given less attention by the 
government. Civil disputes took up a substantial amount of court time and measures 
to reduce litigation were often discussed. The criminal caseload, on the other hand, 
was rarely the subject of adverse comment. Procedures for prosecuting offences were 
modified from time to time such as when an overworked magistrate suggested that the 
police prepared cases before reporting them to him, but, by and large, the criminal 
justice process was carried out without difficulties. This was certainly the case with 
regard to the criminal process experienced by the vast majority of defendants. In 
1912, however, Weihaiwei received unwelcome attention in the North-China Herald. 
Weihaiwei’s criminal justice system was criticised for the death sentences for murder 
of three unrepresented defendants in trials in which 110 jury was present.2 These cases 
and their aftermath, looked at in some detail below, gave rise to public funding for the 
defence of those accused of capital crimes and may also have revived the use of the 
jury in Weihaiwei.
For most defendants charged with a crime in Weihaiwei, however, jury trial 
and legal counsel were not relevant. Their experience of the law after their arrests 
would have been at the Magistrates’ Courts and, if given a custodial sentence, in the 
territory’s prisons. This chapter looks at the criminal processes relevant to most 
defendants. In these processes, adaptations to English law and procedure were made
1 'Fiat Justitia', 29 Sept 1912, letter to the editor, NCH , vol. CV, no. 2356, 5 Oct 1912, p. 46.
2 These were the first murder convictions brought under the Order. At least one death sentence was 
carried out prior to the Wei-hai-Wei Order in Council, 1901.
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to take into account local circumstances, such adaptations also being shaped by the 
magistrate’s multifaceted role and the government’s attitude towards indigenous 
institutions. First, this chapter traces the development of legal representation and the 
jury in the territory in the context of the territory’s criminal justice processes and 
explores some possible reasons as to why interest in these aspects of the criminal trial 
within the territory was muted.
R. v. Wang and Hsieh3
During one of the visits by the High Court Judge to the territory in the autumn of 
1912, the High Court of Weihaiwei heard two murder cases involving three 
defendants. All three were convicted.4 Both trials were reported in the Herald. Of the 
two cases, the case which caught greater attention in the press was R. v. Wang and 
Hsieh (1912). The facts of this case5 were that, on 8 February 1912, some villagers 
reported to the district officer that a man called Hsieh So had died in suspicious 
circumstances the previous day. A post-mortem was carried out and samples from the 
deceased’s stomach were sent to Shanghai for analysis. The cause of death was 
determined as arsenic poisoning and the District Officer, in his capacity as coroner, 
returned a verdict of wilful murder. The son-in-law of the deceased, Wang, and the 
deceased’s wife, Hsieh, were committed for trial in the High Court.
At the trial in September of the same year, evidence was given that the 
deceased had been away from the territory for much of the four-year period preceding 
his death. In his absence, the two accused allegedly began an affair. Before Hsieh 
So’s return to the village, Wang married the daughter of Hsieh So and the defendant, 
but continued the affair with the latter. Evidence was produced showing that both 
Wang and Hsieh stood to gain interests in land in the event of Hsieh So’s death 
pursuant to deeds executed a few months earlier. Another possible motive for the 
killing was the desire to continue their affair without the inconvenience of Hsieh So’s
J Rex v. Wang Lieu-Hs't [sic] and Hsieh Lin-Shih, H.M. High Court at Weihaiwei, Bourne J., Messrs 
Sun Fa-shan and Miao Tso-Pin, Assessors, 2 Sept 1912, Weihaiwei, NCH, vol. CIV, no. 2353, 14 Sept 
1912, p. 784.
4 Although not stated in the reports o f the cases, the charges o f  murder would have been brought under 
the Offences Against the Person Ordinance, 1905 (Ord. 8 o f  1905).
5 These facts have been gathered from the following sources: Report o f Carpmael, District Officer and 
Magistrate (Southern Division) to the Commissioner, 27 Apr 1912, enc. I, Commissioner to SSC, 12 
May 1914, CO 521/15; and NCH, n. 3.
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presence. It was also almost certain that, before the death of Hsieh So, the two
defendants knew that Hsieh was expecting a child.
The Coroner and the High Court heard that the dead man spoke to relatives
and neighbours, shortly before his death, about how he had eaten half a meal cake for
his breakfast in which he tasted something akin to pepper and afterwards felt very ill.
He died in the early afternoon that same day. Witnesses who had seen the deceased
hours before his death said that he appeared to be in good health. The accused were
alleged to have administered the poison.
In the absence of counsel for the defence, the prosecutor, the Crown Advocate,
raised the possibility of suicide:
He [deceased] knew o f the intimacy between the two persons charged; he 
might have been suffering from great disgust, from a sense o f disgrace to 
him self and his family. It is a well-known fact that suicide by arsenic was 
very common, but 011 the other hand there was no evidence to show that the 
deceased had given expression to any feeling o f disgust or any feeling o f  
shame. It was, o f course, possible that he was suffering this sense o f disgust 
and shame without expressing it or apparently showing it.6
Evidence given by villagers said that suicide was not in keeping with the 
man’s character. Bourne J., sitting with two Chinese assessors, found the accused
j
guilty and passed death sentences.
Q
The second case, Rex v. Li Sing-Wu (1912), was a case in which the 
defendant, driven by jealousy over a woman, had stabbed his victim in the throat. The 
report of the case suggests that the defendant had been convicted on confession 
evidence. The defendant was found guilty by the same judge, assisted by the same 
Chinese assessors as in Wang and Hsieh, and sentenced to death.
The aftermath of R. v. Wang and Hsieh
The reports of these cases, Wang and Hsieh more than Li Sing-Wu, provoked a letter 
to the Herald by a reader using the pseudonym of ‘Fiat Justitia’. He wrote: ‘There are 
features about these trials which must strike any, but the most casual of readers, as 
unusual, if not irregular.’9 The lack of a jury trial, if necessary, of Chinese, the
6 As reported in the NCH.
7 The death penalty for murder was prescribed by s. 2 o f the Offences Against the Person Ordinance, 
1905 (Ord. 8 o f 1905, CO 841/1).
s H.M. High Court o f  Weihaiwei, Bourne, J., Messrs Sun Fa-shan and Miao Tso-Pin, Assessors, 5 Sept 
1912, Weihaiwei, NCH, vol. CIV, no. 2353, 14 Sept 1912, p. 785.
9 ‘British Justice’, NCH, vol. CIV, no. 2354, 21 Sept 1912, p. 828.
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absence of legal representation for the defendants, especially given that counsel 
prosecuted for the Crown, and the delay in holding the trial were questioned. 
Referring specifically to Wang and Hsieh, he said that, if the case were appealed, the 
defendants would have a ‘fighting chance’.10 Is it not, he asked, ‘the invariable rule of 
British courts that criminals are provided with legal defence at public expense?’11 Fiat 
Justitia was not familiar with the Order but, when its provisions were pointed out to 
him through a leading article in the Herald, he mentioned the fact that two foreigners 
had, within the decade preceding Wang and Hsieh, been tried in accordance with ‘the 
usual and regular procedure.’12 He went on to say that ‘Weihaiwei has been a British 
possession for fourteen years, and it is time the native population were accustomed to 
British methods and British procedure in criminal trials.’13 He pointed out that a trial 
with Chinese assessors did not preclude a jury. Trial by jury, he confidently asserted, 
was the ‘undoubted right of every British subject whether white, 01* coloured.’14 On 
legal defence, he insisted that a lawyer should have been provided; the Order did not 
exclude this possibility. A defence barrister, he asserted, would have made more of 
the possibility of suicide and the possible impact on the female defendant’s mind of 
her pregnancy. As we have seen, the possibility of suicide was raised at trial by the 
Crown Advocate but dismissed because there was no evidence of revulsion by the 
victim at the intimate relationship between his wife and their son-in-law.
In total, Fiat Justitia’s letters provoked two leading articles and a letter to the 
editor. The authorship of the leading articles is not given but it is very likely to have 
been written by or with the assistance of someone acquainted with Weihaiwei. Aside 
from informing Fiat Justitia of the provisions of the Order, the first leading article also 
mentioned that the Crown Advocate, H.P. Wilkinson, had carefully considered the 
mode of trial. The readership of the Herald were asked to consider the particular 
circumstances of the leased territory:
Arcadian in sim p licity , halcyon  in its normal calm . T he gaol is but rarely
occu p ied , taxes are regularly brought in on the appointed day and the sense o f
10 Ib id
" Ibid.
12 ‘British Justice’, NCH, vol. CV, no. 2356, 5 Oct 1912, p. 46.
13 Ib id
14 Ib id
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community is, on the whole, against law-breakers. O f the intricacies o f trial 
by jury the Chinese o f Weihaiwei have never had any experience.15
In the second leading article16 readers were told that the Colonial Office had
forbidden the expenditure of public funds to provide counsel for the defendant; that
the Chinese of Weihaiwei were not British and therefore the rights of British citizens
did not apply to them; that comparisons with Hong Kong were not apt because, unlike
Hong Kong, Weihaiwei was not a colony. On the outcome of the trial of Wang and
Hsieh, it was argued that there was ‘no shadow of doubt that the prisoners at
Weihaiwei were justly condemned. ’ One of the reasons cited for this was the petition
by the families of the defendants which asked only that the sentence be modified
without protesting against the finding of guilt. ‘If the Chinese of the Territory had any
doubt on this point, they would not have hesitated to present a petition, after their
usual custom’, argued the author of the article. The author further pointed out that,
under the Order, to avoid any possible miscarriage of justice, the judge’s verdict was
subject to confirmation by the Commissioner and the judge was required to report his
decision and notes of the case to him.17 Thus, the reply argued, the system contained
safeguards against any miscarriage of justice.
In Fiat Justitia’s second letter, he canvassed the view that the lack of outrage
in the territory could have been due to the fact that adultery was punishable under
Chinese law and it might have been thought that the defendants were receiving their
just desserts for that, rather than for murder. Justice lay, he argued, in a more
* ISthorough exploration of the alternative explanation of suicide.
Within the territory itself, Johnston, then District Officer and Magistrate in the 
South Division but who had not been involved in the case, had earlier expressed his 
concern in a letter to Lockhart. He wondered if execution of the woman could be 
avoided, seeing that an infant would be deprived of its mother.19 In an even earlier 
letter Johnston had said that he had not heard any murmurs of discontent amongst the 
people over the outcome of the case and added that the people of the territory would
15 ‘British Justice at W eihaiwei’, 23 Sept 1912, NCH, vol. CIV, no. 2355, 28 Sept 1912, p. 874.
16 ‘Justice in the Protectorates’, 2 Oct 1912, NCH, vol. CV, no. 2356, 5 Oct 1912, p. 11.
17 WOIC, art. 32. For the judge’s report see ‘Report to H. H. The Commissioner under Article 32 o f the 
Order-in-Council 1901’, 7 Sept 1912, enc. I. B, Lockhart to SSC, 12 May 1914, CO 521/15.
18 ‘British Justice’, NCH, vol. CV, no. 2356, 5 Oct 1912, p. 46. As seen above, the possibility o f  suicide 
had been raised during the trial by the Crown Advocate.
19 Johnston to Lockhart, 28 Sept 1912, SLPNLS, vol. 9.
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9 0probably be glad that the British did, in fact, pass the death sentence. Lockhart 
sympathised with Johnston but felt unable to ‘reconcile ... duty with [his] private 
feelings which revolt at hanging a woman.’21 He felt duty bound because the judge 
had found no extenuating circumstances and, moreover, the trial had shown that the 
woman had been the ‘leading spirit’ in the crime. If her sentence was commuted that 
of her accomplice would also have to be commuted. Having both sentences 
commuted would not tend to increase the confidence of the people in British justice. 
Lockhart could only express regret that he could not do as Johnston had suggested. 
There was also the matter, not mentioned by Lockhart, of the third prisoner awaiting
• 9Texecution. Johnston accepted the Commissioner’s explanation.
It must have come as some relief to the Commissioner and others in 
Weihaiwei when, just days before the date set for the execution, Wang, the male 
defendant, confessed to the crime of poisoning his father-in-law.24 He made a 
statement to the effect that he had a grudge against Hsieh So because, when he sought 
repayment of a loan made to LIsieh So, the latter refused and threatened to revoke the 
gift of land previously made. He said that he had planned to poison Hsieh So with rat 
poison seven or eight days before the act was perpetrated. His co-defendant was 
ignorant of his plans. He denied having immoral relations with his mother-in-law and
* 25said that he had spent the night at her house only because he was inebriated.
Following the confession, Bourne J. recommended reprieve of the woman 
prisoner’s sentence pending consultation with the assessors who sat with Bourne on 
the case. I-Iis instructions were that a long sentence of imprisonment should be 
substituted if the assessors thought she was guilty of a crime. If they absolved her of 
guilt she should be pardoned. The Commissioner then consulted the assessors. In their 
view the woman was guilty and, in accordance with the judge’s instructions, they 
recommended that she should be sentenced to imprisonment. After further 
consultation with the judge, the assessors and the magistrate involved in the case, the
20 Johnston to Lockhart, 6  Sept 1912, SLPNLS, vol. 9.
21 Lockhart to Johnston, 29 Sept 1912, SLPNLS, vol. 9.
22 Ib id
23 Johnston to Lockhart, 30 Sept 1912, SLPNLS, vol. 9.
24 ‘The Weihaiwei Murder. Male Prisoner's Confession’, 6  Oct 1912, NCH , vol. CV, no. 2357, 12 Oct 
1912, p. 124.
23 Statement made by Wang Lien-Hsi to the SG, 2 Oct 1912, enc. 1 to Commissioner to SSC, 12 May 
1914, CO 521/15.
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Commissioner sentenced the woman to ten years penal servitude to be served in Hong 
Kong.26 Fiat Justitia wrote a final time to the Herald to say that he had all along
• • 9 7  •maintained that there had been some irregularity in the trial. He also argued that it 
was not clear that the benchmark of Hong Kong could be dismissed so easily:
[I]n all essentials the natives o f Weihaiwei may be regarded as British 
subjects ... they are amenable to British laws and punishments, as the recent 
trials and executions show. At Weihaiwei there are British Courts, British 
magistrates, British inspectors o f police and, when H.M. High Court sits, a 
British judge.28
He referred to the ban on employing counsel out of public funds and suggested 
that ‘since the British Government finds itself so short of funds perhaps some public- 
spirited resident of that ‘ “Arcadian” seaside resort will initiate a subscription list and
* • 90so create a fund to supply this serious deficiency.5
There was to be one more episode to this case. Two years after the conviction, 
the Secretary of State for the Colonies received a letter from Ramsay Macdonald, then 
a Member of Parliament, urged by personal correspondence from ‘a correspondent 
occupying a somewhat important official position in Wei-hai-wei.’30 The 
correspondent had written to MacDonald of the lack of trial by jury for Chinese 
defendants and the lack of legal defence for criminals, even in capital cases, because 
of Colonial Office policy. These allegations were not revealed to Lockhart, but he was 
nonetheless asked to supply a report of the case to the Colonial Office. Without 
having been told the allegations, the Commissioner thought that the delay in the 
holding of the trial had been criticised. Fie wrote that ‘it is impossible to avoid a 
certain amount of delay in the administration of justice so long as the judge of the 
High Court and the Legal Adviser of this Government are as at present resident in 
Shanghai and not in this Territory.’31 With the passage of time since the case, 
Lockhart must have forgotten that the trial had been deliberately delayed until the
26 Jamieson (SG) to SSC, 17 Apr 1914, enc. I to Commissioner to SSC, 12 May 1914, CO 521/15. The 
Commissioner’s actions were permitted under WOIC, art. 32. The option o f  trying the woman for 
conspiracy to commit murder or murder through poisoning under ss. 5 and 10 respectively o f the 
Offences Against the Person Ordinance, 1905, does not appear to have been considered.
27 ‘British Justice’, NCH , vol. CV, no. 2358, 19 Oct 1912, p. 184.
28 Ib id
29 Ibid.
30 Ramsay McDonald to Colonial Office, 6 March 1914, CO 521/15.
31 Lockhart to SSC, 12 May 1915, CO 521/15.
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woman defendant had given birth. The Colonial Office replied to Macdonald and no 
further explanation was asked of the Commissioner.
Although the Order made no mention of counsel in court proceedings or the 
jury, both had been experienced in the courts in Weihaiwei prior to 1912. However, 
events prior to 1912 had ensured that the defendants in the two capital cases in 1912 
were not offered legal representation. The jury, as we shall see, appears to have been 
used only sparingly.
Legal representation of defendants
The first legally defended accused were the two defendants in the manslaughter trial 
of Wang Ch 'eng and Ch V Chiu''1 in 1905. This trial was one of the first cases from the 
courts of Weihaiwei to be reported in the Herald. From the very long report, possibly 
the longest of the reports of Weihaiwei cases, it appeal's that the two defendants, a son 
of the deceased and the brother of the deceased’s wife, were charged with 
manslaughter. When this case arose, Swettenham’s recommendation that no counsel 
should be allowed for at least ten years had apparently been forgotten or deliberately 
ignored. The Crown Advocate advised that it was necessary to retain counsel for the 
defence for those who could not afford it.33 A barrister from Shanghai, Francis Ellis, 
was engaged for the two men and the jury returned a verdict of guilty. Both 
defendants were sentenced to seven years penal servitude.
When the Colonial Office heard that counsel had been hired, they were 
indignant. According to officers there, there was not ‘the slightest need’ for defence 
or prosecuting counsel in a place like Weihaiwei.34 However, they had little choice 
but to rally behind the Commissioner: ‘A dozen cases in a year would almost swallow 
up the grant in aid. But we could not expect Mr Lockhart to disregard the advice of 
the Crown Advocate.’35 Alfred J. Harding, one the clerks in the Eastern department of 
the Colonial Office asked if they should express the hope that the Commissioner 
would not ‘find it necessary to do such a thing again’36 but Charles Lucas, a confidant 
of Lockhart’s and one of the two Assistant Under-Secretaries of State at the Colonial
32 NCH, vol. LXXV, no. 1976, 23 June 1905, p. 655.
33 Lockhart to SSC, 6  Sept 1905, CO 521/8.
34 Harding to Fiddes, 23 Oct 1905, CO 521/8.
35 Fiddes to Cox, 23 Oct 1905, CO 521/8.
36 Harding to Lucas, 10 N ov 1905, CO 521/8.
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Office, prevented such a message from being sent, saying that Lockhart objected as 
strongly as they did to the use of counsel.
Shortly after this, however, Lockhart received a despatch from Lord Elgin, 
Secretary of State for the Colonies stating that there was ‘no sufficient reason for 
retaining barristers for the defence of prisoners ... and the practice should not be
TO
adopted in the future.’ This despatch put a stop to the public funding of defence 
counsel until after Wang and Hsieh. In none of the reported criminal cases were 
Chinese defendants legally represented. Counsel appeared to defend in R. v. T.C. 
Ramsey (1906)39 but it is almost certain that the defendant paid for his own defence. 
Ramsey, who had previously served as a juror, was acquitted on a charge of receiving 
stolen property belonging to the Crown. Europeans were not invariably defended. The 
defendant in R v. Purvis (1907), a Royal Navy stoker charged with the manslaughter 
of another stoker after a brawl in the naval canteen on Liukung island, appears to have 
been unrepresented.40 In short, so far as the available information indicates, the 
defendants in Wang Ch’eng and Ch’i Chiu4 1 were the only defendants to be defended 
out of the public purse until after Wang and Hsieh.
When the trial of Wang and Hsieh loomed, neither the Crown Advocate nor 
the judge raised the issue of legal representation for the defendants. As mentioned 
above, in the 1905 case of Wang Ch ’eng and Ch 7 Chiu,42 the suggestion that counsel 
be hired was made by the Crown Advocate. Similarly, the Acting Crown Advocate 
had suggested representation for the manslaughter case of Rex v. Chang Chu, Chang- 
shih, Chang Miao-shih and Chang Ching-shih (1913),43 tried a year after Wang and 
Hsieh. In this case, the accused were charged with being responsible for the death of a 
woman by strangulation. The Commissioner explained to the Acting Crown Advocate 
that, in accordance with Lord Elgin’s despatch of 1906, it was not possible to hire
37 Lucas, 11 Nov 1905, CO 521/8.
38 Despatch no. 32 o f 27 Jul 1906, referred to in Lockhart to SSC, 18 Sept 1913, CO 521/14.
39 R. v. T. C. Ramsey (\906 ), Bourne J., 27 and 28 Feb 1906, NCH, vol. LXXV11I, no. 2014, 15 March 
1906, p. 613.
40 Rex v. Purvis (1907), NCH , vol. LXXXI1I, no. 2079, 14 June 1907, p. 659.
41 NCH, vol. LXXV, no. 1976, 23 June 1905, p. 655.
42 Ibid
43 H.M. High Court at Weihaiwei, 26 Aug 1913, NCH, vol. CV1II, no. 2405, 13 Dec 1913, p. 839. For 
more details on the case, see also Annual Reports for 1913, CO 873/377.
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defence counsel.44 When the papers for the case reached Bourne, the High Court 
judge, he deemed defence counsel essential in the interests of justice45 Fortunately, 
from the point of view of keeping costs down, a banister called Parsons was, at the 
time, on holiday in Weihaiwei. He was asked to undertake the defence on the promise 
that, although he would not be paid an adequate fee, some remuneration would be 
recommended. The Judge, sitting with two Chinese assessors, acquitted the 
defendants. The skeletal report of the case provides 110 details of the case but some 
complexity is suggested by the length of the trial - three to four days. The Acting 
Crown Advocate later also said that the trial had confirmed the view which he and the 
judge had expressed over the need for counsel for the defence.46 It seems very likely 
that the Acting Crown Advocate and Judge were emboldened by the debate in the 
Herald begun by Fiat Justitia.
It would appeal' that Lord Elgin’s despatch in 1906 effectively ended 
payments from public funds to legal counsel. After 1914, however, defence counsel 
appeared in all three capital cases reported in the Herald. In the first of these, Rex v. 
Liu Huan-chu (1915),47 the defendant was defended by Alexander Ting, the first 
Chinese lawyer to be admitted to practise in Shanghai 48 The defendant pleaded guilty 
to a charge of escaping from custody but pleaded not guilty to charges of murder, 
burglary, and assaulting and wounding a police officer. The Crown was represented 
by Francis Ellis, the Acting Crown Advocate. The defendant was convicted of 
burglary, assault, and escaping from police custody, the murder charge having been 
dropped as a result of the Crown entering a plea of nolle prosequi. The second case, 
R. v. Feoderova (1924),49 was deemed newsworthy because the defendant was a 
Russian woman charged with the murder of her Chinese husband who had died from
44 See Lockhart to the SSC, 18 Sept 1913, CO 521/14.
45 See Bourne to Lockhart, 11 Sept 1913, CO 521/14.
46 Macleod to Lockhart, 11 Sept 1913, CO 521/14.
47 H.M, High Court At Weihaiwei, 5 and 6 Nov, H. P. Wilkinson, Acting Judge, NCH , vol. CXVII, no. 
2518, 13 Nov 1915, p. 526.
48 Alexander Ting was a graduate o f  Manchester University, admitted to practice at the Mixed Court at 
Shanghai before 1911, at a time when there was no other Chinese lawyer admitted to practice at that 
court. Ting was admitted on the basis o f his British Bar Association certificate: A.M. Kotenev, 
Shanghai: Its M ixed Court and Council (Shanghai: North-China Daily News and Herald, 1925), 
passim. Kotenev refers to Alexander Ting and four other Chinese lawyers as ‘gifted jurists’ (at 202) 
and describes Ting’s representation o f  the views o f the Chamber o f  Commerce at a meeting during 
1911 to discuss reform o f  the Mixed Court.
49 Only reported as ‘Dramatic Trial At Weihaiwei: Foreign Woman Charged with Murder o f Chinese 
Husband -  found not guilty’, NCH , vol. CLXVII, 110. 2964, 3 1 May 1924, p. 343.
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stab wounds. The defendant was defended by J.G. Priestwood and acquitted after 
members of the jury were directed to consider only whether she was guilty of 
manslaughter. Upon her acquittal, a collection was raised in the territory to enable the 
destitute woman and her son to return to Russia. The defendants in R. v. Liu Mu-te 
and Huang Yueh (1925),50 in which the prosecution withdrew all charges after the 
leading witness for the prosecution recanted his evidence, were also represented by 
J.G. Priestwood.
The reappearance of coimsel for the defence in Weihaiwei was not an 
accident. In the summer of 1914, after Wang and Hsieh (1912) and Chang Chu, 
Chang-shih, Chang Miao-shih and Chang Ching-shih (1913), the Crown Advocate 
recommended that the government of Weihaiwei establish a fund for the cost of hiring 
defence counsel into which £50 would be deposited each year and rolled over until 
such a time when there was a healthy balance. The annual sum to be deposited was 
based on the estimate of requiring defence counsel once every two years.51 
Eventually, the Treasury wrote to the Colonial Office saying that, while they agreed 
with Lord Elgin’s view that defence barristers should not be retained at public 
expense, they were always willing to approve exceptions in special cases. On the 
understanding that such cases were rare, the Treasury gave the Commissioner ‘general 
authority for the employment of Counsel at the desire of the judge to defend prisoners 
where the Commissioner is satisfied that the accused has insufficient funds to obtain 
the services of counsel.’52
It is more than likely that Fiat Justitia’s letters had had some impact on this 
development. No doubt the letter from MacDonald, thought, in the Colonial Office, to 
have been inspired by either Bourne J. or Macleod, the Acting Crown Advocate, also 
helped pave the way. The timing was almost choreographed. MacDonald’s informant 
wrote to him after the case of Chang Chu etc. for which the barrister by the name of 
Parsons was briefed as defence counsel. The Commissioner supplied reports of Wang 
and Hsieh to the Colonial Office in May 1914 and, in July, Lockhart was writing to 
the Secretary of State about public funds for defence counsel. In September of that
50 ‘Weihaiwei Murder Trial: State's Witness Contradicts His Former Testimony: Sordid Story o f A 
Gambling Debt’, NCH, vol. CLV11, no. 3044, 12 Dec 1925, p. 493.
51 This figure, based on the regular charge o f  lawyers in Shanghai going elsewhere for the day o f  
£12.10 a day plus travelling expenses, and the idea o f  a fund, was advised by the Crown Advocate at 
Shanghai and approved by Bourne J.: CO 873/411.
52 Heath (Treasury) to SSC, 4 Sept 1914, CO 521/15.
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year, the Colonial Office informed Lockhart of the decision of the Treasury allowing
ri
him to employ counsel.
Jury trials
As with the issue of legal representation, jury trials were introduced in Weihaiwei as a 
result of the advice of the Crown Advocate and against the judgement of the Colonial 
Office. The Colonial Office could not understand why a jury was needed when the 
Order had provided, in cases involving Chinese defendants, for trial by judge or 
magistrate, assisted, if necessary, by Chinese assessors. The ordinance was not 
disallowed but the possibility of repealing it later was noted.54 The fact that the drafter 
of the Order, Albert Gray, had informed the Foreign Office that there was to be no 
trial by jury but that the court had the discretion, in cases involving Chinese law, to 
employ assessors, had either been forgotten or never brought to the attention of the 
Colonial Office and others. Gray had indeed further said that, in serious cases where 
the accused was a British or other (non-Chinese) subject, a corresponding provision 
for the appointment of British or other assessors might be considered.55
As mentioned earlier, the case in which defence counsel’s fee was found from 
public funds -  Wang Ch ’eng and Ch ’i Chin56 -  was also the case which gave rise to 
the jury trial in Weihaiwei. In addition to advising the necessity of defence counsel, 
the Crown Advocate also recommended that an ordinance allowing for trial by jury 
should be passed. One of the deceased’s sons and his wife’s brother were to be tried 
for manslaughter, death having been caused by assault. In the course of his opinion, 
the Crown Advocate, addressing the question of the absence of the jury in the Order,57 
advised that 4 [wjhere and when a jury can ... be summoned, there is no doubt as to 
the expediency of conducting criminal trials’ in accordance with ‘home practice and
c o
procedure.’ Fie considered that Chinese assessors could not make up for the lack of
53 SSC to Lockhart, 10 Sept 1914, CO 521/15.
54 Cox to Lucas, 12 May 1905, CO 521/8. The subject o f repealing it appears never to have been 
subsequently raised.
55 Gray to Foreign Office, Confidential Print - Affairs o f China, 19 Sept 1899, FO 17/1664.
56 NCH, vol. LXXV, no. 1976, 23 June 1905, p. 655.
57 The jury is not mentioned in the Order except in art. 47 where it is mentioned in the context o f  the 
Coroner’s Court.
58 Crown Advocate’s opinion forwarded in Lockhart to SSC, 2 June 1905, CO 521/8.
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a jury since they had no voice in the decision of the court.59 An ordinance60 was duly
61passed by the Commissioner and the defendants were convicted by a jury.
Weihaiwei’s Jury Ordinance, 1905, was based on the Hong Kong Jury 
Ordinance, 1887, the major differences being that the number on a jury panel was 
reduced from seven to five62 and fewer exceptions to jury service were permitted. 
These modifications were probably deemed necessary because there were few people 
in Weihaiwei qualified to sit on the jury. Cases, with the exception of capital cases 
triable only by a jury of five,63 could continue with up to two jurors leaving the 
panel.64 Majority verdicts were permitted in both civil and criminal cases, though, for 
criminal cases, a majority verdict of at least three jurors was required.65 Jurors had to 
be male, between the ages of 21 and 60, and resident in the territory.66 The small 
European community in Weihaiwei was reflected in the repetition of juror’s names in 
the cases reported. Mr Beer, the principal of the Weihaiwei School, is one example. 
Indeed, his presence as a juror shows how few qualified jurors there were; 
schoolmasters were amongst those exempted from jury service unless there was a 
deficiency in numbers.67 Some of the few Chinese residents who met the English 
language qualification also served as jurors.68
From a perusal of the reports in the Herald and the Annual Reports returned 
for the territory, it is apparent that some defendants were tried by jury. Of the cases 
reported in the former, seven were tried by jury. Three of these -  Ramsey (1906),69
59 Ib id
60 Ord. 2 o f  1905.
61 The defendants were sentenced to seven years penal servitude to be served in Hong Kong.
62 Jury Ordinance, 1905, s. 2.
63 Ibid., ss 19 and 2 0 .
64 Ibid., s. 2 0 .
65 Ibid., s. 19.
66 Ibid., s. 3.
67 Ibid., s. 4.
68 One o f  the jurors in R. v. Liu Chang-te - Y.C. Lee (Yi Chi Lee) - was Chinese, as may have been the 
juror H.W. Sun. Although nothing was said in the Order about familiarity with the Chinese language, it 
was a practical asset for a juror. Donald Clark, a European resident o f  Weihaiwei thought that his 
fluency in Chinese was one reason why he had been a juror on several occasions: ‘Memories o f China’, 
tape recording and transcription o f  interviews by Duncan Clark o f Donald Clark, who was born in 
Weihaiwei on 6  April 1901 and who became manager o f King’s Hotel, Weihaiwei, from 1930 until 
September 1939.
69 R. v. T.C. Ramsey (1906), Bourne J., 27 and 28 Feb 1906, NCH, vol. LXXVIII, no. 2014, 15 March 
1906, p. 613.
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7 0  7 1Purvis (1907) and Feoderova (1924); trials for receiving stolen property, 
manslaughter and murder, respectively -  were cases in which the defendant was a 
European. In all other cases -  where the defendant was Chinese -  the charge was 
either manslaughter (Wang Ch’eng and Ch’i Chiu, Liu Mu-te, Kao Liu and Huang
79  71  h aYueh, and Chang Yung-fu) or murder (Liu Chang-te). Aside from the 1905 case 
of Wang Ch’eng and Ch’i Chiu mentioned above, the three jury trials involving 
Chinese defendants were heard in the last six years of British rule. There are no 
reasons to indicate why Wang and Hsieh were not offered a jury trial except for the 
fact that they were offered trial by a judge in the presence of Chinese assessors. The 
jury and Chinese assessors appeared to have been treated as mutually exclusive 
alternatives, there being 110 reported cases in which the defendant was tried by both 
Chinese assessors and a jury. Although it cannot be said with certainty, it could well 
be that Wang and Hsieh marked a turning point in procedure; the negative publicity in 
the aftermath of this case paved the way for the use of the jury in trials of Chinese 
defendants charged with either murder or manslaughter.
The criticisms of Fiat Justitia appear to have prompted no discussion within 
Weihaiwei as to whether the jury should either be used more often or be the principal 
mode of trial for all serious charges. In meeting the criticisms of Fiat Justitia, the 
authors of the leaders in the Herald do not even mention that a jury tried the case of 
Wang Ch ’eng and Ch 7 Chiu in 1905. Instead, the defence of the Weihaiwei criminal 
justice system was focused on the use of Chinese assessors.
Chinese assessors in criminal trials
Chinese assessors -  defined in the Order as persons with knowledge of Chinese law 
and custom — could, if necessary and where the defendant was Chinese, sit with the
75 * * 'magistrate or judge. Such assessors had no voice in the judgment but could advise
70 Rex v. Punns (1907), NCH, vol. LXXXIII, no. 2079, 14 Jun 1907, p. 659.
71 Only reported as ‘Dramatic Trial At Weihaiwei: Foreign Woman Charged with Murder o f Chinese 
Flusband -  found not guilty’, NCH, vol. CLXVII, no. 2964, 31 May 1924, p. 343.
72 ‘Weihaiwei Murder Trial: State's Witness Contradicts His Former Testimony: Sordid Story o f A 
Gambling Debt’, NCH, vol. CLVII, no. 3044, 12 Dec 1925, p. 493.
73 NCH, vol. CLXXIV, no. 3260, 28 Jan 1930, p. 137.
74 ‘The Murder Trial at Weihaiwei - Son Convicted o f Killing His Mother’, 16 Jan 1930, NCH, vol. 
CLXXIV, no. 3260, 28 Jan 1930, p. 137.
75 WOIC, art. 20.
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the magistrate or judge.76 Judging from the fact that Chinese assessors were 
mentioned only infrequently in the annual reports and that, in relation to civil cases, a 
paucity of qualified persons in the territory was observed, it is likely that Chinese 
assessors were used only exceptionally in criminal trials. In 1906, an assessor assisted 
the magistrate in a manslaughter case which resulted in a conviction for assault77 and, 
in 1925, H.P. Wilkinson, the High Court Judge, was assisted by a Chinese assessor in
7 f ta case where the defendant was charged with aggravated burglary. Chinese assessors 
are mentioned in only four of the cases reported in the Herald. The first two of these 
are the cases of Wang and Hsieh (1912)79 and Li Sing-Wu (1912),80 both mentioned 
above. One of the assessors who sat in both these cases is Sun Fa-Shan (Sun Fashan) 
who was, for some time, the district headman for the Port Edward area. The third was
the manslaughter trial in 1913 of the four members of the Chang family also already
81 82 mentioned. The fourth, Rex v. Chou Pen-shou and Others (1917), was the trial of
four members of the same family for the manslaughter of the daughter-in-law in the
household. Although disadvantaged by the small number of reported cases, it is quite
possible that the court saw the need to appoint Chinese assessors only when the case
contained issues touching upon Chinese law and custom. This would follow from the
qualifications required of an assessor -  knowledge of Chinese law and custom. Cases
of unlawful death in which suicide had to be eliminated as a cause were probably
thought to be typical cases where, in the interest of justice, Chinese assessors would
be of assistance to the court, Chinese and English law being at such variance on the
subject. The cases reported in the Herald bear this out to an extent — Chinese
assessors assisted the court in a number of the cases in which suicide was arguable.
Wang and Hsieh (1912) is an example of this. Suicide was also an issue in Chou Pen-
shou and Others (1917) and very likely to have been an issue in Chang Chu etc
76 Ibid.
77 Annual Report for 1906, CO 873/239.
78 Annual Report for 1925, Russell Brown to the SSC, 17 March 1926, CO 521/28.
79 Rex v. Wang Lieu-Hsi [sic] and Hsieh Lin-Shih, H.M. High Court at Weihaiwei, Bourne J., Messrs 
Sun Fa-shan and Miao Tso-Pin, Assessors, 2 Sept 1912, Weihaiwei, NCH , vol. CIV, no. 2353, 14 Sept 
1912, p. 784.
80 H.M. High Court o f  Weihaiwei, Bourne, J., Messrs Sun Fa-shan and Miao Tso-Pin, Assessors, 5 Sept 
1912, Weihaiwei, NCH, vol. CIV, no. 2353, 14 Sept 1912, p. 785.
81 Rex v. Chang Chu, Chiang Chang-shih, Chang Miao-shih, Chang Ching-shih, H.M. High Court at 
Weihaiwei, NCH, vol. CVII1, no. 22405, 13 Dec 1913, p. 839.
82 Rex v. Chou Pen-shou, Chou Ching, Chou Teng and Chou Hsing, H.M. High Court at Weihaiwei, 
NCH, vol. CXXV, no. 2629, 29 Dec 1917, p. 792.
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(1913). In the former, the daughter-in-law of the first accused was beaten by the 
accused after a family quarrel. The post-mortem showed that she died from injuries to 
her spleen but there was also a small amount of arsenic in the contents of her stomach. 
The evidence in this case was complicated; it included a statement made by the 
deceased’s husband who had, since her death, committed suicide. In this statement, 
the husband said that his wife had admitted having an affair and that she had 
committed suicide. There was a suggestion in the trial that the daughter-in-law, 
having been fatally injured, was urged by her husband to take the poison. Her death 
would thus look like a suicide and cause no, or less, loss of face to her father-in-law. 
With regard to the other cases, we have insufficient information on Li Sing-Wu and 
the aggravated robbery case referred to in the Annual Reports for 1925. In the report 
of the case of R. v. Feoderova, in which the possibility of suicide was mentioned in 
court, we are not told whether Chinese assessors assisted the Judge.
Notwithstanding the informational gaps, the law reports of the Herald suggest 
that Chinese assessors were used less frequently in the last decade or so of British 
rule, whilst the opposite was true for juries. It should, however, be emphasised that 
the reported cases form a small and perhaps unrepresentative sample from which only 
tentative conclusions may be drawn.
Criminal justice in the Magistrates’ Courts
Neither the absence of legal representation nor that of a jury trial was relevant to the 
vast majority of defendants charged with a crime. For them, the criminal justice they 
experienced in Weihaiwei territory took the form of a summary trialS3 before a 
magistrate without a jury or legal counsel and very likely also without Chinese 
assessors. Procedures in the Magistrates’ Courts were conducted in broad accordance 
with the provisions of the Weihaiwei Order. Cases were begun either by complaint or 
by the issue of summonses and warrants for arrest84 and prosecuted by either a police 
inspector or, in the case of breaches of sanitary regulations, the medical officer. 
Although obliged by article 19 of the Order to apply, subject to necessary alterations 
and modifications, the procedure and practice of the Courts of Justice and Justices of
83 Offences punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six months or with a fine not exceeding $100 
had to be tried summarily.
84 Returns for the number o f summonses and arrest warrants issued were regularly made.
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the Peace in England,85 there are indications that, in the case of the rules of evidence, 
English rules were not strictly observed. Here, we are acutely constrained by the lack 
of records of cases heard in the Magistrates’ Courts. In the context of civil litigation, 
it was said that if English rules of evidence were followed, justice would seldom be 
done.86
Trial procedure would also have been affected by the absence of lawyers. The 
territory never acquired a legal profession. All counsel who appeared in the small 
number of reported cases in which the parties were represented were practitioners 
from Shanghai. This was true of Francis Ellis, Alexander Ting, J.G. Priestwood, and 
Parsons mentioned above in connection with particular trials. In almost all cases, the 
defendant represented himself in court. In preparing the draft of the Order, the 
Colonial Office had been in receipt of a recommendation that no legal counsel be 
allowed to practice in the courts of the territory for at least 10 years.87 This and other 
recommendations were based on the premise that the territory’s largely peasant 
population required only the simplest of arrangements for trial. Without lawyers, 
proceedings were likely to have been more informal and the magistrate would have 
had to adapt to a more inquisitorial role, advising the defendant or adjourning to the 
scene of the crime when necessary.88 Indeed, the magistrate, in many instances, was 
involved in the earlier investigation into the crime and in effecting attendant raids and 
arrests. As mentioned in an earlier chapter, magistrates also supervised the police.89
Petty village crimes
Not much is reported of how village headmen, or others within the village, dealt with 
petty crime and infringements of clan or village regulations. Yet, there are reasons to 
believe that some form of village justice was allowed to continue. Village headmen 
were formally recognised and authorised by the government for general 
administrative purposes, including the collection of taxes and the distribution of 
important information. As we saw in chapter 4, headmen were instructed by the
85 WOIC, ait. 19.
86 See ch. 6 , ‘Trial Procedure’.
87 Swettenham to Colonial Office, enclosing his report on Weihaiwei and its future administration, 26 
July 1900, CO 882/6/4, No. 52, also to be found in CO 521/1.
88 An example is a manslaughter case in 1906 which was reported to have been tried at the scene o f the 
crime: Annual Report for 1906, CO 873/239.
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government to be its eyes and ears. Their role in policing is clear; their role in 
establishing guilt and punishing offenders less so. If they had a role, which is highly 
likely, it was not formally authorised or acknowledged. The government appears not 
to have concerned itself with village justice and thus very little is in fact known of 
how petty crimes were dealt with. We know from Johnston’s Lion that the authorities 
were aware that ‘for minor offences evil-doers [were] punished by their neighbours in 
accordance with long-standing rules and bye-laws.’90 The incorrigible could be 
expelled from the village or turned over to the magistrate. Some guidance may be 
afforded by anthropological data from elsewhere in Shantung and from other parts of 
China. Martin Yang’s fieldwork in Taitou shows petty crimes being dealt with 
summarily within the village whilst more serious crimes were reported to the county 
government.91 Forcible entry into homes or other buildings to steal grain, animals, and 
other useful things at night are examples he furnishes of crimes which were 
punishable by local leaders in accordance with local regulations. Even serious crimes 
such as theft and burglary could still be dealt with within the village, in accordance 
with ‘village custom’ and subject to fines or other punishment ordered by the local 
leaders of the village. More serious crimes such as armed burglary involving cash and 
accompanied by threatening behaviour, along with highway robbery, arson and 
kidnap could only be dealt with outside the village.
The crimes mentioned above such as entry into homes to steal grain which 
were punishable in accordance with local regulations were crimes which were often 
mentioned in local village regulations in Weihaiwei. The existence of these 
regulations and the fact that, in Weihaiwei, some villages took their regulations to the 
magistrate for his official seal indicates strongly that some form of tribunal must have 
existed at village level and, moreover, that the government was aware that some 
crimes were being dealt with therein. It may be recalled that Frank Swettenham, 
commissioned by the Colonial Office to look at the administrative needs of the 
territory, had recommended that the government retain village ‘Councils of Elders’ 
who would, inter alia, hear all minor cases, including minor crimes. However, the 
Order in Council did not provide for any form of criminal process beneath the 
Magistrates’ Courts, nor was the Commissioner empowered to set up any such
89 See discussion in ch. 4, ‘The Magistrates’.
90 LDNC, 159.
91 Martin Yang, A Chinese Village (Columbia University Press, 1945), 149-150.
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tribunals. What is likely is that the government allowed villages to deal with some 
minor crimes and, if this could be accomplished without incident within the village, 
was probably ready to close one eye to what was going on. It was only if peace was 
not restored within the village that the government became interested and, at that 
stage, processes could be begun which would result in the offender coming before a 
magistrate. This would have been entirely in keeping with the view of Johnston that 
villages in the territory were ‘to a certain limited extent, so far as their domestic 
affairs are concerned, like so many little self-contained republics’ ... ‘Every 
individual is bound by rigid unwritten law to conform to the will of the maior et 
sanior pars and to fulfil his duties to the community.’92 It was also consistent with a 
machinery of government and justice which was stretched to the extent that it quietly 
welcomed the resolution of disputes, whether civil or criminal, within the village.
Sentencing and punishment of offenders
Having found offenders guilty of crimes, the courts of Weihaiwei were empowered by 
article 21 of the Order to award any punishment as may have been awarded by a court 
of criminal jurisdiction in England at the time, subject to limits on the sentencing
QTpowers of the magistrates and other statutory limits. As we saw above, the death 
sentence could be passed by the High Court, subject to confirmation by the 
Commissioner in accordance with article 32. Death sentences were rare, the territory 
experiencing very few serious crimes. The three death sentences handed down in 
1912 were the first such sentences recorded since the Order was passed.94 One 
defendant in 192795 and another in 1930 made up the remaining death sentences.96 
Aside from the female defendant in Wang and Hsieh, at least one of the other 
sentences was commuted. The prisoner sentenced in 1927 had his sentence commuted 
to 10 years penal servitude by Peter Grain, Judge of the High Court, after the jury 
recommended that the defendant be treated mercifully.97 The Commissioner was also
92 Report o f  the SG for the year 1904, Annual Report 1904, app. I, CO 874/163.
93 See for instance ss 2-4 o f  the Flogging Regulation Ordinance, 1903 (Ord. 8 o f 1903), which imposed 
maximum sentences o f  flogging for both offences and breaches o f  prison regulations.
94 One prisoner was sentenced to death during the period before the Order in Council was passed. No 
other death sentences are mentioned in the records.
95 Annual Report for 1927, CO 521/41.
96 Rex v. Liu Chang-te, NCH , vol. CLXXIV, no. 3260, 28 Jan 1930, p. 137.
97 Annual Report for 1927, CO 521/41.
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empowered to grant conditional or unconditional pardons in all cases.98 The two death 
sentences following the convictions in Wang and Hsieh and Li Sing-Wn discussed 
above were carried out in Weihaiwei by an executioner from Hong Kong.99
With the introduction of the Children and Juvenile Offenders Ordinance100 in 
1910, death sentences could no longer be passed on offenders under the age of sixteen 
but detention during H.M.’s pleasure could be directed by the Commissioner. This 
law was passed because the Offences Against the Person Ordinance, 1905, contained 
no provision exempting young offenders from the death penalty. Neither before the 
Ordinance was passed nor afterwards was a person under the age of sixteen convicted 
of a capital crime.
Other penalties included imprisonment with or without hard labour, penal 
servitude, deportation, payment of damages101 and fines. Costs could also be ordered 
of the person convicted102 and, in cases of vexatious or frivolous prosecution, the
i mcourt could order the complainant to pay all or part of the expenses of both sides. 
Powers to banish from the territory for up to five years those convicted of an offence 
or considered to be a threat to peace and good order were introduced in 1905 through 
the Banishment and Conditional Pardons Ordinance.104 Some sentences of floggings 
were ordered and carried out before the Colonial Office pointed out in 1905 that 
flogging, with the exception of the case of juveniles and other minor exceptions, was 
unlawful.105
Given the paucity of serious crimes and the overwhelming number of 
prosecutions for gambling, fines were the most frequently imposed penalty. The fines
98 WOIC, art. 32. The power to pardon crimes applied to all sentences, not just death sentences: WOIC, 
art. 38.
99 Report o f  Case by Mr. Jamieson, SG, enc. I, Lockhart to SSC, 12 May 1914, CO 521/12.
J0° Ord. 1 o f  1910, CO 841/1.
101 For instance, persons convicted o f  assault could be ordered to pay the victim damages not exceeding 
$50: WOIC, art. 28.
102 WOIC, art. 33.
m Ibid
104 Ord. 6 o f  1905. This Ordinance, based almost entirely upon Hong Kong Ord. No. 1 o f 1882, allowed 
for the deportation o f  Chinese, non-British subjects to Chefoo. Some violations o f  banishment orders 
are recorded in the statistics o f  police cases but these are not numerous. The Ordinance was 
recommended by Johnston - ‘It is most desirable in the interests o f the peace and good order of the 
Territory that the executive should possess the power which has for many years been found so useful in 
Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements and is conferred by this Ordinance upon the Commissioner o f  
W eihaiwei’, Johnston to Lockhart 10 Oct 1905.
105 SSC to Lockhart, 3 March 1905, CO 521/8.
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imposed were probably not excessive, given that there were few convicted of 
contempt of court for failure to pay. One penalty which appears to have been inflicted 
in excess of the provisions of the Order was the imposition of a fine on entire villages, 
where appropriate, the fine being calculated to cover the extra costs of policing to 
prevent the outbreak of fighting in or between villages.
Imprisonment
Prison sentences were usually carried out in the prison on Liukung island. On the 
mainland, the only detention facility was the small lock-up at Port Edward.106 In 1904, 
the island jail had 12 cells in which prisoners, till then male only, were detained two
107to a cell. Three years before the end of British rule in Weihaiwei, the prison’s 
capacity was put at 70 male and 20 female prisoners while the Port Edward lockup 
had seven cells.108 The increase in capacity was largely the result of major 
improvements made to the island jail in 1911. Prior to this, the facilities were clearly 
inadequate, prisoners being held three or more to a cell in buildings which were not 
conducive to proper surveillance. One government officer described the detention 
facilities as being ‘only suitable for rustics sentenced to short terms of imprisonment. ’ 
As a result, long term prisoners - those sentenced to two or more years - had to serve 
their sentences elsewhere.109 The serving of sentences in Hong Kong or in some other 
part of H.M.’s dominions was permitted by article 39(1) of the Order.110 The need to 
expand the detention facilities of the territory’s main prison was given impetus in 
1910, when long term prisoners from the Transvaal and, later, Singapore were 
expected. The improvements involved demolishing part of the prison and building a 
perimeter wall enclosing new facilities. When finished in November 1911, the prison 
had a well, exercise grounds, prison cells, guardrooms, a washhouse, hospital, several
106 This lockup was similar to cells for the short-term detention o f prisoners at police stations: Walter, 
20 Sept 1906, CO 873/230.
107 CO 873/134. Alterations carried out in 1903 had given the jail twice as many cells and a larger 
prison yard surrounded by a wall: Annual Report for 1903, enc. Lockhart to SSC, 18 Apr 1904, CO 
521/6.
108 Annual Report for 1927, C 0521/41.
109 In 1909 for instance, two prisoners sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment with hard labour 
upon convictions for manslaughter were sent to Hong Kong: Report o f  the SG, Departmental Reports 
for 1909, CO 873/292. See also the case o f  R. v, Wang and Hsieh discussed above.
110 This provision is allowed by ss 6 and 7 o f  the FJA. Note also that WOIC, art. 39(2) extended to 
Weihaiwei, with some modifications, the Colonial Prisoners Removal Act, 1884 (47 & 48 Viet. c. 31).
162
workshops, a tool store and isolation rooms. The staff of the improved prison included
one head warden, four sub-wardens and a female warden.111 Despite these
112improvements, several prisoners were later sent to Hong Kong.
The power to make rules for prisoners and wardens lay with the
Commissioner. The Prisons Ordinance, 1903,113 reiterated the Commissioner’s rather
comprehensive powers under the Order to
m ake rules for the regulation and governm ent o f  prisons and for the duties 
and con d uct o f  the officers and other persons em p loyed  in prisons and o f  the 
visitors and for the classification , diet, cloth ing, m aintenance, em ploym ent, 
d iscip lin e , instruction and correction o f  prisoners and for all other matters 
relating to  prisons, and m ay from  tim e to tim e repeal, alter, or add to such  
rules, provided that such rules shall not be in con sisten t w ith  anything  
contained  in this O rdinance . 114
Section 8 of this Ordinance provided two classes of ‘hard labour’; the first consisting
of ‘work at the tread wheel, shot-drill, crank, capstan, stone breaking or such other
like description of hard bodily labour as may be appointed by the Commissioner.’ The
second class comprised ‘such description of bodily labour as may be appointed by the
Commissioner.’ Prisoners sentenced to hard labour could be employed in labour of
the second class outside the prison so long as supervised.
The annual reports show that the prisoners made and repaired roads, drains,
tennis courts and piers, laid telephone cables, rolled golf links, and maintained the
public gardens and nurseries. In 1911, they planted firs on the hills of Liukung and
acacias along the roads. Although most of the work was carried out on the island,
prisoners were sometimes transferred to the lock-up on the mainland so that works
around Port Edward could be carried out. Women prisoners, confined to the jail along
with some long sentence prisoners,115 made, washed and mended summer and winter
prison uniforms.116 Prisoners received some remuneration for their work.117
111 A female warden was appointed for the first time in 1906: Report o f  Inspector Whittaker on the 
Liukungtao Gaol for 1906, CO 873/239.
112 In 1915, for example, a prisoner sentenced to a total o f twelve years penal servitude for burglary, 
escape from custody and assault was sent to Hong Kong: Report o f  the North Division, Annual Reports 
for 1915, CO 873/458.
1,3 Ord. 4 o f  1903.
114 Rules made by the Commissioner under this section were binding on all persons as if  they had been 
contained in the Ordinance: Prison Ordinance, 1903, s. 17.
115 In 1904, after sentencing two men to long sentences with hard labour the Commissioner instructed 
Inspector Whittaker that both prisoners were to be engaged in the breaking o f  stones in the prison yard: 
CO 873/134.
116 CO 873/230. Prisoners' uniforms had originally been imported from Hong Kong.
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On the whole, prisoners were regarded as unproblematic, prompting the 
Medical Officer to remark, in 1909, that ‘Chinese prisoners as a class give little 
trouble. They cheerfully make the best of things. They do good work and they obey 
orders.’118 Minor infringements, such as the possession of cigarettes smuggled in 
while working outside the prison were common but no serious disorder ever erupted. 
From time to time, prisoners complained of real or imaginary illnesses to avoid work 
and some of them attempted escape. Some prisoners also complained of insufficient 
food. In 1914, one prisoner went on a hunger strike to protest against the lack of food. 
Breaches of prison discipline were dealt with by the magistrate. Minor breaches were 
punished with a low diet119 whilst floggings were administered for more serious 
infringements. In 1914, a higher diet was introduced as a reward for hard work.120 The 
basic diet of prisoners, as introduced in 1906, consisted of three pounds of Chinese 
meal bread and four ounces of salted vegetables four days a week, four ounces of 
fresh vegetables three days a week, and two pints of hot water daily. This is hardly a 
balanced diet but more nutritious than the low diet of two pounds of meal bread and
19 1two pints of hot water a day. Walter, perhaps naively, saw the diets as 
‘considerably superior fare to what they get in their own homes’ so much so that 
‘prisoners come out of gaol in far better health than when they are admitted.’ When, 
in 1915, the Magistrate for the North Division received a complaint of insufficient 
food from prisoners in the island jail, Inspector Crawley compiled a table showing the 
weight of prisoners compared with their weight on entering the jail. All prisoners who 
had served more than a month of their sentences had gained weight, in one case 21 
pounds.122 The increase in weight was probably that which inevitably occurs when 
coming off opium, together with a stodgy diet and inadequate exercise.
117 Report on H.M. Gaol Liukungtao, Departmental Reports for 1911, Annual Report for 1911, CO 
873/335.
118 Report o f  Dr. Hickin, Medical Officer, in Departmental Reports for 1909, CO 873/292. Prisoners 
were o f  course not uniformly compliant.
119 Report o f  Inspector Whittaker on the Island Gaol and Police, Annual Report 1910, CO 873/313.
120 Report on Gaol by Inspector Whittaker, 11 Jan 1915, CO 873/435.
121 CO 873/230.
122 CO 873/455.
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Two aspects of the territory’s criminal justice system - legal representation and jury 
trials - brought notoriety to Weihaiwei in 1912. The comments made by Fiat Justitia 
and the responses his letters provoked contained obvious inaccuracies. One general 
misconception of his was that jury trials and legal representation were a necessary 
part of the British criminal process. Throughout the many places under British 
colonial rule or protection, there were many examples of trial without jury or lawyers. 
Trial by judge and lay assessors was often the mode of trial introduced.123 As we have 
just seen, although we do not know of the policies or principles which might have 
determined in which cases a jury trial was offered, jury trials were held from 1905 
onwards. What seems clear is that, prior to Wang and Hsieh, Chinese defendants were 
not precluded from a jury trial.
On legal representation, banisters appeared both to defend and prosecute in 
the exceptional case. Moreover, public funds were used to provide defence counsel 
where the defendants were unable to afford the costs themselves. This was not 
repeated after R. v. Wang Cheng and Others because of Lord Elgin’s despatch.
In tracing the history of the jury trial and legal representation in the tenitory, it 
is clear that the impetus for both came not from those in daily contact with the 
inhabitants of the territory -  government officials, including magistrates, in 
Weihaiwei -  but from outside the territory. There are no traces in Colonial Office 
despatches of the Commissioner being troubled by the lack of defence counsel, 
whether generally or with regard to particular trials. Lucas’ comment that, on the 
question of legal representation, the Commissioner shared the views of the Colonial 
Office was probably accurate, given that he and Lockhart were in private 
correspondence. Even after the publicity following Wang and Hsieh, the principle and 
practice of having counsel in court, at least in civil cases, was still to be established.
123 See J.H. Jearey, ‘Trial by Jury and Trial with the Aid o f Assessors in the Superior Courts o f British 
African Territories: I’, Journal o f  African Law , 1960, vol. 4, pt 3, 133-146; T. Olawale Elias, British 
Colonial Law  (London: Stevens, 1962) and the overview in N eil Vidmar (ed.), World Jury Systems 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), ch. 13. Where jury trials were introduced, they were 
sometimes the privilege o f  European defendants. In England itself, although the alarm over the decline 
o f the jury in criminal trials was overstated, successive legal reforms from the middle o f the 19th 
century had reduced the incidence o f jury trials; the number o f crimes triable either way was increased 
and crimes triable summarily was increased, first for young offenders and later for adults. By the end o f  
the lease o f  Weihaiwei in 1930, five statutes which effected curtailment o f  trial by jury had been passed 
onto the English statute book. See R.M. Jackson, ‘The Incidence o f  Jury Trial During the Past 
Century’, Modern Law Review , 1937, vol. 1, 132-144, esp. 132-138.
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In 1914, Moss, one of the magistrates, heard a contract dispute in which one party was 
represented by a barrister from Shanghai. He minuted the Commissioner afterwards to 
say that he would prefer it if no counsel appeared except in very exceptional 
circumstances.124 He asked if, in all cases, lawyers had a right to appear in his court 
and gave his own view that, in criminal trials, no lawyer should be allowed to appear 
until the case had been referred to the Crown Advocate and that, in civil cases, ‘where 
both or one of the parties is an Asiatic, absolute discretion should be granted to the 
Court -  subject to a local appeal to the Commissioner -  to refuse permission to appear 
in Court.’125 The Commissioner sought the Crown Advocate’s opinion without 
offering his own. The Crown Advocate informed Lockhart that litigants in any British 
Court of Record were presumed entitled to the assistance of any duly qualified British 
legal practitioner, a presumption which could only be negated expressly by Order in 
Council. Furthermore, ‘in criminal cases, the accused is undoubtedly entitled to have 
such legal assistance as he can obtain.’ The Crown Advocate went on to sympathise, 
saying that he could ‘quite understand the apprehensions expressed by Mr Moss’ but 
that the presence of Counsel ‘where the parties really need him, is also in the long run 
of assistance to the court.’ 126 This exchange is instructive of the attitude in the 
territory towards the question of legal representation.
On the question of the jury, the opposition of the Colonial Office is 
unsurprising. From the time it took over responsibility for the territory in 1901, due in 
part to the uncertain length of stay, it intended to run the territory with the minimum 
of expenditure. There was no ambition to establish British rule beyond the level 
determined by necessity.
The indifference of the government of Weihaiwei to the question of jury is 
understandable. Lockhart and other officers in Weihaiwei may have known something
« i on • • •of its unsuccessful use in Hong Kong a few decades earlier. In Weihaiwei,
124 Moss to Commissioner, 15 June 1914, CO 873/421.
125 Ibid.
126 Memorandum on questions raised by Mr Moss, 17 July 1914, CO 873/421.
127 Jury trials had been introduced in Hong Kong in 1844 when the Supreme Court o f Hong Kong was 
established. At first, such trials were few but jury trials increased when, after an instance o f injustice in 
the Magistracy, the Chief Justice ordered that defendants should be tried in the Supreme Court. The 
jury system did not work well: too few qualified to be jurors; those who qualified found the task time- 
consuming; jurors were not always fluent in English even though this was a qualifying condition; and 
most jurors, unable to understand Cantonese, heard the evidence through an interpreter. With many 
unsafe convictions, tidal by jury failed to impress the Chinese that British justice was fair. The jury 
system was only one o f  several problems which beset the criminal tidal system in Hong Kong and these
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moreover, the jury would have been relevant only to the few cases heard in the High 
Court. Officials in Weihaiwei, working within the constraints of limited resources, 
were concerned with retaining the confidence of their Chinese residents in the ability 
of the territory’s courts to prosecute crimes and punish offenders satisfactorily. This 
included adapting procedure to the lack of counsel in the lower courts by adopting a 
more inquisitorial process; and providing adequate detention facilities. Indeed, the 
government feared that the Chinese of the territory would see its laws as too soft 011 
crime. This would explain the remark made by Johnston after being informed by the 
Commissioner that Wang’s death sentence could not be commuted. Magistrates were 
often aware of the harsher penalties for crime committed within Chinese jurisdiction. 
Moreover, lenient laws and a limited police force, it was feared, would draw bad 
characters into the territory. These fears aside, the system worked reasonably well and 
there was nothing to suggest that the inhabitants of the leased territory were critical 01* 
resentful of the criminal justice process. Trial by jury and legal representation would 
not have been familiar to those previously acquainted only with the Chinese courts 
and, from the point of view of the relations between the government and the Chinese 
of Weihaiwei, there was no reason to acquaint them with ‘British methods and British 
procedure’.
problems caused the Chief Justice to enlarge the jurisdiction o f the lower court. With this change, 
fewer defendants faced trial by jury. For an ample discussion o f these and other developments, see 
Christopher Munn, Anglo-China (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2001).
CHAPTER 6
RESOLVING CIVIL DISPUTES
The people o f this Territory positively revel in going to Court and look upon 
it in very much the same light as going to the Theatre or other places o f  
diversion. An injured husband will walk 20 miles to inform the Magistrate 
that he is quite unable to keep his wife in order, - An aggrieved rustic will 
plod wearily a distance o f  10 miles to tell the Magistrate that his neighbour 
has stolen 6 handfuls o f grass that belonged to him, - and he will couch his 
plaint in words o f poetic pathos, imploring “the great man to help him, in 
which case his gratitude will be as the ocean in depth and the vault o f heaven 
in height”.1
This was the impression formed by one of the earliest British magistrates. It was his 
and other magistrates’ experience that the Chinese of the territory took their disputes, 
both petty and serious, to court without hesitation. Litigation appeared to be a 
‘favourite pastime’ and more villagers took advantage of the courts once it was 
discovered that they could do so at ‘a fraction of the cost’ of the previous court 
system.3 Arguments between family members or between neighbours made up the 
larger part of the magistrates’ caseload and family disputes over the adoption of heirs, 
remarriage of widows, custody of children, ownership of clan property, and rights in 
succession were commonly litigated. Disputes between villages over rights to land 
were amongst the most troublesome of cases. Debt, arising from the failure to record 
agreements in writing, bankruptcy and breach of contract cases were fewer; disputes 
involving businesses were less likely to be litigated because these tended to be settled 
through negotiation. Many of those that were not settled were referred for arbitration 
to the Chamber of Commerce in Port Edward or to its predecessor, the gonghui 
(merchants’ guild).4
1 Draft Annual Departmental Report for 1902, Walter, SG and Magistrate, CO 873/97.
2 App. 1, Report o f Johnston, SG, CO 873/163.
3 Although we have no data on civil cases in the two districts, parts o f  which became the leased 
territory, it is established that the Chinese magistrate would have heard many civil disputes. See Adele 
Fielde, A C om er o f  Cathay (New York: Macmillan, 1894), especially the chapter on ‘Suits in Law.’ 
Fielde was an Australian missionary who worked in China for fifteen years, mostly in Swatow. See 
also Byron Brenan, ‘The Office o f  District Magistrate in China’, Journal o f  the North China Branch o f  
the Royal Asiatic Society , 1897-8, vol. XXXII, 36-65; David C. Buxbaum, ‘Some Aspects o f  Civil 
Procedure and Practice at Trial Level in Tanshui and FIsinchu from 1789 to 1895’, Journal o f  Asian 
Studies, 1971, vol. 30, pt 2, 255-279; John R. Watt, The District M agistrate in Late Imperial China 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); and Philip C.C. Huang, Civil Justice in China 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996).
4 The gonghui handled most o f  the disputes involving debt and bankruptcy, deciding cases on the basis 
o f  mercantile custom. See Annual General Report for 1925, Russell Brown to SSC, 17 March 1926,
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In this chapter, the main aspects of the civil justice system put in place under 
British administration are explored. The accessibility of the system and its use by the 
people of Weihaiwei, the trial procedure adopted, the use of Chinese law and custom 
in civil disputes, and the procedures for appealing decisions are each considered in 
turn. The territory’s magistrates and other officials were attentive to the need to 
provide a forum for civil disputes, yet the burden of a large number of petitions on the 
magistrates led them to urge village and district headmen to mediate the settlement of 
some of the disputes.
Access to civil justice
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Figure 5. Civil cases heard in the Magistrates’ Courts 
Until 1906, as mentioned in chapter 3, the territory had just one magistrate, 
whose court was at Port Edward, the territory’s administrative centre. The 
introduction of the post of district officer and magistrate resident in the interior in that 
year allowed for a second Magistrates’ Court to be established in a remote village. 
The establishment of this court brought the court system much closer to a large 
proportion of the population of Weihaiwei. In addition to dealing with criminal cases, 
both this court and the court at Port Edward also heard civil disputes. This state of
CO 521/28. There is no information in these records on the way in which the Chamber o f  Commerce 
dealt with such disputes. We might, however, gain some insight from the excellent and succinct 
synthesis o f works on the dispute settlement functions o f  guilds in Jerome Alan Cohen, ‘Chinese 
Mediation on the Eve o f  Modernization’, California Law Review , 1966, vol. 54, 1201-1226, at 1222, 
and from Madeleine Zelin, ‘Merchant Dispute Mediation in Twentieth-Century Zigong, Sichuan’ in 
Kathryn Bernhardt and Philip C.C. Huang (eds), Civil Law in Qing and Republican China (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1994), 249-286. The Chamber o f Commerce at Weihaiwei was begun in 
1916, motivated by a need, expressed by some local merchants, to be able to deal on a more equal 
footing with modern chambers set up in other cities.
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affairs remained until 1916, when all civil cases were heard in the court at Wen­
ch’iian-t’ang. Unfortunately, due to staff shortages, this court was removed to Port 
Edward in late 1916, reopening in the interior for a few months in 1919. The statistics, 
shown in graph form in Figure 5 above show that fewer cases were litigated in the 
years immediately following closure.
From the first, importance was placed on access to civil justice. The Chinese 
inhabitants of Weihaiwei, it would seem, began petitioning the British officials with 
their disputes as soon as there was an official to whom they could turn. In the first few 
years of British rule, litigants often made unauthorised payments to the magistrate’s 
staff in the course of starting their civil actions but such payments were later stopped. 
In an early report Johnston complained of the prevalence of such activities:
Previous annual Reports will have shown how difficult it is to convince our 
Chinese subjects that British justice is not a marketable commodity. The 
greatest vigilance on the part o f the Magistrate cannot ensure that no money 
is passing from plaintiffs and defendants into the hands o f his Chinese 
subordinates, and it is all but impossible to make litigants understand that 
bribery o f underlings does not and cannot have the slightest effect upon 
magisterial decisions.3
It was the desire to press home the point that British justice could not be 
bought that led to the simplification of the procedures for handing in petitions. 
Petitions were, from then on, delivered at any time to the magistrate himself6 or 
placed in a locked petition box at the roadside near the court. The idea of the box was 
to encourage the communication of legitimate grievances by those who ‘dare[d] not 
openly bring a lawsuit or make accusations against some influential person or family 
in their own village’7 and to avoid giving the magistrate’s staff the opportunity to 
receive bribes. The box proved useful from the point of view of both administration 
and court work. Some of its contents such as the ‘anonymous denunciations of the 
private enemies of the writers’ were discarded immediately, whilst others ‘greatly 
facilitated the labours of the court in ascertaining the rights and wrongs of pending 
cases,’8
Petitioners could use petition forms purchased from local shops at a price 
fixed by the government but use of these forms was not, at least initially,
5 Report o f  the SG, app. I, Annual Report for 1904, CO 873/163.
6 Ibid.
7 LDNC, 114.
8 Ib id , 115 where an example o f  a typical document from the petition-box is provided.
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compulsory.9 Indeed, the Order allowed for applications to be made orally10 and it
was reported by the district officer in 1908 that, with the abolition of licensed petition
writers in 1907, ‘[ejvery party to a case now makes his case in the Court viva voce\u
Such oral petitions were later found to be unsatisfactory and prohibited. Lockhart
summarised the disadvantages of a procedure in which the litigant appeared without
any assistance whatsoever:
The ordinary litigant in Weihaiwei is an illiterate peasant, and is very rarely 
capable o f  giving the Court a clear and succinct oral account o f  his own case.
Very frequently, indeed, he damages his cause not only by his own ignorance 
o f the law but by unintentionally omitting to mention essential facts that 
might be favourable to himself. Sometimes, through nervousness, want o f  
intelligence, or lack o f  education, he is apt to find him self at a greater 
disadvantage when he is called upon to plead orally against an opponent who 
happens to be more skilful or more accomplished than him self.12
Many litigants engaged a licensed petition writer to help them frame their 
pleas. The government had, for a time, recognised petition writers, allowing them to 
charge litigants a fee of $ 1 for drawing up a petition. However, petition writers were 
found to have made surcharges and some of them were prosecuted for these and other
corrupt practices. In one such case, the petition writer had impressed upon his clients
* 1 ^  that he was m receipt of a salary from both the British and Chinese governments. It
was the difficulties of controlling or supervising their work that led the government,
in 1907, to ban petition writers.14
With access in mind, the government resisted the imposition of court fees until
1910, when a petition fee of $2 was introduced.15 The introduction of fees coincided
with the next development - the introduction of government-salaried petition writers.
9 These forms were introduced in 1902 and were still in use in 1907: Annual Report o f  the SG, 1 March 
1903, Annual Reports for 1902, CO 521/4.
10 WOIC, art. 49(2). This permission was subject to the order o f the court and Rules o f Court.
11 District Officer’s Department, Report for the Year 1907: CO 873/265.
12 Lockhart to Colonial Office, 7 March 1910, CO 521/11,
13 Report o f the SG, Annual Report for 1907, CO 873/265.
14 Petition writers were certainly practising their trade in Weihaiwei in 1904: see Report o f  the SG, 
Annual Report for 1904, app. 1, C 0873/163. Detailed information on petition writers in Weihaiwei is 
not available but there is some evidence o f their marginal status. In 1903, the SG, reported that he had 
once ‘asked a rustic who wrote his petition for him and was given the reply “I don’t know. A man 
wrote it and then ran away,” ’: Draft Annual Report for 1902, CO 873/97. For a study o f  litigation 
specialists see the excellent description by Meadows quoted at length by A.M. Kotenev, Shanghai: Its 
M ixed Court and Council (Shanghai: North-China Daily News and Herald, 1925), 203 or Melissa A. 
Macauley, ‘Civil and Uncivil Disputes in Southeast Coastal China, 1723-1820’ in Bernhardt and 
Huang (eds), (1994).
15 Lockhart to Colonial Office, 7 March 1910, CO 521/11. These rules were subsequently approved.
See Rules o f  Court, 13 June 1910, CO 873/543.
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This was a response to the deficiencies already mentioned - the failure of oral-only 
proceedings and the ban on petition writers. Without the use of petition writers, some 
litigants submitted petitions which were ‘so vague in their terms and so slovenly 
drafted that they [were] not much if any help to the Magistrates in their inquiries into 
the facts of the case.’16 The introduction of the petition fee was also intended to deter 
trivial cases from reaching the courts. As the petition fee had no noticeable impact on 
the level of litigation, an increase of one dollar was instituted in 1913.
The Commissioner will have been aware of the burden on magistrates such as 
Johnston. In a letter to Lockhart, Johnston wrote that his court day began at nine and 
ended at six, the workload allowing only a brief pause for lunch. This was despite 
turning away some cases on the grounds of triviality.17 On the day he wrote this letter, 
he had turned four cases away. Two years later, he declined the Commissioner’s 
invitation to attend a children’s picnic on the grounds of having to catch up with 
work. He wrote that ‘court-work is so exhausting that it leaves me every evening fit 
for nothing but walking and reading.’18 Letter after letter to Lockhart, particularly 
those written in 1916, told of the high number of petitions. He once wrote, ‘There is 
such a deluge of litigants that my petition-writer cannot keep pace with them, and I 
am turning people away without receiving petitions from them as I cannot deal with 
their cases.’19 Even public holidays had to be disregarded if the work was not to pile
Of) • * »up. Where appropriate, and it was often so in the case of disputes over land, the 
magistrate held his court at the place of the dispute. In letters to Lockhart written in 
1910, Johnston mentioned going to the villages of Meng-chia-chuang, Tun-h’ou-chia 
and Lu-tao-k’ou. These visits invariably involved ‘tenting it’, sometimes for up to 10 
consecutive days. In 1913, trips to Lu-tao-k’ou to investigate land disputes again 
occupied his time.
The increase in Johnston’s caseload in 1916 no doubt played a part in the 
further increase of petition fees to $5 that year and the dramatic increase to $10 which 
came into effect on 1 January 1917. The effect of this large increase can be seen in 
Figure 5 above, although the decrease was also attributable to one other factor -
16 Lockhart to Wilkinson, Crown Advocate, 10 Jan 1910, CO 521/11, enc. to Lockhart to Colonial 
Office, 7 March 1910.
17 Johnston to Lockhart, 29 N ov 1907, SLPNLS, vol. 9.
18 Johnston to Lockhart, 21 May 1909, SLPNLS, vol. 9.
19 Johnston to Lockhart, 29 June 1916, SLPNLS, vol. 10.
172
reduced accessibility to the magistrates’ court. Around the same time, it may be
recalled, due to complaints of overwork from the magistrate at Port Edward, the
administration of the territory was reorganised.21 The Commissioner accepted
Johnston’s proposal that his court should hear all civil cases while the other
magistrates’ court should hear all criminal cases. This change was instituted together
with the restructuring of the administrative posts to produce a Senior and a Junior
District Officer. Due to staff shortages, this was followed not long after by the earlier
mentioned closure of the court in Wen-ch’uan-t’ang. This measure and the increase in
petition fees to $10, occurring within the same year, were regretted by the
government; officers such as Johnston suggested that both be reversed as soon as 
22resources permitted.
Trial procedure
If the procedure for starting a case was simple and relatively informal, procedure in
court was similarly adapted to suit local conditions. Although article 19 of the Order
in Council provided for the application of the procedure of English courts in civil
matters, as it did in criminal matters, the Order itself also allowed relaxations from
English procedural law. Thus, applications could be made orally and, ordinarily, there
were no written pleadings23 unless rules of court otherwise dictated,24 as they did in
1910. The Order expressly provided that a plea could not be invalidated on the sole
grounds of a technical error. Rules of evidence were also relaxed, so that evidence
could be partly oral or written or in the form of an affidavit or deposition. In
practice, magistrates, we are told, did not adhere to English law rules of evidence.26
Johnston’s opinion was that
if  civil cases in Weihaiwei were to be decided entirely by British rules o f 
evidence and strictly in accordance with the information laid before the Court
20 Johnston to Lockhart, 25 May 1916, SLPNLS, vol. 10.
21 The reorganisation took effect on 1 "Nov 1916: Report o f the Senior District Officer, Annual Reports 
for 1916, C 0873/493.
22 Johnston to SSC, 11 March 1918, CO 521/19.
23 WOIC, arts 48(3), 48(4) and 56.
24 Ibid., art. 48(2).
25 Ib id , art. 57.
26 LDNC, 104.
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by the parties concerned, it is to be feared that justice would seldom be done 
except by accident.27
The absence of barristers in the territory also made it necessary for the 
magistrates to advise the parties and to adopt a more inquisitorial role in order for the 
court to be an effective fact-finder. Plaintiff and defendant appeared in person, often
9 Qaccompanied by their more articulate young sons, ‘each to conduct his own case ... 
[and with] practically unlimited freedom to say what he likes about his opponent and 
about things in general.’29 In this atmosphere, some parties made ‘clamorous recitals 
of real or imaginary woes, bitter denunciations [and] passionate appeals for justice.’30 
Johnston’s early experience had taught him that, although abusive language would 
have been used, accusations of personal violence were usually untrue.
The application of Chinese law and custom
As we saw in chapter 3, article 19 of the Order, whilst providing for the prima facie 
application of English law, also contained a proviso reserving a role for Chinese law 
and custom, so far as it was not repugnant to justice or morality, ‘in civil cases 
between natives’. The court was to be ‘guided by Chinese or other native law and 
custom.’ The annual reports compiled by the magistrates and the small sample of 
cases which were reported or otherwise recorded suggests that Chinese law and 
custom were routinely used in civil disputes between Chinese parties.
The magistrates and the High Court Judge of Weihaiwei carried out their work 
in a period during which there was, in addition to works in Chinese, a growing body 
of reference works on Chinese law published in the English language.31 Where local 
customary law was concerned, most of the magistrates in Weihaiwei accumulated 
first-hand knowledge of the customs of the territory. As we shall see, sometimes this 
accumulation of knowledge had the consequence that a magistrate’s view on a 
particular issue changed as he became more familiar with local customary law.32 
Remaining difficulties were usually resolved by asking the opinion of the magistrates
27 Report o f  the SG, Annual Report for 1904, app. 1, C 0873/163.
28 / bid.
29 LDNC, 105.
30 Ib id , 105.
31 See ch. 3.
32 See the case o f Yii 1-tung discussed below.
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of either Wen-teng or Jung-ch’eng districts or interviewing district and village 
headmen. Article 20 of the Order allowed cases to be heard with the assistance of 
Chinese assessors, who, by their qualifications, ought to have been able to provide 
expertise on matters of local custom. However, the use of local assessors was 
probably the exception rather than the rule.33 In none of the land cases reported in the 
Herald is the presence of Chinese assessors recorded. As previously mentioned, it was 
difficult to find persons who met the qualifications for appointment as an assessor.34
We saw earlier that, in the case of R. v. Hsing-nan, the judge cited a published 
work on the Qing code.35 This express reference to a source of law is, however, 
unusual in the law reports and other records for Weihaiwei. It should also be 
remembered that very few cases were reported in detail and, of the small number that 
were, fewer still were reported with particular attention to legal principle. This lack of 
detail limits considerably the extent to which a critical assessment can be made of 
Chinese law and custom in the courts of the territory. For the vast majority of the 
disputes purportedly decided in accordance with Chinese law and custom, it is not 
possible to examine if the magistrates or judge dealt with the issues in a 
knowledgeable and correct manner. This applies even to disputes over land, a greater 
proportion of which were reported in the Herald. Furthermore, few decisions from the 
Magistrates’ Courts are to be found in the records. In the section which follows, the 
discussion of Chinese law and custom is shaped by the themes yielded by the data. It 
offers a glimpse of how the magistrates collected information on local customary law; 
how local customary law may not have been grasped immediately; and how the High 
Court Judge and one of the magistrates may have had different priorities.
Disputes over land
Aside from the proviso to article 19, it should be remembered that, in accordance with 
the High Court decision in the case of R. v. Hsing-nan,36 rights relating to land 
situated within the territory were to be decided in accordance with Chinese law and 
custom by virtue of the application of the principle in English law that the lex situs 
should govern such rights. Owing chiefly to the lack of a full survey of landholding in
33 Annual Report for 1914, CO 873/440.
34 See ch. 3.
35 R. v. Chi Hsing-nan and others, NCH, vol. LXXIX, no. 2917, 6  Apr 1906, p. 39.
36 Ibid.
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the territory and the absence of a system of compulsory registration of ownership and 
transfers in land, disputes involving rights to land were amongst those which proved 
troublesome.
The territory’s early authorities estimated that nearly all land in the territory 
was held by private individuals or families. The great majority of landlords held title 
deeds; some of these were Chinese registered or ‘red’ deeds, while others were 
unregistered or ‘white’ deeds. British officials later understood that most transactions 
in land were conducted through white deeds to avoid taxation. Cultivation of the land 
would normally be carried out by the landowner or a tenant. A few pieces of land in 
the territory were set apart for worship in the name of a dead ancestor or for the 
upkeep of temples. So far as could be ascertained at the time, there was no land in the 
ownership of clans.37 As the British authorities later discovered, there was often no 
correspondence between the possession of red deeds and ownership of land, since 
sometimes several red deeds - none of which appeared to have been cancelled - 
existed in relation to the same piece of land. This situation was never systematically 
remedied.
The Wei-hai-Wei Order in Council provided for a Land Commission to 
determine the ownership and other rights in land in the territory.38 Such a commission 
was never set up; the costs of surveying all land was thought to out-weigh any 
resulting increase in taxes from the land. Furthermore, the government was aware that 
tax increases could give rise to discontent and it was, therefore, disinclined to increase 
the land tax. It was rumours of taxation - on farmyard fowls, for instance - that were 
partly responsible for the boundary riots early in the lease of Weihaiwei.39 Whatever 
the shortcomings of the land tax system, it was thought that the people of the territory 
were paying sufficient amounts and that very little land escaped taxation.40 One of the
j7 G.T. Hare to Acting Commissioner Cowan, 15 Apr 1902, enc. in No. 96, A General Report on the 
Civil Administration o f  the Territory o f Wei-hai Wei 1899-1901, Eastern No. 75, CO 882/6/7.
38 W01C, art. 81.
39 LDNC , 93. See also Johnston to SSC, 11 March 1918, CO 521/19, recommending that no fresh 
taxation should be initiated. The Colonial Office was also o f the view that care had to be taken not to 
‘overtax’ the villagers o f Weihaiwei: Harding to Fiddes, 7 Oct 1904, CO 521, p. 31. When the Land 
and Road Tax Ordinance was passed in 1904, it contain a section intended to demonstrate that the 
British government was only collecting tax at the same level as had been collected under the Chinese,
40 G.T. Hare to Acting Commissioner Cowan, 15 Apr 1902, enc. in No. 96, A General Report on the 
Civil Administration o f  the Territory o f Wei-hai Wei 1899-1901, Eastern No. 75, CO 882/6/7. See also 
Annual Report for 1906, Commissioner to Lord Elgin, 14 May 1907, CO 521/10 in which it is stated 
that ‘probably only a minute fraction o f  the Territory now escapes taxation.’ The land tax was also used
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deficiencies was that the tax collected, though called the land tax, bore very little
correspondence to actual land ownership in the territory. The old land registers
inherited from the magistrates of Wen-teng and Jung-ch’eng, on the basis of which
the land-tax was levied, were very inaccurate. This, coupled with the fact that each
village determined how much tax each person or family paid, is why the tax was often
said to be a village, rather than a land, tax.41
The government remained interested in increasing its revenue and, to that end,
introduced a system of voluntary registration of sales and mortgages of land for which
a fee was paid to the land office. This system was initially announced in a notice
issued in 1899 by the territory’s first commissioner, Colonel Dorward,42 and does not
appear to have been put on a firmer footing until 1914, when an ordinance was
passed.43 At first, very few registrations were received;44 only 38 transfers were
recorded in 1902.45 A ‘more stirring proclamation’ produced the registration of 2,409
transfers in the following year, giving the government a yield of over $2,000.46
At the end of 1905, the district officer reminded the Commissioner that the
situation was still imperfect:
[t]he system o f land registration is in a chaotic state. The ignorance o f the 
people and the haphazard and inaccurate manner in which deeds o f sale and 
mortgage are drawn up, coupled with the results o f the apathy o f the Chinese 
officials for years past, are a source o f trouble and vexation to the 
Government and a very fruitful source o f litigation among the people47
as the basis on which to collect a road tax which was introduced to replace corvee labour. Thus in 
effect, twice the amount o f  land tax was collected. See Land and Road Tax Ordinance, Ord. 8 o f  1904.
41 Johnston wrote that ‘[h]ow the amount is assessed among the various families is a matter which the 
people decide amongst themselves, on the general understanding that no one should be called upon to 
pay more than his ancestors paid before him unless the family property has been considerably 
increased.’, LDNC, 96.
42 A copy o f  these regulations can be found in CO 873/211.
4-’ Land Registration Ordinance, 1914: Ord. 1 o f  1914, CO 841/1.
44 Very few registrations were received in 1900 and 1901: Hare to Acting Commissioner Cowan, 15 
Apr 1902, enc. in No. 96, A General Report on the Civil Administration o f the Territory o f  Wei-hai- 
Wei 1899-1901, Eastern No. 75.
45 Report o f  the SG (Walter) for the year 1903, app. I to Lockhart to SSC, 18 Apr 1904, Annual Report 
for 1903, CO 521/6. It was speculated that there was a reluctance to register transfers since under Qing 
administration, such registration was invariably expensive: Report o f  the SG, Annual Reports for 1902, 
CO 873/97.
46 Report o f  the SG (Walter) for the year 1903, app. I to Lockhart to SSC, 18 Apr 1904, Annual Report 
for 1903, CO 521/6.
47 G.T. Hare remarked that very few transfers had been registered by officials in eastern Shantung 
‘chiefly owing to the land being poor and valueless’, Hare to Acting Commissioner Cowan, 15 Apr 
1902, enc. in No. 96, A General Report on the Civil Administration o f  the Territory o f Wei-hai-Wei 
1899-1901, Eastern No. 75, CO 882/6/7.
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He thus recommended a system whereby all sales and mortgages would have to 
conform to official printed forms, these forms creating the basis for a system of 
registration of land titles. Such forms would replace the ‘flimsy papers’ which had, 
until then, been in use and would be distributed to district headmen who would bring 
them into the magistrate’s office on quarterly visits to be checked. Counterfoils with 
brief details of the sale or mortgage would be kept as a permanent record by the 
government. The registration fee of 1% of the purchase price, levied for some years, 
was to be continued, with the addition of another 1 % to recoup the cost of printing the 
forms. The buyer would also pay a sum of $30 cash49 to the district headman for his 
role in registering the new owner’s interest.50 This compared favourably with the fee 
of some 6% of the purchase price (including both proper and improper fees) reported 
to be payable outside the territory.51 The years immediately following the introduction 
of the new forms and procedures saw a marked increase in the number of 
registrations. In 1906, 5,145 old deeds of sale, 904 new deeds of sale, 65 old mortgage 
deeds, and 217 new mortgage deeds were registered. Registration continued apace in 
the following year, one of the government officers noted that ‘people have been 
encouraged to bring in their old white deeds by the knowledge that no penalty for late 
registration will attach provided they have any reasonable explanation to offer for the 
delay.’ Legislation on the registration of land transfers, which, inter alia, legalised 
the levying of fees, was only introduced in 1914 through the Land Registration
c o
Ordinance. During the discussions before the ordinance was passed, Lockhart had 
wished to make the registration of transfers compulsory but the Crown Advocate 
advised that this was not advisable and that it would be better to substitute incentives 
for registration.54 At this time, there was also discussion within the government 
concerning the resealing of red deeds or registered Chinese deeds. It was suggested 
that, thereafter, no Chinese deed - red or white - should be recognised unless it was 
registered and replaced with a British deed. This suggestion was not adopted. The
48 Annual Report o f the SG, 1906, CO 873/239.
49 ‘Cash’ referred to Chinese copper coins with a square hole in the middle.
50 See Johnston to Lockhart, Memorandum, 8 Dec 1905, CO 521/14.
51 See for instance, T.R. Jernigan, China in Law and Commerce (New York: Macmillan, 1905), 140.
52 Report o f the SG for 1907, CO 873/265.
53 Ord. 1 o f 1914, CO 841/1.
54 Lockhart to SSC, 15 N ov 1913 and enclosed Memorandum by Crown Advocate, 7 Nov 1913, CO 
521/14.
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need to increase the territory’s revenue led to a proclamation later in 1914 which 
specifically urged people to register their unregistered white deeds and fenshu 
documents, the latter being the written document recording a division of family 
property.55 It is not possible to determine whether the registration procedures reduced 
markedly the number of disputes regarding the ownership or possession of land in the 
territory. Disputes over land, however, remained a mainstay in the Magistrates’ 
Courts and were amongst the cases heard in the High Court.
Particular issues
In a number of High Court cases, the principle that uncultivated land, usually seashore 
or riverbed, was waste land and, therefore, belonged to the Crown was applied. One 
of the earliest reported High Court cases involving rights to land was a case on which 
hung the outcome of disputes over sixteen other tracts of land. This case, R v. Chi 
Hsing-nan,56 previously mentioned in connection with the application of the lex situs, 
was one in which the disputed land was a tract of uncultivable seashore and riverbed. 
At issue was title to the land. Bourne J. found in favour of the government on the 
basis that the land was waste land. He explained that cultivated land would have been 
treated differently, for
[I]n regard to so much o f the land as has been bona fide cultivated and on
which land tax has been paid, there is no dispute, for generally the
government admitted the title o f the several descendants.57
Other cases heard in the High Court in the years 1912 and 1913 stated more 
clearly the principle that uncultivated land belonging to the Crown could become 
privately owned through cultivation followed by purchase from the government and 
payment of the land tax.58 This principle appears to be the same as the one elaborated 
by Jernigan, quoted here for convenience:
55 See various minutes in CO 873/419, especially, Lockhart, 19 June 1914, Moss to Johnston, 5 June 
1914 and Johnston to Lockhart, 9 June 1914. There was a difference o f  opinion between Moss and 
Johnston over the question o f  resealing Chinese red deeds.
56 R. v. Chi Hsing-nan and others, NCH , vol. LXX1X, no. 2917, 6  Apr 1906, p. 39.
57 See also the criminal case o f  R. v. Chi Fit-cheng, NCH , vol. LXXVU1, no. 2014, 15 March 1906, p. 
613, 27 and 28 Feb 1906, Mr Justice Bourne, in which judgment was reserved. This case concerned a 
stretch o f  beach which the government claimed was waste land over which the defendant had allegedly 
trespassed.
58 Hsiachiak'nang Village v. Wangchiak'itang Village, NCH, vol. CV, no. 2356, 5 Oct 1912, p. 69; He 
P ’n Wan v. The Hsia chuang Village, NCH, vol. CV, no. 2356, 5 Oct 1912, p. 69; Chuang Village v. 
La Tao-k'ou, Tien shang, Ao Shang Villages, NCH, vol. CVIII, no. 2405, 13 Dec 1913, p. 839; Han- 
t'on-yuan [sic] Village v. Lin Chia Yen Ten  [sic] Village, NCH, vol. CVIII, no. 2405, 13 Sept 1913, p. 
839, Wen ClTuan T ’ang, 3 Sept 1913.
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If a Chinese wishes to become the owner o f  a piece o f land, the simple 
process is to enter into possession and bring it under cultivation. When he has 
done this he applies to the district magistrate, who issues a proclamation 
setting forth the facts, and if  the older owner wishes to retain title or recover 
what may have been lost, he must come forward and resume the cultivation 
o f the land. If this is not done on his part within a reasonable time, the 
applicant is granted a title deed .. .59
During the first decade of the lease, there had been at least one case heard in 
the magistrates5 court in which the principle regarding waste land had already been 
applied. Unlike the Hsing-nan case, in this dispute, one of the parties claimed a 
customary grazing right. This was the dispute between the neighbouring villages of 
Hsi-lao-tai and Tung-lao-t5ai. Johnston, who heard the case, described it as one which 
had presented ‘manifold difficulties5, regarding which he had received about a dozen 
petitions from those with an interest in its outcome. The case necessitated several 
sittings of his court and a personal inspection of the land in dispute. The land in 
question was a large area of flat land which had previously been under the sea. The 
Miao family of Hsi-lao-t5ai village claimed ownership to the exclusion of the other 
village, evidenced, they argued, by a 16th century red deed showing ownership of a 
tract of land near the sea. The plaintiffs, villagers of Tung-lao-t5ai, on the other hand, 
claimed a right to graze cattle on the same tract of land. They claimed that the red 
deed did not refer to the disputed land and that, on the basis of custom, the disputed 
tract of land was held in ‘common5 ownership. As ‘common5 land, the plaintiffs and 
others had the right to graze their cattle, cut grass or collect firewood on the land. The 
Wen-teng magistrate, whom Johnston had consulted, confirmed his own view that 
most, if not all, of the land in dispute would have been covered by the sea at the time - 
344 years earlier when the red deed was issued. He suggested the following course of 
action based 011 Chinese law: declare the whole area to be government land, have it 
measured immediately, put the land to auction, and measure the land at three-yearly 
intervals. Johnston proposed a ‘less drastic step5 that the land should be considered 
waste land, but that the villagers of Hsi-lao-t5ai were, for a small rent, to be allowed to 
remain in possession of the parts of the land they had already cultivated. Boundary 
stones were to be put in place by the government. Johnston also suggested to the 
Commissioner that the rest of the land should be leased 011 short leases to the two 
villages on condition that the soil was undisturbed and that no buildings were erected
59 T.R. Jernigan, China in Law and Commerce (New York: Macmillan Co, 1905), 135.
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on the land.60 The Commissioner agreed to these suggestions and boundary stones 
were later put in place.61
The action of the British government in this dispute, based on the advice of the 
Chinese magistrate, was consistent with customary principles reported by Jernigan62 
and quoted above, if it is presumed that, instead of transferring the land in an absolute 
sale, the government was at liberty to lease it. In 1919, the Commissioner passed the 
Government Waste Lands Ordinance,63 section 2 of which confirmed that ‘all 
unoccupied land, whether originally waste or formerly cultivated but abandoned 
through famine, civil war or otherwise, which by Chinese law or custom is deemed to 
be public property and to vest in the State’ was government waste land. Furthermore, 
‘all occupied land originally waste land and for which no legal document of title is 
held by the occupier’ was also government waste land.’ The Ordinance made it lawful 
for the Commissioner to make, alter and revoke rules for the regulation of such land 
and, in particular, rules for the issue of licences to occupy and develop such lands.64
The advice of the Chinese magistrate concerning the measurement of the land 
at intervals reflected general practice elsewhere. Hoang mentions the measurement of 
new land formed on the shore of a lake, river or the sea every five years or the annual 
measurement of land which has been washed away.6:1 In the case of the land in this 
dispute, the measurement every three years is probably due to the fact that the land 
was not recently reformed.
Direct recognition of customary grazing rights in a dispute had also been given 
in a magistrate’s decision in a case begun around 1905. This was a case first heard by 
Johnston not long after his appointment as District Officer and Magistrate. A man by 
the name of Yii I-tung {Yu Yidong),66 who had previously been sacked from his 
position as headman of Shuang-ssii-k’uang village, had purchased a tract of land for
60 Johnston to Lockhart, 10 Jan 1905: CO 873/205.
G1 Lockhart to Johnston, 11 Jan 1905: CO 873/205,
62 See text at n. 59.
63 Ord. 6 o f  1919: CO 841/1.
64 Government Waste Lands Ordinance, 1919, s. 3, Ord. 6 o f 1919: CO 841/1.
65 Pierre Hoang, ‘Notions Techniques sur la Propriete en Chine’ (condensed version in English 
published in two parts), China Law Review, 1922-24, vol. 1, 90-96 and 232-244, relevant portions o f  
which are quoted in Jernigan, 151.
66 Yii 1-tung is also discussed in ch. 4.
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which he was able to show a title deed.67 After the purchase, he prohibited villagers of 
Chiang-chia-k’ou from grazing their cattle on his land. Johnston found wholly in 
favour of Yii on the basis of his title deed. During Johnston’s absence from the 
territory, the cattle grazers petitioned the other magistrates for a reversal of the 
judgment. Although wary of those who tried to have their cases reopened, in 1909 and 
‘in the light of a far more intimate acquaintance with local customs’, Johnston 
confirmed Yii’s ownership. However, grazing rights, in this case unchallenged by 
successive landowners over several decades or longer, were customary rights which, 
were they to be extinguished, should attract compensation. He later wrote that in this 
case there was
not only evidence o f  villagers from at least half a dozen neighbouring villages 
but also the evidence o f the very man ... from whom Yii I-tung had bought 
the land. This former owner o f the land stated in court with the utmost 
definiteness that the contention o f the villages o f  Chiang-chia-k’ou was 
correct, that he him self when owner o f  the land had nevei* interfered with 
their prescriptive rights o f pasturage, and that in selling the land to Yii I-tung 
he had no intention o f  depriving them o f these rights even if  he had the power 
to do so.68
Yii was thus ordered by the court to allow the villagers of Chiang-chia-k’ou to graze 
their cattle there after the silkworm season, during the period preceding the sowing of 
wheat, and after Yii had cut firewood for the year.69
Johnston’s method of dealing with the competing claims of cultivators and 
cattle grazers in the case of Tung-lao-t ’ai v. Hsi-lao-t ’ai, chiefly by respecting the 
status quo ante, should be noted. In a number of cases decided by the High Court and 
discussed below, the judgments only went as far as to declare that the land was waste 
land.70 It is not clear how the government actually resolved the competing claims of 
cultivators and grazers. The Tung-lao-t’ai and Yii I-tung cases suggest that grazing 
rights, where long-established, would have been taken into account, not least in the 
applications dealt with by Johnston either in his capacity as District Officer or as 
Registrar of the High Court. The likelihood that grazing rights would have been taken 
into account is further suggested by a disagreement between Johnston and the High 
Court Judge.
67 The court record o f  the case has not survived. Johnston’s recollection is that the case was first heard 
in 1905: CO 873/309.
68 Johnston to Lockhart, 15 Sept 1910, CO 873/309.
69 Ibid.
70 See n. 58.
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The dispute was sparked off by the case of He P ’u Wan v. The Hsia chuang
71Village. Litigation over a stretch of land along a river close to the sea began some 
time in 1912. The villagers of Hsia-chuang had used this land to graze their cattle for 
about a century unchallenged by anyone. P’u-wan villagers had been cutting grass 
from that same tract of land and grazing their mules and donkeys there. In 1911, the 
villagers of Hsia-chuang had planted willow trees on a river bank close to the sea to 
protect the bank from flooding and had also erected boundary stones, with the 
intention, P’u-wan villagers thought, to cultivate the area. P’u-wan villagers were able 
to show that their ancestors had cultivated the land about a hundred years earlier. At 
first instance, Johnston found in favour of the cattle grazers and prohibited both 
parties from cultivating the land. The disgruntled villagers of P’u Wan then removed 
large quantities of turf for which action several of them were ordered to provide 
security against future conduct. Four men who refused to do so were imprisoned for 
contempt of court.
Bourne J. overturned Johnston’s decision on the basis that he had erred in not
allowing either side to prove ownership of the disputed land and in not allowing the
parties to apply to the government for leave to cultivate. The High Court examined 41
title deeds dated between 1576 and 1856 adduced by P’u-wan. Hsia-chuang had no
title deeds or land tax receipts in relation to the tract of land. A difficulty, pointed out
by the judge, was that the deeds produced by P’u-wan did not show clearly the
portions of the tract to which each deed related. Without clearer evidence of
proprietorship or cultivation, he declared the land to be government waste land.
Would-be cultivators could apply to either purchase or lease the land. Applications
would be decided as follows:
The ancient proprietor has the first claim: the adjoining proprietor the next 
claim: the strangers who offer to pay land tax come last and amongst them 
the Government will grant the land to the highest bidder. In this case the 
P ’uwan village claim that any individual family in their village is entitled to 
any parcel o f land in virtue o f  an old title or o f having paid land tax or 
otherwise, the individual in question can apply to the District Magistrate. On 
proof o f  title or payment o f land tax the Magistrate may issue an order 
vesting the parcel in the applicant.
Pending such applications, Bourne J. ordered the parties to return to their 1911 
position, with both sides grazing their animals as they had done. The recently planted 
willow trees were to be left undisturbed.
71 H e P ’u Wan v. The Hsia chuang Village, NCH, vol. CV, no. 2356, 5 Oct 1912, p. 69.
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Two other cases heard in the High Court in 1913 appear to have been decided
7*7 * *in a very similar way. Neither case is reported in detail but, in both of them the 
common grazing land over which the parties claimed rights was declared to be 
government waste land. The parties were advised to seek government permission for 
cultivation, pending which, common grazing was to continue.
After Bourne’s judgment in 1912, P’u-wan villagers had taken possession of 
the tract pending their application as the would-be cultivator but the dispute between 
the two villages continued into the following year. In taking possession, they were 
acting consistently with the prescribed action described by Jernigan as quoted
77above. In May of 1913, Johnston wrote to the Commissioner saying that he was 
meeting with P ’u-wan villagers who had continued to bully the villagers of Hsia- 
chuang and would, if necessary, threaten them with payment for extra policing in the 
village or with imprisonment unless they could find security against good behaviour. 
Under procedures which are not clear from the record, the High Court Judge heard the 
P’u-wan case again. The very brief report of the High Court’s judgment in 1913 
suggests that Bourne may not have done more than to restate the principle that the 
land was adjudged to be waste land belonging to the government and cultivators could 
apply to the government for authority to cultivate the land.74
Bourne’s treatment of the land as waste land, at least in the dispute between 
the villagers of P’u-wan and Hsia-chuang, where cultivation had been abandoned, is 
consistent with the definition of such land given in Jernigan.75 Johnston, however, 
whilst not saying that the judge was wrong in principle, was highly critical of 
Bourne’s approach. Before the case was heard by the High Court in 1913, he told the 
Commissioner that the judge must in future be persuaded to give ‘very clear and 
definite judgments, and not leave details to be settled by the Hua-wu-ssu’ (Senior 
District Officer). The 1912 judgement on the P’u-wan case, he said, was in parts 
‘almost contradictory.’ It is true that Bourne’s judgment may have given the P’u-wan
72 Hai Chuang Village v. Lit Tao-k'on [sic], Tien shang, Ao Shang Villages, Bourne J, 29 Aug 1913, 
NCH, vol. CVIII, no. 2405, 13 Sept 1913, p. 839; Han-t'on-yuan Village v. Liu Chia Yen Ten Village, 
Wen Ch’uan T an g , 3 Sept 1913, NCH, vol. CVIII, no. 2405, 13 Sept 1913, p. 839. All four parties in 
the former case had grazing rights over a tract o f  land but the plaintiff now wished to cultivate the land. 
In the latter case, both parties had used the ground for grazing but one party now sought to cultivate the 
land.
73 See text to n. 59.
74 P'u Wan Village v. Hsia Chuang Village, 3 Sept 1913, NCH, vol. CVIII, no. 2405, 13 Sept 1913, p. 
839.
75 Jernigan, 135.
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villagers hope that the deeds produced in court entitled them to the land. Bourne had 
said that
Some of these [deeds] seem to me to have applied to parcels of land within 
the tract: but how many do so, and where the parcels are situated it is 
impossible for me to decide in the time at my disposal, even if these 
questions are capable of decision at all.76
It may be that Johnston had wished for a declaration by the court as to which of the
competing claims should be recognised. From the administrative point of view,
Bourne’s judgments in all three of the grazing cases simply transferred to the district
officer the question of whether cultivation should be given priority over customary
grazing rights. At the same time, however, Johnston’s reading of the judgment is that
it implied that cultivation should be given priority. For example, in the 1912 P’u-wan
judgment, the judge had said that ‘it is the interest of the people that land should be
cultivated.’ Johnston attributed the actions of the P’u-wan villagers subsequent to the
1912 judgment to this bias.77 It is true that Bourne did not indicate that the customary
rights of grazers would be taken into account by the government. Johnston thought
that grazing rights were inherently weaker because they were not subject to written
proof. We saw above how, in the Yii I-tung case, Johnston himself had, at first,
ignored such rights. He felt strongly that, where grazing had been practised
undisturbed for a long time, a customary or prescriptive right could arise which, if
extinguished, should be compensated. His final criticism of the High Court’s
judgment is that, in privileging cultivation, the judge had failed to take into account
the circumstances of the territory. Johnston later wrote that in Weihaiwei, fields
cannot be cultivated without cattle, and cattle required grass on which to feed. It may
be that Johnston’s greater proximity to the territory gave him a particular perspective
on the balance to be struck between cultivators and grazers. However, it is unlikely
that the judge’s position was as extreme as Johnston took it to be. Indeed, whether in
response to such criticism or not, in 1913, in an appeal against the decision of the
magistrate, Bourne J. upheld the right to graze cattle claimed by one of the parties,
emphasising that the rights were not to be disturbed.78 Unfortunately, the report is too
brief to provide any further insight into how the competing rights were assessed.
76 He P 'u  Wan v. The Hsia chuang Village, Judgment o f Bourne J., read out by Johnston, NCH, vol. 
CV, no. 2356, 5 Oct 1912, p. 69.
77 Johnston to Lockhart, 10 May 1913, SLPNLS, vol. 9.
78 Teng Yueh-hsiang v. Yu Ying-chun, 4 Sept 1913, NCH, vol. CVIII, no. 2405, 13 Dec 1913, p. 839.
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One last land dispute of interest should be mentioned. In 1921, the village of 
Pei-shang-kuang petitioned the magistrate to stop the defendants, described in the 
records as ‘the poor5, from coming onto their land to cut the grass and to collect wood 
for fuel. The defendants argued that they had a customary right to ‘a second raking’ of 
grass after the 1st of the 10th moon each year 011 any of the hill slopes adjacent to 
their villages, even on lands which were privately owned. The plaintiffs did not 
dispute the customary right of raking grass but claimed the right to determine the date 
after which the raking should be permitted on their lands at their convenience. They 
had refused to fix any particular date. Their petition included the complaint that the 
defendants had stolen grass because they had gone onto the land before the villagers 
of Pei-shang-kuang had cut the grass for the first time. The defendants argued that 
they had gleaned for fuel a month after the date when the hill slope should have been 
open to others. They accused the plaintiff village of unreasonable delay in cutting 
their grass and thus inflicting hardship on the poor. In some years, the plaintiffs left 
their grass uncut until the New Year. The magistrate, Hardy Jowett, interviewed four 
district headmen to find out whether there was a customary right as claimed by the 
defendants. The district headmen agreed that landowners had the right to cut the grass 
and to a first raking thereafter. In some cases, the watchmen of the fields also had a 
right to rake grass. The poor from any village were allowed to rake grass on any hill 
or plain after the 1st of the 10th moon even if the grass had been left uncut by the 
owners. The only exception was the village of Li Kou,79 where the lands were open 
only after the later date of the winter solstice.80 In the light of these statements, the 
magistrate determined that the defendants’ arguments should be upheld. Customs 
similar to the one recognised by the court in this case were reported by Kroker for 
Jiangxi province under which landowners in mountainous areas were obliged to allow 
people from neighbouring areas to collect firewood and also to announce the date 
after which such was allowed.81 Kroker also mentions another example from the same 
province of a landowner permitting others onto his land to search for fruit from the 
camphor tree.
79 This would have been a reference to either the village o f  Chien-Li-Kou or Hou-Li-Kou either o f  
which would probably have been referred to as Li Kou by the people o f  the locality. Indeed the two 
villages have now merged into the single village o f  Li Kou.
80 Jowett, Junior District Officer, Minute, 26 Jan 1921: CO 873/626.
81 Edward Kroker, ‘The Concept o f  Property in Chinese Customary Law’, Transactions o f  the Asiatic 
Society o f  Japan, 1959, vol. 7, (3rd series), 123-146, at 144-145.
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Appeals and Rehearings
Under the Order, appeals in civil cases heard in the High Court lay to the Supreme 
Court of Hong Kong.82 Subject to time limits, there was a right of appeal in cases 
involving more than $50083 and, in other cases, the High Court could grant leave to 
appeal.84 The time limit was three months from the date of the decision of the High 
Court. If the appeal was made between three and six months of the decision, leave 
from the Supreme Court was required.85 After six months had elapsed, no leave could 
be obtained.86 In some circumstances, cases appealed to the Supreme Court of Hong 
Kong could be appealed to the Privy Council. It is almost certain that no appeals were 
ever made using these procedures; the petty nature of most civil disputes, the high 
cost of appealing, the absence of lawyers in the territory and the probable ignorance 
of the appeals procedures amongst litigants87 in Weihaiwei were, no doubt, factors. 
However, defeated litigants, such as the villagers of Chiang-chai-k’ou discussed 
above, often attempted to have old disputes re-litigated. Magistrates frequently 
complained of the added burden of petitions from dissatisfied litigants. Litigants took 
the opportunity of the absence of a magistrate from the territory to petition the acting 
magistrate, or petitioned the High Court Judge during one of his visits to the territory. 
An extreme example of the persistence of litigants is the dispute between the villages 
of Lin-chia-yuan and Wen-ch’uan-tang.88 In 1911, the villagers of Lin-chia-yuan 
brought a dispute over the ownership of land in the river bed at Wen-ch’uan-tang to 
the magistrate. Carpmael, Acting Magistrate, dismissed the petition after a hearing. 
The following year, the same dispute came before Johnston. Johnston refused to 
interfere with Carpmaefs decision but advised the villagers of Lin-chia-yuan that they 
could bring an appeal to the Judge. An appeal was brought in 1913 but Bourne J. 
found that the plaintiffs had failed to prove that they had title to the land and,
82 WOIC, art. 68(1).
83 Ibid., art. 68(1).
84 / b id ,  art. 6 8 (2 ).
85 Ib id , art. 69(1).
86 / b id , art. 69(2).
87 Some litigants, such as Yii 1-tung, asked for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court but no leave could 
be given as more than six months had lapsed since the Magistrate’s decision which had been delivered 
on 21 Oct 1909.
88 The facts which follow appear in the Commissioner’s Address to the people o f Lin-Chia-Yuan, 6  Dec 
1915: Acc 4138/45, SLPNLS.
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therefore, the land was waste land belonging to the government.89 Subsequently, still 
unhappy with the situation, the Lin-chia-yuan villagers petitioned Johnston for a 
rehearing of the case. No rehearing was granted. In 1914, when Bourne J was in the 
territory, they petitioned him directly. Bourne confirmed that the case was closed. 
Undeterred, in the following year, the villagers sent a petition by post to the Acting 
Judge, Wilkinson, in Shanghai. By December 1915, the administration had had 
enough of the villagers of Lin-chia-yuan. The Commissioner ordered the 
representatives of the village to appear before him. In his address to them, he pointed 
out that they had exhausted the patience of the government and that they were wrong 
to think that the government was weak since it had indulged them by entertaining 
their repeated petitions over the years.90
With cases such as this, it is not surprising to find judgments that finished with 
exhortations to the plaintiff ‘to live peacefully with his neighbours avoiding all 
stirring up of trouble, strife and litigation.’91 When parties indicated erroneously that 
their case had been litigated previously, the court did not miss the opportunity to point 
out that the case was a fresh one, for fear of encouraging the re-opening of old cases.
Given the disuse of the appeals procedure and the tendency to re-litigate, a 
new law was passed in 1913 to provide a right which was ‘practically equivalent... to 
a right of appeal.’93 The Rehearings Ordinance, 19 1 394 allowed civil cases to be 
reheard by the Commissioner or Judge if certain conditions were satisfied. Section 3 
of this Ordinance gave a right of rehearing, without the need for leave, where the 
amount or value in dispute was $100 or more or in any case where leave was given by 
the magistrate, provided that the application, in both cases, was made within the stated 
time limits of 14 days of an interlocutory order or one month of a final order. There 
was also the right of appeal in other cases with leave from the Commissioner or 
Judge, so long as the application was made within 6 months of a final order. How
S9 Lin Chia Yuan Village v. Wen Chuan Tang Village, Wen Ch’uan T ’ang, 3 Sept 1913, NCH, vol. 
CVIII, no. 2405, 13 Sept 1913, p. 839. This report is very brief and contains few facts relating to the 
dispute.
90 Commissioner's Address to the people o f Lin Chia Yuan, 6 Dec 1915: Acc 4138/45, SLPNLS.
91 Moss to Lockhart, 4 Jan 15, Judgment in the case o f Chang K'ai t'ai v. Chang Wen t'ai, appeal o f  
Magistrate’s decision, Commissioner, sitting as Judge o f the High Court, Acc 4138/45, SLPNLS.
92 Ibid
9> Burdett to Commissioner (Lockhart), 12 Aug 1920, CO 873/608, quoting from an earlier despatch on
the subject.
94 CO 841/1.
188
many cases were reheard as a result of these provisions is not recorded but minutes in 
a file dealing with the question of amendments to the Ordinance indicate that the 
number of applications for rehearing were small in comparison with the number of 
civil cases dealt with.95 Some of the reheard cases, mostly cases concerning land, 
were amongst those reported in the Herald,96
Despite the small number of applications made under the Rehearings 
Ordinance, a few years after its promulgation the Senior District Officer, Burdett,
0 7expressed misgivings about the Ordinance. He urged the Commissioner to introduce 
a rule of court requiring leave in all cases and granting leave only in certain 
circumstances. New rules of court98 which provided, inter alia, that applications for 
rehearing had to ‘state in full the grounds of objection on the part of the applicant to 
the decision of the Magistrate who had heard the case’, were introduced. These rules 
also imposed fees, allowed conditions to be attached to leave, provided for payment 
into court of security for costs and other minor matters. The Senior District Officer’s 
further suggestion that the Ordinance should be amended to require the petition to 
state specific grounds of appeal did not find favour with the Commissioner who 
thought that the new rules should be tried for a period of time before amendments to 
the Ordinance were considered.99 The Rehearings Ordinance appears to have survived 
until the end of the lease without amendment.
Mediation
Alongside the courts, the government encouraged the mediation of civil disputes by 
village headmen or other influential villagers. There were two chief observations 
about the volume of civil cases: too many trivial disputes were reaching the courts and 
a proportion of the cases were old disputes disguised as new ones. Mediation was 
seen as an answer to both these problems. The objective of the government was not
95 Burdett to Lockhart, 12 Aug 1920 and Lockhart, 15 Sept 1920: CO 873/608.
96 Ch'i J ih -ts’eng v. Ch'i Tien-chu, H. M. High Court At Weihaiwei, Bourne J., 29 Aug 1913; Ts'ung 
Jun-sheng v. Ts'ung Chia-chi, Wen Ch'uan T'ang, 3 Sept 1913, Bourne J., (appeal from decision o f  the 
Magistrate); Teng Yueh-hsiang v. Yu Ying-chun, Wen Ch’uan T ’ang, 4 Sept 1913, Bourne J (appeal 
from decision o f  the District Magistrate, Moss); all reported in NCH , vol. CVIII, no. 2405, 13 Sept 
1913, p. 839.
97 Burdett to Commissioner (Lockhart), 12 Aug 1920, CO 873/608.
98 CO 873/608.
99 Burdett, 14 Sept 1920 and Lockhart, 15 Sept 1920, CO 873/608,
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only to deflect trivial cases from aniving at the courts but also to resolve disputes 
with greater finality through what was often referred to as ‘peace talking5. As to 
achieving greater finality, it was believed that, in mediation, neither disputants lost 
face. In contrast,
a decision of a Court even if absolutely just tends to lead to perpetual feuds 
between the parties: and the party which lost the case will probably go on 
bringing it up for years to come in the hope of getting his case revived or a 
previous judgement reversed.100
It was also thought that the underlying causes of a dispute might be more easily dealt
with. Petitions rarely mentioned the real cause of a dispute.
In encouraging ‘peace talking5, the government’s efforts were focused on the
headmen. Mediating village disputes was one of the traditional roles of the headman
and the government was keen to encourage the continuation of this function. Opinion
amongst officials on their effectiveness in this role was, however, divided. In an early
report, Walter, the Government Secretary, was unimpressed, finding them neither
‘capable5 nor ‘influential’: ‘Over and over again cases have been referred to them to
settle and report and the answer has been that they are unable to report and settle.’101
Johnston, however, was a defender of the system, addressing the point about the
ineffectiveness of the village headmen by blaming the magistrate for returning to the
headmen those cases that he had previously failed to settle and those in which the
1 09particular headman had an interest.
It was in part to strengthen mediation that the post of District Headman was 
introduced in 1906. The government thought that giving a small salary to the district 
headmen would heighten their sense of responsibility with regard to the settlement of 
disputes. It was also intended to provide district headmen with prestige in order to 
lend weight to their decisions, thus promoting the cessation of otherwise ongoing 
disputes. As discussed earlier, it is entirely possible that the system of village and 
district headmen suffered from structural tensions, in that those appointed to the posts 
were seen as agents of the government and thus treated with some suspicion.103 Little 
information is available on the effectiveness of the district headmen in mediating 
disputes apart from a report of the Acting Magistrate for the South District in 1909
100 Annual Report for 1909 by the SG, C 0873/292.
101 Draft Annual Report for 1902, 1 March 1903, p. 28 [printed version], C 0873/97, a file bearing a 
cover wrongly entitled Weihaiwei Marriage Ordinance.
102 Report o f  the SG, Annual Report for 1904, app. 1, CO 873/163.
103 See ch. 4, ‘Effectiveness o f  the headmen’.
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stating that many of them had kept petty disputes from reaching his court or had 
helped settle cases which had been begim in the his court.104
By keeping the cost of litigation low, however, the government unwittingly 
undermined mediation. Disputes settled through mediation had to be followed by 
feasts provided by the parties, presided over by the village headman or other 
influential person.105 This made mediation more costly than litigation, especially 
during periods when the cost of living was high.106
The forgoing discussion has assumed that mediation and litigation were 
separate and distinct. The differences between the two are beyond the scope of this 
work but it is observable that, in practice, the boundary between the two was fluid. A 
case begun in the magistrates’ court might be referred to a headman for mediation. 
Cases which had either not been resolved through mediation or in which one party 
remained dissatisfied could end up in court. Another point to note is that Johnston and 
other magistrates sometimes recommended to the parties a settlement along particular 
lines after hearing preliminary statements from the parties and their witnesses. Such 
means were felt to have achieved some success - in the sense of a longer-lasting 
solution.107
As with those charged with an offence, the vast majority of litigants only experienced 
the civil justice system at the Magistrates’ Courts. Though they were not shy when it 
came to petitioning the officials again and again, it was the magistrates with whom 
most litigants would have associated the system of civil justice. As observed earlier, 
the office of the British magistrate shared with the Chinese district magistrate the 
combination, in the same person, of both judicial and administrative roles. The point 
that the British magistrate occupied a position vis-a-vis the inhabitants of his division 
similar to that of a Chinese district magistrate - the father-mother official (fwnuguan)
l(M Report on South District during 1908, E. Carpmael, CO 873/280.
105 See LDNC, 122 - a dispute over a tree for the purpose o f  making a coffin was settled by the 
intervention o f  the neighbours in which the man seeking the tree was eventually given it, but had to 
provide a feast for those who mediated.
106 This was thought to have been the case in 1923 when many cases were not settled through 
mediation.
107 Report for the South District, Departmental Reports for 1908, CO873/280.
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- towards the people in his district was not lost on Johnston. He expressed his role 
thus:
being in theory the father of his district, [the Magistrate] must not merely
hold the balance between his people when they come to him with their
quarrels; he must not merely punish the offender and vindicate the cause of
the oppressed: he must also instil into the minds of his “children,” by word
and example, a submissive reverence for the doctrines of the ancient sages,
which include proper respect for tradition, a dutiful obedience to all properly-
constituted authority, whether in family or in State, and with neighbours and 108strangers.
Likewise, the Chinese inhabitants of Weihaiwei appear to have approached the British 
magistrate as the equivalent of the Chinese district magistrate they would have known 
prior to the lease.109 It is perhaps the similarity in the position and the approach of the 
magistrates that led the Chinese of the territory to bring their disputes to the British 
magistrate. Another reason which may account for the popularity of the courts of 
Weihaiwei is the fact that the system in Weihaiwei offered none of the drawbacks 
associated with the Chinese civil justice process. For example, petitions could be 
handed in on any day of the month and all year round; fees are likely to have been 
lower than the combination of official and unofficial fees payable at the Chinese 
district magistrate’s yamen; and long delays were probably not a feature of the system 
in Weihaiwei.110 Furthermore, magistrates in Weihaiwei were not subject to the 
pressures under which their Chinese counterparts worked. The British magistrate who 
made a wrong decision in law might have his decision overturned by the High Court 
but he did not face the career repercussions which were part of the bureaucratic 
system in which the Chinese district magistrate worked. Also absent in Weihaiwei 
was the conceptual opposition to litigation mentioned by John R. Watt in his
108 LDNC, 122.
109 In 1905 the Commissioner reported that Johnston had been presented with a scroll by local people 
on which was inscribed the phrase ‘the father and mother o f  the people’: Annual Report for 1904, CO 
874/163.
110 Petitions could only be received on six days in each month and then not at all during the busiest o f  
the farming months — the 4th to the 7th months o f the lunar calendar: see Rosser H. Brockman, 
‘Commercial Contract Law in Late Nineteenth-Century Taiwan’ in Jerome Cohen, R. Randle Edwards 
and Fu-mei Chang Chen (eds), Essays on C hina’s Legal Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1980), 76-136, 92ff. The restriction o f  certain days o f  the month is also mentioned in Brenan, 
50.There is also no evidence to suggest that litigants in Weihaiwei risked torture, as is suggested for the 
civil litigation process in China. For proverbial sayings indicating some o f  the hazards o f litigation see 
Sybille Van del* Sprenkel, Legal Institutions in Mancha China (London: Athlone Press, 1962), app. 3.
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monograph on the late imperial Chinese district magistrate and the inconsistent 
approach of the government to litigation.111
Indeed, in Weihaiwei, the magistrates and the government attended to civil 
litigation in earnest. It was the magistrates who changed the practical procedures for 
handing in petitions and made efforts to stamp out bribery. In court, rules of 
procedure and evidence were adapted to the circumstances of the territory. The 
government resisted the introduction of petition fees, banned petition writers and 
opened a second Magistrates’ Court in a remote village. The Commissioner passed 
the Rehearings Ordinance when it was realised that disappointed litigants did not have 
any practical option but to try to have their cases relitigated.
The question is why the administration of Weihaiwei, whose resources were 
already stretched, chose to be so involved in the hearing of civil disputes, to the extent 
of regarding access to justice for the ordinary villager a priority. The answer to this 
question appears to lie in the realisation that in an administration supported by what 
was, for most of the lease, a limited police force, the settlement of seemingly petty 
disputes was necessary. It had been seen how some disputes, if not nipped in the bud, 
could have festered into larger disputes involving entire villages which threatened the 
peace of the territory. In 1905, one of the two criminal cases heard in the High Court 
had resulted from a land dispute between two villages which had been embroiled in 
litigation. The two principal families of the two villages met at the disputed land and a 
fight ensued. One man died and nine others were hospitalised for their various 
injuries. A murder charge was preferred, but later reduced to manslaughter for which 
the defendant was convicted and imprisoned for one year.112 That same year, two 
cases of ‘stirring up litigation’ were recorded.113 Providing an adequate forum for 
litigation was also an effective way of keeping in touch with the people of the 
territory. Another explanation may be the interest in Chinese law and custom of 
individual magistrates such as Johnston and Walter. The chapter devoted to civil 
litigation and the numerous references to Chinese law and custom in Lion, and the
111 Watt, 212, where he describes how officials ‘disapproved strongly’ o f  litigation yet ‘did not prohibit 
i f .  Watt also points out that the conceptual opposition to litigation was shaped by the sayings o f  
Confucius and others on the grounds that it was a threat to social harmony.
112 Draft Annual Report 1905, Commissioner to Earl o f Elgin and Kincardine, Principal SSC, 28 Apr 
1906, C 0521/9.
1,3 Ibid.
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time and effort he was prepared to put into his court work suggests that this was an 
area amongst his responsibilities which Johnston found interesting.
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15. Liukung Island, looking West, c. 1902.
16. A street w ithin the w alled  city  o f  W eihai.
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SEYMOUR STREET. WEIHAIWEI (ISLAND)
17. A postcard sent to an address in Middlesex on 19 May 1911 bearing a Liukung postmark.
KING’S HOTEL, WEIHAIWEI (MAINLAND).
18. Postcard showing King’s Hotel, Port Edward.
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CHAPTER 7
DEALING WITH SUICIDE
It is an old  m axim  ‘hurry no m an’s ca ttle’ and this applies particularly to the 
C hinese; as the m ore you  hurry them  the less you get from  them . H ow ever, in 
look in g  back at efforts over a ten year period som e progress had, it w as felt, 
been ach ieved . But in this case for the last ten years the G overnm ent has been  
stead ily  en forcing  the report o f  su icid es and the m ajority o f  the p eop le  have 
at last understood that the reason for this is the desire to save l ife . 1
Throughout the period of the lease, the government of Weihaiwei was troubled 
by the number of suicides occurring in the territory. It regretted the loss of life and 
instituted measures, including requiring the report of suicides. Despite being 
remarkably well-informed about the nature of suicide in China, government action 
was limited to rescuing those who had attempted suicide and encouraging the report 
of suicide rather than tackling its causes.
Suicide in the territory
Suicide as a social problem was a concern from 1902 at the latest. In that year, the 
Government Medical Officer reported that a proportion of the cases of poisoning he 
had treated had been self-inflicted. In the Annual Report for 1904, three suicides, all 
of them committed by women, were mentioned. Each of them had swallowed a 
sulphurous solution obtained by dissolving the heads of matches in water.3 
Magistrates thereafter included suicides that came to their attention in the annual 
returns for police and criminal cases. The graph in Figure 6 below shows a rise in the 
number of reported suicides, peaking in 1914 before a general falling off for the rest 
of the lease period, rising again only towards its end.
1 Report o f the District Officer, Departmental Reports for 1911, CO 873/335.
2 Annual Report o f  the Acting Colonial Surgeon, CO 521/4.
3 Annual Report for 1904, CO 873/163.
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Figure 6 . Number o f  suicides and attempted suicides4 
As many scholars since Durkheim5 have pointed out, suicide statistics need to 
be used with caution. Douglas, for example, thought suicide statistics unreliable for 
research into the social meaning of suicide because the process of recording suicides 
was too greatly affected by differences in medical training and in the definition of 
suicide applied.6 The suicide statistics for Weihaiwei call for a few comments.
1. Under-reporting of suicide
Although the government made the reporting of suicides obligatory, the population of 
the territory remained reluctant, at least initially, to report such deaths. The 
prosecutions for failure to report a suicide probably represented only a small fraction 
of the concealed suicides. It is difficult to determine the degree of under-reporting. 
The government thought that the real figures for 1909 and 1910, for instance, should 
have been about 10% higher than the number of cases that came to their notice, but 
this was no more than a guess. Besides, the rate of under-reporting may not have been 
constant throughout the period. Given that there was no similar obligation to report a 
suicide under Qing law, it is entirely possible that the rate of under-reporting was 
highest in the early years of British occupation, decreasing gradually as the 
government’s exhortation to report suicides became more widely known. In this 
sense, the District Officer’s boast quoted at the start of this chapter was justified.
4 The table below shows figures for suicide, collected, with the exception o f  the figures for 1918 and 
1919, from government annual reports.
5 E. Durkheim, Suicide: a study in sociology, transl. by John A. Spaulding and George Simpson 
(London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1952).
6 See Jack D. Douglas, The Social Meanings o f  Suicide (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967).
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2. Im pact o f policing
The growth in the size of the police force was undoubtedly a factor affecting the 
number of suicides recorded.7 As the police force expanded and police posts were 
established in villages far from the territory’s main town and administrative capital of 
Port Edward, the added government surveillance, patchy as it was, would in itself 
have accounted for some of the increase in the figures. The impact of this expansion 
011 the statistics may have been magnified by the fact that villagers were exhorted to 
go to the nearest police post upon discovering a suicide. Policing is also relevant to 
the apparent north-south disparity in the number of suicides. There were at one time, 
four times as many police posts in the South Division than in the North Division. This 
almost certainly accounted in good part for the greater number of suicides recorded 
for the South8 even when the uneven distribution of the population is taken into 
account.9 The figures for 1914 for example, show 115 suicides in the South and only 
39 in the North Division.
Division Number o f  
suicides
Rate per 
1 0 0 ,000  
population
Number o f  
police posts
Estimated
population
North 39 78 1 50,000
South 115 115 4 1 0 0 ,0 0 0
Figure 7. Suicide statistics for 1914
3. Lack of uniformity in government reports of suicide
The inconsistent practice amongst officials and between years in returning the figures 
for suicide should also be noted. Apart from a brief period during the 1920s, police 
and criminal cases were not reported in accordance with a template, making 
comparisons between years difficult. A few examples suffice. First, the records 
itemised successful suicides, attempted suicides and cases of failure to report suicides 
separately, but this was by no means the rule. Second, the degree of detail provided on 
suicides also varied from one year to the next and from one officer to the next. The
7 For the size o f the police force and its expansion see Figure 4 in ch. 4 above.
8 A similar observation that the presence o f  a police constable on the beat increased the reporting rates 
for suicide in England, particularly in the urban areas is made in Olive Anderson, Suicide in Victorian 
and Edwardian England  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 23.
9 The South division had twice the population o f  the North division.
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most detailed reports included, in one case, month by month figures, separated by 
gender. There was also at least one table in which suicides were broken down with 
reference to the method used. In general, the returns were more detailed in the last 
decade of British rule than they were in the first decade. Third, as can be seen from 
Figure 6, the gender breakdown for the total number of suicides was not always 
reported. Also missing from the statistics is the age of the victims and their marital 
status. In Lion, Johnston states that the majority of those committing suicide were 
either young married women or young widows.10 His estimate that over 90% of 
suicides were by women is not borne out by the statistics but it prompts the question 
of whether more female than male suicides were concealed. Fourth, while separate 
returns were often made for Liukung, the North Division and the South Division, this 
was not always the case. Between 1906 and 1916 for example, it is possible that 
figures for only one of the two divisions of the territory were reported. It is also 
unclear whether the figures for the North Division in every case included suicides 
committed on the island. Theoretically, the island was a part of the North Division, 
but because it had its own police court which was visited by the Magistrate for the 
North Division to hear cases, the police inspector responsible for Liukung usually 
provided a separate return for police cases heard in this court. Double counting cannot 
be ruled out. Lastly, it is necessary to take into account increases in population, and 
the ratios of males to females generally, and also to look at the rate of suicide rather 
than the raw data of incidents. Unfortunately population data is available only for the 
years 1911 and 1921, years in which official censuses were taken. We do know from 
these censuses that the territory had more women than men, accounted for, in the 
main, by the greater longevity of women and the fact that some men were forced to 
find employment outside the territory, sometimes quite far away. In looking at Figure 
6 above, the growth in population also needs to be taken into account.
The deficiencies of suicide statistics have led some scholars to advise 
abandoning the use of such statistics altogether. Less extreme sceptics acknowledge 
that suicide statistics reveal less about suicide than they do about the legal and social 
processes involved in the production of the statistics but continue to make qualified 
use of them. Olive Anderson, for example, has pointed out that, in historical research, 
taking into account the inaccuracies, statistics would still allow ‘very marked trends,
10 LDNC, 224.
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differences in scale, or relationships’11 to be taken seriously, especially when 
combined with other corroborating evidence. In the context of the study undertaken 
here, the officially generated statistics are relevant since the government addressed 
these statistics (along with other non-statistical information) when determining its 
policies with regard to suicide. What was apparent to government officials was that 
women were more prone to suicide than men and that the numbers resorting to suicide 
peaked in the mid-191 Os. Subject to the qualifications mentioned above, two broad 
observations can still be made from those statistics. First, the greater likelihood of 
women committing suicide in comparison with men is in conformity with the pattern
* * 19for Chinese societies but in contrast with the pattern known or assumed in the
13West. Second, the general pattern of the total number of suicides falling off after the 
1910s is consistent with that presented by Margery Wolf in her study of suicide in 
Taiwan.14
Attempts at understanding suicide in China
The terrible waste of life through suicide was often bemoaned in government annual 
reports and other internal memoranda. Some suicides appeared to have been 
committed ‘in a fit of pique’,15 triggered by incidents as mundane as an argument with 
a husband or mother-in-law.16 Although there was a general sense of bewilderment 
that self-destruction was so often resorted to, attempts were made to locate the deeper 
causes of suicide. ‘The friction of daily life in China, the monotony of the long 
laborious daily round with its narrow and unlovely outlook on life’;17 dissatisfaction 
with married life leading to extra-marital romantic attachments;18 in the case of men,
11 Olive Anderson, 14.
12 See the writings o f  J. Dyer Ball, discussed later in this article.
13 Most nineteenth-century commentators on suicide claimed that male suicide was three or four times 
more common than female suicide.
14 Margery Wolf, 'Women and Suicide in China’ in Margery W olf and Roxane Witke (eds), Women in 
Chinese Society (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975).
15 Annual Report for 1906, CO 873/239.
16 Annual Report for 1906, CO 873/239.
17 Report o f  the SG, Annual Report for 1906, CO 873/239.
18 Report o f  the Junior District Officer, Annual Reports for 1920, CO 873/627.
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the inability to repay debts;19 and pressure put on young widows to remarry were all 
canvassed as possibilities. Intense grief was not ruled out. Johnston wrote of four 
suicides which he thought had been induced by grief. Two of these involved a
• 9fl •widow while the third was the suicide of a young widower. In the fourth case a 
mother grieving for her daughter committed suicide.21 Another contributing factor 
was thought to be the lack of retribution for suicide in the religious beliefs of the 
people in the territory. At worst, those who committed suicide became wandering 
spirits who could only find rest by prompting someone else to commit suicide. Thus 
villagers in Weihaiwei expected a suicide within two years of a previous unexplained
97suicide.
Other remarks made by Johnston on the subject of suicide in China show that
he was aware that suicide and attempted suicide were not offences.23 He knew of the
imperial edicts granting honour to suicides and of the building of monuments to
commemorate widows who remained chaste or who chose to accompany their
husbands in death.24 In the leased territory of Weihaiwei itself chaste widows were
honoured by the people. In one such case, the government added its own
congratulations to those concerned.25 Johnston’s understanding took into account the
historical roots of suicide in Chinese society26 and he certainly understood that suicide
could be a way of bringing trouble 011 others,27 especially when a married woman
committed suicide. He mentioned how, even if in her life a married woman’s natal
family paid her scant attention, in her suspicious death they would be anxious to show
28that ‘blood is thicker than water.’ The death might be brought to the attention of the
19 A peak in male suicide figures just before Chinese New Year was observed by Johnston, this being 
the customary time for the repayment o f  loans: Report o f the District Officer, Departmental Reports for 
1911, CO 873/335.
20 LDNC, 244-5.
21 Ibid., 247-8.
22 Ibid., 2 2 2 .
23 Ibid., 223.
24 Ibid., 223.
25 In 1920 the Senior District Officer suggested to the Commissioner that the government send formal 
letters o f  congratulation to two women honoured as virtuous widows in the village o f Meng-Chia- 
Chuang after Inspector Jennings had reported that a village ceremony had taken place: CO 873/590.
26 LDNC, 225.
27 See the ‘doorstep’ suicide discussed in the text below.
28 LDNC, 210.
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Magistrate or at the very least they would insist that the other family held a 
sufficiently lavish funeral for their daughter.29
Johnston and others also tried to gauge public opinion on suicide and 
concluded that, with some exceptions, the act was not condemned by the community. 
The exceptions were when a young woman committed suicide without providing her
• » • • 30husband with an heir or while she was still nursing an infant. On widow suicide he
summed it up thus:
A  w om an undoubtedly performs a m eritorious act in fo llo w in g  her husband 
to the spirit-w orld, but her relations are fu lly  ju stified  in preventing her, and 
indeed are ob liged  to prevent her, from  throw ing aw ay her life  i f  they know  
o f  or gu ess her intention. If  her husband has died leaving to her the care o f  his 
aged  parents w ho have no other daughters-in-law  to look  after them , or i f  she 
has you n g  children w ho require her care, she does w rong to com m it su icide, 
though the children are som etim es ignored. The h ighest praise is reserved for 
a w om an  w ho tem porarily refrains from  destroying h erse lf  in order that she 
m ay devote h erse lf to her husband’s parents and her ow n offspring, but w ho, 
w hen  they are dead or independent o f  her care, then fu lfils  her original desire 
and sacrifices h erse lf  to the spirit o f  her dead husband .31
The absence, apart from the exceptions mentioned above, of societal 
condemnation should not be read as a suggestion that family members encouraged or 
supported the act of suicide, or that individual life was dispensable. As indicated 
above, a person determined to commit suicide usually had to carry out the act before 
his or her plans were discovered.
Johnston further understood that a suicide was often committed in such a 
manner as to point the finger at the oppressor. He mentioned a ‘doorstep’ suicide 
reported by a man whose younger brother had committed suicide at the home of his 
wife’s father because his wife had ill-treated him. The court dismissed the petition of 
the older brother for the right to have the widow remarried, keeping the proceeds as 
solatium, but ordered the widow’s natal family to bear the funeral expenses, a solution 
which seemed to Johnston to satisfy public opinion.32
29 Ibid., 210.
30 District Officer's Report, Departmental Reports for the year 1907, CO 873/265.
31 LDNC, 225.
32 Ibid., 209.
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Published materials on suicide
It is almost unnecessary to mention that Lockhart, Johnston and other key officials
had studied the major works on China available at the time. In the case of Johnston
and Lockhart, both men took an interest in the social and religious life of the Chinese
beyond that called for by duty. Amongst the jottings made by Lockhart in his private
notebooks are references to J. Dyer Ball’s Things Chinese. In this work’s short
section on suicide, Ball notes that most suicides were committed by women and
summarises what he saw as the causes of suicide ‘particular to the Chinese’.34
Although his list of causes may lack refinement by the standards of today’s
scholarship on suicide in China, nonetheless Ball’s summary represents the
assumptions and conclusions on the subject at the time. He mentions the polygamous
nature of Chinese marriages and states that being replaced in the affections of a
husband or ill treated by a more senior woman in the household were frequent causes
of suicide. Ball saw that suicide was a marriage avoidance strategy amongst young
women faced with the potentially polygamous nature of marriage. The second cause
he identifies is the practice of a form of sati amongst the Chinese or a refusal of the
widow to go on living after the death of her husband. Particular mention was made of
the practice of widows in the Fuzhou region jumping off bridges. The third and fourth
causes were the lack of deterrence in Buddhism against the act of suicide and the
‘slight esteem in which human life is held’, while the final cause was the revenge that
could be achieved through a well-planned suicide:
G hosts to annoy the man; the n ecessity  o f  purchasing a co ffin  at least, and 
trying to hush up the matter w ith  the relatives by m oney freely  g iven , the 
dangers o f  sq u eezes from  o ffic ia l underlings and o f  the interference o f  the 
offic ia ls  th em selves . . .  and lastly, the trouble w hich m ay be brought by his 
en em y in a future state o f  ex isten ce - these all render such  a m ode o f  revenge  
one o f  the m ost e ffec tiv e  that can be taken .35
Marriages in Weihaiwei were rarely plural, and it is thus not surprising that 
this did not feature in the thinking of Johnston and others when it came to suicide in 
the territory. Ball’s point about suicide by young women to avoid marriage was also 
of little application to Weihaiwei. Although there may have been individuals desirous
J. Dyer Ball, Things Chinese (London: Sampson Low, Marston, 1892) Suicide was often encountered 
by Christian missionaries in China: see Adele Fielde, Pagoda Shadows (Boston: Corthell, 1884), 
especially the biographies o f  women in chs XIX and XXVIII.
34 J. Dyer Ball, Things Chinese, 5th edn rev. by E. C. Werner (Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, 1925), 622.
35 Ibid., 624.
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of avoiding marriage, this part of China, unlike other parts, did not experience 
marriage resistance movements.36
In Qing law, suicide was not without consequence. The focus of the law, 
however, was not so much on the person who had committed suicide but on the 
person who had instigated it. It was an offence for a person, with a view to 
accomplishing an objective such as a marriage, repayment of a debt or the transfer of 
property, to make violent or fearful threats which alarmed another to the extent the
• • ' * 3 7  • * • »person threatened or alarmed took his own life. There was no provision in the Qing 
penal code - the Da Qing Lit Li - which made suicide an offence. The cases involving 
suicide discussed in the 19th century work on Qing criminal law by Alabaster38 do not 
show the suicide’s corpse, estate or family suffering any legal consequences for the 
suicide. Neither do these cases show punishment ordered against a person for 
attempting suicide. Instead, the examples demonstrate how, in some situations 
involving a suicide, a person could be found to be complicit in a murder. Alabaster 
suggests that responsibility for the suicide in such cases is to be distinguished from 
the offence of causing suicide by violent or fearful threats. Thus looking 011 without 
trying to prevent a suicide and assisting in or participating in a suicide pact was 
punishable. Later scholarship on Qing criminal law also suggests that these acts or 
omissions were apparently treated as instances of complicity in self-murder.40 
Although there is no suggestion that suicide was a criminal offence, in these instances 
at least, suicide was considered self-murder.41
36 See for instance, the study o f  marriage resistance and delayed transfer marriages in Southern China 
by Janice E. Stockard, Daughters o f  the Canton Delta  (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 
1992).
37 Sir George Thomas Staunton, Ta TsingLeu Lee (London: T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1810), 321.
38 Alabaster, Notes and Commentaries on Chinese Criminal Law and Cognate Topics (Taipei: Ch’eng- 
Wen, 1968), 304-307. For first publication details in 1899 see bibliography.
39 Ibid., 304-307.
40 See the cases discussed in M.J. Meijer, Murder and Adultery in Late Imperial China (Leiden: E.J. 
Brill, 1991), 20-21. See also M.J. Meijer, ‘Criminal Responsibility for the Suicide o f Parents in Ch’ing 
Law’ in Wilt L. Idema (ed.), Leyden Studies in Sinology (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1981), 109-137.
41 After the fall o f  the Qing dynasty, the Republican Government authorised the continuation o f laws 
previously in force and the Provisional Criminal Code on 10 March 1912 subject to the avoidance o f  
laws which were repugnant to the republican form o f  government. In 1923, the following article was 
announced: ‘whoever instigates any person to commit suicide, or takes the life o f  any person with his 
consent, shall be punished with imprisonment for a period from the 2nd to the 4th degree [from 1-10 
years]. Whoever aids any person to commit suicide, or takes the life o f any person at his request, shall 
be punished with imprisonment for a period from the 3rd to the 5th degree [3-15 years]. Whoever 
commits any offence under this Article in consequence o f an agreement made with the deceased to die 
together may be exempted from punishment’: art. 320 o f the Provisional Criminal Code o f the
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Amongst the works on suicide in imperial China written decades after the end 
of British rule in Weihaiwei is a short but often cited work by Hsieh and Spence.42 In 
it, classical literature, historical, and legal sources are surveyed before concluding that 
suicide was not in itself a deviant act. It was neither unlawful nor socially censured. 
Indeed, suicide had received state encouragement43 from Ming times, if not earlier.
The historical sources demonstrated that suicide had begun as a public act of 
loyalty owed by men to a particular dynasty. When a dynasty came to a close, some 
men committed suicide to avoid transferring their loyalties to the succeeding dynasty. 
This same behaviour was later seen in the relationship between a master and servant 
and, later still, became a part of the loyalty owed by a widow to her dead husband. 
Such loyalty included maintaining and defending a chaste widowhood,44 if necessary, 
by committing suicide.
Although widow chastity was an ideal shared by ordinary people,4:5 for the 
poor, however, it was rarely viable. The added incentives to remain a chaste widow 
provided by the widow’s property rights in Ming and Qing laws46 were lessened 
considerably if there was little or no property over which rights could be exercised. 
Moreover, poor widows often remarried in contravention of the ban on remarriage 
during the three-year mourning period47 when liquidation of their dead husband’s 
debts was an economic imperative.48 Magistrates often treated such widows with 
leniency by reading into the widow’s actions the motive of honouring their deceased
Republic o f China, published by the Commission on Extraterritoriality, Peking, 1923. Note how this 
article continued the instigator emphasis and other aspects o f Qing law.
42 A.C.K. Hsieh and J. Spence, ‘Suicide and the Family in Pre-modern Chinese Society’ in Arthur 
Kleinman and Tsung-yi Lin (eds), Normal and Abnormal Behavior in Chinese Culture, 2nd edn 
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1981), 29-47. For a more detailed study o f law, particularly property law and 
suicide see Matthew H. Sommer, Sex, Law, and Society in Late Imperial China (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2000), ch. 5. Some o f  the most recent scholarship on women and suicide in Ming and 
Qing times is published in Paul S. Ropp et al (eds), Passionate Women (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2001).
43 Hsieh and Spence, 45.
44 For a work explaining the development o f  the cult o f widow chastity from the Sui dynasty until the 
Qing dynasty see M. Elvin, ‘Female Virtue and the State in China’, Past and Present, 1984, vol. 104, 
111-152.
45 ‘Democratization’ o f female virtue and a spread o f  its popularity occurred during the Ming and Qing 
periods, encouraged by a lowering o f  the threshold requirements for those seeking state recognition o f  
virtuous widowhood: see Elvin, 123ff.
46 See discussion in text below.
47 Sir George Thomas Staunton, Ta Tsing Leu Li (London, T. Cadell and W. Davies, 1810), 112-113 
and William C. Jones, The Great Qing Code (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 126-127.
48 Sommer, 184.
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husbands.49 The relevant Qing sub-statute provided that, if a widow without a son
maintained her chastity, she should receive her husband’s share of the property, a son
and heir to her husband being later adopted by the family. If she remarried, her first
husband’s family was authorised to determine the disposition of the widow’s property
and her original dowry.50 As Sommer cautions,
[w ]e need  not ascribe any great ev il to in-law s w ho eyed  a you n g  w id o w ’s 
property; they sim ply w ish ed  she w ould  begin a n ew  life  e lsew h ere, so  that 
their brother’s assets could  im prove their ow n standard o f  liv ing , h ow ever  
m arginally  . . .  51
This was often the case where land had been splintered into small plots as a 
result of the equal division of estates amongst all sons, as was normally required in 
Chinese law. Forcing a widow to remarry was a crime52 but, if the widow could be 
persuaded to remarry, no crime was committed.
Suicide is relevant in this context because the penalties for forcing remarriage 
were structured in such a way that, by committing suicide rather than maiming 
herself, the widow ensured that the severest of penalties would be applied to those 
who forced her to remarry.53 This hierarchy of penalties and the widow’s own desire 
to remain chaste provided two dimensions to the act of suicide where it was 
committed in response to pressure to remarry.
The inclusion of the law as a source of data by Hsieh and Spence, and the focus 
on law in the study by Sommer contribute significant insight into suicide. As 
mentioned earlier, suicide was not an offence; putting pressure on a person, with the 
result that he is driven to take his own life, was. This explains why dying on the 
doorstep of an enemy formed a part of an individual’s ‘interpersonal strategy’.54 It 
also explains why a woman, lacking avenues to pursue her claims during her life, was 
more likely to resort to suicide than a man was. In suicide, she found a way of 
bringing trouble upon her in-laws who may have been ill-treating her or who may 
have been plotting to block her aspirations to become a chaste widow.
49 Ibid., 186-187.
50 G. Jamieson, Chinese Family and Commercial Law (Hong Kong: Vetch & Lee, 1970), 14.
51 Sommer, 167.
52 Ibid., 113 and Jamieson, 36.
53 Jamieson, 36-37; Staunton, 113, 321 and Jones, 127,282.
54 Hsieh and Spence, 16.
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In comparing these relatively recent findings with the thoughts of those in 
Weihaiwei on the subject of suicide, the extent of the government’s collective 
understanding is remarkable. Gathering together the observations made by Johnston 
and other government officials, it is observable that the fact that suicide was neither 
unlawful nor socially censured was understood. They further understood that suicide 
had a particular history in China, that more women than men resorted to suicide, that 
suicide was an important interpersonal strategy, and that remarriage of a widow was a 
major cause of suicide.
In the rest of this chapter, the government’s response to suicide in Weihaiwei 
is explored. The regret at the number of lives lost through suicide led the government 
to introduce various measures. Yet, the scope of government intervention was limited. 
Why this should have been so given the authorities’ remarkably full understanding of 
suicide in China is also addressed.
Suicide and the law in Weihaiwei
The authorities in Weihaiwei reported that they did not treat suicide and attempted 
suicide as crimes.55 This was explained as a policy adopted in deference to Chinese 
law, wherein, it was assumed, suicide was not a crime. The Chinese residents of 
Weihaiwei had, after all, been used to Chinese law. Thus, it would not be fair or 
appropriate, it was implied, to treat suicide as a crime. In Weihaiwei, attempted 
suicides were sometimes followed by an inquiry which could result in the would-be 
suicide being ordered to provide security against repetition, usually by supplying one 
or more guarantors. Magistrates thought that ordering security was an effective 
measure, appealing, so they assumed, to the Chinese notion o f ‘face’.56 We also know 
that more frequent than the action taken against those who had attempted suicide was 
action taken against village headmen for failure to report a suicide. By 1906, at the 
latest, village headmen were obliged by the government to report suicides and 
threatened with fines or imprisonment for not reporting or concealing a suicide in 
their village. The obligation to report a suicide was probably imposed 011 all, not just 
headmen, though prosecutions of headmen were a more frequent occurrence than the 
prosecution of ordinary villagers. The government acted with a measure of sensitivity
55 District Officer’s Report, South Division, Annual Reports for 1914, CO 873/435.
56 District Officer's Report, Departmental Reports for the Year 1911, CO 873/335.
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and restraint in its efforts to encourage the reporting of suicides. Post-mortem 
examinations were held only in cases of suspicious death, as it was felt that there 
would be even greater reluctance to report suicides if post-mortems were held as a 
matter of course.57 Where the suicide was successfully rescued, similar restraint was 
applied. In 1911, for instance, inquiries were held in only thirteen of the thirty-two 
cases of successful rescues.58 Another example of restraint occurred in relation to the 
failure of headmen to report suicides. The magistrates felt that dealing with headmen
59severely might be counter-productive.
During the time of the Weihaiwei lease, suicide was a felony in English law if 
committed deliberately by a person in his right mind. Attempted suicide was also a 
crime.60 Whilst forfeiture of property had ceased to be a penalty for felonies in 1870,61 
a finding of suicide continued to have some legal consequences. The fact that suicide 
was still a crime was taken into consideration in the public policy rule that a criminal 
should not profit from his own crime.62 Those who attempted suicide could be 
prosecuted and, if found guilty, fined, imprisoned,63 put on probation or discharged 
with or without conditions. In practice, unless the would-be suicide was a known 
criminal, magistrates in England exercised their discretion, using binding over orders 
or releasing persons, particularly young women, to the care of relatives after 
extracting a promise not to repeat the attempt. Information on the practice of 
magistrates in metropolitan areas showed that those who attempted suicide were 
usually remanded for a week during which they were visited by the prison chaplain 
and surgeon.64 Approving the practice of the Metropolitan Police and urging the same 
on all police forces the Home Office directed, in 1921, that attempted suicide should
57 Report o f  the SG, Annual Report for 1906, CO 873/239. If forensic investigations were required, 
samples were sent to Shanghai to be examined. See for instance R. v  Wang and Hsieh (1912), 
discussed at length in ch. 5. Magistrates acting as coroners and the government medical officers may 
have known o f H.A. Giles, ‘The Hsi Yuan Lu, or Instructions to Coroners’, China R eview , 1874, vol. 3, 
159-172, in which, inter alia, the coroner is given instructions on distinguishing a suicide from an 
unlawful killing.
58 Report o f  the District Officer, Departmental Reports for 1911, CO 873/335.
59 Ibid.
60 Suicide and attempted suicide remained crimes until abolished by the Suicide Act, 1961.
61 33 and 34 Viet. c. 23.
62 Beresford  v  Royal Insurance [1938] A.C. 586, HL and Gray v Barr [1971] 2 Q.B. 554, in which the 
Court o f Appeal stated that public policy was not static and that it could march ahead o f  criminal law.
63 See Rex v  Crisp 7 C.A.R. 173 (1912) and Rex v Mann [1914] 2 K.B. 107, both mentioned in 
Glanville Williams, The Sanctity o f  Life and the Criminal Law  (London: Faber & Faber, 1958), 249.
64 See Olive Anderson, 295,
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only be prosecuted exceptionally.65 In ecclesiastical law, the suicide could be buried 
with other protestant liturgy but not the full Church of England burial rites. Coroners’ 
juries had long been avoiding the consequences of secular and ecclesiastical law by 
returning a verdict of suicide whilst temporarily insane.
Although the action taken by the authorities in Weihaiwei against those who 
attempted suicide is recorded, the position of suicide in law was never clearly 
articulated. Furthermore, no discussion with the Crown Advocate or amongst the 
officials in the territory appears to have taken place. The action taken is consistent 
with two possibilities. First, under article 19 of the Order, the authorities rejected the 
application of English law on suicide on the grounds that the circumstances of 
Weihaiwei did not admit such law, at least with regard to the Chinese of the territory. 
This would have been consistent with the decision of the Privy Council in Advocate- 
General o f Bengal v. Ranee Snmomoye Dossee (1863),66 in which Lord Kingsdown 
recognised that suicide in non-Christian countries was an act which derived its moral 
character from the circumstances in which the act was committed so that sometimes it 
was ‘blameable’, whilst in other circumstances it was ‘justifiable’, ‘meritorious’, ‘or 
even an act of positive duty.’67 The only difficulty with this possibility is that 
attempted suicide would likewise not have been a crime. The prosecution of 
attempted suicide would have had to be founded on some other law. There was 
certainly no ordinance making attempted suicide an offence.
The second possibility is that English law on suicide was not rejected. Suicide 
and attempted suicide were crimes in Weihaiwei but enforcement of the law was 
carried out selectively. Enforcing the law in the case of successful suicides would not, 
after all, have amounted to much. Strictly speaking, suicide would have had to have 
been recorded along with other crimes. As mentioned above, suicide figures appeared 
in the returns made for ‘police and criminal cases.’ In practice, there were no 
consequences for the estate of the deceased. The public policy cognisance of suicide 
was not likely to have had any practical application in Weihaiwei and the withholding 
of Church of England burial rites was hardly applicable in a territory with few
65 This circular is mentioned in Glanville Williams, 249.
66 [1963] 2 Moore NS 22.
67 Ibid., at 64.
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converts to Christianity.68 Selective enforcement is more clearly observable in relation 
to attempted suicides. The records do not show any persons being sentenced to 
imprisonment for attempted suicide but, as mentioned above, some would-be suicides 
did end up in court.
The second of the two possibilities provides a tidier fit for the policy and 
practice of the authorities, justifying as it does, the prosecution, as mentioned above, 
of those who attempted suicide. It remains accurate to say that the authorities gave 
little thought to the legal intricacies; it is most likely that the Weihaiwei authorities 
were not aware that their policy aims could have been achieved through the 
application rather than the rejection of English law.
Rescue efforts
Beyond using the law to deter further suicide attempts and to encourage the reporting 
of suicides, the government instituted preventative measures through public 
education, instructing the police in life-saving techniques and the employment of a 
medical assistant.
1. Educating the villager and training the police
Villagers were issued with simple instructions on how to deal with suicide attempted 
by ‘the usual methods in vogue at the time’,69 namely poisoning by arsenic, opium or 
heads of matches dissolved in water and hanging by rope. They were told to go to the 
nearest police post upon discovering a suicide. This was important in that the police 
had been trained in resuscitation techniques and quantities of emetics were kept in the 
police posts. The government thought that their notices in simple terms on what to do 
in the case of poisoning had been effective on at least a few occasions.70 One of the 
police inspectors was able to report that 23 lives were saved in 1914, many of these as
7 1a consequence of a villager going to the nearest police post for an emetic.
68 Lord Kingsdown made this point in relation to Hindus and Muslims in Adv.-Gen. o f  Bengal v Ranee 
Surnomoye Dossee (1863), Ibid., at 63.
69 Report o f  the SG, Departmental Reports for the year 1908, CO 873/280.
70 Report o f  the SG, Departmental Reports for 1909, CO 873/292.
71 11 Jan 1915, Report by Inspector Whittaker, Annual Reports for 1914, CO 873/435.
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2. Medical Assistance
In May 1911, the government increased its efforts by appointing a medical assistant, 
one Mr Ma, at a newly established hospital in Wen-ch’iian-tang, the town in which 
the Senior District Officer resided. Suicide was high on the list of Ma’s priorities and 
villagers were duly informed of his appointment and role. Ma had some twenty years 
experience in medical work at an American missionary hospital in Tsinan. Prior to the 
establishment of the Wen-ch’iian-tang hospital, he had already acquired a reputation 
in the south-eastern extremes of the territory for his energy in suicide rescue work. It 
would seem that both Ma and the government were anxious that most of his energies 
be spent on saving lives rather than in treating the sick. When the hospital proved 
popular, a form of means testing for drugs dispensed to patients was introduced on 
Ma’s suggestion. The idea was to deter the mildly ill so as to preserve enough time to 
attend to attempted suicides. That year alone, Ma was responsible for saving 32 of the 
35 suicide attempts reported in time. This was a large increase from the year before 
his arrival when only ten lives were saved. Yet greater success in saving lives was 
anticipated with the decrease in the use of rope and its replacement by matches, a 
trend that was already noticeable. On average, death from drinking match heads took 
ten days and provided greater opportunity for rescue. With Ma’s arrival, the 
government repeated its warning to headmen of severe consequences if they failed to 
report suicides and attempted suicides, particularly those from poisoning which stood 
the best chance of reversal, if reported in time. By the end of 1911, there were two
convictions for failure to call for medical assistance on discovery of a suicide
10attempt. When Ma died several years later, the government erected a monument to 
honour his work.73
Beyond reporting and rescue
The measures discussed so far were aimed at either encouraging the reporting or the 
rescue of suicides. Beyond these efforts, the government’s record was unimpressive. 
As can be glimpsed in the sections which follow, little was done to alter the social 
conditions in which women in Weihaiwei found it necessary to resort to suicide.
72 The source for all o f  the forgoing on the work o f Mr Ma is the Report o f  the District Officer, 
Departmental Reports for the Year 1911, CO 873/335.
7j Johnston to Lockhart, 9 Dec 1917, SLPNLS, vol. 10.
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There was, initially, some concern for the plight of widows but the discussion 
amongst the officers of the government became mired in the difficulties of 
distinguishing between what was legitimate and what was not under Chinese law and 
custom. Progressive policies in the area of education and the social custom of foot- 
binding might have empowered women and reduced the incidence of suicide. In both, 
government intervention was negligible.
1. Protecting women
The Protection of Women and Girls Ordinance, 1905,74 made it an offence to traffic in 
women for the purposes of prostitution and slavery. One of its sections, section 26, 
made it a crime to ‘by force, take away or detain against her will any woman with the 
intent to marry or cause her to be married \  It was soon after this Ordinance had been 
passed that the Government Secretary, Walter, acting on information received from a 
district headman on the common practice of families remarrying their widows, usually 
against the widow’s wishes, suggested to the Commissioner that a proclamation 
should be drafted on the subject of the remarriage of widows.75 Taking the view that 
such a practice should not be tolerated, the Commissioner gave instructions for a 
proclamation to be drafted.76 Unfortunately, the file remained dormant for over three 
years until Walter raised the question again, this time with Johnston.77 Walter doubted 
the correctness, from the point of view of what was permitted under Qing law, of a 
prohibition on the selling of widows in remarriage since he understood that the family 
of the deceased husband probably had a right to make the marriage contract and to 
receive money from the transaction. Cases of widow remarriage were also likely to 
vary in their facts so that no single rule against it was likely to be effective. The 
problem of distinguishing between transactions involving women that could be 
tolerated and those that could not, along with the difficulties in establishing consent in 
the context of a patriarchal family system in China, are discussed further below. 
Although laws which contravened Chinese law and custom could be passed under the 
Order in Council, what is apparent from this file is that there was a desire to respect 
the traditional practices of the Chinese and to ensure that such practices were not
74 Ord. 5 o f 1905, CO 841/1.
75 Walter to Lockhart, 14 June 1906, CO 873/223.
76 Lockhart to Walter, 14 June 1906, CO 873/223.
77 Walter to Johnston, 21 Jan 1910, CO 873/233.
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made offences without very good reasons. Johnston agreed that no rule was needed 
for the reason that the Protection of Women and Girls Ordinance, with its section 26,
78was in existence. The limits of section 26 soon became apparent.
Although detailed information on prosecutions brought under the Women and 
Girls Ordinance is not available, it is clear that section 26 posed some problems. In 
particular, detention or removal by force had to be established. As Walter noted, a 
widow who had been ill-treated by her in-laws often consented to a remarriage on the
basis that ‘escaping from the frying pan into the fire would be welcome’.79 The
requirement of forced detention was equally a barrier to successful prosecution in 
other situations, including those where a stranger, rather than the family of the 
widow’s deceased husband, was accused of selling the woman. In R. v. Puin Fn Ko*° 
the defendant was detained for selling a widow to a man in search of a wife. Prior to 
this transaction, the widow had been offered to, and refused by, another man. As far 
as can be ascertained from the records, the woman was not at any time held against 
her will. There was, in fact, evidence that she was happy with the arrangement. Since
she was not trafficked for prostitution nor forced into the marriage, the Protection of
• 8 1 Women and Girls Ordinance could not be used. Officers of the government found
this unsatisfactory and were determined to stamp out what they characterised as a
‘bartering of human flesh’ where women were sold ‘like so many cows’.82 Johnston’s
view was expressed in a minute to the Acting Commissioner:
. ..  it seem s extraordinary that there is no British law  under w hich  w e can 
punish m en w ho haw k strange w om en  (that is, w om en w ith  w hom  they are 
connected  by no bonds o f  relationship or fam ily friendship) round the
Territory for sa le  to the h ighest bidder: or that such men can escap e all
punishm ent i f  on ly  the w om an in question can be persuaded to say that she 
d o e s  n o t m in d  b eing hawked about and offered for sa le .S3
The Crown Advocate had earlier advised that there was no offence for which 
the defendant could be prosecuted since the objective was not prostitution. The 
detention by force, required under section 26 of the Protection of Women and Girls
78 Johnston to Walter, 24 Jan 1910, CO 873/233.
79 Walter to Commissioner, 14 June 1906, CO 873/223.
80 Unreported. The source o f  these facts is a minute in CO 873/287.
81 Another provision which might have been considered similarly required forcible taking or detention 
and the intention to sell the detained person or as a ransom: Offences Against the Person Ordinance, 
1905, s. 44.
82 Walter to Wilkinson, undated, CO 873/287.
83 Johnston to Walter, 11 Aug 1909, CO 873/287.
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Ordinance, was also absent from the facts of the case. In addition, he could not see 
how the case of Puin involved anything other than concubinage and warned against 
giving too much weight to the fact that money changed hands or to the presence of a 
third party who received money for his services. Money, wrote the Crown Advocate,
84.changed hands even in legitimate marriages.
Finding this unsatisfactory and being determined to convict the defendant, the 
opinion of the Chinese magistrate of the contiguous district of Wen-teng was sought. 
His view was that, if the activity in Puin had occurred in Chinese jurisdiction, it 
would have been punishable.S5 The reply received from the Magistrate of Wen-teng 
strengthened the resolve of Johnston and Walter to prosecute and provided a moral 
justification for taking action against Puin. Since there was no specific law in 
Weihaiwei upon which a charge could be brought, the defendant was banished from 
the territory under section 4(1) of the Banishment and Conditional Pardons
o/r
Ordinance, 1905, on the grounds of being a threat to the peace of the territory. Even 
with the difficulties experienced in this case, legislation was not pursued. Instead, a 
case by case approach was recommended by the Government Secretary.87
Where the facts of the case provided evidence of forced detention and the 
intention to sell the woman into prostitution, prosecution under the Protection of 
Women and Girls Ordinance was more straightforward. In R. v Wang and Lin
S8(1915)' the defendants were arrested by the police near a village on the border after 
the police became suspicious of the passengers inside the defendants’ mule cart. In the 
cart were two women from Peking and two young girls. The women, who had not 
expected to be sold, claimed Liu had duped them. They asked to be released and, at 
the expense of the government, were put on a steamer bound for Tientsin. It was not 
clear whether the women were to be sold as wives or as prostitutes. The girls, whose 
stories did not emerge coherently except for the fact that they were from Peking or 
near Peking, were delivered into the care of a charitable institution.89 Both defendants
84 Wilkinson to Walter, 20 July 1909, CO 873/287.
85 Johnston to Walter, 11 Aug 1909, CO 873/287.
85 Ord. 6  o f  1905 as amended by Ord. 3 o f  1906, both in CO 841/1.
87 Walter to Johnston, 20 Jan 1910, CO 873/287.
88 Unreported but the facts are given in enc. to Commissioner to Combe, Acting Consul, Chefoo, 11 
Aug 1916, CO 873/480.
89 For the relevant powers o f the SG for the removal o f women and girls, see ss 34-36 o f the Protection 
o f Women and Girls Ordinance, 1905, CO 841/1.
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were convicted of trafficking women, at least one of them being sentenced to six 
months imprisonment. The defendants were almost certainly charged with offences 
under the Women and Girls Protection Ordinance.90
These cases show that the Protection of Women and Girls Ordinance, with its 
requirements of either prostitution or forced detention was too narrow in scope to 
cover the activity or activities the authorities were keen to stamp out. Where Johnston 
was concerned, both Puin and Wang and Liu were cases of trafficking of women by a 
broker for the purposes of selling them as wives, prostitutes or possibly as slave girls. 
The last of these were girls from destitute families given in adoption to families of 
means. Their adoptive families usually married them off when they reached 
marriageable age but, during their childhood, many were treated as domestic 
servants.91 Both Puin and Wang and Liu involved action against brokers who did not 
seem to have been engaged by a family seeking the arrangement of a marriage. The 
fact that some of these women might have ended up in the hands of a broker as a 
result of being sold by their families or with the woman’s collusion was not raised. If 
it had been raised, the legal complexities would have multiplied and the magistrates in 
Weihaiwei might have found it less easy, in effect, to apply Qing penal law.
In their discussion of the problem, it appears that the British authorities were 
unable to emerge from the intricacies of consent and voluntarism and to distinguish 
legitimate traditional social practices from offences. Nor were they able to get to the 
point where they could distinguish between traditional social practices that they were 
willing to tolerate and those they would not condone. The Crown Advocate’s caution 
that the fact of money changing hands was not indicative of a socially undesirable 
practice must have been obvious to most of the officials in Weihaiwei who had any
90 The offence is not recorded in the file.
91 Slave-girls do not appear to have been discussed between the officials, but there were some in 
Weihaiwei in the households o f the prosperous few. See LDNC , 215, at which Johnston refers to the 
‘so-called slaves ... generally brought in as young girls from poor parents and guardians for the 
purposes o f  domestic service’. His almost positive account o f the condition o f  such slave-girls suggests 
that at least up till the time o f  the publication o f  LDNC, the practice was not perceived by the 
government as a social evil. Johnston relates the facts o f  a civil dispute between a petitioner who had 
inherited a slave-girl from his adoptive mother. The girl had been loaned by her mistress to a family 
who subsequently had her betrothed to one o f  its sons. The petitioner sought the return o f  the girl. The 
court allowed the girl to decide to whom she should go and she elected to stay with the family she had 
been loaned to. There is considerable literature on a very similar, if  not identical, institution in southern 
China and elsewhere where such girls were referred to by the Cantonese term mid tscii. See Maria 
Jaschok, Concubines and Bondservants (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1988), Suzanne Miers, 
‘Mui Tsai Through the Eyes o f  the Victim ’ and M. Jashok, ‘Chinese “Slave” Girls in Yunnan-Fu’ both 
in Maria Jaschok and Suzanne Miers (eds), Women and Chinese Patriarchy (London: Zed Books, 
1994).
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contact with the Chinese population. Walter’s earlier mentioned views, on the 
difficulty of establishing lack of consent, hint at the difficulties of defining the 
offensive activity. Indeed, as Elizabeth Sinn reminds us, within the patriarchal nature 
of Chinese society, children could be sold by their fathers, and wives, concubines and
09daughters could be temporarily pledged to others. Women could share in this 
understanding. In this situation a test based on ‘consent’ is unlikely to have been 
useful. The most extreme case is that of a woman who submits to a transfer because in 
her understanding this is what she must do. Less extreme may be the woman who 
colludes in the sale or transfer as part of her personal strategy. In these circumstances, 
she is inaccurately portrayed purely as a victim and returning her to her family or 
husband would not advance her interests. In 19th century Hong Kong, Sinn has shown 
how the Chinese community leaders were concerned that the law was too widely 
defined, criminalising, as they saw it, both good and evil forms of the trafficking of
93women. We do not have any information as to whether similar arguments were 
raised in Weihaiwei but from the perspective of the British officials, the law was too 
narrowly defined. It failed to capture abominable forms of trafficking. However, so 
long as action could be taken against ‘strange men’ who hawk women, they saw no 
reason to introduce new laws. By taking action against those who sold women with 
whom they had no family ties and by not taking similar action against families selling 
widows, the British authorities in Weihaiwei were, like the Chinese community 
leaders in Hong Kong, also defining the offence on the basis of patriarchy.
At the time the question of forced widow remarriage was under consideration 
in Weihaiwei, the propensity of young widows to commit suicide had already come to 
the attention of the government. Yet this understanding of suicide was not enough to 
lead to any direct or proactive protection of widows. The idea of issuing a 
proclamation against forced re-marriage was rejected and few cases of ill-treatment of 
daughters-in-law or widows were investigated. By and large, dealing directly with the 
source of pressure on widows, i.e., their in-laws, was avoided. The single recorded 
conviction for ‘cruelty to daughter-in-law’ contrasts sharply with the larger number of 
prosecutions for failure to report a suicide.94 Even when the Women and Girls
92 Elizabeth Sinn, ‘Chinese Patriarchy and the Protection o f  Women in 19th-century Hong Kong’ in 
Jaschok and Miers (eds), 141-170, at 142.
93 Ibid., 145-147.
94 Report o f  the District Officer, Departmental Reports for the Year 1911, CO 873/335.
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Protection Ordinance proved to be too narrow in ambit, no new laws were introduced. 
Yet, the discussion above on distinguishing between acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviour when the pressure 011 widows came only from their relatives and in the 
context of patriarchy shows how difficult it would have been to draft an appropriate 
law. A law might have been introduced to allow a widow to take her inheritance with 
her, thus giving her an important lever in her relations with her deceased husband’s 
family and removing the most important factor which encouraged them to try to have 
her re-married. However, in the light of the general attitude of the government, it is 
not reasonable to expect them to have introduced a law in direct challenge to Chinese 
law and custom. They might have legislated the statute in the Da Qing Ln Li under 
which it was an offence to cause suicide by alarming or threatening a person95 or the 
sub-statute under which it was an offence for the relatives of a widow to force her to 
enter into another marriage.96 A milder step would have been to issue a proclamation 
or notice, warning the people of the territory that the government took a dim view of 
families putting pressure on their widows to remarry. As mentioned above, this was 
once suggested, but not accomplished.
2. Education
Social reform for girls through education might have had an impact on suicide but 
here, government efforts were again very limited. In 1927, the government 
acknowledged that its impact on education had been ‘insignificant5 and ‘insufficient 
attention’ had been devoted to education, something they hoped to remedy if rendition
07of the territory was further delayed. The government’s record on education for girls 
was even worse than the overall record. A government free school for boys - the 
Huang Jen Free School for Boys - had been established in 1904 in Port Edward but its 
enrolment was small. Even in 1911 the daily average attendance was only ten. 
Numbers increased dramatically in 1912 to a daily average attendance of 70 as a 
result of the republican revolution98 and, by 1927, there were about 200 boys
95 Staunton, 321, Jones, 282.
96 Staunton, 113.
97 Annual Report for 1927, Annual Colonial Reports No. 1408, Johnston to Colonial Office, 28 May 
1928, CO 521/41.
98 Annual Report for 1912, enc. to Commissioner to Colonial Office, 27 May 1913, CO 521/14.
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attending this school." Chinese girls in the territory had no equivalent school. A 
school - the Shun Te School - set up by the Anti-Foot-Binding Society, which had 
established a branch in the territory in 1906, received help from the government in the 
form of an unused barracks and half the school’s budget for the short duration from 
1909 until 1911.100 Government funding was later withdrawn after the school began 
admitting girls with bound feet. The enrolment of this school was small; it had 21 
pupils in 1912 and 28 pupils in 1913.101 The gap between male and female literacy 
rates was large. The 1921 Census data showed that, of the 13,966 Chinese who said
t 00they could read and write, only 227 were females. By the mid-1920s, there were at
• 1HTleast five other schools for girls but the total enrolment of these schools in 1925 
was still only 168.104
3. Foot-binding
When it came to foot-binding, the government was most reluctant to lead the way. 
Despite the fact that agriculture was the dominant occupation in Weihaiwei, foot- 
binding was practised. In 1906, Lockhart asked the Government Secretary to ascertain 
what reaction the government could expect if they were to ‘abolish this cruel practice’ 
and whether the Chinese magistrates of the two adjacent districts had recently 
received instructions on the prohibition of foot-binding.105 The attitude of the 
government was that it would prohibit foot-binding only if there was support for 
prohibition amongst the Chinese in the territory. Influenced by the example of the 
Imperial Chinese Government, the government of Weihaiwei decided that it too 
would not prohibit the custom but would instead merely exhort the people to abandon 
what it felt was a deeply entrenched custom.106
99 Annual Report for 1927, Annual Colonial Reports No. 1408, Johnston to Colonial Office, 28 May 
1928, CO 521/41.
100 Draft Annual Report for 1912, Lockhart to Colonial Office, 27 May 1913, CO 521/14.
101 CO 873/655.
102 CO 873/649.
103 These were the Convent School at the Roman Catholic Mission, the Port Edward School for Girls 
run by the Protestant Mission, a Plymouth Brethren Mission School, a school in Nan Chu Tao and a 
fifth school just outside the North gate o f Weihai City.
I0,t Annual Report for 1925, Russell Brown to SSC, 17 March 1926, CO 521/28.
105 Lockhart to SG, 20 March 1906, CO 873/218.
106 Walter to Lockhart, 7 and 10 May 1906; Lockhart to Walter, 10 May 1906, CO 873/218.
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The government does not appear to have taken further measures against foot- 
binding until 1913 when the Anti-Foot-Binding Society submitted a petition signed by 
304 village headmen, urging the government to renew its efforts.107 At this point, the 
government still thought it too early to make foot-binding a punishable offence but 
was prepared to issue a fresh proclamation on the subject.108 The government 
proclamation appears to have been met with opposition from some villagers, mainly 
those who saw in it the threat to enforce the proclamation by law. As a result it was 
withdrawn and replaced with a more mildly worded exhortation.109
In 1921, the Senior District Officer twice addressed the district headmen about 
the practice of foot-binding.110 The district headmen were more or less agreed on a 
draft proclamation. This proclamation probably denounced the evil of foot-binding, 
indicating that penal measures were to be introduced. No laws were in fact 
introduced. On the whole, government officials seemed persuaded by local views 
such as those conveyed by a village headman that, if the people of Weihaiwei ceased 
to bind their feet, they would only be the objects of ridicule for setting a fashion for 
the rest of Shantung.111 In 1923 there was evidence that local opposition to a ban on 
foot-binding persisted, mainly because parents thought that daughters with natural 
feet would have fewer prospects of marriage. This came to light when the Senior 
District Officer received a complaint from a European resident that the prospective in­
laws of a young woman had forced the young woman to re-bind her feet.112 The 
Senior District Officer met with the father of the girl and informed him that he was 
free to unbind the feet of his daughter.113
In the twilight of British rule, headmen continued to report difficulties in 
persuading villagers to abandon the custom. Unlike the practice of wearing the queue, 
the custom of foot-binding was not dying out. Government policy continued to be
107 Cliing, President o f  the Anti-Foot-Binding Society to Walter, 16 June 1913, CO 873/373.
108 Resume on Commissioner Files on Foot-binding, 17 Jan 1922, attachment, Burnett to Jamieson o f  
same date, CO 873/655.
109 For details o f  the opposition to the proclamation, the misunderstanding over the introduction o f  
penal measures, local suspicion over who had influenced the government in this matter and action 
taken to quell fears see CO 873/373.
110 Mentioned in Resume on Commissioner Files on Foot-binding, 17 Jan 1922, attachment, Burnett to 
Jamieson o f  same date, CO 873/655.
111 Ibid.
112 Jowett to Blunt, 9 Feb 1923, CO 873/655.
113 Jowett, 15 Feb 1923, CO 873/655.
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conservative. In 1929, with the Chinese Nationalist Government reforms affecting the 
rest of Shantung province, the Government of Weihaiwei still insisted that they could 
not enforce these reforms in the territory.114 Thus it was that, by the time the British 
left in 1930, foot-binding was still prevalent and still lawful.
Government officials in Weihaiwei possessed, collectively, an understanding of 
suicide in China which was quite remarkable for its time. Led by scholar- 
administrators such as Lockhart and Johnston, the government knew, through 
scholarship 011 China and day to day experience in Weihaiwei, nearly everything that 
is understood today about suicide in late Imperial China. Yet, this knowledge was not 
translated into measures to reduce the number of people resorting to suicide. The 
government’s most effective measures lay in encouraging the reporting of suicide and 
in the rescue of those who attempted suicide. Government officials appeared eager to 
be seen observing Chinese law, in which suicide was not a crime. In practice at least, 
suicide was not followed by legal consequences but attempted suicide and the failure 
to report a suicide were susceptible to the criminal justice processes. Restraint and 
sensitivity towards local feeling, seen in the avoidance of unnecessary post-mortems 
and discretion in prosecuting instances of failure to report, permeated government 
action.
Beyond the requirement to report and rescue efforts, the government acted 
conservatively and was reluctant to tackle the underlying causes of suicide. These 
would have involved a level of interference with the Chinese inhabitants and a degree 
of intrusion into life in the village which was not, by and large, the practice of the 
government. The government was also loath to introduce measures which did not 
meet with consent. Hence, despite the limits of the Protection of Women and Girls 
Ordinance, 1905, further protective legislation was not passed. Particular lacunae in 
the law were filled, on a case by case basis, by applying the substance of Qing penal 
law. The Protection of Women and Girls Ordinance was, moreover, not of much use 
in protecting women from abuse within the household. The cases that posed the 
greatest difficulties were those where any action, if taken, would be against the 
widow’s in-laws. Few, if any such cases were prosecuted. Efforts could have been
114 CO 873/767.
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more directly targeted at the ill-treatment of women, especially daughters-in-law, 
rather than on the re-marriage of widows, but this too, would have involved 
interfering with relations within the family. The appearance in the records of only one 
prosecution for ill-treatment of a daughter-in-law suggests that the law enforcement 
agencies shied away from involvement unless it was impossible to ignore the ill- 
treatment. It was when no family members were implicated, such as in Wang and Lin 
where the broker was acting purely out of self-interest rather than 011 behalf of two 
families, that the government found it easiest to intervene. Despite official lament, a 
reluctance to interfere in the lives of the Chinese 01* to introduce measures which were 
unpopular, as well as other general factors which shaped government action such as 
resource constraints, conspired to produce a conservative response to suicide.
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CONCLUSION
We saw in chapter 2 how the Colonial Office, prior to the final draff of the Weihaiwei 
Order, had commissioned a report on the circumstances then existing in the territory. 
This report informed the process of drafting the Order in Council and also the process, 
then underway, of deciding upon arrangements for the administration of the territory 
and its future development under the Order. Despite making some allowance for local 
conditions, the Order introduced a legal system that was a break from the pre-existing 
legal system. It introduced a court system previously unknown in the territory in 
which the procedure of English courts was to be followed and, subject to ordinances 
passed by the territory’s Commissioner, the courts were to apply English substantive 
laws. Only in civil disputes between the Chinese, were the courts to apply Chinese 
law and custom. This was the only significant concession in an otherwise unfamiliar 
system of law.
Despite the overwhelming break with the system of law under the Qing, the 
legal system introduced to Weihaiwei appears to have caused little difficulty for the 
government of the territory. This is significant, not least because the law played an 
important part in the relationship between the government and the governed. Through 
the law, for instance, the government was able to demonstrate its interest in the 
territory’s ordinary villagers. Through the processes of law reform, it consulted local 
headmen, and often heeded their advice.
The Order in Council may have signalled a break from the past yet the impact 
of its provisions was softened in a number of ways, so that the legal system which 
affected the Chinese of the territory contained more that was familiar than the Order 
itself suggested. The foregoing chapters provide a number of examples of how this 
came about. Some were deviations from the Order; others merely reasonable 
interpretations of the Order. In yet others, the softening occurred through the 
arrangements made for the administration of justice. In further examples, reforms 
were made to the Order in response to local conditions and the needs of the territory.
Criminal law
Article 19 of the Order limited crimes in Weihaiwei to acts or omissions constituting a 
crime either under English law or a local ordinance. No direct application of Chinese 
penal law was allowed. Yet, as we saw in chapter 7, when action was taken against a 
man for selling a woman in the territory, it was justified on the basis of Chinese law.
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No new ordinance was passed to ban such activity, nor was the prosecution expressly 
founded on a principle of English criminal law. Other examples include the 
prosecutions for unfilial conduct and breaches of village regulations. Again, these 
were not done pursuant to an ordinance, a specific English statute or a principle of the 
common law.
Chinese law and custom
In civil disputes between the Chinese, the Order allowed the courts to apply Chinese 
law and custom and such law was applied in a large number of cases concerning land, 
marriage and adoption. Moreover, the application of Chinese law and custom was not 
limited, as a reading of the Order might suggest, to civil disputes between the 
Chinese. Chinese law and custom also determined the outcome of criminal cases, in 
that a criminal case might require the prior determination of a right in Chinese law 
and custom. An example of this is the theft case, heard in 1921, and discussed in 
chapter 6, which turned 011 the question of whether the poor had a customary right to 
glean for fuel on land which they did not own.
Sources of law
A way in which the effect of the Order was mitigated was the continuation of village 
regulations to which the government not merely acquiesced, but sometimes even lent 
the weight of their official approval. Such regulations were also recognised by the 
courts. The impact of the common law as a source of law was also reduced through 
selective application or discretionary prosecution. Here, the example of suicide might 
be recalled; the authorities saw themselves as departing from English law in order to 
respect Chinese law.
Procedure in the Magistrates’ Courts
I11 the magistrates’ courts, departures from the procedure of the English courts took 
the form of frequent ad hoc modifications of English laws of evidence and procedure. 
Most litigants and accused in Weihaiwei were tried by a magistrate without even the 
assistance of Chinese assessors. Procedure in the magistrates’ courts was all the more 
significant because few Chinese saw any other court in the territory either because 
their offences were too minor or their disputes too petty, or because they did not use 
the procedure for appealing the decision of the magistrate. Of the cases that could
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have been heard by the High Court, many of them were tried by the magistrates 
exercising delegated powers.
The Magistrates
Aside from the specific comments above, the unfamiliar nature of the system of law 
introduced by the Order was - for most litigants and accused - mitigated by the 
structural similarity between the British magistracy and the Chinese district 
magistracy. As we saw, the British magistrate was the central figure of the legal 
system. By coincidence rather than planning, the British magistrates occupied a 
position vis-a-vis the people of the territory that was very similar to that which a 
Chinese district magistrate would have occupied. The Chinese district magistrate was 
the official at the most basic level of the Chinese bureaucracy and therefore closest to 
the people. He was part of the Qing bureaucracy in which there was no separate and 
independent judiciary. The British magistrate was similar in his proximity to the 
villagers of the territory. Unlike the remoter figure of the Commissioner, the 
magistrates had many reasons to tour the villages. Furthermore, each magistrate 
simultaneously held an administrative post. Since his Chinese counterpart was an 
administrative official, this contributed significantly to the resemblance between the 
two.
Village justice
A final example of how the full impact of the system introduced by the Order was 
mitigated can be made with reference to the way in which local forms of justice were 
recognised. The Order did not provide for the recognition of local forms of justice nor 
did the adoption of such forms of justice, discussed though they were in the 
Swettenham report, feature in the discussions 011 the administration of the territory. 
Yet there was a largely unrecorded realm of justice in which village headmen 
mediated civil disputes and also maintained order in the village, sometimes through 
dealing with petty offences, including breaches of village regulations. The headman’s 
role in mediating civil disputes was officially encouraged by the government but his 
role in dealing with petty crime was not officially acknowledged.
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Law enforcement
When it came to law enforcement, although the Weihaiwei police force did reach 
reasonable numbers, its presence amongst the villagers is likely to have remained 
slight, as a result of which policing within the villages probably remained in the hands 
of headmen or other influential persons.
Priorities of the government
The Chinese inhabitants’ experience of law and the administration of justice in 
Weihaiwei was also affected by the priority accorded by the authorities to particular 
aspects of the legal system. For instance, importance was attached to stamping out 
bribery and corruption and to ensuring the delivery of justice without undue delay. 
These are particularly observable in the attitudes of the magistrates towards civil 
litigation. The example of civil litigation also demonstrates the commitment of the 
authorities to Chinese law and custom and the importance they attached, despite over­
stretched resources, to intervening in the everyday disputes of the Chinese. The use of 
the system of village headmen by the government was clearly another priority, despite 
the gradual realisation that headmen were not an effective substitute for a sizeable 
police force. These priorities contrasted with the lack of interest shown when it came 
to aspects of the criminal justice system such as the jury, the presence of legal 
counsel, and radical law reforms. In general, little interest was taken in legal issues, 
except when raised by the High Court Judge or the Crown Advocate. This is not 
surprising, given that none of the magistrates and other officials were legally trained.
Taken together, the Chinese inhabitants’ experience of law and the 
administration of justice under the British was one in which the full impact of the 
legal system introduced by the Order was considerably lessened. Indeed, it afforded 
the Chinese some continuity with the past. Subject to qualifications, this was true by 
virtue of the application of Chinese law and custom, the headmen system, the 
continued recognition of village regulations, the mediation of some civil disputes and 
the punishment of offences occurring in the village. Perhaps one of the most 
significant continuities was the magistrate, who was sufficiently familiar in role and 
position to the Chinese district magistrate for the Chinese to identify as their ‘father 
mother’ official. If we return to Seidman’s schema, the transformation from alien 
legal system to the more familiar one experienced by the inhabitants of Weihaiwei 
might be put thus: the legal system as it was experienced (the ‘output’), was a product
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of the Order (the ‘inputs’) as it was transformed by the Colonial Office, the local 
authorities in Weihaiwei, and other pressures and influences (the conversion process).
Though this has not been the main focus of this work, some remarks may be 
made regarding the conversion process. It is a process which can be observed from 
looking at how the law was put into operation, the policies and conditions that shaped 
the law and its practice and the impact of those whose influence in the territory was 
greatest. A question which might be asked is why the impact of the legal system 
introduced by the Order was softened?
Continuities with Qing law and the lack of law reform may reasonably attract 
two explanations. The first, which may conveniently be termed the ‘Chinese territory’ 
explanation, emphasises the status of Weihaiwei as a Chinese territory. It might be 
argued that, because the territory was considered to be Chinese territory, little 
importance was attached to English law and legal institutions. The fact that the 
majority of the people in Weihaiwei were not British subjects was a further reason for 
not insisting on the introduction of certain aspects of English law. Consequently, the 
introduction of law reform and the insistence, in practice, of a legal system truer to the 
English legal system, were not priorities. Had Weihaiwei been regarded as ceded 
territory, it may be argued that bolder steps would have been taken to ensure that 
English law was applied in its full rigour. The Chinese inhabitants would simply have 
been expected to adapt to the new legal system and indeed to appreciate it as one of 
the benefits of British rule.
The second explanation is the idea roughly encapsulated by the term ‘British 
mandarins’. This idea is present in the biographical works on Lockhart and Johnston 
and in the main work of history on Weihaiwei. It may be argued that British 
mandarins such as Lockhart and Johnston carried out their duties consciously 
imitating the Confucian scholar-administrator. This idea is given credence by a speech 
that Johnston made to the people of Weihaiwei just before rendition. He said that the 
British government had never tried to turn the inhabitants of Weihaiwei into 
Englishmen but that, in over thirty years of administering Weihaiwei, the people of 
the territory had turned some of its British administrators into Chinese.1 The view that 
Weihaiwei was run by British mandarins suggests that its officials were interested in 
preserving Chinese institutions and traditions, including Chinese law and traditions
1 Commissioner’s speech at the Government Offices, Weihaiwei, 29 Sept 1930: SLPNLS, vol. 64.
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that may have been undergoing change in other parts of China. Examples of Lockhart, 
Johnston and others acting in ways they thought appropriate to the Confucian scholar- 
administrator role are not difficult to find. We saw that Johnston finished his 
judgements with quotations from the classics or other Chinese works and that the 
people of the territory referred to him as the father-mother official, using the term - 
fumugnan - which would have been used to refer to the Chinese district magistrate. 
Johnston was not alone in using Chinese sayings. In 1910, in an address to district 
headmen which mentioned, inter alia, the ‘litigious spirit’ of the people, Lockhart 
reminded them of the sayings: ‘Inform against a man once and there will be enmity 
for three generations. Nine lawsuits out of ten should be settled by arbitration.’2 
Another example was the desire to make laws through proclamation rather than 
through ordinances, arguing that the people of the territory were used to being ruled 
by edict or proclamation. The example of the British magistrates consulting nearby 
Chinese magistrates on questions of law and justifying their actions by reference to 
the opinion of a Chinese magistrate might also be cited as an example of the so-called 
mandarin tendency.
Both the Chinese territory and British mandarins explanations have, of course, 
inherent weaknesses and each fails to capture completely the many ways in which the 
impact of the system introduced by the Order in Council was mitigated. The 
Weihaiwei Order’s provisions were those that could have been bestowed upon a 
colony. Aside from the invocation of the Foreign Jurisdiction Act, jurisdiction without 
sovereignty did not, in itself, have any consequences for the system of law bestowed 
upon a territory. Third, officials in Weihaiwei rarely invoked the status of the 
inhabitants of Weihaiwei as Chinese subjects or the fact that the territory was Chinese 
territory as reasons for pursuing a particular policy. Neither did this fact lead them to 
adopt measures to ensure that Weihaiwei was marching in step with legal and social 
changes in the neighbouring areas under Chinese jurisdiction. An example of this is 
the failure to act on the question of foot-binding discussed in chapter 7.
Like the Chinese territory explanation, the British mandarins explanation 
contains weaknesses. That individual magistrates imitated the Chinese district 
magistrate is not disputed. However, it is clear that their knowledge of Chinese law 
and custom was not always sufficient for them to copy Chinese law and procedure
2 Commissioner’s address to district headmen on 8 Apr 1910, Lockhart to SG, 1 Apr 1910, CO 
873/299.
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completely. We saw in chapter 7 that the collective knowledge on a subject such as 
suicide in China possessed by officials in Weihaiwei was impressive. In other areas of 
the law, their knowledge of relevant law was not necessarily as comprehensive and as 
we saw, headmen and Chinese assessors were not always able to fill the gaps in the 
magistrates’ knowledge. Furthermore a magistrate such as Johnston sometimes 
ignored the opinion of the neighbouring Chinese magistrate. Yet stronger evidence of 
the shallow interest in preserving Chinese law was the absence of any 
acknowledgement that the procedures of the courts of Weihaiwei differed from the 
procedures of Chinese courts. When discussing the propensity of disappointed 
litigants to petition the courts repeatedly, no mention was ever made of the fact that 
the concept of finality was absent from the Qing system of civil justice. Likewise, the 
Qing system of obligatory review was not acknowledged. The Weihaiwei system of 
criminal justice, in comparison, lacked procedures for the supervision of the 
magistrates’ decisions. Death penalties, not least, were carried out with few pauses for 
review.
Even if we assume that the magistrates and other officials had a good working 
knowledge of Chinese law and custom, and intended to apply Chinese law, it is fair to 
conclude that changes, however subtle, inevitably occurred. We saw in chapter 4, for 
instance, that the government repeatedly said that the British authorities had not 
invented the village headman system. However, in co-opting village headmen, the 
authorities unwittingly caused a lessening of their influence. A similar point may be 
made in relation to the application of Chinese law and custom. Though it is difficult to 
ascertain from the available records, it is entirely possible that, in land disputes, rights 
which had not been exercised for a long time and may thus have been ignored by a 
Chinese magistrate, may have been enforced, thus disturbing the settled rights of the 
parties.
Geo-politics, parsimony, conservatism and pragmatism
Thus, though of some use, neither the ‘Chinese territory’ nor the ‘British mandarins’ 
theories can fully account for the law and its administration in Weihaiwei. What then 
are the factors that can help account for the conversion of the legal system introduced 
by the Order in Council into that which affected the inhabitants of the territory? A 
number of themes have arisen in the course of looking at various aspects of the 
territory’s system of law. They may be tentatively sketched as follows. The first is the 
focus of local officials on the Chinese inhabitants of the territory. This is true of the
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criminal justice system and the civil litigation processes. It is also true of the policies 
of the government when it came to thinking about the policing needs of the territory. 
The second is the parsimony with which the territory was run. The lack, for a number 
of years, of a police force of sufficient strength for the population of the territory, has 
been commented on. Another example is the lack of staff. This necessitated the 
appointment as magistrate of an official who also carried an administrative role. The 
third is the conservatism of key officials. Here, conservatism covers both a tendency 
towards the status quo as well as an ‘orientalist’ tendency in which the Chinese, in the 
minds of British officials, possessed characteristics which marked them out as a 
group. These characteristics informed and influenced the process of policy-making 
and were invoked to justify decision-making based on the needs of ‘the Chinese’. A 
fourth theme is the pragmatism of the government. Ways of co-opting local structures 
may have appealed to the conservative mindset of the British mandarin but this also 
involved making a virtue out of a necessity, given that the small administration relied 
for its authority on co-operation rather than coercion.
The ‘Chinese territory’ and ‘British mandarins’ ideas are to be found within 
these themes. Their impact, however, was less direct than might be supposed. For 
instance, whilst it is true that Weihaiwei was not a showcase for the benefits of British 
rule and English law, its failure to benefit from the application of English law and the 
introduction of legal institutions to a greater extent is more fully explained by the 
territory’s failure to develop economically and, as a consequence, its failure to attract 
a sizeable European community. Both of these causes can be traced to the 
uncertainties over the lease and, ultimately, to the lack of reasons, other than the geo­
political one, for the British decision to obtain the lease of the territory. The legal 
status of Weihaiwei was not a cause but was itself a consequence of the geo-political 
circumstances under which Weihaiwei was leased. It will be remembered that the 
acquisition of Weihaiwei in 1898 was hardly an auspicious occasion and that the 
status of Weihaiwei as Chinese territory was inextricably linked to the limited reasons 
for obtaining the territory and to the agreement that the lease was contingent on 
Russian presence in Port Arthur. As we saw, this led to much uncertainty which, in 
turn, was responsible for the reluctance of Europeans to invest in the territory. The
3 No more is intended by the use o f  the word ‘orientalist’ as is defined in the text. A discussion o f  
aspects o f  the legal history o f  Weihaiwei with reference to the work o f Edward Said and others is left to 
be pursued on another occasion.
230
presence of a larger number of European businesses in Weihaiwei with trading links 
to Chinese businesses would, in time, have allowed English contract and commercial 
law to play a more significant role. As it was, the courts seldom had the opportunity to 
apply such law. The limited purpose for which the territory was obtained also explains 
why the British government was quick to provide Germany with the assurance that no 
railway linking Weihaiwei and the interior would be built. This and the lack of public 
expenditure in the territory, it has been assumed, stymied its growth as a commercial 
port. There is, moreover, no evidence to suggest that legal policy within Weihaiwei 
was constrained by the territory’s status as Chinese territory. The many continuities 
with the past appear to have been motivated by other reasons. From the point of view 
of the relations between the government and the people of the territory, a criminal 
justice system without lawyers or the jury appeal's to have worked reasonably well. 
The same focus on the needs of the Chinese was observed in the shaping of procedure 
in the magistrates’ courts, in law-making, in policing, trial and punishment, and in 
civil justice.
The ‘British mandarins’ factor is not, however, irrelevant. Lockhart and 
Johnston were certainly conservative. They did not welcome change in the Chinese 
community of the territory and were thus not minded to encourage, let alone impose, 
policies that would interfere with the Chinese way of life. We saw, in the example of 
foot-binding,4 that the government did not lead the way in encouraging the anti-foot- 
binding movement and when asked to legislate the prohibition of the practice, in the 
absence of widespread support within the territory, it refused to do so. Law was not, 
in general, used instrumentally to effect change. On the question of forced remarriage 
of widows, there was similarly little appetite for tackling the problem head-on rather 
than relying on an ordinance aimed at a quite different type of activity. Lockhart’s 
view that the ‘uneducated rustics’ of the territory were better governed by 
proclamations or other simple executive edicts rather than ordinances is revealing. It 
shows his view that, in some respects at least, governing the Chinese through methods 
they understood was better than imposing a form of law which, in their lack of 
sophistication, they would not understand. During his prior appointment in the New 
Territories, Lockhart was once criticised by Blake, the Governor of Hong Kong, for 
actions he had taken which were not in accordance with the law. Lockhart had given
4 See ch. 7.
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orders to burn down the houses of those who had murdered a man whom the 
government had appointed to hoist the British flag in the New Territories. Lockhart 
thought it useless to follow the usual procedure in criminal cases, namely, that of 
carrying out an investigation, charging the suspects and trying them in court. He 
insisted that this was the right course of action to take because these procedures and 
methods were ones which the Chinese understood. Furthermore, he said, if they had 
waited to follow the procedures, the evidence required for a conviction might not have 
been forthcoming and this would have had disastrous consequences for an 
administration which was still establishing its authority in the newly acquired area.5 
Lockhart also wanted to take retaliatory measures against a village which had burnt 
down a police matshed erected by the government. The villagers claimed that the 
location of the shed offended the principles of feng shni. In reality, the destruction of 
the matshed was an act of resistance by the villagers to the British take-over of the 
New Territories. Although there were no similar incidents during Lockhart’s service 
in Weihaiwei, there were, nonetheless, deviations or attempted deviations from the 
law which were done in the name of Chinese law or custom, the established manners 
of the people or the conditions and circumstances of the Chinese inhabitants of the 
territory. It should be noted briefly that the conservatism of the officials in Weihaiwei 
was not so crude as to have led them to impose ‘Chinese punishments’ such as the 
cangue as had been done elsewhere earlier. In chapter 1, we saw how, prior to the 
Colonial Office taking over responsibility for the territory, the early British authorities 
in Weihaiwei had resorted to cutting off the queue of a man who had ignored a 
prohibition against selling liquor on Liukung island. Such punishments were never 
again considered by the government once Lockhart arrived in 1902. However, 
conservatism should not be allowed to conceal the possibility that officials were often 
motivated by pragmatic considerations. The government did not have the means to 
enforce unpopular legislation and widespread disobedience of the law would have 
damaged its authority in the eyes of the people.
The interest in Chinese law and custom and the application of such law by 
successive magistrates has been referred to above. Subject to what has already been 
mentioned about unwittingly changing Chinese law and custom in the course of
3 See Peter Wesley-Smith, Unequal Treaty 1898-1997, rev. edn (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press,
1998), 95ff  and Shiona Airlie, Thistle and Bamboo (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1989),
lOOff.
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applying it, without doubt the application of Chinese law formed one of the main 
continuities with the system of law prior to the British lease. However, such 
continuity was not unique to Weihaiwei and it is therefore accounted for by other 
explanations. The common law had recognised the lex situs as the law governing 
rights to land and had long recognised the concept of a personal law, particularly in 
issues relating to the family such as marriage, divorce, and adoption. The extent to 
which such personal law was recognised differed across the British overseas 
territories and dependencies but the principle was nonetheless well established by the 
time of the lease of Weihaiwei. Thus, rather than emanating from the fact that 
Weihaiwei was Chinese territory or from the propensity of local officials to behave 
like Chinese officials, the application of Chinese law and custom in Weihaiwei was 
part of a tradition of pluralism in the common law. What is noteworthy here is that, in 
Weihaiwei, there was 110 pressure to lessen the ambit of applicable Chinese law and 
custom. Elsewhere and at different times, colonial judges were responsible for 
denying a role to customary law. In Weihaiwei, judges of similar background and 
training had few opportunities to have such an impact since the cases heard by a 
professional judge were few in number.
In looking at the adoption and revitalisation of the system of village headmen, 
the government was motivated by a number of factors, one of which was parsimony. 
We saw how the use of the headman system appealed to Lockhart because this was 
one way in which a pre-existing social structure would be continued. The system of 
headmen was also intended as a means of enabling the authorities to keep an eye on 
the villages whilst avoiding a more costly police force. Village headmen received no 
salary from the government and, at least initially, this system averted the need for 
more police. Other motivations included the realisation that, as long as the 
administration remained small, it was important to have the loyalty of the headmen. 
Without this, village and district headmen might have been a rallying point for 
resistance to British rule. In the circumstances, it was politically astute to co-opt 
headmen. I11 chapter 6, we asked why a government whose resources were stretched 
was nonetheless interested in the petty civil disputes of the villagers of Weihaiwei. 
We saw that there was interest in applying Chinese law and custom but that the 
answer to the question probably lay in the need to maintain order in the territory. 
Without access to the courts, the petty disputes might have escalated into serious 
outbreaks of disorder, as some did, particularly when villagers from one village were 
in a dispute with those of another. When examining the introduction of the jury and
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counsel for the defence in the territory it was clear that the Crown Advocate and High 
Court Judge, on the one hand, and the Colonial Office, on the other, held opposing 
views. The Colonial Office was strongly of the view that ‘a place like Weihaiwei’ was 
not a territory for the more elaborate aspects of the English legal process. The view of 
the local authorities in Weihaiwei, i.e. the Commissioner and the magistrates, though 
not expressed, came closer to the position taken by the Colonial Office than to the 
position taken by Fiat Justitia, or the less extreme view of the High Court Judge and 
the Crown Advocate. Lockhart and other officials did not think that the territory had 
any need for lawyers in court, even though the people of the territory were 
accustomed to having the assistance of petition writers in formulating their pleas. So 
far as they were concerned, the criminal justice system worked satisfactorily, in that 
they had not experienced any resistance from the people of the territory, aside from 
the prisoners who went on a hunger strike to protest the inadequacy of their rations. 
As we saw in chapter 5, the convictions of Wang and Hsieh for murder after a trial 
without either jury or defence counsel seems not to have produced any bad feeling in 
the villages toward the authorities.
It appears, therefore, that the conversion process was one in which 
circumstances and several motivations transformed the ‘input’ into the ‘output’. Local 
considerations such as costs and the pragmatic need to rule by consent rather than 
coercion were, 011 balance, probably more important than lofty ideals such as the 
virtues of the common law, the rule of law, the separation of powers and, not least, the 
motivations of the British mandarin. In highlighting the ways in which the ‘input’ was 
diluted, as mentioned above, the dilution took the form of continuities with the pre­
existing legal system. This should not eclipse the bare fact that many parts of the legal 
system were a dramatic break from the past. In criminal law especially, English law 
dominated. Paradoxically, in this area of the law, the impression from the records is 
that the people of the territory accepted English law. In civil justice, we saw how 
litigants, by petitioning the courts with previously litigated disputes, exposed the need 
for a system of appeals which the ordinary villager embroiled in litigation could use. 
In criminal law, the forms of resistance, if there were any, are too subtle to be 
detected. The Chinese inhabitants of the territory were not passive. As seen in chapter 
6, they were quick to take advantage of the better access to civil justice and to exploit 
the system.
The conversion process produced a system of law that appears to have met 
with the consent of most of the inhabitants of the territory. The Chinese of Weihaiwei
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used the courts for their civil disputes and registered few complaints about the 
criminal justice system. Even the comparative swiftness of that system, with its few 
checks, if it disconcerted some, was not the subject of disgruntlement, not even, it 
would appear, in the wake of the death sentences in 1912. In civil litigation, the 
comparative efficiency of the courts was almost certainly appreciated by litigants, 
alongside the lesser costs and reduced risks of having to make unofficial payments. In 
matters of law reform, there were no complaints that the law lagged behind or 
marched ahead of popular feeling, apart from members of specific interest groups 
such as the Anti-Foot-Binding Society. Where the police force was concerned, as was 
observed in chapter 4, the relatively peaceful nature of the territory probably meant 
that the police put their efforts into policing the boundary of the territory rather than 
intruding into the villages of Weihaiwei. Villagers were certainly not slow to 
complain of the behaviour of the police. If law and the administration of justice is 
seen as an important interface between government and the governed, the legal 
system in Weihaiwei which emerged from the conversion process contributed to the 
cordial relations between the government and people of Weihaiwei.
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Appendix
Text of the Peking Convention between Great Britain and China respecting
Wei-Hai Wei
Signed between the United Kingdom and China, confirmed by ratifications exchanged 
at London 011 5th October 1898 : -
In order to provide Great Britain with a suitable naval harbour in North China, and for 
the better protection of British commerce in the neighbouring seas, the Government of 
His Majesty the Emperor of China agree to lease to the Govt of HM the Queen of 
Great Britain and Ireland Wei-hai-wei, in the Province of Shantung, and the adjacent 
waters, for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia.
The territory leased shall comprise the Island of Liu Kung, and all the islands 
in the Bay of Wei-hai-wei, and a belt of land 10 English miles wide along the entire 
coast-line of the Bay of Wei-hai-wei. Within the above-mentioned territory leased, 
Britain shall have sole jurisdiction.
Great Britain shall have in addition the right to erect fortifications, station 
troops, or take any other measures necessary for defensive purposes at any points on 
or near the coast of the region east of the meridian, 121’ 40’ east of Greenwich, and to 
acquire 011 equitable compensation within the territory such sites as may be necessary 
for water supply, communications, and hospitals. Within that zone Chinese 
administration shall not be interfered with, but no troops other than Chinese or British 
shall be allowed therein.
It is also agreed that within the walled city of We-hai-wei, Chinese officials 
shall continue to exercise jurisdiction, except so far as may be inconsistent with naval 
and military requirements for the defence of the territory leased.
It is further agreed that Chinese vessels of war, whether neutral or otherwise, 
shall retain the right to use the waters herein leased to Great Britain.
It is further understood that there will be no expropriation or expulsion of the 
inhabitants of the territory herein specified, and that if land is required for 
fortifications, public offices, or any official or public purposes, it shall be bought at a 
fair price.
This convention shall come into force on signature. It shall be ratified by the 
Sovereigns of the two countries, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as 
soon as possible.
In witness thereof the Undersigned, duly authorised thereto by their respective 
Governments, have signed the present Agreement.
Done at Peking in quadruplicate (four copies in English and four in Chinese), 
the 1st day of July, in the year of our Lord 1898, being the 13th day of the 5th moon 
of the 24th year of Kuang Hsu.
(L.S.) CLAUDE MACDONALD 
(L.S.) Seal of the Chinese Plenipotentiary
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